Purvis v Dairy Adjustment Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Purvis v Dairy Adjustment Authority [2006] FCAFC 50

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – deregulation of dairy industry – two statutory schemes implemented to facilitate financial assistance – claims made under Dairy Structural Adjustment Program Scheme 2000 and Supplementary Adjustment Dairy Assistance Scheme 2001 – applicants granted payment under one scheme but not the other – whether the Tribunal erred in its proper construction of the statutory schemes – 10 questions of law raised on appeal

Dairy Produce Act 1986 (Cth) Sch 2, cl 2
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44(3)
Dairy Industry Act 1992 (SA)
Dairy Industry Adjustment Act 2000 (Cth)
Dairy Produce Legislation Amendment (Supplementary Assistance) Act 2001 (Cth)

Dairy Structural Adjustment Program Scheme 2000 s 30, 30(3A)
Supplementary Adjustment Dairy Assistance Scheme 2001 ss 8(4), (5)(a)(i)(ii)(iii)(iv), 13(5), 16

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 cited
Hyundai Automotive Distributors Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Customs Service (1998) 81 FCR 590 cited
K & S Lake City Freighters Pty Ltd v Gordon & Gotch Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 309 cited
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 cited
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 cited

Pearce & Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (5th Ed, 2001)

RONALD PURVIS, KAYLENE PURVIS & ROGER CLARK v DAIRY ADJUSTMENT AUTHORITY

No SAD 77 of 2005

BLACK CJ, BRANSON & FINN JJ
ADELAIDE
23 JANUARY 2006

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 77 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

RONALD PURVIS
FIRST APPLICANT

KAYLENE PURVIS
SECOND APPLICANT

ROGER CLARK
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

DAIRY ADJUSTMENT AUTHORITY
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, BRANSON AND FINN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JANUARY 2006

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

SAD 77 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

RONALD PURVIS
FIRST APPLICANT

KAYLENE PURVIS
SECOND APPLICANT

ROGER CLARK
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

DAIRY ADJUSTMENT AUTHORITY
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BLACK CJ, BRANSON AND FINN JJ

DATE:

23 JANUARY 2006

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicants, Ronald and Kaylene Purvis and Roger Clark, are dairy farmers in the south east of South Australia.  Towards the end of 1999 the Commonwealth and the States agreed to deregulate the dairy industry.  That deregulation took effect on 1 July 2000.  The Dairy Industry Adjustment Program, which was a creature of the Dairy Produce Act 1986 (Cth) (“the Act”), was developed to assist the industry to adjust to deregulation. Two schemes were formulated under that program, each of which enabled financial assistance to be made to dairy farmers to ease their transition to a deregulated market. That assistance…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Mr and Mrs Purvis, sought review of decisions by the Dairy Adjustment Authority (DAA) and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) denying their eligibility for discretionary payments under the South Australian Dairy Adjustment (SDA) Scheme. The applicants, who were granted payment rights under the Dairy Special Assistance Payment (DSAP) Scheme, were unsuccessful in establishing their eligibility for the SDA Scheme. The Tribunal affirmed the DAA’s decisions, albeit on different grounds. The applicants now seek review of the Tribunal’s decision by the Full Court of the Federal Court.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal erred in affirming the DAA’s decision denying the applicants eligibility for a discretionary payment under the SDA Scheme. The applicants argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the effect of their decision to change milk processors on their entitlement to a discretionary payment. The DAA and the Tribunal, on the other hand, maintained that the applicants were not entitled to a discretionary payment under the SDA Scheme because their decision to change processors resulted in a lesser proportion of their milk being processed as market milk.

The court found that the Tribunal had correctly exercised its discretion in affirming the DAA’s decision. The court held that the applicants’ decision to change milk processors resulted in a greater proportion of their milk being processed as manufacturing milk, rather than market milk. Consequently, the applicants received a lesser DSAP payment than they would have if they had remained with their original processor. The court further held that to grant the applicants a discretionary payment under the SDA Scheme would undermine the rationale of the DSAP Scheme and result in an arbitrary exercise of discretion.

