PVQQ and Secretary, Department of Education

[2019] AATA 659

PVQQ and Secretary, Department of Education [2019] AATA 659 (5 April 2019)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2018/3702

Re:PVQQ

APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Education

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member B J Illingworth

Date:5 April 2019

Place:Adelaide

The application for extension of time is refused.

................[Sgnd]......................................

Senior Member B J Illingworth

CATCHWORDS

HIGHER EDUCATION SUPPORT – FEE-HELP – remission of debt – whether the applicant’s circumstances were beyond the applicant’s control – medical evidence – whether special circumstances exist – extension of time application – extension of time refused

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975

Higher Education Support Act 2003

CASES

Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 4516

Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Re Civic Tavern Pty Ltd and ACT Liquor Licensing Board (1993) 32 ALD 381
Re Grafton and Commonwealth (1998) 16 ALD 533
Re Romeo and Secretary Department of Social Security (1992) 26 ALD 248

Re Wallis and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] AATA 45

SECONDARY MATERIALS

The Administration Guidelines 2012

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member B J Illingworth

5 April 2019

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an application by PVQQ (“the Applicant”) for an extension of time to review a decision of the University of South Australia (“the University”) dated 26 March 2015.

2. On 9 February 2015, the University received a request from the Applicant to grant a Post-Census Amendment of Enrolment to Withdraw Application from 13 units of study across five study periods between 2009 and 2011 as follows:

Units	Census Date
ECON1007 Macroeconomics	31 March 2009
BANK1002 Financial Management
MATH1052 Statistics for Business	31 August 2009
MARK1010 Marketing Principles: Trading and Exchange
BANK1005 Derivatives and Securities Markets
COML1001 Foundations of Business Law	31 March 2010
BANK2007 Business Finance
BUSS1057 Business and Society
EDUC1073 Children’s Services in Community Contexts	31 March 2011
EDUC1063 Language and Multiliteracies
EDUC1041 Children Developing in Context 1	31 August 2011
SOCU1005 Migration, identity and Multiculturalism
EDUC1032 The Context of Mathematical Competency

1. The University’s Review Officer (“URO”), having referenced the units of study and their census dates,  worded the decision of 26 March 2015 in the following terms:

   “Unfortunately your application cannot be assessed as it was received outside the timeframe of 12 months from the last day of the study period in which you were enrolled in. Whilst there is supporting documentation provided that demonstrates that there were various times that you would have been unable to submit an application, the documentation also shows that it was still practicable for you to submit an application between 2011 and 2013. Therefore the timeframe requirement has not been waived, and your application cannot be assessed.”

2. The wording of the decision is unfortunate and arguably ambiguous as to whether it was decided that the application could not be assessed, or, that upon considering the material presented, a decision was made not to waive the timeframe for making the application. It would appear that the URO received and considered supporting documents that went to the question of whether it was practicable for the Applicant to submit an application for remission of her HECS-HELP debt within the prescribed timeframe. Implicit in the decision is that the URO must have considered the statutory framework that enables a person to apply to a higher education provider for the remission of the person’s HECS-HELP debt in respect of a unit of study as provided by ss 36.20 and 36.21 of the Higher Education Support Act 2003 (“the Act”) and The Administrative Guidelines 2012 (“The Guidelines”). This plainly must be so insofar as the URO decided that the supporting documents demonstrated that, at least to some extent, the Applicant would have been unable to submit an application, but that it was still practicable for her to do so between 2011 and 2013.

3. On 3 July 2018, the Applicant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for a review of the URO’s decision. That application was approximately three years and four months out of time.

4. On 5 July 2018, the Applicant lodged with this Tribunal an application for an extension of time for making the application that was filed on 3 July 2018.

5. The Applicant’s argument on the extension of time application was particularly centred around the prospects of success of her case, the Applicant’s medical condition at the time she was studying, whether it was impracticable for her to complete the requirements for the unit of study because of circumstances beyond her control, and that special circumstances applied pursuant to ss 36.20(1)(d) and 36.21 of the Act. The Applicant submitted that she has continued to receive treatment for her drug induced psychotic condition, to date, which condition has been ongoing since her enrolment for the 13 units of study.

