Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 171

Citation: Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 171
Parties: QING QUAN YAO v ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL and SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
File number: NSD 116 of 2011
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 2 March 2011
Catchwords: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – application for extension of time within which to appeal from a decision of a single judge – relevant principles discussed – no “special reasons” established – applicant failed to appear – application dismissed   
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 42B(1)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 25(2), 25(2B)(bb)(ii) and 25(2BA)
Cases cited: Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11 related
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 applied
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 applied
Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission (1995) 38 ALD 366 cited
SZMFI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 386 applied
Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 applied
Date of hearing: 2 March 2011
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant did not appear
Counsel for the First Respondent: The first respondent submitted to any order the Court might wish to make save as to costs and was excused from attendance at the hearing
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 116 of 2011

BETWEEN:

QING QUAN YAO
Applicant

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
First Respondent

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application made by the applicant for an extension of time within which he might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Katzmann J delivered on 19 January 2011 (Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11) be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to that application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 116 of 2011

BETWEEN:

QING QUAN YAO
Applicant

AND:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
First Respondent

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE:

2 MARCH 2011

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant seeks an extension of time within which to file a Notice of Appeal from a judgment of a single judge of this Court given on 19 January 2011 (Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11). The applicant’s application for an extension of time…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 171
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal involved an application by the applicant for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a decision of a single judge. The applicant sought to appeal against a decision of the Federal Court that had dismissed his appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The primary issue before the court was whether the applicant had established "special reasons" for the extension of time within which to file the notice of appeal.

The court considered the relevant principles for granting an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. The court noted that the Federal Court Rules provided for a 21-day period within which a notice of appeal must be filed and served. However, the rules also provided for the possibility of an extension of time for special reasons. The court held that special reasons were circumstances that took the case out of the ordinary and justified a departure from the general rule. The court held that the test for special reasons was flexible and required a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure from the ordinary rule in the particular circumstances.

In this case, the court found that the applicant had failed to establish special reasons for the extension of time. The applicant had not appeared at the hearing of the application and had not provided any explanation for his failure to do so. The court held that the applicant's failure to appear was a significant factor in the decision not to grant an extension of time. The court also noted that the applicant had not provided any other compelling reasons for the extension of time.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the application. The court held that the applicant had not established special reasons for the extension of time and that the application should be dismissed. The court held that the failure of the applicant to appear at the hearing was a significant factor in the decision not to grant an extension of time. The court also noted that the applicant had not provided any other compelling reasons for the extension of time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Application made by the applicant for an extension of time within which he might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Katzmann J delivered on 19 January 2011 (Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11) be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to that application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Qing Quan Yao sought to appeal a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which found that he had not been deprived of his Newstart allowance by Centrelink for the period of an eight-week preclusion period. The AAT had found that Mr Yao had not been deprived of his Newstart allowance, but Centrelink had made a payment for two weeks in June 2008 that had not previously been paid to Mr Yao. The primary judge found that the AAT's finding that Mr Yao had never been interrupted in receiving his Newstart allowance was correct and supported by evidence not led before the AAT. This evidence established that Mr Yao had been paid his Newstart allowance at all material times. The primary judge also found that the eight-week preclusion period in respect of Mr Yao's Newstart allowance could not be taken into account in respect of his Austudy payments.

