Purcell v Barry

[2003] NSWSC 552

CITATION:	Purcell v Barry [2003] NSWSC 552 revised - 1/07/2003
HEARING DATE(S):	28/05/03, 10/05/03; 16/06/03
JUDGMENT DATE:	24 June 2003
JURISDICTION:	Equity Division
JUDGMENT OF:	Master Macready at 1
DECISION:	I order that the summons be dismissed and order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs on a party and party basis.
CATCHWORDS:	Family Provision. Claim by adult daughter. Consideration of provision made during lifetime. Application refused. Costs and whether indemnity costs should be ordered. - Held: Party and party costs ordered.
PARTIES :	Beryl Ellen Purcell v Edward John Henry
FILE NUMBER(S):	SC 5281/2001
COUNSEL:	Miss Karin Ottesen for plaintiff Mr CJ Bevan for defendant
SOLICITORS:	John Byrnes & Associates for plaintiff Turner Freeman for defendant

- 1 -

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

Master Macready

Tuesday 24 June 2003

5281/01 Beryl Ellen Purcell v Edward John Barry

JUDGMENT

1 Master: This is an application under the Family Provision Act 1982 in respect of the estate of the late Edward James Barry who died on 24 May 2001 aged 91 years. He was survived by the plaintiff, his daughter and the defendant, his son.

The deceased’s last will

2 The deceased made his last will on 30 November 2000 under which he appointed the defendant his executor and left the whole estate to him. In his will the deceased gave the following reasons for not making provision for his daughter in these terms:

“4. I have made no provision .in this will for my daughter Beryl Purcell for reasons including the following :-
(a) my daughter has been offered and has accepted the sum of Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00) from my son in return for giving up any entitlement she might have had to an interest in my estate;
(b) my son and his wife have spent much of their time and effort over many years caring for me. For example, my son has left his home for an extended period during my recent illness to live with me in order to care for me during my illness;
(c) my daughter has shown little or no interest in my health and welfare over many years. For example, my daughter has not invited me to stay with her during my recent illness.”

3 The deceased had made a will on 26 April 2000 which also left his estate to the defendant. At that time he signed a statutory declaration in these terms:

“1. I have this day made a new Last Will & Testament. A copy of that Last Will and Testament is annexed hereto and marked with the letter "A".

2. In that Will I have not provided for my daughter Beryl Ellen Purcell ("Beryl") or any of her children. I have done so because my son Edward John Barry has paid Beryl the sum of $70,000.00 prior to the date of execution of my newWill.

3. At the date of execution of my new Will being annexure "A" hereto I own the following assets:

(a) The property situate and known as 760 Hume Highway, Yagoona. I am informed by my son Edward John Barry and verily believe that this property is worth approximately $190,000.00.
(b) A Commonwealth Bank Account in an amount of $5,000.00.
(c) A further Commonwealth Bank account in an amount of $4,000.00 which is held to cover the cost of my funeral.
(d) Various items of furniture, furnishings and household effects contained in the property at 760 Hume Highway, Yagoona. I do not know the value of these items.

4. As at this date I have no debts or liabilities.”

4 I will return to these circumstances in due course.

The Estate of the Deceased

5 At the date of death the deceased owned a property at 760 Hume Highway, Yagoona and some cash which has been used to pay funeral expenses and administration expenses. The house is now valued at $285,000 and the solicitors for the estate hold the balance of the cash amounting to $1,150.

6 The defendant’s costs amount to $51,193 and the plaintiff’s costs amount to $53,133. These estimates, which total $104,326, were for a two day hearing but the case has taken three days to complete.

Family History

7 The deceased was born in 1907. His daughter, the plaintiff, was born on 2 December 1929 and his son, the defendant, was born on 27 November 1937. For many years the deceased had lived in a rented house.

8 In 1950 the plaintiff and her then fiancée purchased a block of vacant land at 760 Hume Highway, Yagoona. The plaintiff provided the whole of the purchase money of 150 pounds and in the following year when her expected marriage did not eventuate the land was transferred into the plaintiff's name alone. The property in which the deceased, his wife and family had been residing was sold by its owner in 1952. This led to discussions as to where the family would move and the plaintiff offered to transfer her land to her father and mother which was done on 3 June 1952. Consideration for the transfer was shown as natural love and affection.