6. However, the Applicant’s present application before the Tribunal is for an extension of time within which to file the application for review of the decision of the University dated 26 March 2015 with the Tribunal. The consideration of ss 36.20(1)(d) and 36.21(1) of the Act on the current application are relevant only insofar as there is a need to consider whether there is merit in the application for remission of her HECS-HELP debt and whether a miscarriage of justice may arise if the Applicant is not granted an extension of time to bring the application.

7. The Applicant’s medical condition from 26 March 2015, being the date of the URO’s decision, to 3 July 2018, being the date of filing of the current application, is highly relevant in considering the reason for the delay.

   EXTENSION OF TIME LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

8. Section 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 allows the Tribunal to extend the time for the making of applications “if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so”.

9. In Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 (“Hunter Valley”), Wilcox J set out a number of non-exhaustive criteria that can be taken as a guideline for the Tribunal’s determination of extension of time applications.[1] The criteria can be summarised as:

   (a)Whether the Applicant has shown an acceptable explanation for the delay and that it is fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time;

   (b)Whether the Applicant has rested on their rights and allowed the decision-maker to believe that the matter has finally concluded;

   (c)Whether there has been any prejudice to the Respondent as a result of the delay in the making of the application; and

   (d)Whether there is merit in the substantive application.

   [1] See also Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 4516.

10. The criteria most relevant to this application are criteria (a), (b) and (d).

11. I acknowledge that the decision in Hunter Valley concerned an extension of time in a different statutory context, namely the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. However, I note that the decision in Hunter Valley has been cited with approval in numerous Tribunal decisions; although with the caveat that “too slavish” adherence to the Hunter Valley guidelines should be avoided.[2]

    [2] Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 118, 128 [41] per Hill J.

12. An Applicant is expected to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay in bringing the application for review out of time.[3] In circumstances where an Applicant is fully aware of the right to review the decision but failed to do so within time, the Tribunal has decided not to grant an extension of time.[4]

    [3] Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441 at 444.

    [4] Re Grafton and Commonwealth (1998) 16 ALD 533; Re Romeo and Secretary Department of Social Security (1992) 26 ALD 248; Re Civic Tavern Pty Ltd and ACT Liquor Licensing Board (1993) 32 ALD 381.

    The delay in bringing the application

13. There has been an extraordinary delay in relation to the Applicant’s HECS-HELP debt reimbursement application and the current application before the Tribunal.

14. In respect of the current application before the Tribunal, the Applicant has submitted two principal reasons for not filing the application within time.

15. Firstly, the Applicant submits that the delay was a result of her financial hardship and inability to pay the filing fee. The Tribunal makes the following observations in respect of this argument. The AAT application form states ‘You are entitled to pay a reduced fee of $100 instead of a standard application fee if…we decide that paying the full fee would cause you financial hardship’ which is to be paid six weeks after the application is lodged.  Further, the decision of the URO dated 26 March 2018 also states ‘There are some circumstances in which you do not have to pay the fee and you should contact the AAT to obtain more information about this. If your application is successful, the fee will be refunded.’ The Applicant does not suggest that she was not advised about her entitlement to apply for waiver of her AAT fee. I do not accept the explanation that she was saving money to meet the cost as a valid reason to grant an extension of time. The delay of three years and four months was extraordinary.

16. Secondly, the Applicant submits that the delay was also a result of her mental illness. However, the Tribunal notes no medical evidence in respect of the Applicant’s mental health during the period 2015 to 2018 has been provided. The last medical report relates to her mental health as at 2013. The decision of the URO was made approximately two years later.

    The Strength of the Applicant’s substantive application

17. The Tribunal has considered the strength of the substantive application with respect to the remission of the HECS-HELP debt. It is helpful to summarise the legislative framework within which this arises.

