Psomas (Trustee), in the matter of Moran (Bankrupt)

Link copied
Case Copied 49 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Psomas (Trustee), in the matter of Moran (Bankrupt) [2024] FCA 1259

File number(s): WAD 47 of 2024
Judgment of: MCDONALD J
Date of judgment: 31 October 2024
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application to set aside or vary examination summonses – application to set aside or vary orders for production of documents – where summonses and orders alleged to be invalid – whether compliance with summonses would be oppressive – examination summonses set aside in part – orders for production of documents set aside
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Broadway Plaza Investments Pty Ltd v Broadway Plaza Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 410

Karounos v Official Trustee (1988) 19 FCR 330

Re Osenton; Ex parte Osenton v Worrell (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 3 March 1995, BC9507765, Cooper J)

Roufeil v Fiore, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Peter Andrew Fiore (No 2) [2019] FCA 916

Shangri-La Constructions Pty Ltd v Hyatt, in the matter of GVE Hampton Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 1577

Smorgon v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 143 CLR 499

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 89
Date of hearing: 17 September 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms P A Honey
Solicitor for the Applicant: CX Law
Counsel for the First Interested Party: Mr J L Winton
Solicitor for the First Interested Party: Tudori Hager Grubb
Counsel for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Interested Parties: Mr M D Cuerden SC
Solicitor for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Interested Parties: Di Lena Defamation & Litigation

ORDERS

WAD 47 of 2024

IN THE MATTER OF RUSSELL HAROLD MORAN (A BANKRUPT)

BETWEEN:

MARIA PSOMAS AS THE TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF RUSSELL HAROLD MORAN

Applicant

AND:

RUSSELL HAROLD MORAN

First Interested Party

FIONA MARISA PATERSON

Second Interested Party

CANDICE MARGARET STEVENSON (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Interested Party

ORDER MADE BY:

MCDONALD J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Each of the following summonses be discharged insofar as it requires the person to whom it is addressed to produce documents, namely:

(a)the summons for examination addressed to Russell Harold Moran dated 1 May 2024;

(b)the summons for examination addressed to Fiona Marisa Paterson dated 1 May 2024;

(c)the summons for examination addressed to Candice Margaret Stevenson dated 1 May 2024;

(d)the summons for examination addressed to Nicholas John Mann dated 1 May 2024; and

(e)the summons for examination addressed to Gino D’Anna dated 1 May 2024.

2.Orders 2, 3 and 4 of the orders made by Registrar Trott on 1 May 2024 be set aside.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCDONALD J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The issues with which this judgment is concerned arise out of the bankruptcy of Russell Harold Moran. On…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Psomas (Trustee), in the matter of Moran (Bankrupt) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] FCA 1259
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Psomas (Trustee), in the matter of Moran (Bankrupt), the court addressed an application to set aside or vary examination summonses and orders for production of documents. The application was brought by the trustee, seeking information relevant to the bankrupt's assets and transactions, but the summonses were contested on the basis of their validity and oppressiveness. The court found that the summonses were substantially invalid due to their broad and unclear descriptions of documents, and that compliance with the summonses would be oppressive to the recipients. The court considered the need to balance the interests of creditors, the recipients of the summons, and the administration of justice.

The legal issues before the court included whether the summonses were validly issued, whether they were oppressive, and what discretion the court had to amend or set aside the summonses. The court held that it had the discretion to set aside or amend the summonses, taking into account the interests of all parties. The court concluded that the summonses should be set aside in part because they were beyond the scope of what was authorised by the Bankruptcy Act and were oppressive in certain respects. The court found that the summonses required recipients to assess whether documents evidenced particular facts, which was objectionable. Additionally, some categories of documents were described too broadly, capturing documents likely to be privileged. The court also found that the summonses did not confine the categories of documents sought to those in the possession of the person summoned, rendering them invalid.

Ultimately, the court discharged the summonses insofar as they required the production of documents and set aside certain orders made by the registrar. The trustee was permitted to apply for further orders, provided they were carefully drafted. The court exercised its discretion, finding that the invalidity of the summonses and their oppressive nature justified setting them aside rather than merely amending them. The court considered the potential delay and costs to creditors if the summonses were set aside and new ones issued, but found that the delay could have been avoided by the trustee issuing valid summonses earlier. The court's decision aimed to ensure that the summonses were appropriately limited and that the interests of all parties were fairly balanced.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Each of the following summonses be discharged insofar as it requires the person to whom it is addressed to produce documents, namely:

(a) the summons for examination addressed to Russell Harold Moran dated 1 May 2024;

(b) the summons for examination addressed to Fiona Marisa Paterson dated 1 May 2024;

(c) the summons for examination addressed to Candice Margaret Stevenson dated 1 May 2024;

(d) the summons for examination addressed to Nicholas John Mann dated 1 May 2024; and

(e) the summons for examination addressed to Gino D’Anna dated 1 May 2024.

