Psychology Board of Australia v Sullivan
[2017] ACAT 104
•6 February 2017
ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PSYCHOLOGY BOARD OF AUSTRALIA v SULLIVAN (Occupational Discipline) [2017] ACAT 104
OR 38/2015
Catchwords: OCCUPATIONAL DISCIPLINE – health practitioner – psychologist – dual relationship – non-publication orders
Legislation cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 ss 7, 38, 39, 60
Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (ACT) ss 5, 39, 41, 222, 225
Legislation Act 2001 s 179
Cases cited: Craig v The Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169
Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Nurse DZ [2015] ACAT 93
Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria v Schirmer [2009] VCAT 2349
Psychology Board of Australia v D [2010] VSC 375
Psychology Board of Australia v Fox (2) [2015] ACAT 25
List of papers/
texts cited: Code of Ethics, Australian Psychological Society (2007) cl 4.3
Tribunal: Presidential Member M-T Daniel
Senior Member D Byrne
Date of Orders: 6 February 2017
Date of Reasons for Decision: 8 December 2017
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ) OR 38/2015
BETWEEN:PSYCHOLOGY BOARD
OF AUSTRALIA
Applicant
AND:CAROLYN SULLIVAN
Respondent
TRIBUNAL: Presidential Member M-T Daniel
Senior Member D Byrne
DATE:6 February 2017
ORDER
The Tribunal orders that:
The practitioner is reprimanded.
CONDITION AS TO SUPERVISION/MENTORING
The Practitioner must undergo counselling, which is a form of supervision, by another registered psychologist (the supervisor) in relation to the Psychology Board of Australia' (the Board's) Code of Ethics and the identification, development and maintenance of strategies for boundary setting with clients in psychology practice and must meet the Board's specific requirements in relation to this as follows:
(a)For the purposes of this condition, 'supervision' is defined as a professional relationship in which a skilled registered practitioner (the supervisor) helps to guide the professional development of another registered practitioner (the supervisee) to integrate professional knowledge and skills into demonstrated competencies that meet the accepted standard of performance outlined in the Board adopted code of ethics.
(b)The supervision must occur on a monthly basis for a minimum of six sessions with each session being of at least one hour's duration.
(c)The supervision should be separate from the practitioners general supervision, relating to her area of practice, which is a general practice requirement for registered psychologists
(d)Within fourteen days of the notice of the imposition of these conditions the Practitioner must nominate, on the approved form (HPN13), the names of a registered psychologist for consideration by the Board for approval.
(e)The Practitioner must ensure that the nominated practitioner is suitably skilled or experienced, holds unrestricted registration with the Board, and the nomination is accompanied by an acknowledgement, on the approved form (HPNA13), from the nominated supervisor.
(f)The nomination is accompanied by the contact details of the nominated supervisor together with a detailed copy of the nominated supervisor's curriculum vitae which demonstrates that the supervisor is senior to the practitioner by either years of experience or position and has additional training, experience and/or qualifications in order to provide the counselling required.
(g)the nominated supervisor must not be in a close collegiate, family, social or financial relationship with the practitioner.
(h)The practitioner must ensure that each nomination is accompanied by a supervision plan, signed by the nominated supervisor, outlining the form the supervision will take, how it will address the Code of Ethics and identification, development and maintenance of strategies for boundary setting with clients in psychology practice, and the proposed schedule for supervision.
The nomination must be accompanied by written confirmation from the proposed supervisor that they have read these conditions and agree to the nomination, they are not in a relationship with the practitioner as described above and they agree to provide the reports required below
(j)Within fourteen days of the notice of the imposition of these conditions the Practitioner must provide to AHPRA, on the approved form (HP13), acknowledgement that AHPRA may seek reports from the approved supervisor. The reports provided by the supervisor will include details of the number of counselling sessions including details of whether or not the practitioner has, in the opinion of the supervisor, satisfactorily participated in and understood the focus of the counselling. These reports will be sought on any or all of the following occasions:
(i) every month from the date of notice of approval of the supervisor;
(ii) at the conclusion of the minimum period of supervision required in the conditions; and
(iii) whenever the supervisor has a concern or becomes aware of a concern regarding the Practitioner's conduct or professional performance, and
(iv) when otherwise requested by AHPRA or the Board.
(k) In the event the supervisor is no longer willing or able to provide the supervision required the Practitioner must provide a new nomination to the Board in the same terms as previous nominations. Such nomination must be made by the Practitioner within 21 days of becoming aware of the termination of the supervision relationship.
(j) Within fourteen days of the conclusion of the minimum period of supervision the Practitioner must provide to the Board a report demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the Board, that the Practitioner has reflected on the issues that gave rise to the condition requiring they attend for supervision and how the Practitioner has incorporated the lessons learnt in the supervision into their practice and confirming that the Practitioner has not used the hours spent with the supervisor and the preparation of the report as part of the continuing professional development requirements for registration.
The Tribunal notes: The review period for this condition is 6 months.
CONDITION AS TO FURTHER EDUCATION
The Practitioner must undertake and successfully complete a program of education, approved by the Psychology Board of Australia and including a reflective practice report, in relation to the code of ethics, as follows:
(a)Within 6 months of the notice of the imposition of these conditions, the Practitioner must, on the approved form (HPN24), nominate for approval by the Board an education course, assessment or program (the education) addressing the topics required. The Practitioner must ensure:
a. the nomination includes a copy of the curriculum of the education
b. the education consists of a minimum of 6 hours.
(b)The Practitioner must complete the education within 6 months of the notice of the Board's approval of the education.
(c)Within 1 month of the completion of the education, the Practitioner must provide to AHPRA:
a. Evidence of successful completion of the education
b. A reflective practice report demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the Board, that the Practitioner has reflected on the issues that gave rise to this condition and how the Practitioner has incorporated the lessons learnt in the education into the Practitioner's practice.
The Tribunal notes: the review period for this condition is 12 months
GENERAL CONDITION
The following general conditions are imposed on the practitioner's registration
(a)All costs associated with compliance with the conditions on their registration are at the Practitioner's own expense.
(b)Within fourteen days of the notice of imposition of these conditions the practitioner is to provide to AHPRA, on the form provided, the details of any and all places of practice, together with, where relevant, confirmation from the senior person at each and every place of practice that they have sighted a copy of these conditions.