    The Statutory Framework – HECS-HELP Debt Remission

18. Under s 36.20 of the Act, a person can apply to a higher education provider for the remission of their HECS-HELP debt in respect of a unit of study. Section 36.20(1) of the Act sets out the circumstances in which a higher education provider must, on the Secretary’s behalf, determine that s 36.20 of the Act applies to a person. Relevantly, paragraphs (d) and (e) of s 36.20(1) of the Act state that this section applies if:

    (d)the provider is satisfied that special circumstances apply to the person (see section 36-21); and

    (e)         the person applies in writing to that provider for either or both:

    (i)the repayment of any amounts that the person paid in relation to his or her student contribution amount for the unit; or

    (ii)the remission of the person’s HECS-HELP debt in relation to the unit.

19. In relation to “special circumstances” s 36.21 of the Act provides:

    (1)For the purposes of paragraph 36-20(1)(d), special circumstances apply to the person if and only if the higher education provider is satisfied that circumstances apply to the person that:

    (a)are beyond the person’s control; and

    (b)do not make their full impact on the person until on or after the census date for the unit of study in question; and

    (c)make it impracticable for the person to complete the requirements for the unit during the period during which the person undertook, or was to undertake, the unit.

    (2)The Administration Guidelines may specify circumstances in which a higher education provider will be satisfied of a matter referred to in paragraph (1)(a), (b) or (c). A decision of a higher education provider under this section must be in accordance with any such guidelines.

    The Administration Guidelines 2012

20. Section 36.21(2) of the Act also provides that a decision under s 36.21(1) “must be in accordance with” any such guidelines.

21. Section 238.10 of the Act provides that the Minister may, by legislative instrument, make guidelines of various kinds, including The Guidelines. Relevantly, Ch 3 of The Guidelines deals with “special circumstances” as follows:

    3.1     PURPOSE

    3.1.1The purpose of this chapter is to specify the circumstances in which a higher education provider will be satisfied that special circumstances apply to the person that:

    (a)     are beyond the person’s control (paragraph 36-21(1)(a) of the Act);

    (b)    do not make their full impact on the person until on or after the census date for  the unit of study in question (paragraph 36-21(1)(b) of the Act); and

    (c)     make it impracticable for the person to complete the requirements for the unit of study during the period which the person undertook, or was to undertake, the unit (paragraph 36-21(1)(c) of the Act).

    3.5     CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A PERSON’S CONTROL

    3.5.1A higher education provider will be satisfied that a person’s circumstances are beyond that person’s control if a situation occurs which a reasonable person would consider is not due to the person’s action or inaction, either direct or indirect, and for which the person is not responsible.

    3.5.5The situation referred to in paragraph 3.5.5 [sic] must be unusual, uncommon or abnormal.

    3.10CIRCUMSTANCES THAT DID NOT MAKE THEIR FULL IMPACT UNTIL ON OR AFTER THE CENSUS DATE

    3.10.1A higher education provider will be satisfied that a person’s circumstances did not make their full impact on the person until on or after the census date for a unit of study if the person’s circumstances occur:

    (a)before the census date, but worsen after that day; or

    (b)before the census date, but the full effect or magnitude does not become apparent until on or after that day; or

    (c)on or after the census date.

    3.15CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAKE IT IMPRACTICABLE FOR THE PERSON TO COMPLETE THE REQUIREMENTS

    3.15.1A higher education provider will be satisfied that a person’s circumstances make it impracticable for the person to complete the requirements for the unit of study during the period which the person undertook, or was to undertake, the unit if circumstances such as the following occur:

    (a)medical circumstances. For examples, where a person’s medical condition has changed to such an extent that he or she is unable to continue studying;

    (b)family/personal circumstances.  For example, death or severe medical problems within a family, or unforeseen family financial difficulties, so that it is unreasonable to expect a person to continue studies; or

    (c)employment related circumstances.  For example, where a person’s employment status or arrangements have changed so that the person is unable to continue his or her studies, and this change is beyond the person’s control; or

    (d)course related circumstances.  For example, where the provider has changed the unit it had offered and the person is disadvantaged by either not being able to complete the unit, or not being given credit towards other units or course.