9 In 1951 the deceased obtained a loan for 2100 pounds and in 1953-1954 the proceeds of the loan were used to build and complete a house on the land.

10 In 1982 the plaintiff began looking after her elderly parents and would often visit them two or three times a week. She also managed their banking needs from time to time. In 1993 the plaintiff and her husband moved to their daughter’s house 129 Bellinger Road, Ruse to care for their daughter, Deborah, who was then suffering from breast cancer. Their daughter had two children, Rebecca and Nathan. Two years later in 1995 Nathan was diagnosed with cancer and had an operation on his right leg followed by a year of chemotherapy.

11 In 1995 the plaintiff was also diagnosed with breast cancer. She had radiation therapy and subsequently developed lymphoedema in the left arm. This required continued treatment.

12 In 1997 Edith Olive Barry, the wife of the deceased and mother of the plaintiff, died. Also in that year the plaintiff's daughter Deborah died as a result of her breast cancer. The plaintiff and her husband then obtained custody of Deborah’s children, Rebecca and Nathan. Probate was granted in respect of Deborah's estate to her brother John Michael Purcell. Under her will Deborah's house, in which the plaintiff and her husband were residing with their grandchildren, and other assets were left in trust for Rebecca and Nathan equally.

13 On 19 February 1998 the deceased made a will in which he gave his estate to the plaintiff and the defendant in equal shares. In November 1998 the defendant left his residence at Pyrmont, a Housing Commission flat shared with his wife and two children, and then went to live in the home of the deceased to nurse the deceased who was then aged 91 years for the last 2 1/2 years of his life while the deceased was dying from bladder cancer.

14 During the year 2000 Nathan had an operation on his left leg and was then also diagnosed with a lymphoedema in his right leg. In February and March 2000 there were discussions between the plaintiff and the deceased to see whether the plaintiff could look after the deceased on a temporary basis at the Ruse property. There were also discussions about the sale of the Yagoona property and the discussions led to an offer for the defendant to buy the plaintiff out of the property which the plaintiff and the defendant expected would be left to them jointly under their fathers will.

15 According to the defendant, the plaintiff offered to sell her half share for $65,000 and he offered to the buy it for $70,000. The defendant then went to his Superannuation Rollover account with the Sydney Credit Union and withdrew $80,000. He gave $70,000 to the plaintiff. This occurred on 14 April 2000. There was a meeting at the offices of Mr Taylor, a solicitor, when the deceased gave instructions to prepare a will leaving the estate to the deceased. It came out in that conference that the defendant thought, as a result of enquiries that he had made, that the house was worth $190,000. That will was signed on 26 April 2000 along with a statutory declaration to which I have referred above.

16 There was some deterioration in the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased during the middle of the year 2000 and the locks were changed on the doors to the Yagoona property. According to the defendant this was because the plaintiff had been interfering with things in the house. At this time the plaintiff handed back to the deceased his bankbooks and thereafter the defendant managed the deceased’s bank accounts.

17 There was correspondence in August 2000 between the plaintiff’s son and the defendant suggesting that the value of the property was somewhat higher than that suggested to the plaintiff at the time of the arrangement for transfer of her interest.

18 On 30 November 2000 the deceased’s last will was executed. The deceased died on 24 May 2001 and probate was granted on 16 August 2001. The summons in this matter was filed on 31 October 2001. On 23 September 2002 the defendant’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors and suggested that the proceedings were misconceived and invited a discontinuance.

The Plaintiff’s Eligibility

19 The plaintiff is an eligible person and the application was made within time. In applications under the Family Provision Act the High Court in Singer v Berghouse (1994) 181 CLR 201 has set out the two stage approach that a Court must take. At page 209 it said the following:-

"The first question is, was the provision (if any) made for the applicant 'inadequate for (his or her) proper maintenance, education and advancement in life'? The difference between 'adequate' and 'proper' and the interrelationship which exists between 'adequate provision' and 'proper maintenance' etc were explained in Bosch v Perpetual Trustee Co Limited . The determination of the first stage in the two-stage process calls for an assessment of whether the provision (if any) made was inadequate or what, in all the circumstances, was the proper level of maintenance etc appropriate for the applicant having regard, amongst other things, to the applicant's financial position, the size and nature of the deceased's estate, the totality of the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, and the relationship between the deceased and other persons who have legitimate claims upon his or her bounty.
The determination of the second stage, should it arise, involves similar considerations. Indeed, in the first stage of the process, the court may need to arrive at an assessment of what is the proper level of maintenance and what is adequate provision, in which event, if it becomes necessary to embark upon the second stage of the process, that assessment will largely determine the order which should be made in favour of the applicant. In saying that, we are mindful that there may be some circumstances in which a court could refuse to make an order notwithstanding that the applicant is found to have been left without adequate provision for proper maintenance. Take, for example, a case like Ellis v Leeder where there were no assets from which an order could reasonably be made and making an order could disturb the testator's arrangements to pay creditors."