(c)With each and every subsequent place of practice the practitioner must, within seven days of the commencement of practice at that place, provide to AHPRA the details of the subsequent place of practice together with written confirmation, where relevant, from the senior person at each and every subsequent place of practice that they have sighted a copy of these conditions.
(d)With each and every subsequent alteration to these conditions the practitioner must, within seven days of the notice of alteration of these conditions, provide to AHPRA, written confirmation from the senior person, where relevant, at each and every place of practice that they have sighted a copy of the altered conditions.
Pursuant to section 39 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 there is to be no public access to the file for this proceeding.
The Tribunal Notes: the written reasons for decision issued in this matter will be made public, save for that part of the reasons containing personal information which will be subject to an additional non-publication order to be made at the time of publication of the reasons.
The application for interim and other orders filed 24 January 2017 is dismissed.
……………Signed…………..
Presidential Member M-T Daniel
REASONS FOR DECISION
These proceedings consist of an application for occupational discipline brought by the Psychology Board of Australia (Board) against the respondent practitioner (the practitioner) pursuant to the Health Practitioners National Law (National Law). The gravamen of the application is the allegation, which is admitted, that the practitioner commenced a sexual relationship with a client (the client) within two years of termination of the treating relationship, and failed to consult with a senior colleague before doing so. Both of these circumstances constitute a breach of the Code of Ethics issued by the Australian Psychological Society.
The factual issues in the case were the date on which the therapeutic relationship ended (if at all) and the extent to which the practitioner’s practice in the future might pose a risk to the public.
The legal issues in the matter were:
(a)whether the practitioner’s conduct should be characterised as professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct[1];
(b)whether orders imposing conditions upon the practitioner’s future practice should be made;
(c)if conditions were to be imposed, how the conditions should be phrased; and
(d)whether to make orders for a private hearing or non-publication under section 39 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACAT Act) given the personal information contained in evidence in the proceedings.
The hearing and decision
[1] Under section 5 of the National Law
The hearing was conducted over two non-consecutive days, on 3 February 2016 and 13 April 2016. The final orders were made on 2 February 2017.
When the hearing commenced on 3 February 2016 the parties had filed an agreed statement of facts but did not agree on the characterisation of the practitioner’s conduct or the orders that should be made by the Tribunal.
The agreed facts were minimally stated:
1. The [practitioner] commenced a therapeutic/treating relationship with her former client on 9 August 2011.
2. The [practitioner] engaged in 24 treatment sessions with the former client between 9 August 2011 and 4 October 2012.
3. The [practitioner] commenced the relationship with her former client less than two years (approximately 16 months) after the therapeutic relationship ended and did not, prior to commencing the relationship, consult a senior psychologist about commencing the intimate relationship with her former client, less than two years after the therapeutic relationship had been terminated, in breach of cl 4.3 of the Code of Ethics.
4. The [practitioner’s] registration has been subject to supervision conditions since 31 March 2015 and the [practitioner] has complied and engaged with those supervision conditions.
5. The [practitioner] has otherwise continued to practice as a psychologist.
During the opening statements by the parties’ representatives the Tribunal raised its concern about some vagueness in the wording of the statement of agreed facts. Specifically, it was not clear to the Tribunal, by reference to the documents filed, that the therapeutic relationship between practitioner and client had ever ended. While the last documented appointment had taken place on 4 October 2012, a treating relationship does not necessarily end because of a lack of formal or documented appointments.[2] The material before the Tribunal indicated that the client had anticipated further appointments would occur in January 2013.[3] The Tribunal asked the parties to specify the date on which it was agreed the treating relationship had ended. The parties were unable to agree on a date.
[2] Professor Love, third report dated 4 March 2016, page 6
[3] Health Record dated 19 December 2012
The Tribunal was also concerned by the paucity of the client’s health records apparently maintained by the practitioner. These had been filed with the Tribunal as a part of the documentation obtained by AHPRA in its’ investigation of the notification. These records could best be described as minimalist. It was clear from the health records for the client maintained by other health care providers, also before the Tribunal, that the client habitually engaged in lengthy and detailed email correspondence with his other health care practitioners. While there was some reference by the practitioner in her witness statements to email correspondence with the client, no such email correspondence was included in the client’s health records maintained by the practitioner.
It seemed to the Tribunal that email correspondence between the practitioner and client, being contemporaneous documents, could be of assistance in determining the date of cessation of the treating relationship as well as the point in time at which a dual relationship (whether platonic or sexual) arose. These facts would be significant for the Tribunal in determining whether the conduct of the practitioner was to be characterised as unprofessional conduct or professional misconduct.
When this second issue was raised by the Tribunal, the solicitor for the practitioner confirmed that there was email correspondence for the relevant period in the possession of the practitioner. The Tribunal then stood the matter down so that the practitioner could return home to retrieve the email correspondence.
When the matter resumed later in the day, the Tribunal was advised that the practitioner and the client had attended the home together but had been unable in the time available to retrieve all of the email correspondence for the relevant period.
The hearing was adjourned to 13 April 2016 in order to allow the parties to obtain and file telephone and email records showing the contact between the practitioner and client over the relevant period.
When the hearing resumed on 13 April 2016, the practitioner filed a bundle of email correspondence between herself and the client. This was not the entirety of the email correspondence for the relevant period, but consisted of such email correspondence as the practitioner had been able to recover.
During the adjournment the Board had issued subpoenas for telephone records for the client (for the period 9 August 2011 to 26 January 2014) and practitioner (for the period 22 September 2013 to 20 February 2014). The telephone records so obtained were also placed before the Tribunal. Further experts reports were also tendered.
At the resumed hearing on 13 April 2016, the practitioner conceded that her actions should be characterised as professional misconduct. However, the parties remained at odds in relation to the date of cessation of treatment, and what orders the Tribunal should make.