Mr Yao applied for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from the decision of Katzmann J. The application was heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court. The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time, finding that Mr Yao had not established any "special reasons" as required by O 52 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In light of these facts, the AAT dismissed the applicant’s application. THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge held that the finding made by the AAT that the Newstart allowance had never been interrupted was a finding which was not supported by any evidence led before the AAT. However, at [29] of her Reasons, her Honour found that this finding nonetheless correctly reflected the facts. Her Honour allowed Centrelink to tender evidence before her which had not been led at the Tribunal hearing which established that the applicant had continued to receive all of his entitlements during the preclusion period. This was a course which her Honour was entitled to take. At [29] of her Reasons, her Honour said:29The evidence consisted of an affidavit from Andrew Wingrave, a policy officer with the Compliance Framework Team of Centrelink. Mr Wingrave testified that he had accessed the Centrelink database that records details of entitlements and payments to Centrelink customers. Annexed to the affidavit were computerised payment records relating to Mr Yao showing, amongst other things, that at no time since Centrelink made its decision to impose the eight-week non-payment period was Mr Yao in fact not paid his allowance each fortnight. The records also disclosed some earlier payments of arrears relating to earlier periods in which he had apparently not been paid. Mr Yao ultimately accepted that the records produced by Mr Wingrave accurately recorded the payments made to him. That evidence established that at all material times Mr Yao had been paid the newstart allowance to which he was entitled. It is unquestionably convenient to make a finding of fact to this effect, which would certainly not be inconsistent with the finding made by the AAT. The Secretary submitted that it was appropriate for the Court to do so. To require the matter to return to the AAT for it to make the same factual findings would be an unjustifiable burden on both parties. For this Court to make the relevant factual findings is an expeditious and efficient means of resolving the matter. Having regard to the evidence of Mr Wingrave I therefore find that the Secretary has not in fact imposed any penalty on Mr Yao and, in particular, has not withheld from him any payment of newstart allowance for eight weeks, the subject of the original Centrelink decision. At [30], her Honour also found that Centrelink had made the payment for the two weeks in June 2008 which had previously not been paid to the applicant. At [31]–[36], her Honour discussed the question of whether the Newstart allowance payments made by Centrelink could ever be recovered by the Commonwealth from the applicant. At [35], her Honour held that the second respondent was obliged to waive any debt that had arisen. At [37] of her Reasons, her Honour held that the eight week preclusion period in respect of the applicant’s Newstart allowance could not be taken into account in respect of his Austudy payments. Her Honour also recorded in that paragraph that Centrelink’s advocate had conceded as much before the Tribunal.CONSIDERATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [37] of her Reasons, her Honour held that the eight week preclusion period in respect of the applicant’s Newstart allowance could not be taken into account in respect of his Austudy payments. Her Honour also recorded in that paragraph that Centrelink’s advocate had conceded as much before the Tribunal.CONSIDERATION The relevant part of the Rules of Court is O 52 r 15 which is in the following terms:15 Time for filing and serving notice of appeal(1)The notice of appeal shall be filed and served:(a)within 21 days after:(i)the date when the judgment appealed from was pronounced;(ii)the date when leave to appeal was granted; or(iii)any later date fixed for that purpose by the court appealed from; or(b)within such further time as is allowed by the Court or a Judge upon application made by motion upon notice filed within the period of 21 days referred to in the last preceding paragraph.(2)Notwithstanding anything in the preceding subrule, the Court or a Judge for special reasons may at any time give leave to file and serve a notice of appeal.(3)An application for leave under subrule (2) must:(a)be in accordance with Form 54A; and(b)include a statement indicating whether the applicant wishes to have the application dealt with without an oral hearing; and(c)be accompanied by an affidavit setting out:(i)the nature of the matter; and(ii)the factual and legal issues in dispute; and(iii)the reasons why leave should be given.(4)If a respondent objects to an application being dealt with without an oral hearing, the respondent must:(a)file a notice to this effect; and(b)serve a copy of the notice on each other party to the application. The applicant in the present case must satisfy subrule (2) and subrule (3) of O 52 r 15. The Full Court has held that a special reason within the meaning of O 15 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules is a circumstance which takes the case out of the ordinary run of cases in which an appeal should be filed within 21 days (Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 at [5] per Jessup J, with whom Gyles and Besanko JJ agreed). In Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195, the Full Court said:It is useful to consider the meaning and application of r 15(2) against a background of an understanding of how other courts have applied corresponding rules. But in the end, this Court must construe and apply the terms of its own rule. The question is what that rule means, and how it is to be applied to the circumstances of the case. It is clear that the rule reflects the same general structure exemplified by the various decisions we have discussed – the provision of a time for lodgment of an appeal, but the provision also of a discretion to permit an appeal out of time where it is shown that the circumstances warrant the exercise of that discretion. As Lord Guest, speaking for the Privy Council, put it in Ratnam v Cumarasamy [1965] 1 WLR 8 at 12: “The rules of court must prima facie be obeyed and in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.” What is needed to justify an extension of time is indicated in r 15(2) by the words “for special reasons”. It is that there be shown a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry of twenty-one days. In that context, the expression “special reasons” is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is twenty-one days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the Court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression “for special reasons” implies something narrower than this. The proposition cannot be accepted that r 15(2) was intended to constrict the broad measure of justice for the individual case which the Court could award upon the principle of Gatti v Shoosmith. No return was contemplated to the old law by which the discretion of the Court to waive the rules was itself fettered by further rules. We agree with the dictum of Davies J cited earlier in these reasons, and we think the construction of the rule we have adopted is in line with the decisions in Ex parte Mehta, the Palata Investments case and Avery’s case. It should not be overlooked that r 15(2) enables leave to be given “at any time”; the “special reasons” relevant to such a power cannot but describe an elastic test, suitable for application across a range of situations, from an oversight of a day to a neglect persisted in during a prolonged period. It would require something very persuasive indeed to justify a grant of leave after, for example, a year; equally, it may be said, something much less significant might justify leave where a party is a few days late. “Special reasons” must be understood in a sense capable of accommodating both types of situation. It is an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served.