SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
QNI Metals Pty Ltd v Vannin Capital Operations Ltd [2020] QSC 238
PARTIES:
QNI METALS PTY LTD
ACN 066 656 175
(first applicant)
QNI RESOURCES PTY LTD
ACN 054 117 921
(second applicant)
v
VANNIN CAPITAL OPERATIONS LIMITED
COMPANY NUMBER C74594
(first respondent)
ASHURST AUSTRALIA
ABN 75 304 286 095
(second respondent)
JOHN RICHARD PARK, KELLY-ANNE LAVINA TRENFIELD AS LIQUIDATORS OF QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) (ACN 009 842 068)
(third respondent)
QUEENSLAND NICKEL PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION)
ACN 009 842 068
(fourth respondent)
HWL EBSWORTH LAWYERS
(fifth respondent)
FILE NO/S:
BS 6476 of 2020
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
DELIVERED EX TEMPORE ON:
1 July 2020
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
1 July 2020
JUDGE:
Bond J
ORDER:
The application is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
COURTS AND JUDGES – JUDGES – DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS – PARTICULAR GROUNDS – PREJUDGMENT – where the presiding judge previously recused himself from hearing the trial of a related proceeding on the ground of apprehended bias – where the apprehended bias was said to have arisen from an adverse assessment by the presiding judge of the credibility of one of the directors of the defendants in that proceeding, who are the present applicants – where the applicants apply in the present proceeding for orders requiring the respondents to depose to the information passing between themselves and senior counsel regarding the subject matter in dispute – where the present application does not involve any assessment of credibility of the relevant director – whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the presiding judge might not determine the issues in accordance with their legal and factual merits
Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 107, cited
Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 213, appliedCOUNSEL: P Dunning QC, with M Karam and K Byrne, for the applicants
J C Bell QC, with A I O’Brien, for the first respondent
G R Coveney for the second respondentJ D McKenna QC, with C G C Curtis, for the third to fifth respondents
SOLICITORS: Robinson Nielsen for the applicants
Ashurst for the first and second respondents
HWL Ebsworth for the third to fifth respondents
There is a long procedural history which forms the background of the relationship between the litigants who appear before me today. It is set out in my decision in Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 107, which was my freezing order judgment; in Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 213, which was my decision to recuse myself from further involvement in that litigation; and, ultimately, in Parbery v QNI Metals Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 143, which was Justice Mullins’ recent decision on the merits of that underlying litigation.
There had been, it seems, a settlement as between some of the parties. The consequence of that settlement and orders made in relation to it have…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read QNI Metals Pty Ltd v Vannin Capital Operations Ltd and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2020] QSC 238
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court carefully considered the circumstances of the prior recusal and the nature of the current application. The judge examined whether the apprehension of bias from the previous proceeding could extend to the current matter. The court concluded that the current application did not require an assessment of the credibility of the director in question, nor did it involve any direct evaluation of the respondents' conduct. The court reasoned that the apprehension of bias that led to the previous recusal did not translate to a situation where the judge would not be able to fairly assess the current application. The court determined that a fair-minded observer, knowing all the material facts, would not reasonably apprehend that the judge might not determine the issues according to their legal and factual merits.
Consequently, the court dismissed the application, holding that there was no basis for the judge to recuse himself in the current proceeding. The presiding judge was able to proceed with the case, and the application for the respondents to depose to the information was denied. The court's decision underscored the importance of maintaining impartiality and ensuring that any apprehension of bias is grounded in the specific circumstances of each case.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The applicants argue that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the presiding judge's previous recusal. They claim that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the presiding judge might not determine the issues in accordance with their legal and factual merits. The respondents, on the other hand, assert that the current application is unrelated to the previous proceeding and does not involve any assessment of the director's credibility. They argue that there is no basis for the apprehension of bias in the current proceedings.
The procedural history of this matter begins with the applicants, QNI Metals Pty Ltd, filing an application in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The application seeks orders requiring the respondents, Vannin Capital Operations Ltd, to depose to the information passing between themselves and senior counsel regarding the subject matter in dispute. The application is heard by Justice Bromberg, who had previously recused himself from hearing the trial of a related proceeding on the ground of apprehended bias. The applicants argue that the presiding judge's previous recusal gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current proceedings. The respondents contend that the current application is unrelated to the previous proceeding and does not involve any assessment of the director's credibility. They argue that there is no basis for the apprehension of bias in the current proceedings.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the presiding judge might not determine the issues in accordance with their legal and factual merits.
2. Whether the previous recusal of the presiding judge from a related proceeding on the ground of apprehended bias gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current proceedings.
Held
1. The court concluded that a fair-minded lay observer might not reasonably apprehend that the presiding judge might not determine the issues in accordance with their legal and factual merits.
2. The previous recusal of the presiding judge from a related proceeding on the ground of apprehended bias did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the issue of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the presiding judge might not determine the issues in accordance with their legal and factual merits. The court examined the circumstances surrounding the previous recusal of the presiding judge from a related proceeding on the ground of apprehended bias. In that proceeding, the presiding judge had made an adverse assessment of the credibility of one of the directors of the defendants, who are now the applicants. The court noted that the current proceeding did not involve any assessment of the credibility of that director.
The court emphasised that the mere fact of a previous recusal does not necessarily give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in a subsequent proceeding. The court applied the principle that the test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the presiding judge might not determine the issues in accordance with their legal and factual merits. The court held that, given the differences in the factual and legal contexts between the two proceedings, a fair-minded lay observer would not reasonably apprehend that the presiding judge might not determine the issues in the current proceeding in accordance with their legal and factual merits.
The court further considered whether the previous recusal on the ground of apprehended bias gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current proceedings. The court noted that the current proceeding did not involve any assessment of the credibility of the director in question, which was the basis of the apprehended bias in the previous proceeding. The court held that the previous recusal did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in the current proceedings.
In summary, the court applied the principle that the test for apprehended bias requires an objective assessment of whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend bias. The court distinguished the current proceeding from the previous one by noting the absence of any assessment of credibility of the director in question. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that the previous recusal of a judge on the ground of apprehended bias does not necessarily give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in subsequent proceedings, particularly where those proceedings do not involve any assessment of credibility of the same party.