The evidence and submissions
The Tribunal had before it:
(a)the application for occupational discipline, with attached documents held by the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency relating to the receipt of the notification, investigation, immediate action decision and decision to institute disciplinary action;
(b)the Code of Ethics, Australian Psychological Society (2007) approved by the Board under section 39 of the National Law (Code of Ethics)[4];
(c)Australian Psychological Society Guidelines on managing professional boundaries and multiple relationships (2008)[5];
(d)Australian Psychological Society Guidelines on prohibition of sexual relationships with clients (2008);
(e)Australian Psychological Society Guidelines for providing psychological services and products on the internet (2008);
(f)three reports of Professor Love, an expert witness in boundary violation and boundary management;
(g)multiple reports of Dr Magor-Blatch, who had been performing a supervisory role in boundary management for the practitioner, pending finalisation of these proceedings[6];
(h)witness statements of the practitioner (some attaching letters of support);
(i)witness statements of the client;
(j)witness statements of Pamela Brown, a friend and colleague of the practitioner; and
(k)email correspondence and telephone records relating to the practitioner and client.
[4] The Code of Ethics is published on the Board’s website in accordance with section 40 of the Lational law
[5] While these and the following Guidelines are not themselves approved by the Board under section 39 of the National Law, they complement the Code of Ethics by providing specific examples and guidance in relation to the general principles set out in the code of Ethics. Accordingly, the Tribunal considers it is appropriate to have regard to the Ethical Guidelines in determining the standard of conduct expected of a registered practitioner
[6] On March 2015 the Board made an immediate action decision to impose upon the practitioner’s registration a condition to engage in such supervision, pending finalisation of the investigation and any disciplinary proceedings.
The practitioner and client each gave oral evidence to the Tribunal, as did Professor Love and Dr Magor-Blatch. At the conclusion of the hearing the decision was reserved.
The parties were given leave to file written submissions addressing the facts, the characterisation of the conduct, and the orders that should be made, including orders for non-publication of evidence given in the proceedings.
Due to the length of time during which the decision was reserved, further supervision reports of Dr Magor-Blatch were also received and considered.
On 6 February 2017 the Tribunal made its decision and made final orders requiring the practitioner to continue supervision/mentoring, with a review period of six months; to undertake further education in relation to the Code of Ethics; and for there to be no public access to the Tribunal’s file. The Tribunal indicated that it would publish written reasons for the decision with an Annexure containing such personal health information which formed the basis of findings of fact, but which the Tribunal considered should not be made publically available due to competing public interests. These are those reasons.
The findings of fact
The evidence before the Tribunal satisfied it of the following facts.
The practitioner was first registered as a psychologist in 1995. She holds a Bachelor of Arts and a Diploma of Education, attained in 1968, and a Masters of Education (1988). The practitioner’s education and training did not involve any formal study of ethics in the practice of psychology. This was not a bar to registration at that time.
Since 2002 the practitioner has worked as a sole practitioner in a private psychology practice.
On 9 August 2011 the practitioner commenced a therapeutic relationship with the client. The client was receiving services from another psychologist (the other psychologist) and was referred to the practitioner to provide ‘adjunct’ treatment for the client. It is questionable who, in the end, could be considered to be the ‘primary’ psychologist, however nothing turns on this distinction.
The practitioner had four sessions with the client, in August 2011. Around 22 August 2011 the practitioner went on leave for two weeks. After her return from leave, treatment continued for the following months September 2011 to April 2012.
The practitioner then went on an overseas trip in May, June and July 2012. The client continued seeing the other psychologist at this time.
At this time the practitioner and client exchanged some email correspondence. An email from the client to the practitioner dated 26 May 2012 states:
Hi, I’m worried you’re not getting my emails. I’ve sent you five or six over two days. Some are me effusively thanking you. I even forwarded you one as I thought that worked last time. Please let me know if you are receiving them as I really want you to have my thanks if nothing else before you leave. Thanks, [first name of client].
The practitioner replied by email that she had not received the other emails. Her response included some details of her holiday together with therapeutic advice. The tone was both polite and friendly.
The practitioner and client exchanged further emails during the period of the overseas trip, the client’s emails were noticeably personal in tone and contained updates on his state of health and personal circumstances, the practitioner in sometimes lengthy reply provided a large amount of travel information, some of her own personal information, and further therapeutic advice.
Upon her return in August 2012 the practitioner emailed the client and asked for an update on his situation. More email correspondence ensued, the content on the practitioner’s part being both therapeutic and personal. At the same time, formal sessions of treatment recommenced on 10 August 2012, and continued on 28 September and 4 October.
It is clear, from the email correspondence and the telephone records of the client that over this period of time the practitioner and client were in contact by telephone, both texting and speaking.
For example, the telephone records show that on 22 August 2012 the client had contacted the practitioner by mobile phone for almost 40 minutes.[7] There is no entry in the client’s health records maintained by the practitioner of that conversation. In an email exchange of 26 August 2012 the client wrote:
What you said to me on the phone definitely helped, I’m not sure how you know what to say or do but you certainly do know what to say! Does that mean you didn’t get my other text saying thank you? … I’ll try and call tomorrow or the next day…
[7] call duration 2397 seconds
The health records for the client maintained by the practitioner indicate that the last recorded session of treatment occurred on 4 October 2012.
The practitioner in her statements to the Board during the investigation of this matter conflated the events of the following months, with the impression given that both treatment and regular contact with the client had ceased with the appointment on 4 October 2012. The practitioner stated:
I had continued working with [client] until around October 2012. I discussed by phone his reaction to [other psychologist] leaving … as he had been unable to return … to consult with me. …
The possibility of resuming therapy (I had not seen him for fourth months)(sic) and my role as [client’s] psychologist completely ended at this time as [client] moved to Western Australia.[8]
[8] Paragraphs 37 - 39
While there is no record in the client’s health records of treatment or contact after 4 October 2012, the other contemporaneous records indicate no cessation of contact or ending of treatment before the client ultimately moved to WA in February 2013.
The telephone records indicate that the client sent text messages to the practitioner on 11 and 16 November 2012. On 21 November the client emailed the practitioner about a book he was interested in, also indicating in that email his fear of abandonment by the practitioner.[9] There is however no suggestion in that correspondence that the therapeutic relationship with the practitioner had in fact ceased, or that the client was moving to WA.
[9] Annexure A paragraph 9
On 19 December 2012 the client had a final session with the other psychologist, who was ceasing her role. There is no suggestion in the other psychologist’s notes that the client was moving to WA, or that treatment with the practitioner had ceased. On the contrary, a picture is painted of continuing treatment with the practitioner, with the next appointment due in January.
The telephone records of the client indicate that the client sent text messages to the practitioner on 6, 11, 15, 16 and 25 December 2012. In addition, at some stage, presumably after 19 December 2012, the client spoke with the practitioner about the other psychologist ceasing his treatment.
