FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 171
Citation: Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 171 Parties: QING QUAN YAO v ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL and SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS File number: NSD 116 of 2011 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 2 March 2011 Catchwords: APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – application for extension of time within which to appeal from a decision of a single judge – relevant principles discussed – no “special reasons” established – applicant failed to appear – application dismissed Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 42B(1)
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 25(2), 25(2B)(bb)(ii) and 25(2BA)Cases cited: Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11 related
Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 applied
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 applied
Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission (1995) 38 ALD 366 cited
SZMFI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 386 applied
Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 appliedDate of hearing: 2 March 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 32 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant did not appear Counsel for the First Respondent: The first respondent submitted to any order the Court might wish to make save as to costs and was excused from attendance at the hearing Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Ms D Watson of Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 116 of 2011
BETWEEN: QING QUAN YAO
ApplicantAND: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
First RespondentSECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 MARCH 2011
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application made by the applicant for an extension of time within which he might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Katzmann J delivered on 19 January 2011 (Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11) be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to that application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 116 of 2011
BETWEEN: QING QUAN YAO
ApplicantAND: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
First RespondentSECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE:
2 MARCH 2011
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks an extension of time within which to file a Notice of Appeal from a judgment of a single judge of this Court given on 19 January 2011 (Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11). The applicant’s application for an extension of time…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2011] FCA 171
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant principles for granting an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. The court noted that the Federal Court Rules provided for a 21-day period within which a notice of appeal must be filed and served. However, the rules also provided for the possibility of an extension of time for special reasons. The court held that special reasons were circumstances that took the case out of the ordinary and justified a departure from the general rule. The court held that the test for special reasons was flexible and required a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure from the ordinary rule in the particular circumstances.
In this case, the court found that the applicant had failed to establish special reasons for the extension of time. The applicant had not appeared at the hearing of the application and had not provided any explanation for his failure to do so. The court held that the applicant's failure to appear was a significant factor in the decision not to grant an extension of time. The court also noted that the applicant had not provided any other compelling reasons for the extension of time.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the application. The court held that the applicant had not established special reasons for the extension of time and that the application should be dismissed. The court held that the failure of the applicant to appear at the hearing was a significant factor in the decision not to grant an extension of time. The court also noted that the applicant had not provided any other compelling reasons for the extension of time.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Application made by the applicant for an extension of time within which he might file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of Katzmann J delivered on 19 January 2011 (Qing Quan Yao v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2011] FCA 11) be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the second respondent’s costs of and incidental to that application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Yao applied for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from the decision of Katzmann J. The application was heard by the Full Court of the Federal Court. The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time, finding that Mr Yao had not established any "special reasons" as required by O 52 r 15 of the Federal Court Rules.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At [37] of her Reasons, her Honour held that the eight week preclusion period in respect of the applicant’s Newstart allowance could not be taken into account in respect of his Austudy payments. Her Honour also recorded in that paragraph that Centrelink’s advocate had conceded as much before the Tribunal.CONSIDERATION The relevant part of the Rules of Court is O 52 r 15 which is in the following terms:15 Time for filing and serving notice of appeal(1)The notice of appeal shall be filed and served:(a)within 21 days after:(i)the date when the judgment appealed from was pronounced;(ii)the date when leave to appeal was granted; or(iii)any later date fixed for that purpose by the court appealed from; or(b)within such further time as is allowed by the Court or a Judge upon application made by motion upon notice filed within the period of 21 days referred to in the last preceding paragraph.(2)Notwithstanding anything in the preceding subrule, the Court or a Judge for special reasons may at any time give leave to file and serve a notice of appeal.(3)An application for leave under subrule (2) must:(a)be in accordance with Form 54A; and(b)include a statement indicating whether the applicant wishes to have the application dealt with without an oral hearing; and(c)be accompanied by an affidavit setting out:(i)the nature of the matter; and(ii)the factual and legal issues in dispute; and(iii)the reasons why leave should be given.(4)If a respondent objects to an application being dealt with without an oral hearing, the respondent must:(a)file a notice to this effect; and(b)serve a copy of the notice on each other party to the application. The applicant in the present case must satisfy subrule (2) and subrule (3) of O 52 r 15. The Full Court has held that a special reason within the meaning of O 15 r 15(2) of the Federal Court Rules is a circumstance which takes the case out of the ordinary run of cases in which an appeal should be filed within 21 days (Vu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 101 ALD 211 at [5] per Jessup J, with whom Gyles and Besanko JJ agreed). In Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 at 195, the Full Court said:It is useful to consider the meaning and application of r 15(2) against a background of an understanding of how other courts have applied corresponding rules. But in the end, this Court must construe and apply the terms of its own rule. The question is what that rule means, and how it is to be applied to the circumstances of the case. It is clear that the rule reflects the same general structure exemplified by the various decisions we have discussed – the provision of a time for lodgment of an appeal, but the provision also of a discretion to permit an appeal out of time where it is shown that the circumstances warrant the exercise of that discretion. As Lord Guest, speaking for the Privy Council, put it in Ratnam v Cumarasamy [1965] 1 WLR 8 at 12: “The rules of court must prima facie be obeyed and in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to an extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.” What is needed to justify an extension of time is indicated in r 15(2) by the words “for special reasons”. It is that there be shown a special reason why the appeal should be permitted to proceed, though filed after the expiry of twenty-one days. In that context, the expression “special reasons” is intended to distinguish the case from the usual course according to which the time is twenty-one days. But it may be so distinguished (not necessarily will, for the rule gives a discretion) wherever the Court sees a ground which does justify departure from the general rule in the particular case. Such a ground is a special reason because it takes the case out of the ordinary. We do not think the use of the expression “for special reasons” implies something narrower than this. The proposition cannot be accepted that r 15(2) was intended to constrict the broad measure of justice for the individual case which the Court could award upon the principle of Gatti v Shoosmith. No return was contemplated to the old law by which the discretion of the Court to waive the rules was itself fettered by further rules. We agree with the dictum of Davies J cited earlier in these reasons, and we think the construction of the rule we have adopted is in line with the decisions in Ex parte Mehta, the Palata Investments case and Avery’s case. It should not be overlooked that r 15(2) enables leave to be given “at any time”; the “special reasons” relevant to such a power cannot but describe an elastic test, suitable for application across a range of situations, from an oversight of a day to a neglect persisted in during a prolonged period. It would require something very persuasive indeed to justify a grant of leave after, for example, a year; equally, it may be said, something much less significant might justify leave where a party is a few days late. “Special reasons” must be understood in a sense capable of accommodating both types of situation. It is an expression describing a flexible discretionary power, but one requiring a case to be made upon grounds sufficient to justify a departure, in the particular circumstances, from the ordinary rule prescribing a period within which an appeal must be filed and served.