20 I turn to consider the various matters to which the High Court refers.

The Situation of the Plaintiff

21 The plaintiff is married and aged 73 years. She has the responsibility for caring for her deceased’s daughter’s two children, Rebecca Rix (“Rebecca”), a university student now aged 19 years, and Nathan Rix (“Nathan”), a high school student now aged 16 years.

22 The plaintiff’s financial situation is as follows:

1. Interest with her husband in a house at Wilson Place, Campbelltown leased to a tenant at $180 pw and valued at $285,000

2. Car – RN 3110 $12,000

3. St George Bank savings account $4,467

4. GIO investment account $15,500

TOTAL ASSETS $316,967

23 The plaintiff has no liabilities. The rent she and her husband receive for their house is said to be below the market rent but the evidence does not disclose the amount of the current market rent.

24 This only paints part of the picture as the plaintiff and her husband since 1993 have lived in the house that used to belong to their daughter before she died. Their daughter’s estate is held in trust under her will by her brother, John Michael Purcell, executor, pending Nathan Rix attaining his majority in Feb 2005 on which date the estate assets are to be transferred to these two sui juris beneficiaries in equal shares under will. The assets in the estate are:

1. House at 129 Bellinger Street, Ruse, occupied by plaintiff and husband rent-free - held in trust for grandchildren, Rebecca & Nathan, in equal shares by estate executor, John Purcell, plaintiff’s son (average of range of available values) $330,000

2. Other assets of estate of the late Deborah Anne Rix held in trust in equal shares for Rebecca & Nathan (bank accounts, proceeds of sale of car, superannuation and employee entitlements as per grant of probate) $19,000

25 There is also an Inter vivos trust created in June 2001 by the plaintiff for Rebecca and Nathan in equal shares being $49,000 paid into three St George Bank accounts by plaintiff sourced in a payment made to the plaintiff by the defendant in April 2000 of $70,000. These accounts now total $54,805. The plaintiff and her husband use these funds to support the whole family not just the grandchildren.

The relationship between the Plaintiff and the Deceased

26 Clause 4 (c) of the will of the deceased referred to his daughter showing little or no interest in his health over many years and gave as an example his daughter not inviting him to stay with her during his recent illness. There is no doubt on the evidence that the plaintiff looked after the deceased and her mother while the mother was alive since about 1982. She had a power of attorney from them, did their banking and she shopped for them. She also did cleaning and took them on visits to the doctor.

27 After her mother died in 1997 the plaintiff still visited the deceased two or three times a week to do the shopping, pick up medical prescriptions, do housekeeping and cooking. She continued to use the power of attorney from the deceased and did his banking and paid his bills from his pension up until August 2000. The plaintiff ceased doing the banking when a question arose about a payment to her brother from the deceased and she handed back the bank books in August 2000.

28 As I have indicated earlier, there was a breakdown of the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased in the middle of 2000. This probably was a result of some actions by the plaintiff and her rearranging items in the house. It came to a head with discussions relating to relieving her brother from the continual care of her father. At that stage he had been looking after their father for about a year to a year and a half.

29 It seems clear that the plaintiff declined to have her father to stay with her. It is also equally clear that the deceased did not want to go to a nursing home and he was fully supported in these endeavours by the defendant. There were a series of well-meant suggestions by the plaintiff and her son about providing respite care for the defendant which he rejected and it was this difference in approach to their father’s care which breached the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased. The plaintiff was very concerned about her physical ability to look after the deceased both because of her own illnesses and the fact that many steps were to be found in the property in which she was living. It seems clear that the reference in the deceased’s will was a reference to her failure to have him to stay to give his son some well earned relief.

