Qamar v Director General, Department of Transport

[2000] NSWADT 92

CITATION:	Qamar -v- Director General, Department of Transport [2000] NSWADT 92
DIVISION:	General Division
PARTIES:	APPLICANT Khaled Qamar RESPONDENT Director General, Department of Transport
FILE NUMBER:	003042
HEARING DATES:	20/03/2000, 19/05/2000, 30/05/2000
SUBMISSIONS CLOSED:	05/30/2000
DATE OF DECISION:	07/13/2000
BEFORE:	Britton A - Judicial Member
APPLICATION:	Passenger Transport Act - taxi driver - cancellation of authority - Taxi driver - cancellation of authority
MATTER FOR DECISION:	Principal Matter
LEGISLATION CITED:	Passenger Transport Act 1990
CASES CITED:	Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 Saadieh v Director General Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 68 Singh v Director General Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 96
REPRESENTATION:	APPLICANT L Judge, barrister RESPONDENT A Wozniak, solicitor
ORDERS:	1. The decision of the Director General of the Department of Transport not to grant the applicant a taxi authority is affirmed.

1 This decision concerns an application by Mr Qamar for review by this Tribunal of the decision by the Director General, NSW Department of Public Transport (the administrator), to cancel his taxi authority.

2 By way of notice dated 17 January 2000, a delegate of the administrator, advised the applicant of the decision to cancel his authority to drive taxicabs. An internal review affirmed the administrator’s original decision. On 8 February 2000 the applicant applied to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal of NSW (the Tribunal) under the Public Transport Act 1990 (the Act), ss52(1) for a review of the administrator’s decision.

3 The issue for determination in this inquiry is whether the Director General's delegate made the correct and preferable decision having regard to any relevant factual material and any written or unwritten law. The Tribunal has the power to affirm, vary or set aside the decision: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act (NSW) 1997, s63.

Background

4 The applicant was born in Jordan and arrived in Australia in 1972 at age 14. Since arriving in Australia he has held various jobs including that of driving instructor and bus driver. He gave evidence that during his six years employment as a bus driver there were no complaints against him.

5 Mr Qamar commenced driving cabs in 1980 and has driven continuously since that time for South Western Cabs (Radio Room) Pty Ltd. In his estimate he has driven approximately 90 hours per week over the last three years. The applicant owns a taxi plate for which he borrowed approximately $146,000.00. The fortnightly repayments on the taxi plate and vehicle are $1100. The financial stability of Mr Qamar’s family is dependent upon his ability to continue to earn income as a taxi- driver.

6 Mr Qamar is supported by a loving wife who gave evidence in these proceedings. His family is close.

7 In January 1997 following three complaints concerning Mr Qamar, two of a sexual nature and another of failing to provide a disabled passenger reasonable assistance, the administrator issued Mr Qamar with a notice to show cause. After consideration of an undated letter from Mr Qamar, denying these allegations, the administrator advised Mr Qamar that no further action would be taken, however warned “that should he come under the adverse notice of the Department in the future his public passenger vehicle driver’s authority may be immediately suspended or cancelled”: letter from administrator to applicant, 20 January 1997. There is no evidence before this Tribunal to explain why the administrator decided not to take further action against Mr Qamar at that time. There is nothing on the administrator’s file on Mr Qamar, which was provided to the Tribunal in these proceedings, to indicate whether the administrator concluded that any of these complaints had been proven to his/her satisfaction.

8 A statement of reasons attached to the administrator’s 17 January 2000 cancellation notice set out five complaints relating to Mr Qamar and was relied on by the administrator in reaching the decision to cancel Mr Qamar’s taxi authority. The statement of reasons included two fresh complaints in addition to the three complaints referred to in the administrator’s show cause notice: failure to afford reasonable assistance and sexual harassment of an intellectually disabled passenger. It is not disputed that the later complaint precipitated the administrator’s decision to cancel Mr Qamar’s authority.

9 After the cancellation of Mr Qamar’s authority in January 2000 he was charged with driving without a valid authority and improperly using another driver’s PIN number. In April of this year, Magistrate Milson at Parramatta Local Court found him guilty of these charges.