The client emailed the practitioner on 31 December 2012 effusively thanking her “for the last few days”, emphasising the high degree of trust he placed in her, and ending that he would see her the next year. The Tribunal took this to mean a continuation of treatment was planned. Startlingly, the client included with his thanks the comment “Anyway, big hug.”
The email correspondence between client and practitioner continued over January 2013. The content of this correspondence became increasingly personal on both parts. In an exchange around 1 February 2013 the client ended his email with the inexplicable comment “big hug to you (they always help), what are husbands for?” On 5 February 2013 the practitioner emailed the client a short story she had written, which she stated nobody else had seen, entitled ‘The Death of My Family’. The content of the short story, which was acknowledged to be autobiographical, was deeply personal and private.
The client departed for WA on 16 February 2013 and returned in September 2013. No arrangements were made for the client to consult with another psychologist while in WA, notwithstanding his distress less than two months earlier at the cessation of treatment with the other psychologist.
The client in his written statement dated 2 February 2015 described the relationship with the practitioner during his months in WA as follows:
…during this period [the practitioner] continued to support me by email. We discovered a series on the internet about the brain and current research which she thought might be useful to me. The series was on neuroplasticity and was beneficial to my thought processes on dealing with …
Occasionally I would ask [the practitioner] questions about how she was doing as a friend. She maintained her boundaries and was reticent to answer despite the fact our therapeutic relationship had ended and I was planning to stay in WA permanently. We eventually began a tentative friendship and talked on occasion by phone as it was painful for me to type. Those conversations did not involve any therapy.
The practitioner in her written statement of 2 February 2015 described the WA period in similar terms:
[client] contacted me to discuss some of those [treatment] options and I shared with him information from a newly published book … We also discussed a series on the neuroplasticity of the brain. We continued to communicate occasionally by email and by telephone about the brain and its role in pain and through these discussions we developed a mutual intellectual friendship. We had many discussions about neuroplasticity as we were both interested in the topic. Our communications were not therapeutic or treatment nor were they intimate. I saw them as the sharing of ideas, thought and insights about pain management and related issues in which both [client] and I had an interest. … We also spoke about recipes…
The contemporaneous records suggest that the contacts between client and practitioner over the 2013 year were more frequent and intimate than either practitioner or client now recollect. While the content of the emails which were filed in these proceedings did cover shared interests in reading and podcasts, from as early as February 2013 it also, on the practitioner’s part, included intimate personal information about the practitioner, with the client’s responses appearing to provide emotional support.
In July 2013, the practitioner separated from her husband of over 40 years. An email from the practitioner to client of 18 July reads “Thank you for being there for me this morning.” It is clear from the emails that the practitioner obtained emotional support and reassurance from the client at the time of the separation.
The email correspondence provided to the Tribunal for the WA period does not demonstrate reticence on the part of the practitioner or maintenance by her of professional boundaries, nor does it reveal the tentative development of an intellectual friendship or communications which were not therapeutic or intimate. The Tribunal rejects these descriptions of the correspondence between practitioner and client. The written communications were both therapeutic and intimate, and demonstrated failure to maintain professional boundaries on the part of the practitioner from as early as February 2013.
The client and the practitioner were also in constant contact by telephone in the 2013 year. The client sent sms messages to the practitioner, sometimes multiple times per day. For example, sms messages were sent on 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, and 28 February. Sms messages were sent by the client on ten separate dates in March, on eight days in April, thirteen days in May, seventeen days in June, ten days in July, and every day in August. This frequency of communication cannot be described as ‘occasional’, the Tribunal rejects this description of the practitioner’s telephone contact with the client.
The frequency of the telephone contact initiated by the client while he was in WA demonstrates that the client’s desire or need to have contact with the practitioner, a dependence very clearly expressed by him in his emails of 21 November 2012 and 31 December 2012, was continuing.
The telephone records of the practitioner[10] demonstrate a pattern of the practitioner often telephoning the client shortly after a sms had been sent to her from his phone. The practitioner gave oral evidence that the client would leave her a message, and that she would then telephone him back. So for example, on 24 September 2013 the client sent a sms at 1:34pm; the practitioner called the client at 1:35pm (6:21 duration). The telephone calls from practitioner to client as recorded in the practitioner’s telephone records from September 2013 were lengthy, often lasting around 30 minutes and sometimes closer to an hour.
[10] The practitioners mobile telephone records were obtained only for the period commencing 24 September 2013
The Tribunal is satisfied that this ‘call-back’ practice developed over the client’s time in WA.
It is also apparent from the content of emails that the client and practitioner also communicated by Skype, at least around September 2013.
Overall this pattern of telephone communications by sms, voice call and Skype cannot be described as ‘occasional’, and the Tribunal rejects this description. The Tribunal is satisfied that telephone contact between the client and practitioner was frequent, being often daily, and lengthy. There is no reason to conclude that the content of those communications was any different to those occurring by email, and the Tribunal infers the content of such communications was similarly personal, private and occasionally therapeutic.
The client returned from WA in September 2013. The practitioner in her written statement of 2 February 2015 described the events as follows:
[Client] contacted me on his return and we continued to speak occasionally. Sometime after Christmas 2013 I agreed to meet [client] in person for coffee when he came to Canberra. I told [client] about the separation from my husband and he said that he was concerned for me as a friend.
The client in his statement dated 2 February 2015 wrote:
I returned … in September 2013. I contacted [the practitioner] when I returned as a friend and we met for coffee. [The practitioner] told me about her separation … . When I rang her for her birthday in January she said she had no plans, so I invited her to a movie because I felt sorry for her.
The impression conveyed by these written statements is inconsistent with the pattern of contact displayed by the contemporaneous documents filed in these proceedings. Rather than contact with the client being ‘occasional’ upon his return, the telephone records indicate sms messages were sent from the client on all but three days in September, and on 20 days in October 2013. The practitioner telephoned the client on 24 September 2013 (duration 6:21), 26 September (29:12), 28 September (35:50), 29 September (22:15), 30 September (59:56 and 40:49). Similarly lengthy calls from practitioner to client occurred in October, November and December. As noted above at paragraph 45, the practitioner had told the client about her separation, by email and by telephone, at the time it had happened in July 2013.