30 It was an unfortunate break in the relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased but I do not see it as having any effect on the plaintiff’s claim such that it would reduce her entitlement or consideration of her application. In my view she was not in a position to safely look after her father.

The payment of $70,000

31 This is another reason for the deceased not leaving any provision in his will in favour of the plaintiff. It is perfectly clear from the statutory declaration and what happened at the solicitor’s conference that, in the deceased’s view, the $70,000 was less than one half of the value of the property. The plaintiff first recounted the discussions concerning this matter and did not indicate who initiated the discussions. It seems that the discussions arose at the time the parties were discussing the future care of their father and the plaintiff’s inability to look after the deceased at her home. According to the defendant she offered to the defendant that perhaps he would buy her out of the estate now. According to the defendant she later offered to sell her interest for $65,000 to which the defendant responded that he would pay $70,000. This seems a little strange and perhaps suggests that the defendant knew more about the value of the house than the plaintiff at the time.

32 The situation became clearer at the discussion at the solicitor’s office where it was indicated, as the solicitor recorded in his notes, that there was a real estate valuation of the house for $190,000. It was obvious from what occurred at the solicitor’s office that the plaintiff was not happy about the $70,000 which she had reluctantly accepted a few days earlier. It is also clear that the defendant justified the figure by the fact that he had been caring for his father for a year or so and would be continuing to do so in the future. As the solicitor perceived at the time, this unresolved problem and dispute was bound to lead to trouble in the future. It was not resolved and the deceased insisted on the matter proceeding and the will was drawn on the deceased’s instructions to leave the estate to the defendant.

33 The precise rights and wrongs of this approach on both sides do not have a substantial role in the consideration of the case at this stage. What is important is that the defendant made a payment in advance to the plaintiff. She had the benefit of receiving it at that time. Although it is probably not relevant to consider the extent to which it might represent what she thought she was entitled to, there is in evidence a letter obtained in April suggesting that the value of the house might be in the order of $205,000. The parties were working on a valuation, which has not been produced in evidence, of $190,000. Assuming the real estate was then worth in the order of $200,000 dollars the plaintiff's complaint is that she was being paid $30,000 less than a half share.

34 The problem with this whole approach to the matter by the plaintiff is that her sense of injustice is predicated on her being entitled to have one half of the deceased estate. She has no such entitlement in law and the deceased is free leave his estate to whom he pleases subject to the power of this court to make provision for dependants or other relatives if there has been an inadequate provision in a will. What has happened in fact is that the plaintiff has been paid by her brother for something less than half of the value of the estate on the basis that she took it early and that she was happy for the defendant to continue to look after her father at some personal inconvenience to himself and his family.

Contributions to the Estate of the Deceased

35 There is a dispute on the evidence as to whether the plaintiff gave the Yagoona land to her parents in 1951 or whether her parents had paid her for it. The defendant gave evidence of conversations with his father in which his father stated that he had paid out his daughter. The defendant was only 15 years old at the time. Given the circumstances in which the deceased came to move and his reported financial situation I think that the plaintiff’s account is more likely.

36 The purchase price of the land a year or two earlier was 150 pounds and probably reflected the then value of the land at the date of transfer. This contribution has to be taken into account. It was only a small proportion (6%) of the value of the completed property given the amount borrowed to construct the home

The defendant’s situation

37 The defendant is aged 65, married without dependants. He has lived with the deceased for some years before his father’s death in order to look after him. During this period his wife remained in their rented Housing Commission flat. The defendant’s assets are as follows:

1. Furniture & caravan $8,333

2. Bank accounts and credit union accounts:

Defendant $1,600

Defendant’s wife $3,929

TOTAL ASSETS $13,862

LESS LIABILITIES:

3. Credit card debt – Visacard $5,000

NET ASSETS $ 8,862

38 The defendant receives a pension of $388 per fortnight and his wife a pension of $340.20 per fortnight. These figures will be reduced shortly when they resume living together in the same residence when this litigation is concluded. The expenses of maintaining their separate households consume their pensions. Once they do live together in one household they will receive a combined pension which will be less than the total of their present pensions and their rent of Pyrmont will be increased.

The Defendant’s Relationship with the Deceased

39 The defendant seemed to have a good relationship with his father throughout his life. At some personal inconvenience to himself and his family the defendant moved in to care for the deceased some two and a half years before the deceased died. In this period of time the defendant has made contributions to the estate property in that he effected repairs to the extent of somewhere between $13,000 and $20,000. Although he has been in occupation of the house since the date of death of the deceased he has met all expenses in respect of the house.

