Psyhopoulos v Northern Sydney Central Coast Area Health Service
[2011] NSWADT 151
•22 June 2011
Administrative Decisions Tribunal
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Psyhopoulos v Northern Sydney Central Coast Area Health Service [2011] NSWADT 151 Hearing dates: 30 November 2010 Decision date: 22 June 2011 Jurisdiction: General Division Before: S Higgins, Deputy President Decision: The decision of the respondent is set aside and in substitution thereof a decision that the applicant be granted access to a copy of the clinical notes of her son with the uncontested exempt matter deleted.
Catchwords: Access to documents - refusal of access-exempt document - document containing matter the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any person - clinical notes -typed version of clinical notes provided with names of staff members deleted Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997
Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW)
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)Cases Cited: Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442
Dezfouli v Justice Health [2008] NSWADT 175
Dunstan v Department of Corrective Services [2004] NSWADT 177
IPART v Services Sydney Pty Ltd (GD) [2008] NSWADTAP 79
Lambell v Department of Justice and Attorney General [2011] NSWADT 23
McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 229 ALR 187
Re Attorney-General's Department and Australian Iron and Steel PTY Limited v Peter Crockcroft [1986] FCA 35; (1986) 64 ALR 163Category: Principal judgment Parties: Amelia Psyhopoulos (Applicant)
Northern Sydney Central Coast Area Health Service (Respondent)Representation: Counsel:
E Raper (Respondent)
Slattery Thompson (Applicant)
Gild Insurance Litigation Pty Ltd (Respondent)
File Number(s): 103121
REasons for decision
Introduction
GENERAL DIVISION (S Higgins, Deputy President): The applicant, Mrs Psychopoulos, seeks review of a decision of a delegate of the respondent, the Northern Sydney Central Coast Area Health Service, to refuse her access to documents she had sought access to under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1989 (the FOI Act).
The applicant made a request under the FOI Act for access to the clinical notes of her son, a former patient in a facility, attached to a hospital operated by the respondent. The applicant's son had been a patient of the hospital since 2001 and he had been an inpatient at the facility attached to the hospital since early 2007. The diagnosis of the applicant's son was treatment resistant schizophrenia and polydipsia. He died on 20 August 2009 while an inpatient at the facility. Subsequent to his death, the applicant made her request for access to her son's clinical notes for the period 18 May 2009 to 20 August 2009. The respondent initially refused the applicant access to the requested clinical notes on the grounds that they were an exempt document as they contained 'matter, the disclosure of which would reasonably be expected to endanger the life of physical safety of a person' (see clause 4(1)(c) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act).
On an internal review, the respondent determined to provide the applicant with a new document, created by the respondent, which was a verbatim record of her son's handwritten clinical notes, with deletions of the names of staff members contained in the handwritten notes. The respondent's contention has always been that the only exempt matter in the clinical notes for which the applicant has sought access are the names of staff members. The respondent had not provided the applicant with a copy of her son's handwritten clinical notes with the names of staff members being deleted as it had formed the view that the applicant would be able to identify, from the handwriting, which staff member had made each entry. The reason why she would be able to do this was because she had previously been provided with complete copies of earlier entries in her son's handwritten clinical notes.
The applicant was not satisfied with this decision and has pressed for access to her son's handwritten clinical notes.
The hearing
The applicant's application was heard on 30 November 2010. The applicant tendered into evidence an affidavit sworn by her on 18 November 2010. The applicant also tendered into evidence a letter from her former treating practitioner, Dr M Piliotis, and her current general practitioner, Dr P Voutos. In addition to this, the applicant tendered into evidence her treatment progress notes. At the hearing, the applicant, with the assistance of a Greek interpreter, also gave oral evidence and was cross-examined.
The respondent tendered into evidence a number of documents including, a statement, with redactions, of Nehmet Kasif, dated 2 November 2010. Mr Kasif is the nursing unit manager of the facility where the applicant's son was an inpatient. The respondent also tendered into evidence a statement, with redactions, of Dr Elsa Bernardi, dated 1 November 2010. Dr Bernardi is the Medical Superintendent of the facility where the applicant's son was an inpatient and the most recent treating psychiatrist of the applicant's son. The respondent made the redactions in the statements of Mr Kasif and Dr Bernardi on the grounds that they would disclose the names or identity of staff members (i.e. the exempt matter) contained in the applicant's handwritten clinical notes (see section 55 of the FOI Act).