In her oral evidence the practitioner stated that she did not ‘see’ the client from October 2012 until January 2014. It is not clear whether this was a reference to a professional consultation or a face to face meeting. The practitioner in her statement detailed that in the month of January 2014 she had two face to face social contacts with the client, culminating in the client disclosing his feelings for her. The practitioner and client both stated that the relationship between them became sexual in January 2014. The practitioner stated that over the following 12 months the relationship had grown in a slow and considered manner.
At the time of the hearing, the practitioner and client remained in a supportive personal relationship.
The Tribunal is satisfied there was never a formal end to treatment, notwithstanding the views expressed by the practitioner and client. Professor Love’s opinion was that nominating October 2012 as the time when the therapeutic relationship ended was “of dubious value”. The Tribunal agrees with Professor Love’s assessment in this regard. Given the client’s ongoing emotional dependency, the Tribunal was curious that the practitioner did not refer the client to another psychologist for ongoing treatment, at the relevant times in October or December 2012, or February 2013.
The Tribunal is satisfied that a dual relationship arose, at the latest in early 2013, and that over the period of that year the personal relationship developed but an informal therapeutic relationship continued.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the personal relationship between practitioner and client became sexual no later than the end of January 2014.
The Tribunal is satisfied from these facts, and from the evidence referenced in Annexure A, that the client was at the relevant times in a position of dependence and placed great trust in the practitioner, and was going through periods of personal stress at the time the dual relationship developed. In this regard, the Tribunal notes the witness statement of Ms Brown[11], in which she expressed the opinion that there was “no evidence of a power imbalance” in her subsequent observations of the personal relationship between the client and practitioner. Although it may be genuinely held, the Tribunal gives little weight to Ms Brown’s opinion in this regard, because of her less than objective position as a ‘confidant and supportive friend’ of the practitioner, because her opinion appears to be in regards to the later public relationship, and because Ms Brown in forming that opinion was not privy to the information now before the Tribunal.
[11] Dated 30 January 2015
The Tribunal is equally satisfied that the practitioner was under emotional stress in the 2012 and 2013 years and was vulnerable to allowing an inappropriate relationship to develop co-incident with the ending of her marriage.
Characterisation
Section 5 of the National Law defines professional misconduct and unprofessional conduct as follows:
professional misconduct, of a registered health practitioner, includes—
(a) unprofessional conduct by the practitioner that amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and
(b) more than one instance of unprofessional conduct that, when considered together, amounts to conduct that is substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered health practitioner of an equivalent level of training or experience; and
(c) conduct of the practitioner, whether occurring in connection with the practice of the health practitioner’s profession or not, that is inconsistent with the practitioner being a fit and proper person to hold registration in the profession.
…
unprofessional conduct, of a registered health practitioner, means professional conduct that is of a lesser standard than that which might reasonably be expected of the health practitioner by the public or the practitioner’s professional peers, and includes – …
The parties agreed that the conduct of the practitioner should be characterised as professional misconduct, although they acknowledged that this is a matter of which the Tribunal must be independently satisfied.
The Code of Ethics by clause 4.3(b) prohibits psychologists from engaging in sexual relationships with a former client within two years after terminating the professional relationship. Clause 4.3(c) provides that if wishing to engage in sexual activity with a former client after the two year period has passed, a psychologist should seek guidance from a senior psychologist about the possibility that the former client may be vulnerable and at risk of exploitation and must encourage the former client to seek independent counselling on the matter.
Section 41 of the National Law provides that Codes approved by a relevant Board are admissible as evidence of what constitutes appropriate professional conduct or practice.
The Tribunal is satisfied that in breaching the requirements of the Code of Ethics, the practitioner’s professional conduct was of a lesser standard than that which might reasonably be expected of the practitioner by the public or the practitioner’s professional peers, and amounted to unprofessional conduct.
Further, that unprofessional conduct was substantially below the standard reasonably expected of a registered psychologist of equivalent training and experience, and must therefore be characterised as professional misconduct. Although the practitioner was not required to complete an ethics course at the time of her registration in 1995, a practitioner of more than 20 years’ experience would be expected to keep up to date and, specifically, to know the standards (here set out in the Code and Guidelines) that apply to the profession in which he or she is registered.
The Code of Ethics states “Members are [also] reminded that lack of awareness or misunderstanding of an ethical standard is not itself a defence to an allegation of unethical conduct”[12]. Registered psychologists should be fully aware of the Code of Ethics, and to the extent that clarification of the Code is required, the complementary Guidelines.
[12] Code of Ethics page 10
As a registered psychologist the practitioner had a clear obligation to be aware of the Code of Ethics and Guidelines and adhere to them.[13]
[13] See Code of Ethics, B.1.2(c)
We accept the submissions of the Board, which are not contested, that by commencing a sexual relationship with the client as she did, less than two years after the therapeutic relationship had ceased and without first consulting a peer, the practitioner engaged in conduct which is professional misconduct.
It was submitted on behalf of the practitioner that her entering into a friendship or platonic relationship with the client was not in breach of the Code of Ethics, because such action was not specifically prohibited. Clause C.3.1 of the Code of Ethics requires, in summary, that psychologists refrain from engaging in multiple relationships that may impair their objectivity or ability to render a psychological service, harm clients or lead to exploitation of clients. The Guidelines for managing professional boundaries and multiple relationships outline the risk factors that were present in this case, and the steps the practitioner should have taken, emphasising that the responsibility for maintaining professional boundaries at all times rests with the psychologist. Given the personal stresses upon the practitioner at the relevant times, and given the vulnerability and dependence of the client, these risks highlighted in Clause C.3.1 of the Code of Ethics were manifest. The Tribunal is satisfied that Clause C.3.1 was clearly engaged so as to prohibit the practitioner from engaging in a platonic relationship of the kind and intensity, and in the way, that she did.
There are other aspects of this case in which the practitioner appears to have been unaware, and/or fallen short, of the standards of practice set out in the Code and Guidelines:
(a)The end of treatment in 2012, if it was intended to have ended, was not managed appropriately.[14]
(b)The practitioner failed to maintain appropriate records of her consultations with the client, notably failing to keep email correspondence or record her telephone consultations occurring in 2012.[15]
(c)The practitioner failed to avoid multiple boundary crossings, ultimately entering into a dual relationship (friendship) with the client.[16]
[14] See Code of Ethics B.11.2 and B.11.3
[15] See Code of Ethics B.2.1
[16] See code of Ethics C.3.1 and C.3.2, and B.3.(g)
In hindsight, adherence by the practitioner to the requirements of the Code and Guidelines in these respects may well have averted the events that have now led to a finding of professional misconduct.