The application is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants were each granted a payment right under the DSAP Scheme. They were unsuccessful in establishing their eligibility for a discretionary payment right under the SDA Scheme. They sought internal review of the decisions denying their eligibility. The DAA confirmed those decisions. They then sought review of the decisions by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). A Deputy President of the Tribunal affirmed the DAA’s decisions, albeit on different grounds. They now apply to this Court constituted as a Full Court under s 44(3) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).BACKGROUND AND THE STATUTORY SETTING Prior to deregulation, regulation of the dairy industry in South Australia was effected under the Dairy Industry Act 1992 (SA) through a state-wide market milk equalisation scheme. The scheme itself was embodied in an agreement (“the SAMME Agreement”) between three processors of milk, the South Australian Dairy Farmers’ Association Inc and the South Australian Market Milk Equalisation Committee Ltd. It was authorised by the responsible Minister under the State Act. Its purpose was to ensure that the proceeds from the sale of “market milk” in the State were shared equitably amongst producers who delivered their milk to processors who were parties to the SAMME Agreement. The SAMME Agreement distinguished between “market milk” and “manufacturing milk”. Importantly for present purposes, the definition of “manufacturing milk” (but not of “market milk”) included UHT milk and flavoured milk. The contrary was the case under the two Commonwealth schemes. Under the South Australian Scheme, the farmgate (or sale) price of market milk was set by the Minister for Agriculture. Nineteen per cent of the milk produced by dairy farmers was treated under the Scheme as having been produced by a dairy farmer as market milk (irrespective of the actual percentage so produced). This figure was used to spread the benefits of superior income from market milk across all producers in South Australia.Dairy Produce Act 1986 (Cth) This Commonwealth Act is important for contextual reasons. With national agreement to deregulate the dairy industry achieved, the Act was amended by the Dairy Industry Adjustment Act 2000 (Cth) to add a Schedule 2 which constituted the Dairy Industry Adjustment Program. Part 2 of the Schedule provided a framework for the DSAP Scheme; it required the responsible Minister actually to formulate the DSAP Scheme; and the Scheme itself was to be directed towards ensuring the achievement of the policy objectives established in the framework. It is this contextual background to the Scheme (which was gazetted on 14 April 2000) that makes the supporting parliamentary materials for the 2000 amending Act of relevance in the interpretation of the DSAP Scheme itself. The Scheme was estimated to cost about $1.74 billion over eight years. In 2001, Schedule 2 to the Act was further amended by the Dairy Produce Legislation Amendment (Supplementary Assistance) Act 2001 (Cth). A new Part 1A was added to the Schedule to establish the framework for the SDA Scheme. It had similar requirements to those noted above for the DSAP Scheme relating to ministerial formulation of the scheme and consistency with the policy objectives of the framework. The parliamentary materials for the 2001 amending Act are likewise relevant in the interpretation of the SDA Scheme which was gazetted on 1 August 2001.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The following four paragraphs, which were minutely dissected at the hearing of the appeal (cf Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272), encapsulate the Tribunal’s reasons for exercising the discretion adversely to Mr and Mrs Purvis: “156.The policy to which DAA has regard is that set out in its Business Guidelines (at [58]) above. It expressly states that it is not exhaustive. I consider it consistent with the provisions of the SDA Scheme and of the DSAP Scheme. It does no more than draw attention to factors that may be considered without stipulating any particular result when that is done. I have considered those factors but have done so in light of the purpose of both the SDA Scheme and the DSAP Scheme. In summary, the payments under those schemes are not intended to be arbitrary but are based on the milk that was delivered to processors in the base year and, in effect, the use that the processor made of that milk. The way in which the actual volumes is calculated is subject to some variations but the overall intention is to ensure that DSAP payments are based on whether a levy was paid on the milk so that it is market milk or whether the producer received a DMS payment so that it is manufacturing milk.157.The effect of Mr and Mrs Purvis’s changing processors from Dairy Vale to De Cicco was that a greater proportion of their milk was processed as manufacturing milk than would have happened had they remained with Dairy Vale. Therefore, they received a lesser DSAP payment than they would have received had they remained with Dairy Vale for generally 46.23 cents per litre was paid for market milk and 8.96 cents per litre for manufacturing milk. The difference, the Second Reading Speech states, reflects the premium paid for market milk under the regulated systems that prevailed in the States before deregulation and recognised the price of market milk after deregulation was expected to fall towards that of manufacturing milk. While the package was not about compensation, it was about recognising those consequences of deregulation.158.Like other dairy farmers, Mr and Mrs Purvis took into account a range of factors in reaching their decision to transfer from Dairy Vale to De Cicco or to remain with Dairy Vale. The return that they would receive from each processor was at the heart of those factors. It was at the heart of their decision to transfer. By moving to De Cicco, they received a greater return for their milk at the time. They have received payments according to the milk they actually delivered and the amount that was market milk and the amount that was manufacturing milk. That is in accordance with the DSAP Scheme and its rationale.159.If I were to decide that they should receive an SDA payment because they would have made a different decision had they known that they would have received a greater sum had they remained with Dairy Vale, I would be undermining the DSAP Scheme and its rationale. I would be effectively deciding to give them DSAP payment at the higher market milk rate for a certain portion of their milk when they actually sold that portion not as market milk but as manufacturing milk. I would be making that decision when they have already received payment for that portion at a rate greater than they would have received for it had they sold it as market milk. This would not be an appropriate exercise of the discretion and I decline to exercise it. Therefore, I have decided that Mr and Mrs Purvis are not entitled to an SDA payment under the SDA Scheme and I affirm the decision under review.”The Clark decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established