The respondent also provided the Tribunal, on a confidential basis, with a copy of the un-redacted statements of Mr Kasif and Dr Bernardi and also applicant's handwritten clinical notes the subject of this application.
Dr Bernardi and Mr Kasif both gave oral evidence and were cross-examined at the hearing.
At the conclusion of the hearing, at the request of the applicant's legal representative, I made directions for the filing and serving of written submissions. The respondent had filed and served an outline of written submissions prior to the hearing and the applicant sought to respond to these.
Relevant legislation
Section 16 of the FOI Act gives every person a legally enforceable right to be given access to an agency's documents in accordance with the provisions of that Act.
The FOI Act sets out a number of circumstances where an agency may refuse access to a document sought pursuant to the Act. One such circumstance is where the document is an 'exempt document' (see paragraph 25(1)(a) of the FOI Act). An 'exempt document' is defined in section 6 of the FOI Act and includes a document referred to in any one or more of the provisions of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. In this application, the respondent relies on the exemption contained in paragraph 4(1)(c) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. That exemption relevantly provides as follows:
4.Documents effecting law enforcement and public safety
(1)a document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected:
(a) ...
(c)to endanger the life or physical safety of any person ...
Unlike other merit review applications, where there is no onus of proof on either party to establish that the decision the subject of review is either correct or incorrect, section 61 of the FOI Act places the burden on the agency (in this application the respondent) to establish its determination is justified.
The evidence
It was the evidence of Mr Kasif that, since March 2008 and up until the death of the applicant's son, he had regular weekly dealings with the applicant. He said the applicant visited her son about once a week. She would also telephone regularly to enquire about her son's wellbeing, or to inform staff that she was coming to visit him, or take him out for a meal or to bring takeaway food that her son had requested. Mr Kasif said his recollection was that the applicant frequently present as being angry and frustrated about her son's care. In particular she blamed the staff and the system for allowing her son to remain 'sick.' He said the applicant blamed her son's condition on the medication that he was being given. He said the applicant often said words to the effect 'they are killing my son with this medication. I want it changed, this medication is no good, it is making my son sick, the doctors are stupid.'
Mr Kasif said he often spoke to the applicant about her son's medication, which the treating team felt was the most suitable for her son so he was able to function at his optimum level. Mr Kasif explained that the applicant's main concern was the drug clozapine, which was being given to her son. The applicant believed that this drug was the cause of her son's water intoxication and that it was of no benefit to him at all.
Mr Kasif stated that at a family meeting, on 26 August 2008, the applicant became angry and said that she believed her son's treating psychiatrist, Dr McLean, was deliberately making her son worse. He said that before leaving the family meeting, the applicant had said that she would kill herself and kill Dr McLean. He explained that the incident was reported to Dr Bernardi, who subsequently took over the care of the applicant's son 'in light of the potential risk to [the applicant] and Dr McLean.'
Mr Kasif in his statement said that various members of the nursing staff had informed him that they felt intimidated by the applicant and uncomfortable in her presence and for this reason they did not wish to deal with her. He said staff had told him of incidents where the applicant had been hostile, rude and demanding towards them in regard to her son's medication and treatment. On occasions the applicant would yell at them. He could not recall actual dates, however he did recollect staff expressing their concerns from the time he commenced working at the facility. He said staff were also concerned that the applicant was not administering her son's prescribed medication when he was on weekend leave.
Mr Kasif acknowledged that shortly prior to his death it had been agreed that the medication for the applicant's son would be changed and that he would no longer be given the drug clozapine.
Mr Kasif said that on 20 May 2010 he received a telephone call from the applicant. He said she sounded agitated and very angry. She had called to ask if she could collect her son's clothing. When Mr Kasif asked her how she was the applicant said:
I am not very happy mate, you killed my son, all the staff killed my son and you did too, why are you still open, this is ridiculous.