2. Orders 2, 3 and 4 of the orders made by Registrar Trott on 1 May 2024 be set aside.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

To be clear, I do not consider that it is objectionable or oppressive for a summons to seek a class of documents merely because some of them may, or will, be covered by legal professional privilege; the oppression lies in defining a category that, of its very nature, is likely to capture a great many privileged documents, in circumstances where a more narrowly described category (or categories) could be stated which would largely or wholly achieve the Trustee’s purpose, without putting Mr Moran to the time and possible expense of making and justifying claims of legal professional privilege. For example, I do not consider that it would be oppressive for a summons to require Mr Moran to produce all documents in his possession that record the value of legal services provided to him by his lawyers in relation to the three proceedings, even though that category might well include some communications which are subject in whole or part to legal professional privilege.Descriptions of documents by reference to what they “evidence” I accept that, generally speaking, it is undesirable that summonses should be issued in terms that require the recipient of the summons to assess whether they “evidence” particular transactions or facts: see Shangri-La Constructions Pty Ltd v Hyatt, in the matter of GVE Hampton Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] FCA 1577 at [126] and [129]; Broadway Plaza Investments Pty Ltd v Broadway Plaza Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 410 at [138]. To describe documents in that way requires the recipient of a summons not merely to make a factual judgement by reference to the content of each document but to make an assessment of the capacity of the content of a document to be probative of a particular fact; an assessment that can only sensibly be made in light of an understanding of other evidence. Moreover, the degree of relevance necessary before a document can be said to evidence a fact is uncertain. That is not necessarily to say that it can never be permissible to describe a category of documents to be produced by reference to what they evidence. It is possible, for example, that in the circumstances of a particular case, a description of documents as “evidencing” a particular identifiable transaction may be sufficiently confined that it is not oppressive to require the recipient of a summons to make that judgement, especially if the recipient is someone familiar with the particular transaction or if the documents evidencing the transaction are likely to be easily exhaustively identifiable. However, in these summonses, each description of what the produceable documents are to “evidence” is itself very broad. I accept the recipients’ submissions that the summonses are objectionable insofar as they require the recipients to make an assessment as to whether documents evidence particular facts. I accept that items 3-10 and 13 in the summons issued to Mr Moran, and all of the items in the summonses issued to the other recipients, are objectionable on this basis.Category of documents said to be unclear

Decision

Reasons for decision

Again, it will be open to the Trustee to make a new application for orders under s 81(11A) requiring Ms Paterson and Ms Stevenson (in their respective capacities as the proper officers of corporations associated with Mr Moran) to produced documents in their possession, providing they are appropriately limited.CONCLUSION Each of the summonses will be discharged insofar as it requires the person to whom it is addressed to produce documents. The Additional Orders, being orders 2, 3 and 4 made by the registrar on 1 May 2024, will be set aside. The Trustee will be at liberty to apply for further orders under s 81(11A) as she sees fit, providing that they are carefully drafted taking into account these reasons. I will hear the parties as to costs and any other orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I incline to the view that the Court has the power to make orders which have this effect, which can be described by the shorthand of “amending” a summons. By s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) the Court is given a broad “power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, … as the Court thinks appropriate”. In any event, in Osenton, Cooper J held, and did not merely assume, that the Court had the power to amend a summons: see also Fiore (No 2) at [78]. I consider that I should follow that decision. I proceed on the basis that I do have the power to make an order of the kind I have described. The power is discretionary.Consideration of the discretion to set aside or amend the summonses I did not understand there to be any dispute between the parties that, in deciding whether to discharge a summons, the Court exercises a discretion which requires it to weigh the interests of:(a)creditors in discovering what assets the bankrupt had, what became of them, and whether action should be taken to recover them;(b)creditors in not having the bankrupt estate needlessly diminished by the issue of summonses for examination which are too broad;(c)recipients of the summons (including the bankrupt) in ensuring that the use of the extraordinary power does not unnecessarily cause them “real harm”; and(d)the administration of justice in ensuring that the extraordinary power is responsibly exercised, only when necessary, and only so far is as necessary, to achieve the purpose for which the power is conferred. Given that the summonses are at least substantially invalid, they should not be allowed to stand in their current form. The discretion to be exercised is as between setting aside or discharging the summonses, and ordering that they be “amended” in the sense I have described above. One consideration that weighs in favour of discharging the summonses and against amending them in the present case is that, in light of my conclusions at [30]-[67] above, there are a number of respects in which I consider the requirements of the summonses as presently drafted to be beyond the scope of what is authorised by s 81 of the Bankruptcy Act (and, in some instances, oppressive). All of the categories of documents in all the summonses are affected. Amendment of each of the summonses to address those issues would not merely involve the insertion of a simple textual formula limiting the documents sought to those in the possession of the person to whom the summons is addressed; it would involve the Court effectively redrafting several paragraphs of each of the summonses. That is not a task that would necessarily be impossible in this case, but it is a task that is most appropriately undertaken by the Trustee. It would involve choices that may be informed by what is known to the Trustee but is not before this Court. If the summonses were set aside in their entirety, it would be open to the Trustee to issue fresh summonses which are valid and which seek categories of documents described or limited so as to avoid the features which I have found to be oppressive. I accept that, if I were to make an order setting aside the summonses rather than “amending” them, and assuming the Trustee did then issue fresh summonses, that would likely result in some further delay in the administration of the bankruptcy compared with the making of an order amending the summonses. I accept that any such delay may generally be assumed to be to the prejudice of creditors. However, there was no submission as to, or evidence of, any particular prejudice to the creditors that would be occasioned by a short further delay in the event that the summonses were set aside and the Trustee elected to issue fresh summonses. Moreover, the Trustee has accepted since at least 9 September 2024 (and must have realised earlier than that, this ground of objection having been identified by the recipients in documents filed in May 2024) that each of the summonses was invalid due to its failure to confine the categories of documents sought to documents in the possession of the person summonsed. The delay could have been avoided almost entirely had the Trustee (or her predecessor) elected not to rely upon the summonses and instead issued fresh summonses after the defects in the summonses were identified. The additional costs of issuing further summonses would have been modest compared with the costs of the contested hearing that has occurred. In these circumstances, in the exercise of the discretion I give only relatively slight weight to the impact of delay on the interests of the creditors in the efficient administration of this bankruptcy.