The Plaintiff’s claim for Provision.

40 It is necessary to see how the plaintiff claims that she has been left without adequate and proper provision for her maintenance, education and advancement in life. The plaintiff in her affidavit evidence advanced three areas for consideration. The first was that she wished to make some repairs and maintenance to the house, which is held on behalf of their grandchildren and in which the plaintiff her husband and their grandchildren reside. Quotations were given in evidence for painting amounting to $6,500, carpets $4,008 and renovation of two bathrooms amounting to $19,780. The evidence before me indicates that the first two items are matters which would be part of the ordinary maintenance of the premises. The bathrooms which are to be renovated are apparently some 22 years old but no particular problems are referred to in respect to their current condition. It is however recommended by the home care service that because of the plaintiff's husband’s frailty there would need to be some alterations. There is a need for rails in the shower area and for an increase in the shower recess space as it is too confined. Clearly there will have to be alterations to at least one bathroom.

41 If an amount is provided to cover these items it will be for the benefit not only of the plaintiff but also of the grandchildren whose property will increase in value. The does not necessarily make it an inappropriate provision but the amount must be considered carefully.

42 The second area for provision was originally expressed by the plaintiff saying that she would like to create investments for her grandchildren. She explained this as wanting to have some monies available to her that she could use to assist her in looking after the grandchildren. Given the funds presently available to her I would have thought that she has adequate funds particularly as the moneys on deposit have increased over time.

43 The plaintiff also asked for a lump sum for her security in the future as she wished to avoid having to dip into capital to meet her expenses. The plaintiff gave no evidence at the trial of her living expenses and I am not satisfied that she has this problem. There is no doubt that at the moment she has a responsibility for the maintenance of the two grandchildren. That will be for a limited time in respect of Rebecca and in respect of Nathan it is not known how long he will require support.

44 The plaintiff also referred to the uncertainty in respect to her medical situation and that of her husband. There was evidence from Dr Peter Campbell who dealt with the plaintiff's medical condition, namely, her breast cancer that she suffered 7 1/2 years ago. He says that she has been free of any evidence of reoccurence since the surgery. She needs to have follow-up mammography and ultrasound on an annual basis and remain under care. He says that although there is a potential for a recurrence of breast cancer she is in a favourable prognosis group. She is at an increased risk of developing synchronous breast cancer thus there is the need for follow-up examinations and imaging. He regards her lymphoedema as likely to have reached its maximum extent.

45 There were no estimates of any likely future medical costs apart from the costs of a dressing for her arm to manage her lymphoedema which is $100 each six months.

Consideration of the Application

46 Although the home in which the plaintiff and her husband are residing will pass to their grandchildren in two years’ time, given Nathan's condition, it is probably likely that they will stay there with the blessing of their grandchildren for some time to come. In this regard it is to be noted that the plaintiff and her husband have the benefit receiving rent in respect of their property that assists in them meeting their living expenses. As they occupy the home it is properly reasonable that they should feel an obligation to spend some moneys on it as a matter of practicality and also because some alterations to a bathroom will be necessary for the plaintiff's husband. In this respect I would have thought that some part of the expenses for renovations would be appropriate. It would be the en suite bathroom, which would require renovation, and, accordingly, the figures I have referred to above could be reduced by the sum of $10,990.

47 Given the absence of evidence advanced of the plaintiff's expenses and outgoings I am not satisfied that there is any need demonstrated for further income or for future medical expenses.

48 The plaintiff's demonstrated needs are quite small. It is abundantly clear from cross-examination of the plaintiff that the reason why this application was brought was because of her perceived unhappiness as a result of the arrangements for the purchase of her "half share" of the estate by her brother.

49 One must bear in mind the contributions that both the plaintiff and the brother have made towards the estate and the happiness and well-being of their father. Their father lived until the age of 93 years and was in most of his life well supported by his children. The defendant certainly went out of his way to support this father over the last two 1/2 years of his life. The plaintiff made a real contribution to the property in the estate as she contributed to some 6 percent of its cost which, with inflation, would now amount to some $17,100. The defendant himself has spent money on improvements in something in excess of $13,000.