Mr Kasif said that he had been informed that when the applicant did collect her son's clothes, she told staff on duty that Dr Bernardi and Dr Mclean had killed her son.
During cross-examination, Mr Kasif agreed that shortly before the death of the applicant's son, it had been decided to change his medication and that he was to be able to go home with the applicant. He acknowledged that the applicant appeared to be happy about this decision. Mr Kasif also agreed in cross-examination that it was the applicant's abruptness, rudeness, curtness, verbal abuse and yelling which made her difficult to deal with.
Dr Bernardi gave evidence of a telephone call she had with the applicant two days after the death of her son, on 24 August 2009. Dr Bernardi had initiated the telephone call to offer her condolences and also to explain that she did not know how her son had died. In Dr Bernardi's record of this conversation, she said the applicant was shouting at her and stated that they would not listen to her and that during the conversation said words to the effect:
'You would not listen to me'.
'You killed my son'.
In her statement Dr Bernardi said that she had a number of dealings with the applicant since 2005. She said that she was able to observe that the applicant 'was irrational in her dealings with staff and made repeated complaints which were dealt with.' She expressed the view that if the applicant were to be given access to her son's clinical notes she held 'a genuine belief' that the applicant 'may target nursing staff' who were on duty around the time of her son's death.' That belief she said was founded on the applicant's assertions that members of staff of the facility were responsible for her son's death. This assertion she noted had been expressed on a number of occasions. In her oral evidence, Dr Bernardi said that while she could not make a psychiatric assessment of the applicant, she was able to give an opinion about the applicant's mental state based on the discussions she had with the applicant on 24 August 2009 and prior thereto. That opinion was that the applicant had a fixed irrational belief (with a flavour of paranoia) about the staff. Her concerns were that the applicant had identified staff rather than the health service as being the cause of her son's death. As I understood Dr Bernardi's evidence, she was of the view that people who held an irrational belief (with a flavour of paranoia) were more likely to act on such an irrational belief.
The applicant in her evidence readily acknowledged that she was not happy with the treatment that her son was being given. In particular she was not happy with her son being prescribed clozapine. It was her view that this drug was making him worse.
It was the evidence of the applicant that she always administered her son's medication to him when he was on weekend leave with her. She denied intimidating staff or making them feel uncomfortable. She did however confirm that she had expressed her concerns, on a number of occasions, about the medication that was being provided to her son. In her affidavit, the applicant said she believed staff at the facility where her son was an inpatient may have contributed to his death and that she required her son's clinical records so that she may take disciplinary action and also seek compensation. She explained that she had become depressed with her son's treatment and that her doctors had advised her, following the death of her son that if she were to be given access to his clinical notes this may have a therapeutic effect on her condition.
In her oral evidence the applicant agreed that she believed that staff were responsible for her son's death. She also agreed that she believed her son was being given the wrong medication and that she was angry and frustrated about this. During cross-examination the applicant acknowledged that she had complained to the Health Care Complaints Commission about the medication that was being provided to her son. She agreed that in early August 2009, when she had taken her son home for weekend leave she had noticed some bruises on his arm and as a result of this she had complained to the Health Care Complaints Commission. She agreed she was concerned about what had happened the Thursday before he had come home for the weekend. She agreed that she had asked the Health Care Complaints Commission who had worked that particular day and Commission refused to divulge this information to her.
The applicant also acknowledged that in September 2009 she had complained to police that people at the hospital wanted to have sex with her and her son. She said that she did this because her son had informed her of this.
In her oral evidence the applicant said she needed the names of the staff 'so that I can know that I have done the right thing for my son'. She said she wanted to find out who was working so that her son's death could be investigated. She denied she wanted to harm the staff and said this was for the court to do.
The applicant said she was very upset about the death of her son and while she may have used the words 'you killed' in her conversations with Mr Kasif and Dr Bernardi she did not mean they personally had killed her son. What she meant to say was that the facility had killed him. She said that her words may have been misunderstood due to her poor English.