    A person is unable to complete the requirements for a unit if the person is unable to:

    (a)undertake the necessary private study required, or attend sufficient lectures or tutorials or meet other compulsory attendance requirements in order to meet their compulsory course requirements; or

    (b)complete the required assessable work; or

    (c)sit the required examinations; or

    (d)complete any other course requirements because of their inability to meet (a), (b) and (c) above.

22. The Applicant’s units of study fell into five separate categories with five different census dates as detailed in the table above. The period within which a person may apply for reimbursement is governed by s 36.22 of the Act which relevantly reads:

    (1)For the purposes of subparagraph 36-20(1)(f)(i), if:

    (a)the person has withdrawn his or her enrolment in the unit of study; and

    (b)the higher education provider gives notice to the person that the withdrawal has taken effect;

    the application period for the application is the period of 12 months after the day specified in the notice as the day the withdrawal takes effect.

    (2)If subsection (1) does not apply, the application period for the application is the period of 12 months after the end of the period during which the person undertook, or was to undertake, the unit.

23. As the Applicant failed to withdraw her enrolment from the relevant units of study, the application period during which the Applicant could apply to the University for remission of her HECS-HELP debt is taken to be 12 months after the end of the period during which the Applicant undertook, or was to undertake, each unit of study.

24. The Applicant failed to apply separately in respect of each unit of study within the relevant application period for remission of her HECS-HELP debt. The application to the University received on 9 February 2015 dealt with all five units of study, and hence was out of time by varying numbers of years with respect to each unit of study.

25. However, an application may still be accepted by the University if the provider waives the requirement that the application be made before the end of that period, on the ground that it would not be, or was not, possible for the application to be made before the end of that period.[5] The Applicant provided supporting medical documentation with her application however, upon considering this evidence, the URO deemed it was still practicable for the Applicant to submit her application on time.

    [5] s 36.20(1)(f)(ii) of the Act.

    The Medical Evidence

26. The Applicant submitted to the Tribunal three bundles of medical evidence, namely confidential client records.

27. The Tribunal asked the Applicant to identify the relevant documents within the medical evidence upon which she relied in support of her application for extension of time before the Tribunal. The Applicant identified hospital records in respect of her admissions during 2010, 2011 and 2013.

28. A brief letter from her psychiatrist dated 7 September 2017 was also filed with the Tribunal.

29. It is helpful to here to summarise that medical evidence. One record from 2010 reports that the Applicant had at least a two month history of psychotic symptoms in the context of marijuana use. She had been seeing a psychologist for some months. There were stressors to her psychosis including a relationship breakup three months prior, her parents’ separation 18 months prior, estrangement from her father, and juggling work and University commitments. The Applicant had been using one to two cones of marijuana daily for two to three years. The Applicant was treated with Risperidone for her mental health condition. She was advised to postpone further study until mid-2011 and look at only low stimulus, part-time employment.

30. As to the records from 2013, they report that the Applicant attempted to run into traffic on a busy road. She had been diagnosed with cannabis induced psychosis (first episode) in 2010 and had since been stable and under the care of a psychiatrist. Risperidone had been tapered and ceased six weeks prior to her presentation. There was a noted decline in the Applicant’s mental health over the two months prior to admission. The Applicant had been unable to function at work or in her studies, and smoked excessively. She had a recent breakup with a boyfriend. She had been using cannabis. She had used a small amount of cannabis within a few days of her current admission. She was advised to limit her alcohol intake and avoid illicit substances.

31. The medical record also includes notes that the Applicant was weaned off Risperidone in mid-2013 under supervision from a doctor but relapsed in the context of this weaning off process, with concurrent recreational cocaine use. The report notes the Applicant was putting herself at risk by walking into traffic, resulting in admission to hospital where she remained as an inpatient for three weeks and was discharged. There is no discharge summary in relation to that admission. The report continues “Otherwise [the Applicant] appears to be doing well. She reports she is currently taking time off from work and study and is exercising a lot and catching up with friends regularly”. The record further notes that the Applicant was later described as “bright” and “reactive” generally which appears to be a significant improvement on discharge from hospital.