The practitioner’s insight and knowledge
Much of the evidence before the Tribunal, and a significant focus of the parties’ submissions, addressed whether the practitioner now had insight or knowledge. These matters are important because a practitioner who has knowledge of their obligations and applicable standards of practice, together with insight into their own personal drivers and needs, is unlikely to pose a risk to the public in their practice.
The practitioner in her statement to AHPRA dated 2 February 2015 wrote:
I sincerely believe that the therapeutic relationship had ended in at least October 2012 and appropriate boundaries were set and maintained during that period between.
I did not then and do not now believe that I entered into a dual relationship. … I do not believe that either I or [client] were impulsive or that [client] was in a position of vulnerability but rather that our relationship had changed over a significant period of time … this was a personal relationship which I entered into having carefully and at length considered my position…[17]
[17] Paragraph 70 ff
The practitioner in her oral evidence remained unable to acknowledge that the client was vulnerable, notwithstanding the content of the email correspondence and patterns of telephone contact in evidence before the Tribunal. The dogged maintenance of this position in the face of the objective information was surprising and indicative of a lack of perspective. The practitioner also seemed in her oral evidence to find it difficult to accept that she was herself vulnerable at the time in 2013 when her marriage was breaking down, again notwithstanding the content of her emails.
The practitioner gave evidence that her thought processes in January 2014 were in terms of not harming or exploiting the client. The practitioner seemed to be, at the time of the hearing, largely oblivious to the fact that a client can be exploited or harmed through the development of a platonic as well as a sexual relationship, this notwithstanding that Dr Magor-Blatch had spent some time working with the practitioner on client vulnerability and power imbalance in the treating relationship.
The practitioner considered her email correspondence to the client in 2012 had been professional, rather than personal, seeming to justify her assessment with the information that she had had other email exchanges with clients that had not ended in sexual relationships.
Professor Love in his evidence considered that the email correspondence even while the practitioner was overseas in 2012 contained information relating to the practitioner of a personal nature, which was disclosed ‘inappropriately and inadvisedly’ to the client. Professor Love pointed out that the email correspondence at this time demonstrated that the professional relationship had become in his terms ‘porous’ with personal information being revealed alongside information which related to the professional relationship.
Professor Love opined that a ‘prudent’ psychologist would at that time have taken stock and addressed this with the patient, or sought guidance from peers as to how to address the issue. Professor Love gave it as his view that the situation was dangerous in the sense that once enmeshed in a non-professional relationship, it is easy for a practitioner to lose perspective about whose interests are being protected. Professor Love explained that notwithstanding rationalisations that psychologists in these situations may make, what is in the best interests of a client is not to form a personal relationship with their psychologist. Such relationships “can have repercussions decades down the track.”
Dr Magor-Blatch in her evidence detailed the educative element of her supervision of the practitioner, including assignment work and implementing changes to practice. Dr Magor-Blatch also referenced the ‘vigorousness’ with which the practitioner had discussed aspects of the Code of Ethics in the context of the circumstances of this case, such as when considering the email correspondence.
The evidence of Dr Magor-Blatch was that the practitioner was developing insight and implementing processes to reduce the risk of boundary transgression in the future. Professor Love also gave evidence that in his view the practitioner now posed little risk to the public, and that while she had demonstrated little insight initially her understanding was developing.
While making allowance for the stress of giving oral evidence, the practitioner nonetheless seemed to the Tribunal to continue to have a superficial knowledge of the Code of Ethics, which she drew upon to justify her perceived position, rather than an awareness of how the principles embodied in the Code had been breached in this case. Her position appeared to be better described as defensive rather than contemplative. The practitioner also appeared to misunderstand the requirements of the Code of Ethics in relation to multiple (platonic) relationships.
Orders
As submitted by the parties, the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is protective.[18]
[18] Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria v Schirmer [2009] VCAT 2349; Craig v The Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169
The Board submitted that the practitioner should be reprimanded and her registration subject to conditions requiring a further period of supervision or counselling by a Board appointed supervisor, with a review period of six months.
The practitioner submitted that a reprimand alone would be an appropriate outcome, the practitioner having already engaged in a significant period of counselling. The practitioner pointed out that by the time of the final hearing in April 2016 the practitioner had undergone almost 12 months of counselling.
The practitioner pointed out that all of the expert evidence before the Tribunal (including Professor Love) indicated that the practitioner was rated a minimal risk to the public, that she was developing an understanding of the Code of Ethics and had engaged in vigorous and active debate with her supervisor in that regard, and that her understanding of boundary issues had deepened over the period of supervision.
The facts of this matter show that the practitioner breached the Code of Ethics in a way which could have had very serious ramifications for the client. It is submitted by the practitioner that she has developed insight into what went wrong, and consequently poses no risk to the public. The evidence before the Tribunal does not allow it to accept that submission.
The practitioner’s oral evidence did not fill the Tribunal with any confidence as to the practitioner’s general knowledge of what is required of a competent practitioner in managing relationships with clients, her understanding of what occurred in this particular case, or her ability to avoid a future blurring of professional boundaries.
In considering how to protect the public, the Tribunal is concerned not merely with the risk to the public of the practitioner developing a sexual relationship with a future client, but with the broader question of the practitioner’s ability to identify when a dual relationship is developing and manage that appropriately and in a client-centred manner.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner has a developing understanding of the Code of Ethics, and has started to take steps to change the way she maintains client records and uses email in order to keep her professional boundaries clear and manage records appropriately.
However, the Tribunal is concerned that the practitioner, despite the past supervision, remains defensive and lacking in understanding of management of dual relationships with clients.
While both Dr Magor-Blatch and Professor Love did not see the need for Board imposed supervision, Dr Magor-Blatch pointed out that as a general rule psychologists benefit from ongoing supervision, and that she would suggest the practitioner have ongoing supervision with a senior psychologist who practices in the area. While the practitioner indicated she proposed to implement ongoing informal supervision with a senior peer, the Tribunal has no confidence that without an order the practitioner would persist with suitably independent and experienced supervision.