Consideration
The respondent contends that the exemption is made out on the basis of the applicant's comments in August 2008 that she would kill Dr McLean, her subsequent behaviour towards staff and her comments, on a number of occasions, that staff 'killed' her son and her persistence in making unsubstantiated complaints about the staff of the facility. As I have mentioned, it was the evidence of Dr Bernardi that the applicant's views about staff was irrational and had a flavour of paranoia about them.
That irrationality and paranoia, the respondent seems to suggest is further evidenced by the applicant not being satisfied with the verbatim typed version of her son's handwritten clinical notes. This verbatim typed version the respondent contended contained sufficient information on which the applicant could base a claim, or investigation arising from her son's death.
In my opinion, the applicant being dissatisfied with being provided with a newly created document (i.e. the verbatim typed version of the handwritten clinical notes with the names of staff members deleted) cannot be construed in this way. The FOI Act makes no provision for access to be given in this form. While I do not criticize the respondent for providing the applicant with a verbatim typed version, in my view, provision of this document did not alter the respondent's initial determination, which was to refuse the applicant access to the documents she had requested. The grounds relied on by the respondent in its refusal was that the documents were exempt documents under paragraph 4(1)(c) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. The exempt matter in those documents being the names of staff members. As I have mentioned, the onus is on the respondent to satisfy the Tribunal that its decision is justified.
The respondent contended that a finding that there was a possibility that the applicant could target, threaten or bully staff at the facility was sufficient to satisfy the test of whether disclosure to the applicant of the handwritten clinical notes of her son could reasonably be expected to endanger life or physical safety of any person.
In my view, although it is ultimately a question of fact as to whether disclosure of the handwritten clinical notes of the applicant's son could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of a person, the authorities make it clear that this is not determined on the basis of possibilities or probabilities.
The meaning of the phrase 'could reasonably be expected' was considered by the Full Federal Court in Re Attorney-General's Department and Australian Iron and Steel PTY Limited v Peter Crockcroft [1986] FCA 35; (1986) 64 ALR 163. In that decision the Court construed the phrase in the context of the equivalent provision in the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act 1982 (the Commonwealth FOI Act) to the clause 13(b)(ii) exemption in Schedule 1 of the NSW FOI Act (i.e. document containing matter obtained in confidence). At [29] and [30] Bowen CJ and Beaumont J said the following:
29. In our opinion, in the present context, the words "could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information" were intended to receive their ordinary meaning. That is to say, they require a judgment to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous, to expect that those who would otherwise supply information of the prescribed kind to the Commonwealth or any agency would decline to do so if the document in question were disclosed under the Act. It is undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. In particular, it is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in terms of probabilities or possibilities or the like. To construe s.43(1)(c)(ii) as depending in its application upon the occurrence of certain events in terms of any specific degree of likelihood or probability is, in our view, to place an unwarranted gloss upon the relatively plain words of the Act. It is preferable to confine the inquiry to whether the expectation claimed was reasonably based (see Jason Kioa v. The Honourable Stewart John West, High Court, unreported, 18 December 1985 per Mason, J. at p 36; see also per Gibbs, C.J. at p 12).
30. The majority of the Tribunal thought that an assessment of what was more probable than not was called for. As Woodward, J. has pointed out, there are difficulties in this approach for the legislature has chosen not to introduce the notion of a "probable" result (cf. Ex parte White; In re White (1885) 14 Q.ED. 600). It is also unnecessary to consider whether an "even chance" or something of that kind is needed. It is preferable to confine oneself to the language of the provision itself and to attempt to form an opinion, on the evidence, as to what can reasonably be expected to happen if disclosure occurs . In our opinion, in departing from the terms of s.43(1)(c)(ii) and requiring the applicants to establish a case on the balance of probabilities, the majority of the Tribunal fell into error in their construction of the provision. (emphasis added)
In the same decision, at [12] Sheppard J said:
12. I do not myself feel able to derive from the presence of the word "reasonably" in the relevant expression a great deal of assistance. The difficulty is to give full weight to the meaning of the word "expected". It is only then that one can turn one's mind to the question of the significance of the qualification of it by the word "reasonably". The words are expressed in the passive voice - "could reasonably be expected". What is required is that the decision-maker act reasonably. For the document to be exempt his conduct must be taken to be that of the reasonable man. But then comes the difficulty. So acting, the decision-maker must expect that disclosure of the document could prejudice the future supply of information. In my opinion he will not be justified in claiming exemption unless, at the time the decision is made, he has real and substantial grounds for thinking that the production of the document could prejudice that supply. But, stringent though that test may be, it does not go so far as to require the decision-maker to be satisfied upon a balance of probabilities that the production of the document will in fact prejudice the future supply of information.