Evidence

Customer Complaint No 25563, 7 June 1999 (Christine Morris incident)

10 Christine Morris complained that on 7 June 1999, at about 11 am, she caught a taxi from Fairfield Station to her home in Crosby Crescent, Fairfield. She sat in the front passenger’s seat. During the journey, the driver touched her leg and told her that he wanted to have sex with her. He asked for her telephone number. She refused to divulge it and simply asked to be taken home immediately. She told him not to touch her. The driver said that he would come back to haunt her. He also told her that he now knew where she lived and that he would come back to get her.

11 The driver dropped her at her house. Ms Morris suffers from a disability and she paid for the fare in part by Taxi Transport Subsidy Scheme docket. She signed the docket but the driver filled in the rest of the details on the docket.

12 The complained immediately after the incident to neighbour, Vanessa West.

13 The issue in relation to this complaint is whether Mr Qamar was the taxi-driver who sexually harassed Ms Morris. Apart from the taxi-docket, there is no direct evidence to identify the driver of the cab.

14 On 13 December 1999, officers of the Department of Transport interviewed Mr Qamar. The allegation was put to Mr Qamar and he was cautioned that he was not obliged to say or do anything, but that anything said would be recorded and might be used in evidence.

15 He was shown a copy of the docket signed by Ms Morris and admitted that the handwriting on it “looked like” his own. He was, however, unable to remember this particular incident. He gave evidence before the Tribunal to this effect also. During his evidence in reply to the respondent’s case, he stated that he could not recognise the complainant.

16 In cross-examination before the Tribunal, however, Mr Qamar admitted that the docket was “his”, in the sense that he had “filed” it but denied that the handwriting was his. He claimed to have disputed the handwriting on the document when the question was raised by the Department of Transport. Under further cross-examination, he admitted that the code on the docket was his, and that the name on it was his, and he had submitted it for payment and that he had been paid in respect of that journey. During cross-examination, in his case in reply, Mr Qamar resiled from his claim that the handwriting on the docket was not his, and admitted that the code was in his handwriting. He claimed that his admission to the Department of Transport officers had been partial only.

17 He also gave evidence that dockets are sometimes swapped or exchanged by taxi-drivers (notwithstanding the fact that to do so is an offence). He was, however, able to give no evidence concerning whether or not he had exchanged this particular docket. He adduced no evidence from any other driver that this was a common practice.

18 Mr Qamar’s wife, in giving evidence, was shown a copy of the docket and recognised her husband’s handwriting on the document, although she said that he had written only the plate numbers and the authority number. She thought that the name was not clear on the copy she was shown and she denied that the figures for the fare and the date were in Mr Qamar’s writing.

19 Character evidence was adduced on behalf of Mr Qamar. In criminal proceedings, character evidence is admissible on two bases. It seems to me appropriate to admit the evidence in that fashion. (See Murphy v The Queen (1985) 158 CLR 613). A defendant, in putting forward evidence of good character, in effect says two things to the court: first, “I am a person of good repute and have no propensity to commit the sort of offence(s) alleged against me”. In other words, the presumption of innocence is given real work to do, because the law of evidence presumes that most people are honest and do not commit crimes, and that therefore someone proven to be of good character over a number of years, is less likely than a person with a criminal record to commit an offence of the type alleged. Secondly, the defendant says, in effect, “Because I have a good reputation, the court should believe me, or, at the very least, should not disbelieve me and reject my evidence.” In other words, character evidence goes to the issues of guilt and innocence of the accused person and their credibility.

20 A copy of the docket – somewhat difficult to read due to being copied from a microfiche – was tendered in evidence. As far as it is possible to tell, it indicates, in the boxes for the start and finish times of the journey in question, that the journey commenced at about 12 midday and finished at about 12.20pm. The full fare for the journey was $7.00 of which Ms Morris paid $3.50 in cash.

21 Radio and computer records, indicating the locations of Mr Qamar’s cab between the hours of 9.18am and 1.22pm were obtained from South West Taxis. They show that at 11.21am Mr Qamar was in Crows Nest. At 11.57 he reported being at Smithfield and at 12.02pm he was reported as being on the Fairfield rank. The records indicate that at 12.12pm he was engaged and was vacant again at 12.20pm.

22 Vannesa West’s mother, Irene West gave evidence on 30 May this year that corroborates the evidence that Christine Morris complained to her mother and her on the day of the incident (although she was unable to remember the date). She also told the Tribunal that the complainant has difficulties writing and she has the taxi-driver fill out most of the details of the docket. She merely signs her name.