1. The psychiatrist report said that the Applicant had been a patient of hers since January 2011, and had a significant medical illness of a psychotic disorder with likely schizophrenia. The Applicant had been admitted to hospital in October 2013 due to relapse of psychotic symptoms.

2. The Applicant enrolled in an applied finance course at the University in 2009 to 2010 and subsequently changed to a teaching course in 2011. The psychiatrist opined that the Applicant was quite unwell, had significant and severe psychotic symptoms during 2010 and 2011, and was consequently unable to complete her studies at University. The psychiatric report was confined to 2010 and 2011. There is no reference to the Applicant being unwell in 2009 or the state of her psychological health since October 2013. Indeed from the time of her release from hospital in September 2013, she was described as doing well with significant improvement.

3. The Applicant submitted that she was unable to complete her studies due to drug induced psychosis in relation to all units of study between 2009 and 2011, and also such condition was a highly compelling reason for the period of time that lapsed prior to the Applicant being in a satisfactory mental condition to challenge the decision of the Respondent and file her application before the Tribunal. Further, the Applicant was critical of the University for having accepted the Applicant’s enrolment for units of study when she was plainly unwell and not attending those courses.

4. This claim is contrasted with letters, submitted by the Respondent, indicating that the University had written to the Applicant on at least four separate occasions in relation to her studies, advising that she take action in contacting the University.

5. There was no medical evidence that went to her mental condition nor raise any issue of drug induced psychosis during 2009. There was clearly medical evidence that suggested that the Applicant suffered drug induced psychosis in 2010 to 2011. However, that evidence is lacking in terms of the timing and duration of such illness.

6. The 2013 record from the Applicant’s psychiatrist in relation to her psychotic episode and resultant admission in 2013 does not reference any other period of ill health save for 2010 and 2011. The psychiatrist opined that the Applicant was quite unwell in terms of significant and severe psychotic symptoms and then references her psychiatric admission in 2013 after which it appears the Applicant had been managing extremely well.

7. Hence, from the medical evidence, it appears that there were arguably fluctuating periods of ill health associated with the consumption of drugs in 2010, 2011 and 2013.

8. There is no evidence before the Tribunal which speaks to the Applicant’s mental health condition from the date of the URO’s decision and the filing of the application before the Tribunal. There is no reported medical condition that gives any explanation for the three years and four months delay in applying to the Tribunal for review.

9. The Respondent argues that there is no contemporaneous or corroborating evidence that the Applicant suffered from any mental health issue in 2009 impacting upon her ability to complete her studies. Indeed, the fact that the Applicant was able to achieve a credit pass and pass in two other subjects in 2009 would indicate that, at least in that year, the Applicant was well and able to study. To the extent that there is any medical evidence, it is only for the years 2010, 2011 and 2013. The Applicant was taking medication and it was reported she had periods of stability in respect of her mental health.  There is no evidence of significant ongoing mental health issues that impeded the Applicant from applying for remission of her HECS-HELP debt within the application period, or for any extended period thereafter, or that impacted upon her ability to file an application to the Tribunal within time.

10. The Respondent also notes that the Applicant is not seeking fee remission in respect of any units of study relating to the second semester in 2010. Insofar as the Applicant was admitted to hospital in September 2013, that reported condition was outside the timeframes for the relevant units of study and well before the URO’s decision.

    CONSIDERATION

11. In considering whether an extension of time should be granted, one significant issue to be considered is the strength of the Applicant’s case in having the decision to be reviewed set aside. The extent to which the Applicant’s case has merit must be approached carefully.

12. In the present application, there has been much emphasis on whether “special circumstances” exist to justify the alleviation of a statutory provision. However, this issue cannot be resolved in this application. The Tribunal is only to consider the merits of the Applicant’s case at its highest and should be slow to dismiss an application where this forms the substantive issue on appeal.[6] In this application, there has been much documentation and submissions provided in regard to this issue. However, it is inappropriate for the Tribunal to make an assessment of the merits of an application in an application for extension of time.

    [6] Re Wallis and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] AATA 45.