In Centrelink v Dykstra [2002] FCA 1442 (28 November 2002), at [25], after making reference to the decision in Crockfort, Mansfield J made the following remark in regard to the equivalent provision in Commonwealth FOI Act to the exemption contained paragraph 4(1)(c) of Schedule 1 of the NSW FOI Act:
25 It was plain to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal apparently accepted, that both Mr Gates and Mr Sladden did fear for their physical safety if the documents were disclosed to the respondent. But it was not their personal or subjective belief which was determinative. The Tribunal had to determine whether the documents had the character that their release would, or could reasonably be expected to, endanger the life or physical safety of any person. I do not discern from the Tribunal's reasons that it misdirected itself in considering that question. It set out to judge objectively whether there was a possibility that the disclosure of the documents could endanger the life or physical safety of other persons, and if so whether that possibility was one which was a reasonable one as distinct from one which was irrational, absurd or ridiculous. It is not for the Court to substitute its view of the outcome of such consideration. ...
The President followed this reasoning of Mansfield J in Dunstan v Department of Corrective Services [2004] NSWADT 177 (see at [19]).
In its submissions the respondent referred to the decision of the High Court in McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 229 ALR 187. That decision has also been referred to in a number of decisions of the Tribunal: see Lambell v Department of Justice and Attorney General [2011] NSWADT 23, IPART v Services Sydney Pty Ltd (GD) [2008] NSWADTAP 79 and Dezfouli v Justice Health [2008] NSWADT 175.
In McKinnon the document in issue was an internal working document for which the Minister had issued a conclusive certificate under section 36 of the Commonwealth FOI Act. That certificate certified that disclosure of the document would be contrary to the public interest. The issue before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, at first instance, was whether there existed 'reasonable grounds' for the Minister's claim (see subsection 58(5) of the Commonwealth FOI Act). The issue before the High Court was whether the Tribunal had applied the correct test in determining this issue. Although I am not required to make a determination of this nature, the analysis of the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable grounds' in the decision of the High Court is of relevance in so far as it discusses the reasoning of Bowen CJ and Beaumont J in Cockcroft. At [6 0] to [65] Hayne J said the following:
The expression "not irrational, absurd or ridiculous" is not synonymous with "reasonable grounds". Of course, absurd, irrational or ridiculous grounds are not reasonable grounds. But the words "reasonable grounds " do not denote grounds which are "not irrational, absurd or ridiculous". The statutory words are to be given their ordinary meaning. It will seldom be helpful, and it will often be misleading, to adopt some paraphrase of them.
In Attorney-General's Department v Cockcroft the Full Court of the Federal Court considered the operation of s 43(1)(c)(ii) of the Act - a provision which contained the words "could reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information". In their joint reasons, Bowen CJ and Beaumont J rightly pointed out that it was undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. Thus when their Honours said, as they did, that the words required a "judgment to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous," to expect certain consequences, they are not to be understood as having used the latter expression as a paraphrase of the former. Rather, they are to be understood, and have since been understood, as doing no more than drawing an emphatic comparison. To do more would have been, as their Honours correctly said, "to place an unwarranted gloss upon the relatively plain words of the Act". And the same approach should be taken to the expression " reasonable grounds" when it is used in s 58(5) of the Act.
It follows that the appellant was right to say that the characterization of any one reason favouring non-disclosure of documents as "non-absurd" does not of itself require an affirmative answ er to the statutory question posed in s 58(5). That is, it would be an error to treat the statutory question as requiring an affirmative answer wherever there is any "non-absurd" reason favouring non-disclosure of the documents in question.
In decidi ng whether reasonable grounds exist for a claim, the Tribunal must take account of any relevant evidence that has been adduced and of any relevant arguments that have been advanced. It must consider the particular claim that has been made and that will require consideration (and commonly the examination) of the particular documents that are in question.