23 In cross-examination, however, she gave some evidence, which is inconsistent with that of the complainant concerning the time that Ms Morris arrived home. Her recollection was that the complainant had not arrived home until about 1.30pm. She said that she could recall this because she had been to the doctor’s surgery with the complainant’s mother, and had arrived home approximately thirty minutes after the complainant, who immediately complained to Mrs Morris and Mrs West of having been molested by the taxi-driver. She said that she had missed some television shows that she likes to watch and fixed the time of her arrival home that way.

24 The difficulty with this evidence is that it is unclear how Mrs West arrived at the conclusion that she had arrived home only 30 minutes after Ms Morris. She was asked in cross-examination how she had made this calculation:

Q;: How do you know you arrived home about half an hour after Christine?
A: Because that’s what time that – like my daughter told me that, that she said, ‘ Oh”, she said, “Oh”, because she was – she started to watch something on TV and that and then she said – and then when she – when she said – when she said, ‘I’ve wanted to just finish this – finish doing this – watching the TV show.’ And then so, I turned round – when she said, ‘Oh I’ll wait till this is finished.’ But it finished at 2.

25 Her evidence on the point did not get any clearer than this. At best, it indicates that her daughter told Mrs West something about a television show finishing at 2pm. Any calculations made by Mrs West about the time Christine Morris arrived home (which are not, in any event, revealed in the answer given in evidence) can only have been based on hearsay evidence. She gave no evidence of Christine Morris telling her what time she arrived home. It follows that Mrs West’s evidence concerning Christine Morris’ time of arrival home is mere opinion evidence based on hearsay, the meaning of which is unclear from her answer. I cannot be confident in accepting this evidence, especially when it is contradicted by a contemporaneous record – the taxi docket, and when the evidence was being given almost a year after the events in question.

26 Christine Morris was called to give evidence on 30 May this year. She gave evidence which was consistent with the version of events given in her statement of complaint. She gave evidence that the dockets are filled out by the drivers to whom she gives them, but that she signs them. She said that she had only caught one cab on 7 June.

27 In cross-examination, she was unable to provide a description of the driver who had touched her, and she was not able to say what time her mother had arrived home on 7 June.

28 Vanessa West was at home watching “soap operas” on television when Ms Morris came to her house and complained about being touched and harassed by a taxi-driver. She was cross-examined about the time Ms Morris had come to the house. Her evidence was that Ms Morris interrupted “The Young and the Restless” and she estimated that this had been at approximately midday or some time after.

29 While no evidence was tendered as to the time “The Young and the Restless” was broadcast on 7 June 1999, this evidence is reasonably consistent with the time shown on the taxi docket.

30 The case against Mr Qamar is, obviously, circumstantial. Given the serious nature of the allegations, they must be proven to the Briginshaw standard. That is, while the applicant bears the legal onus of proof, the evidential onus, which falls on the respondent, is a high one. In Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, the High Court considered the reasoning process and standard of proof required to prove crime in civil proceedings. The classic formulation was stated by Dixon J:

…Reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of the given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters, “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences… It is often said that such an issue as fraud must be proved “clearly”, “unequivocally”, “strictly” or “with certainty”… This does not mean that some standard of persuasion is fixed intermediate between the satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt required upon a criminal inquest and the reasonable satisfaction which in a civil case may, not must, be based on a preponderance of probability. It means that the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is obtained…

31 There must be clear and unequivocal proof, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Morris was touched and harassed, and that Mr Qamar was the taxi-driver responsible.

32 Ms Langshaw, the coordinator of the Mandala Recreation Centre, a centre for people with disability has worked with people with intellectual disabilities for ten years. She gave evidence that in her opinion Ms Morris had a good memory and was an honest person, incapable of inventing the taxi- driver incident. Ms Morris’ oral evidence revealed she had a good recollection of the key elements of the incident notwithstanding her intellectual disability. Her evidence was clear and unequivocal, and the fact that she was touched and harassed by someone is not contradicted by any evidence led by the applicant. It was corroborated by evidence of immediate complaint. The only issue, as far as the applicant is concerned, is the identity of the offending taxi-driver. He denies that it was he.

