FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Psomas (Trustee), in the matter of Moran (Bankrupt) [2024] FCA 1259
File number(s): WAD 47 of 2024 Judgment of: MCDONALD J Date of judgment: 31 October 2024 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – application to set aside or vary examination summonses – application to set aside or vary orders for production of documents – where summonses and orders alleged to be invalid – whether compliance with summonses would be oppressive – examination summonses set aside in part – orders for production of documents set aside Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth)
Cases cited: Broadway Plaza Investments Pty Ltd v Broadway Plaza Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 410
Karounos v Official Trustee (1988) 19 FCR 330
Re Osenton; Ex parte Osenton v Worrell (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 3 March 1995, BC9507765, Cooper J)
Roufeil v Fiore, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Peter Andrew Fiore (No 2) [2019] FCA 916
Smorgon v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 143 CLR 499
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 89 Date of hearing: 17 September 2024 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms P A Honey Solicitor for the Applicant: CX Law Counsel for the First Interested Party: Mr J L Winton Solicitor for the First Interested Party: Tudori Hager Grubb Counsel for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Interested Parties: Mr M D Cuerden SC Solicitor for the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Interested Parties: Di Lena Defamation & Litigation ORDERS
WAD 47 of 2024 IN THE MATTER OF RUSSELL HAROLD MORAN (A BANKRUPT)
BETWEEN: MARIA PSOMAS AS THE TRUSTEE OF THE ESTATE OF RUSSELL HAROLD MORAN
Applicant
AND: RUSSELL HAROLD MORAN
First Interested Party
FIONA MARISA PATERSON
Second Interested Party
CANDICE MARGARET STEVENSON (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Interested Party
ORDER MADE BY:
MCDONALD J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 OCTOBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Each of the following summonses be discharged insofar as it requires the person to whom it is addressed to produce documents, namely:
(a)the summons for examination addressed to Russell Harold Moran dated 1 May 2024;
(b)the summons for examination addressed to Fiona Marisa Paterson dated 1 May 2024;
(c)the summons for examination addressed to Candice Margaret Stevenson dated 1 May 2024;
(d)the summons for examination addressed to Nicholas John Mann dated 1 May 2024; and
(e)the summons for examination addressed to Gino D’Anna dated 1 May 2024.
2.Orders 2, 3 and 4 of the orders made by Registrar Trott on 1 May 2024 be set aside.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCDONALD J:
INTRODUCTION
The issues with which this judgment is concerned arise out of the bankruptcy of Russell Harold Moran. On…
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- Case
- [2024] FCA 1259
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the summonses were validly issued, whether they were oppressive, and what discretion the court had to amend or set aside the summonses. The court held that it had the discretion to set aside or amend the summonses, taking into account the interests of all parties. The court concluded that the summonses should be set aside in part because they were beyond the scope of what was authorised by the Bankruptcy Act and were oppressive in certain respects. The court found that the summonses required recipients to assess whether documents evidenced particular facts, which was objectionable. Additionally, some categories of documents were described too broadly, capturing documents likely to be privileged. The court also found that the summonses did not confine the categories of documents sought to those in the possession of the person summoned, rendering them invalid.
Ultimately, the court discharged the summonses insofar as they required the production of documents and set aside certain orders made by the registrar. The trustee was permitted to apply for further orders, provided they were carefully drafted. The court exercised its discretion, finding that the invalidity of the summonses and their oppressive nature justified setting them aside rather than merely amending them. The court considered the potential delay and costs to creditors if the summonses were set aside and new ones issued, but found that the delay could have been avoided by the trustee issuing valid summonses earlier. The court's decision aimed to ensure that the summonses were appropriately limited and that the interests of all parties were fairly balanced.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Each of the following summonses be discharged insofar as it requires the person to whom it is addressed to produce documents, namely:
(a) the summons for examination addressed to Russell Harold Moran dated 1 May 2024;
(b) the summons for examination addressed to Fiona Marisa Paterson dated 1 May 2024;
(c) the summons for examination addressed to Candice Margaret Stevenson dated 1 May 2024;
(d) the summons for examination addressed to Nicholas John Mann dated 1 May 2024; and
(e) the summons for examination addressed to Gino D’Anna dated 1 May 2024.
2. Orders 2, 3 and 4 of the orders made by Registrar Trott on 1 May 2024 be set aside.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I incline to the view that the Court has the power to make orders which have this effect, which can be described by the shorthand of “amending” a summons. By s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) the Court is given a broad “power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, … as the Court thinks appropriate”. In any event, in Osenton, Cooper J held, and did not merely assume, that the Court had the power to amend a summons: see also Fiore (No 2) at [78]. I consider that I should follow that decision. I proceed on the basis that I do have the power to make an order of the kind I have described. The power is discretionary.Consideration of the discretion to set aside or amend the summonses I did not understand there to be any dispute between the parties that, in deciding whether to discharge a summons, the Court exercises a discretion which requires it to weigh the interests of:(a)creditors in discovering what assets the bankrupt had, what became of them, and whether action should be taken to recover them;(b)creditors in not having the bankrupt estate needlessly diminished by the issue of summonses for examination which are too broad;(c)recipients of the summons (including the bankrupt) in ensuring that the use of the extraordinary power does not unnecessarily cause them “real harm”; and(d)the administration of justice in ensuring that the extraordinary power is responsibly exercised, only when necessary, and only so far is as necessary, to achieve the purpose for which the power is conferred. Given that the summonses are at least substantially invalid, they should not be allowed to stand in their current form. The discretion to be exercised is as between setting aside or discharging the summonses, and ordering that they be “amended” in the sense I have described above. One consideration that weighs in favour of discharging the summonses and against amending them in the present case is that, in light of my conclusions at [30]-[67] above, there are a number of respects in which I consider the requirements of the summonses as presently drafted to be beyond the scope of what is authorised by s 81 of the Bankruptcy Act (and, in some instances, oppressive). All of the categories of documents in all the summonses are affected. Amendment of each of the summonses to address those issues would not merely involve the insertion of a simple textual formula limiting the documents sought to those in the possession of the person to whom the summons is addressed; it would involve the Court effectively redrafting several paragraphs of each of the summonses. That is not a task that would necessarily be impossible in this case, but it is a task that is most appropriately undertaken by the Trustee. It would involve choices that may be informed by what is known to the Trustee but is not before this Court. If the summonses were set aside in their entirety, it would be open to the Trustee to issue fresh summonses which are valid and which seek categories of documents described or limited so as to avoid the features which I have found to be oppressive. I accept that, if I were to make an order setting aside the summonses rather than “amending” them, and assuming the Trustee did then issue fresh summonses, that would likely result in some further delay in the administration of the bankruptcy compared with the making of an order amending the summonses. I accept that any such delay may generally be assumed to be to the prejudice of creditors. However, there was no submission as to, or evidence of, any particular prejudice to the creditors that would be occasioned by a short further delay in the event that the summonses were set aside and the Trustee elected to issue fresh summonses. Moreover, the Trustee has accepted since at least 9 September 2024 (and must have realised earlier than that, this ground of objection having been identified by the recipients in documents filed in May 2024) that each of the summonses was invalid due to its failure to confine the categories of documents sought to documents in the possession of the person summonsed. The delay could have been avoided almost entirely had the Trustee (or her predecessor) elected not to rely upon the summonses and instead issued fresh summonses after the defects in the summonses were identified. The additional costs of issuing further summonses would have been modest compared with the costs of the contested hearing that has occurred. In these circumstances, in the exercise of the discretion I give only relatively slight weight to the impact of delay on the interests of the creditors in the efficient administration of this bankruptcy.