50 One has to consider the financial and personal situation of the plaintiff and the defendant. When one analyses this one sees an overwhelming disparity in the situation of the parties. Although one can feel sympathy for the plaintiff when one has regard to the medical problems she and her husband have suffered and responsibilities which they have had to adopt in respect of the grandchildren, they are clearly in a sound financial position. On the other hand, the defendant and his wife have had little by way of capital and the defendant used almost half of his superannuation entitlement to make the plaintiff’s payment. Part of the remaining funds were used to do work on the deceased’s house and to provide for his daughter's wedding and he has little remaining.

51 As a result of the payment of $70,000, the plaintiff received in 2000 something on account of what she might have expected the deceased to leave to her. That sum has to be taken into account. In the circumstances it seems to me that when one has regard to the matters to which I have referred and, in particular, the substantial difference in the financial situation of the plaintiff and the defendant, that no order should be made on the application. Accordingly, I propose to dismiss the application.

Costs

52 The defendant made an application that in the event that I dismissed the plaintiff's claim that I should order the costs against the plaintiff on an indemnity basis. The defendant referred to be decision of the High Court in Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 at page 89. There the High Court referred to the matter of these turns:

“It may be true in a general sense that cost orders are not made to punish an unsuccessful party. However, in the particular circumstantial the case involving some relevant delinquency on the part of the unsuccessful party, and order is made not abiding party costs but the costs on May "Lister and client" basis and brought on an indemnity basis. The result is more fully or adequately to compensate the successful party to the disadvantage in what otherwise would have been the position of the unsuccessful party in the absence of such delinquency on its part.”

53 Many cases have dealt with the relevant delinquency or “special circumstances”. One example that was referred to by the High Court was the case of Degnan Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v Wright (No 2) (1983) 2 NSWLR 354. That was a case where Justice Holland concluded that the unsuccessful party had prolonged the trial by deliberately false defences and allegations of fact.

54 In the present case the defendant suggests there are five reasons why there has been the relevant delinquency. The first was that the plaintiff claimed for a reason that had nothing to do with the purpose of the Family Provision Act. It was suggested that it was for an ulterior purpose. The evidence demonstrates that she brought the application because of her perceived unhappiness as a result of the arrangements for the purchase of her “half share” of the estate.

55 For example at pages55 to 56 of the transcript the cross examination of the plaintiff was in these terms:

Q. You know that your father was aware of the arrangement made with Ted when it was made?
A. Yes, to get half share.
Q. The reason you brought these proceedings is because
you wanted to in effect have the court review the
arrangement you made with Ted in April 2000 to ensure you receive, together with what Ted has already given you,

half of your father's estate?
A. Yes.

Q. And that is because in the third last will, that is
the will your father had made prior to 26 April 2000,your
father had left the estate equally to you and Ted?
A. Yes.

Q. You thought it fair that you and Ted continue to
receive half the estate?
A. Yes.
Q. And that is why you brought these proceedings, you
wanted the difference between half the estate and the
seventy thousand Ted had already given you?
A. Equals half.

56 Second, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any need for provision. On my finding some has been demonstrated but is quite minor. Third, the defects in the plaintiff's claim were brought to the plaintiff's attention early in the proceedings and were rejected by her or ignored.

57 Fourth, the plaintiff has failed to voluntarily make the requisite true and full disclosure of her financial position until obliged to do so six days before the hearing commenced to resolve the issue by the defendant pre-trial subpoenas. This may be so but there has been at least the appropriate disclosure.

58 Fifth, the result will be that unless indemnity costs are ordered the defendant will have to sell the family home and move back to rented premises. There does not seem to be any evidence that the plaintiff deliberately brought the proceedings with this objective in mind and therefore this result is not relevant of itself.

59 Of these reasons the only matter that really approaches relevant delinquency is the question of whether the plaintiff brought her claim for an ulterior purpose. Many plaintiffs bring this type of proceeding as a result of a perceived injustice at the hands of the testator. In this case it is the perceived injustice resulting from the actions of the testator and the defendant. Although the matter occupied some time in the hearing and in the affidavit material the provision of the funds by itself was a material matter for the court to consider on this application. Accordingly, I do not think that there has been any relevant delinquency and costs will be on a party and party basis.

60 I order that the summons be dismissed and order the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs on a party and party basis.
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Last Modified: 07/15/2003