33 In my view, the best evidence of the time of the journey in question is that recorded on the taxi docket itself. It was recorded contemporaneously with the events, whereas all the other evidence is affected to some degree by the lapse of time and possible reconstruction of evidence. It would appear that the journey took place some time between about midday and 12.20 on 7 June 1999. Vanessa West’s evidence is consistent with this. Irene West’s evidence on the point is to the contrary, but, for reasons I have outlined, carries little weight. Ms Morris’ account of the journey taking place at about 11am is consistent with no one else’s account. It is evident she was mistaken about the time in her statement..

34 Mr Qamar’s cab was in the Fairfield area at the time the journey commenced. Mr Qamar logged in that he was engaged at 12.12pm and vacant at 12.20pm. The taxi docket records that the journey concluded at 12.20pm.

35 Ms Morris said that the driver filled out the docket, except for her signature. It follows that, if her evidence is accepted, whoever filled out the docket drove the taxi in question.

36 The applicant admitted to the departmental officers on 13 December 1999 that his handwriting appeared on the docket. Mr Qamar’s wife confirmed this.

37 Mr Qamar hedged his bets for some time in cross-examination but, having at first denied that any of the handwriting on the document was his, and having claimed that he had disputed the handwriting when interviewed by the departmental officers, ultimately admitted that he had written some parts of the document himself.

38 At that point, and only then, did he advance the theory that he may have given the docket to another driver who had used it on the journey with Ms Morris. This inherently implausible story was not corroborated at all, and, having been raised only at the last moment during his case in reply, had the appearance of recent invention. In the absence of any corroboration, I do not accept that this version of events is true.

39 Ms Judge, Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Tribunal should take into account the fact that Ms Morris when entering and leaving the court room to give evidence on May 30 showed no signs of recognising the applicant. Mr Wozniak for the respondent had sought leave for Ms Morris to give evidence over the phone because of her reluctance to give evidence in person before the Tribunal. This request was refused but arrangements were made for Ms Morris to give evidence from behind a screen. Otherwise she entered and left the court room in the usual fashion. I am not persuaded by Ms Judge’s argument. Had Ms Morris made a positive identification of Mr Qamar, on the day she gave evidence, Ms Judge would correctly have submitted that the Tribunal should disregard that evidence, as it did not constitute a proper identification. Leaving this aside, from where the applicant was seated when Ms Morris entered and left the courtroom I am not convinced that Ms Morris saw him.

40 Mr Qamar’s good character evidence is counter-balanced by proof of his conviction in the Parramatta Local Court in 1996 of an offence of a less serious but similar nature to that alleged by the Department concerning Ms Morris. This does not aid his credibility.

41 Mr Qamar did not cut an impressive figure as a witness, given his change of positions on the handwriting question and his apparent recent invention of the hypothesis that someone else may have had a taxi docket with his handwriting on it. He was in the area at the time that the offence occurred. His handwriting was found on the document, which identifies the driver. There is no acceptable evidence of anyone else having been involved in the incident. I am therefore satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Qamar was the taxi-driver who touched and harassed Ms Morris.

Complaint No 14522, 15 September 1994

42 This incident concerns a complaint from a female passenger who alleged that during a taxi journey from Liverpool to Dural, the driver later identified as Mr Qamar, stopped the taxi in an isolated area and asked her if she wanted to get in the back with her as it was “more comfortable.”

43 The passenger complained by phone to the Southern District Radio Cabs Co-op (SDRCC) the day following the incident. The administrator’s file contains a copy of the complaint form completed by SDRCC employee, Alison Lynch following the call from the complainant. The complaint form states that the applicant when questioned about the allegation had said ‘ [the passenger] was a very attractive lady who had a lot of problems and that he had given her some helpful advice...there was nothing sexual about it.’ Ms Lynch noted on the form ‘he made this statement before I even told him about the nature of the complaint.’

44 Attached to the complaint form is a file note apparently taken by SDRCC employee, ‘Des’. This undated and unsigned note purports to have been taken after the conversation between Ms Davies and the applicant and states:

‘[Qamar] mentions she was ‘warped’, lady said she had a lover only wanted her for one thing-sex. Said to her she was a good looking lady ..he had other women himself.....he states he made no advances or suggestions on his part....Qamar believes Alison[Lynch] doesn’t like him and feels she would be unfair to him regarding this complaint.’