...
Of course the Tribunal must decide any relevant questions of fact that are tendered for decision in the matter before it. And, if opinion evidence is given, the Tribunal may find it necessary or desirable to decide what, if any, of that evidence it accepts. But it by no means follows that, by tendering evidence of opinion about what is or is not in the public interest, a party may require the Tribunal to decide what view of the public interest is to be preferred. That is not the question that the Act presents for the Tribunal.
As indicated in the decisions referred to above, the determination as to whether the disclosure of the handwritten clinical notes could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any person is an objective one having regard to all the material before the Tribunal, including the content and character of the document in issue. In this respect I note that neither Mr Kasif or Dr Bernardi have expressed a view that they personally had at any time feared for their safety as a result of the applicant's behaviour. Although the respondent has provided material, including that provided on a confidential basis, from which it might be inferred that there were concerns about how the applicant might behave towards staff members, in my view that material does not go so far to make a finding that disclosure of the handwritten clinical notes of the applicant's son could expect to endanger the life or physical safety of staff members. Even if I am wrong, in my view the expectation, if assessed objectively from the material, is not a reasonable.
There is no dispute that the applicant believed that her son was not receiving the correct medication and the applicant said on a number of occasions that the staff were responsible for her son's death. While her beliefs may be irrationally based this does not mean that the disclosure to her of her son's handwritten clinical notes will give rise to the expectation set out in clause 4(1)(c) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. The only time the applicant made a threat to a staff member was in August 2008. It was made at a time she was clearly very concerned about the medication her son was receiving, and also the EC Treatments he was receiving. The applicant's threat appears to have been made in frustration and exasperation. I note, after this incident, no restrictions were placed on the applicant in visiting her son while in the facility. Nor did the applicant's behaviour change towards staff after this incident. She continued to be hostile towards them but there is no evidence of her having physically threatened or harmed them in any way, or having attempted to do so. Although some hearsay evidence was provided in confidence, it was not of a nature, when objectively assed with other material, to give rise to a reasonable expectation of the applicant posing a possible danger to staff if her son's clinical notes were provided to her.
I accept that the applicant was abrupt, hostile and even rude, towards staff and that she was very angry with staff when her son died. However, this does not mean that the disclosure to her of her son's handwritten clinical notes could reasonably be expect to endanger the life or physical safety of staff members. It is now almost 2 years since her son died. Since the death of her son there has been no reason for the applicant to attend the facility where her son was an inpatient. She has attended the facility on one occasion only, in 2010. Her visit was solely for the purpose of collecting her son's clothes and she attended to collect them only after having made arrangements with staff for her to do so.
I also note that, with the exception of the names of staff members and the fact that the notes were in the handwriting of staff members, the respondent has not claimed that the content of what is recorded in the handwritten clinical notes of the applicant's son could give rise to a claim for exemption under clause 4(1)(c) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act
Although I accept Dr Bernardi's evidence, in my view, her evidence has a flavour of subjectiveness. I am in no way critical of her.
In my view, when the evidence of the respondent is assessed objectively together with the evidence of the applicant, the content of the handwritten clinical notes that were provided to the Tribunal on a confidential basis, and all the other material before the Tribunal, I am unable to conclude that disclosure to the applicant of her son's handwritten notes could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of a person.
Accordingly, I find that the respondent has failed to establish that its determination, the subject of review, is justified. On this basis, I find that the determination (i.e. decision) of the respondent is not the correct and preferred decision: see section 63 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997.
In light of my findings, the appropriate order is to set aside the decision of the respondent and in substitution thereof a decision to grant the applicant access to a copy of her son's handwritten clinical notes, pursuant to subsection 25(4) of the FOI Act. I have made an order for a copy of the handwritten notes as the respondent has claimed that the notes also contain matter concerning the personal affairs of a person other than the applicant or her son, which is exempt under clause 6 of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. This has not been disputed by the applicant and in my view is appropriately claimed to be exempt and for this reason it should be deleted from the copy provide to the applicant.
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.
Registrar
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Decision last updated: 22 June 2011
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