The orders the Tribunal makes in this matter are first to issue a reprimand to the practitioner. The issuing of the reprimand is a formal statement of the Tribunal’s disapproval of the conduct engaged in by the practitioner, and sends a message to the broader profession and public that such conduct is unacceptable.
Secondly, the Tribunal will require the practitioner to undertake a formal course of study of Ethics, which will rectify the historic gap in the practitioner’s training. Although some of the content may have been addressed in supervision sessions with Dr Magor-Blatch, the Code of Ethics covers more concepts than the presenting problem of dual relationships, and it is in the view of the Tribunal essential that the practitioner’s training be entirely brought up to date.
Thirdly, the Tribunal requires that the practitioner actively engage in a further period of supervision to assist her to practice safely while she undertakes the formal course of study of ethics, develops her understanding on a personal level, and embeds changes to her practice to allow her to practice at the required standard into the future. A six-month review period will be set, which means that within that six-month period the practitioner may not apply to the Board to cease counselling. However, at any time after the review period is reached the practitioner may seek to remove this condition.
The Tribunal understands that the requirement to undergo further counselling has a financial impact upon the practitioner, and will be seen by her as punitive. However the Tribunal is persuaded that any negative impact is outweighed by the need for the practitioner to further reflect on the ethical issues of boundary separation which the Tribunal believed were not sufficiently demonstrated either in her oral or written evidence.
It was submitted on behalf of the practitioner that the wording of the proposed condition as to counselling provides no certain endpoint, and leaves the cessation or lifting of the condition in the discretion of the Board. It was submitted on behalf the practitioner that this was inappropriate because of the lack of finality of the proceedings, and because it reserved to the Board a decision which should be that of the Tribunal. The Tribunal does not accept this submission.
Unlike a condition to undertake a course of study, which can be demonstrated to have been achieved by the successful completion of the course, the imposition of supervision or counselling is aimed at enabling the practitioner to develop skills or competencies to practice appropriately while unsupervised, an outcome which is less easily assessed and not necessarily determined by the passage of time. The National Law deals with these difficulties by providing for the imposition of a condition on registration which has a review period before which it may not be lifted. It is the role of the Board, upon review of the condition, to consider whether the aims of supervision have been met such that the condition may be removed. If the Board refuses to remove the condition after review, it is open to the practitioner to apply to have the Board’s decision reviewed by the Tribunal.
The decision to hold a private hearing and make non-publication orders
Proceedings before the Tribunal are required to be public,[19] unless legislation provides otherwise[20] or the Tribunal orders otherwise. In the usual course of events any member of the public can attend an occupational discipline hearing, and the written reasons for the decision will be published online. As a concomitant of the obligation to provide a public hearing, documents which were before the Tribunal for the hearing are usually able to be viewed by the public should a request be made to inspect the Tribunal’s file. With limited exception[21], the names of parties to an occupational discipline matter are also available to the public through the daily lists, the reasons for decision, or upon inspecting a file.
[19] ACAT Act section 38
[20] See for example the Mental Health Act 2015, section 194
[21] Section 423A of the Legal Profession Act 2006 specifies that disciplinary proceedings in the Tribunal in relation to lawyers are de-identified until all appeal processes are finalised
Although there is an important public interest served by this transparency, competing private and public interests can in some cases outweigh the public interest served by a public hearing. Section 39 of the ACAT Act provides the mechanism by which specified competing interests are weighed up, and gives the Tribunal power in appropriate cases to make orders for a private hearing or restricting publication of information in relation to the hearing:
39 Hearings in private or partly in private
(1) This section applies in relation to an application, or part of an application, if the tribunal is satisfied that the right to a public hearing is outweighed by competing interests.
Note See s (5) in relation to competing interests.
(2) The tribunal may, by order, do 1 or more of the following:
(a) direct that the hearing of the application, or part of the hearing, take place in private and give directions about the people who may be present;
(b) give directions prohibiting or restricting the publication of evidence given at the hearing, whether in public or private, or of matters contained in documents filed with the tribunal or received in evidence by the tribunal for the hearing;
(c) give directions prohibiting or restricting the disclosure to some or all of the parties to the application of evidence given at the hearing, or of a matter contained in a document lodged with the tribunal or received in evidence by the tribunal for the hearing.
(3) The tribunal may make an order under subsection (2) on application by a party or on its own initiative.
(4) A person must not contravene an order under subsection (2) (b) or (c).
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units, imprisonment for 6 months or both.
(5) For this section, the right to a public hearing is outweighed by competing interests if the tribunal is satisfied that the application, or part of the application, should be kept private—
(a) to protect morals, public order or national security in a democratic society; or
(b) because the interest of the private lives of the parties require the privacy; or
(c) to the extent privacy is strictly necessary, in special circumstances of the application, because publicity would otherwise prejudice the interests of justice.
In this matter, on 9 November 2015 after a short hearing, the Tribunal made orders under section 39 of the ACAT Act restricting public access to the documents filed with the Tribunal until further order. The parties consented to those orders. When the substantive hearing commenced on 3 February 2016 the Tribunal made further orders that the hearing would take place in private, and that there be no access by the public to the audio or transcript of the hearing. Those orders were not opposed by the parties.
The non-publication and private hearing orders were precipitated because the vast majority of the information contained in the documents before the Tribunal consisted of personal health information of the client, interspersed with personal information relating to the practitioner and the notifiers. Most of the personal health information, in particular, fell within the operation of the Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997 which would oblige a person in possession of that information to maintain its confidentiality except in specified circumstances.
Subsection 39(5) of the ACAT Act does not expressly provide for the private interests of third parties such as the client to be taken into account as outweighing the public interest served by a public hearing.
In this case, the Tribunal was satisfied that the right to a public hearing, and specifically the interest served by public access to the documents filed with the Tribunal and public attendance during the hearing, was outweighed by the prejudicial effect that public access to the information contained in those documents and discussed during the hearing would have on the interests of justice. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was contrary to the interests of justice for private health information relating to named third parties, normally subject to statutory confidentiality obligations, to become publicly available as an incident of the bringing of disciplinary proceedings against a practitioner. Not only does such an approach undermine the objectives of the Health Records (Privacy and Access) Act 1997, the inevitable consequence of such disclosure routinely occurring would be a reluctance on the part of clients to notify regulatory bodies of inappropriate conduct, or to participate in subsequent disciplinary proceedings.[22] Conducting the hearing publically, but with adjustments to de-identify the client or minimise the amount of personal health information being openly discussed, would be cumbersome, lengthen the hearing and become administratively inefficient, contrary to the objectives set out in section 7 of the ACAT Act.