In cross-examination Mr Qamar denied using the word ‘warped’ and said he did not know the meaning of the word. He claimed that Ms Lynch held a grudge against him and that this was well known within the SDRCC.

46 In evidence Mr Qamar denied inviting the passenger to get in the back of the taxi with him. He admitted that he did stop the car but said the reason he did so was because it was cold and he wanted to get a jacket from the back of the station wagon. In cross-examination he said he elected to put on a jumper rather than turn on the heater because many passengers did not like air conditioning. He recalled in evidence that the passenger initiated a conversation along the lines that she disliked men and was experiencing some problems with them.

47 In cross-examination he denied talking with the passenger about sex. He denied making suggestive comments to her before stopping the car.

48 Mrs Qamar gave evidence that her husband discussed the incident with her the next day. Her evidence of what her husband told her is largely consistent with the applicant’s evidence to the Tribunal.

49 It seems curious that a woman who, according to Mr Qamar dislikes men, would confide details of her private life to a male taxi- driver. This seems inherently unlikely. It also seems unlikely that a perfect stranger would simply make up this story about the applicant.

50 The complainant’s account however was not tested in these proceedings. While in light of the available evidence I have a strong suspicion that the incident in fact occurred I am not satisfied that this complaint has been proven to the Bringinshaw standard.

Complaint No 14735 (the wheel chair incident)

51 Mr Norman Payne complained to the administrator in 1994 that following a taxi journey from Heckenberg to Liverpool on 19 October of that year, the driver, later identified, as the applicant, refused to assist with Mr Payne’s wheel chair.

52 A statutory declaration from Mr Payne dated 20 February 2000 was tendered in evidence which states he has ‘ no prior knowledge of any complaint made about this trip and totally disagrees with the allegations made.’…I believe that Mr. Qamar was quite helpful and pleasant’. Mr Payne was not required for cross-examination.

53 No explanation was provided to the Tribunal as to why Mr Payne withdrew his earlier complaint. In the light of Mr Payne’s more recent unchallenged statement the evidence before me does not support a finding that the wheel chair incident occurred in the manner described in the administrator’s statement of reasons.

Complaint No 16349, 19 August 1995 (Fairfield to Holsworthy incident)

54 A female passenger complained to the administrator that during a taxi journey from Fairfield to Holsworthy the driver later identified as Mr Qamar suggested she could make up the short fall in the fare ‘in other ways’.

55 This complaint came before Parramatta Local Court on 1 May 1996. The applicant was convicted of failing to behave with propriety towards a passenger and fined $400.

56 A copy of the complainant’s statement in relation to this incident was on the administrator’s file. She stated that when she advised the driver she had insufficient funds to cover the fare, Mr Qamar replied “we can work it [the fare] out some other way.... You’ve only got $12 the deal only works for single women. I only like single women. You are very attractive but I break the rules.” The complainant stated she was terrified and asked to be dropped off some way from her house so that the applicant would not know where she lived.

57 In cross-examination the applicant said his words had been taken out of context and explained that what he had meant was that the passenger could pay him in kind by leaving with him an item of value such as a watch as security until the passenger returned to pay the fare.

58 No material was presented to the Tribunal that challenged the evidence that came before the Local Court in relation to this matter. The presiding magistrate had the benefit of comparing the respective version of events given by the complainant and Mr Qamar. Accordingly I find this complaint upheld.

Complaint no 26628 18 November 1999 Incivility/Impropriety failure to afford assistance (the walking frame incident)

59 A male passenger complained to the Department of Transport that Mr Qamar would not assist him to get his walking frame out of the boot.

60 Mr Kopti a director of Southern Western Cabs (Radio) who described himself as the ‘head judiciary’ of the base stated that he investigated this incident and concluded that Mr Qamar had no case to answer. Mr Kopti was not required for cross-examination

61 The evidence before me is insufficient to make any finding in relation to this incident.

Character Evidence

62 Ten character references were tendered on behalf of Mr Qamar. All attest to Mr Qamar’s good character and standing within the community. Of these, all but three had used Mr Qamar’s services as a taxi- driver; a number booked his services on a regular basis. These passenger references referred to Mr Qamar’s polite and helpful manner and reliability and punctuality as a driver. A number of references from female passengers specifically referred to feeling comfortable in his presence.