13. I will deal in summary with the parties’ submissions in this respect.

14. The Applicant submits that, while the drug taking was not beyond her control, the consequent psychosis was beyond her control and was a restraint on the ability to undertake any task, particularly an extensive process such as completing the application. The Applicant subsequently became “addicted” to recreational drugs and could not stop.

15. The Applicant further submits that prior to attending University, there had been no drug use and so she was not aware how the use of drugs would impact her ability to study.

16. The Applicant submits that the University continued to accept her enrolment despite the Applicant never attending a class. This is contrasted by the Respondent’s letters of four separate occasions, sent to the Applicant from the University, addressing the Applicant’s unsatisfactory progress in accordance with the University’s policies.

17. The Respondent has submitted that the Applicant has provided no medical evidence to support an “addiction” to drugs, and that the circumstances were not beyond the Applicant’s control as the Applicant’s drug-taking was a deliberate action on her part causing the psychosis. If only occurring once, the psychosis may be seen to be unusual or uncommon. However, the drug-taking was sustained and within her control. The Applicant has not submitted evidence to demonstrate that the psychosis was not caused by her drug use.

18. The Respondent submits that, in the substantive application for review, the Applicant will need to demonstrate special circumstances for the five different study periods, and that if the Applicant was affected by special circumstances in one study period then she should not have subsequently enrolled in further subjects.

19. The Respondent concedes that there were times when the Applicant was incapable of making rational decisions, however this level of incapacity was not sustained over the whole of the period for which the Applicant is seeking remission. The Tribunal agrees with this submission.

    CONCLUSION

20. In regard to the explanation for the delay in filing the application in the Tribunal, the Applicant has not provided any medical or other evidence that gives any satisfactory explanation for the delay of three years and four months. The Tribunal has nonetheless considered the whole of the medical evidence provided and referred to above. However that evidence does not satisfactorily inform the Tribunal for the delay from the date of the decision on 26 March 2015 to the filing the application on 3 July 2018.

21. The medical evidence does confirm that for periods during 2010, 2011 and 2013 the Applicant was intermittently unwell due to drug induced mental health issues. But there is no evidence to indicate she was unwell or that such mental health condition extended beyond the date of the decision on 26 March 2015.

22. In considering the length of the delay, the Tribunal observes that the delay is significant. The Applicant has failed to provide any acceptable reason for the delay in filing the Application to the Tribunal. While the length of the delay does not appear to prejudice the Respondent in any way, it appears that the Applicant, who was fully aware of her review rights and took no action, rested on her rights, and allowed the Respondent to believe the matter had finally concluded. The application for extension of time must fail.

23. I have nonetheless considered the merits of the substantive case and the question of “special circumstances”. The Tribunal is informed by Ch 3 of The Guidelines and s 36.21 of the Act.

24. The Applicant suffered from drug induced psychosis following the deliberate consumption of marijuana or cocaine. The consumption of illicit substances was something that was within the control of the Applicant. The mere fact that the consequence of that deliberate act was a psychotic or schizophrenic reaction does not mean that such reaction should be considered separately as an event beyond the Applicant’s control. It is a folly to suggest that a deliberate act which gives rise to an injury requires the act be considered separately to its consequence.

25. A reasonable person would consider that the consumption of drugs and the consequent psychotic and schizophrenic episode was a direct result of the Applicant’s action for which she is responsible. Sadly, it could not be said that drug consumption is unusual, uncommon or abnormal.

26. In those circumstances, the Applicant would not be entitled to rely on her mental health as a special circumstance beyond her control entitling her to the remission of her HECS-HELP debt. Accordingly, I find that no special circumstance exists within the meaning of the Act and The Guidelines.

27. Hence, the Applicant has not satisfied the Tribunal that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to extend the time within which to bring the application to review the decision of the URO dated 26 March 2015.

    DECISION

28. The application for extension of time is refused.

62.     I certify that the preceding 61 (sixty-one) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member B J Illingworth

.............[Sgnd].........................................

Associate

Dated: 5 April 2019

Date of hearing:	21 January 2019
Advocate for the Applicant:	Terese Wacyk, Von Doussas
Advocate for the Respondent:	Johanna Palenschus, Department of Education