[22] See the principles set out in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd & Anor v District Court of NSW & Ors [2004] NSWCA 324
Accordingly, in advance of the hearing the Tribunal ordered that there be no public access to the file pending further order, that the hearing of the disciplinary application take place in private, and that there be no public access to the transcript or audio recording of the hearing.
After an occupational discipline hearing, in the ordinary course of events, a decision would be made with written reasons provided to the parties and also published. The written reasons would ordinarily name the practitioner, and witnesses, and set out findings of fact together with the evidence on which those findings were made.[23] The Board would then, in accordance with its obligations under the National Law[24], record in the public register outcomes such as any reprimand issued by the Tribunal, suspension of practice or conditions imposed upon the practitioner’s registration.
[23] Section 60 of the ACAT Act and section 179 of the Legislation Act 2001
[24] Sections 222 and 225 of the National Law
At the conclusion of the hearing in this matter, the practitioner sought a continuation of the non-access and non-publication orders, and also sought that there be no publication of the reasons for decision other than to the parties.
While de-identification of the client in published reasons might be one way to address the issue of sensitive personal health information, it was submitted by the practitioner that because of the unique medical information and the circumstances of the case, including the facts that the practitioner and client continued to have a personal relationship, the outcome would be recorded against the practitioner on the public register, and the small number of practitioners in the ACT, the use of a pseudonym in relation to the client was unlikely to prevent a member of one sector of the public identifying the client, and thus his personal health information.
The practitioner also submitted that the release of detailed reasons setting out the personal interactions between the client and practitioner was likely to damage or impact upon the ongoing relationship between the practitioner and the client and might be misunderstood or misused by the notifiers. It was further submitted that if the Tribunal made a finding that the practitioner and the client were in a dual relationship from 31 December 2012 then any information passing between the practitioner and client for that period must by necessary definition be considered to be part of the client’s private and confidential medical records and therefore be withheld from publication.
For all of these reasons, the practitioner requested the Tribunal publish the reasons for decision only to the parties and by order require that no party publish those reasons further without leave of the Tribunal. The practitioner sought that the order preventing public access to the file be maintained. The practitioner sought that the Board be permitted to record on the public register only the findings as to characterisation, any reprimand and conditions imposed upon the practitioner’s registration and no further information.
The Board agreed that the orders preventing public access to the file and record of proceedings should be continued, but opposed orders restricting publication of the reasons for decision, on the basis that the public interest in reasons for the decision being made publically available outweighed the other interests, which it submitted could be addressed by de-identification. The Board noted the legislated requirement that hearings be public, as the default position, and referred the Tribunal to the open justice principle and the approach to section 39 of the ACAT Act established in previous cases.[25]
[25] Psychology Board of Australia v Fox (2) [2015] ACAT 25; Health Care Complaints Commission v BXD (No 2) [2015] NSWCATOD 135; Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Nurse DZ [2015] ACAT 93 and Psychology Board of Australia v D [2010] VSC 375
The Board submitted:
(a)there is a public interest in the findings of the Tribunal, the nature of the breaches, the consequences for the practitioner of those breaches and the reasoning process of the Tribunal being published;
(b)the health records of the client could be protected by continuation of the non-publication orders and by maintaining de-identification in any reasons published by referring to the client as ‘the ex-patient’;
(c)any non-publication orders should be limited only to those that are strictly necessary to ensure the interests of justice are not prejudiced by publication of the reasons;
(d)to the extent that it might be necessary to prevent identification of the client or to prevent disclosure of his health records, it might be necessary to de-identify the practitioner in any published reasons by referring to the practitioner by a pseudonym; and
(e)otherwise, the reasons of the Tribunal should be published in full.
The Tribunal notes the Board’s obligation to maintain a public register of practitioners, specifying any conditions or disciplinary outcomes. Given the small size of the ACT jurisdiction, any de-identification of the practitioner in these reasons would be unsuccessful in maintaining the anonymity of the practitioner. Given the ongoing relationship between practitioner and client, which is public, de-identification of the client in these reasons for decision will be equally ineffective to that sector of the public which knows the client and the practitioner – an audience which the client can be assumed to not wish to be privy to his confidential medical records.
The Tribunal considers that there is an overwhelming public interest in the reasons for a disciplinary decision, setting out the findings of fact, conclusions as to characterisation of the conduct and orders which are appropriate, being published. While these written reasons include personal information of the practitioner and the client, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the publication of contents of the emails, or the dates and durations of telephone contacts, being information known to them would be likely to damage their relationship, nor would it impact on the interests of the private life of the practitioner to such a degree as to outweigh the public interest in a public hearing.
However, the Tribunal is concerned that some information on which findings integral to this decision are based is private health information of the client. There is little public interest served by the disclosure of such information to the public. The Tribunal is satisfied that the interests served by maintaining confidentiality of such information can be addressed by issuing reasons for decision to the parties which contain such information as an annexure which is provided only to the parties.
These reasons for decision, without the annexure, will be published. Orders will be made at the time of publication of the reasons for decision, restricting publication of the annexure. The orders of 3 February 2016 prohibiting public access to the audio or transcription of the hearing remain in place, as do the orders of 6 February 2017 providing that there is to be no public access to the Tribunal’s file. In this way, both the interests of justice served by the public hearing, and the interests of justice served by maintaining the confidentiality of third party health information, can be served.
………………………………..
Presidential Member M-T Daniel
HEARING DETAILS
FILE NUMBER: | OR 38/2015 |
PARTIES, APPLICANT: | Psychology Board of Australia |
PARTIES, RESPONDENT: | Carolyn Sullivan |
COUNSEL APPEARING, APPLICANT | Ms Tarbet |
COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT | Mr Tierney |
SOLICITORS FOR APPLICANT | ACT Government Solicitor |
SOLICITORS FOR RESPONDENT | Ken Cush & Associates |
TRIBUNAL MEMBERS: | Presidential Member M-T Daniel, Member, Senior Member D Byrne |
DATES OF HEARING: | 3 February 2016 & 13 April 2016 |
3
5
0