63 Mrs Phyllis Michael gave evidence in person for Mr Qamar. She found Mr Qamar polite, patient and trustworthy. In the years prior to her husband’s death in April 1994 she and her husband made extensive use of taxis to attend various medical appointments. Mr Qamar made every effort to ensure her husband who was very ill for an extended period was comfortable and assisted Mr Michael in getting in and out of his wheel chair.

64 Mrs Michael gave evidence that she had been aware in a general sense that Mr Qamar’s taxi authority had been removed because of his alleged sexual harassment of female passengers. In cross-examination she agreed she had not been aware that Mr Qamar had been convicted for sexual harassment. In any event she did not accept the allegation: she trusted him implicitly.

65 Directors of Southern Western Cabs (Radio) Messrs Elnijjar and Kopti provided written character references to the Tribunal.

Relevant Legislation

66 Section 14 of Act provides that 'Having regard to the purpose of an authority, the Director General may at any time vary, suspend or cancel any person's authority'. Sub section 11(2) provides that the purpose of an authority is to attest:

(a) that the authorised person is considered to be of good repute and in all other respects a fit and proper person to be the driver of a public passenger vehicle; and
(b) that the authorised person is considered to have sufficient responsibility and aptitude to drive the vehicle or vehicles to which the authority relates:
(i) in accordance with the conditions under which a public passenger service is operated; and in accordance with law and custom.

67 Section 4 of the Act sets out the objectives of the Act which include "(e) to encourage public passenger services that meet the reasonable expectations of the community for safe, reliable and efficient passenger transport services".

CONCLUSIONS

68 The law relating to the meaning of the terms ‘fit and proper’ and ‘good repute’ has been canvassed at length in previous decisions of this Tribunal. See for example the decisions of Deputy President Hennessy in Saadieh v Director General Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 68; and Singh v Director General Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 96.

69 In Saadieh's case Deputy President Hennessy set out a number of factors that need to be taken into account in determining a person's suitability and fitness to obtain an authority. These factors include:

· the nature, seriousness and frequency of any criminal offences for which the applicant has been arrested or convicted;
· the nature, seriousness and frequency of any complaints made against the applicant;
· the applicant's driving record;
· the applicant's reputation in the community; and
· the likelihood that the applicant will re-offend, be the subject of further complaints or commit further traffic offences.

70 The incident concerning Ms Morris is in my view most serious in nature and of itself establishes that Mr Qamar is not a fit and proper person to be the driver of a public passenger vehicle. Not only did Mr Qamar make unwelcome sexual advances to an unaccompanied female passenger but these advances were made to a person with an obvious intellectual disability. She was in an especially vulnerable position. Her evidence, corroborated by other witnesses (not surprisingly) reveals she was traumatised by the experience. She continues to have nightmares and now refuses to use taxis unaccompanied. Her ability to maintain an independent lifestyle has been compromised.

71 There is no evidence that leads me to conclude that a similar incident will not be repeated, indeed if anything the evidence before me of two incidents of sexual harassment suggest that the opposite is likely to be the case.

72 The relationship between a taxi- driver and their passenger is an intimate one. Both driver and passenger are in a potentially vulnerable position. The public interest demands that all public transport passengers regardless of their gender, age or disability can take comfort in the fact that their relationship of trust with their driver will not be abused. Unwelcome sexual advances represent a fundamental breach of that relationship.

73 In assessing whether Mr Qamar meets the requirements of s11(2) of the Act I am required to take into account not only any complaints made against him but other factors such as his reputation within the community and driving record. The evidence before me is that Mr Qamar has an impressive driving record and is respected by his colleagues at Southern Western Cabs. Mr Qamar has put before the Tribunal an impressive list of character references that testify to his good standing within the community. No doubt Mr Qamar has provided an excellent service to many passengers and enjoys their respect but this alone is not sufficient to meet the requirements of s11 of the Act. Moreover the evidence of good character is contradicted by my finding of relation to the Christine Morris incident.

74 The objects of the Act provide amongst other things the encouragement of public passenger services that meet the reasonable expectations of the community for safe, reliable and efficient passenger transport services: 4(a). A taxi service that guarantees passengers a journey free of sexual harassment is in my view, a most basic and minimum expectation of the travelling public.

75 I am satisfied that the applicant is not a fit and proper person to be the driver of a public passenger vehicle. Consequently I affirm the decision of the Director General of the Department of Transport to cancel his taxi-cab authority.