Psevdos v First Mortgage Company Home Loans Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Appeal from a Master: Civil)

PSEVDOS v FIRST MORTGAGE COMPANY HOME LOANS PTY LTD

[2019] SASC 130

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Hinton

26 July 2019

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - MASTERS

Appeal from a decision of a Master of this Court.

On 24 August 2018 a Master of this Court dismissed two interlocutory applications made by the appellant. The interlocutory applications were made in proceedings instituted by the respondent in which the respondent sought, amongst other things, the removal of a caveat from a title so that the respondent, as mortgagee in possession, could sell the related property. The Master had ordered that the caveat be removed on 7 December 2017.

The appellant did not appeal against the order of 7 December 2017. Notwithstanding this, and despite the effective conclusion of the proceedings to which the interlocutory applications purported to be adjectival, the appellant pursued this appeal on the basis that the Master had erred in refusing to grant the relief he sought in his two applications.

By his first interlocutory application the appellant sought permission to file and serve a statement of cross-action. By his second interlocutory application the appellant sought an order setting aside the orders made on 7 December 2017 and re-opening the proceedings.

Held; the appeal against the second interlocutory application seeking an order setting aside the orders of 7 December 2017 and re-opening the proceedings should be dismissed. Assuming power exists to do as sought, the application was futile because the property to which the caveat related had been sold. The fate of the first interlocutory application was inextricably linked to the second in that the cause having been determined there was no longer an action in which to introduce a cross-action.

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 302; Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 55; National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 191; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) rr 35, 242; Trustee Act 1936 (SA), referred to.

PSEVDOS v FIRST MORTGAGE COMPANY HOME LOANS PTY LTD
[2019] SASC 130

Masters Appeal:       Civil

HINTON J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal against orders made by a Master of this Court dismissing two interlocutory applications made by the appellant in proceedings instituted by the respondent in which, amongst other things, the respondent sought the removal of a caveat from a title so that as mortgagee in possession it may sell the related property. Ultimately, the order was made that the caveat be removed. The appellant has not appealed that order. Despite this, and notwithstanding the effective conclusion of the proceedings to which the interlocutory applications purported to be adjectival, the appellant pursues his appeal against the refusal to grant the relief he sought in those applications.

  2. For the reasons that follow I would dismiss the appeal.

    Background

  3. In January 2017 the…

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Details
Case
[2019] SASC 130
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of South Australia, the case of Psevdos v First Mortgage Company Home Loans Pty Ltd involved the appellant, who was a mortgagor, challenging the actions of the respondent, the mortgagee, in relation to a property located at 108 South Terrace, Adelaide. The primary dispute centred on the nature of the appellant's interest in the property, with the appellant asserting that he held title as trustee for the Orio Investment Trust, rather than as a tenant in common with the other mortgagors. This dispute was significant because if the appellant held the property as trustee, it would not form part of his personal estate that vested in the trustee in bankruptcy following a sequestration order made in June 2016.

The legal issues before the court included the proper procedure for the respondent to follow when entering and taking possession of the property and selling it, the validity of the respondent's reliance on the appellant's bankruptcy, and the appropriateness of the Master's decisions in the substantive proceedings. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Master erred in dismissing the respondent's application to dispense with the notice requirement under s 55A(1) of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA), and whether the Master correctly granted the respondent's application under s 191(1)(d) of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) to remove the caveat placed by the appellant. Additionally, the court had to consider the appellant's interlocutory applications and whether they should have been allowed.

The court found that the Master's decisions were correct. The respondent had initially erred in relying on the appellant's bankruptcy, but had subsequently sought to remedy this by applying to dispense with the notice requirement and to remove the caveat. The Master's dismissal of the former application and grant of the latter were upheld, as the appellant had not provided a sufficient reason for reopening the matter, particularly given that the property had already been sold and settlement had occurred. The court also held that the appeal was an inappropriate forum for the appellant to seek a declaration binding on the trustee in bankruptcy regarding the beneficial ownership of the property. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and no further orders were made.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow I would dismiss the appeal.Background In January 2017 the respondent entered and took possession of a property situated at 108 South Terrace, Adelaide (the South Terrace property), in its capacity as mortgagee in consequence of the mortgagors’ default on the loan made to them by the respondent and secured against the property. The appellant was one of the three mortgagors who borrowed from the respondent. He disputes that he held an interest in the property in a personal capacity as tenant in common with the other mortgagors, Mr and Mrs Costi. He contends that he held title in the property and, indeed, borrowed money for its purchase, as trustee for the Orio Investment Trust. Importantly, in June 2016 a sequestration order was made in respect of the bankrupt estate of the appellant. Consequently, whether or not the appellant held an interest in the South Terrace property in a personal capacity or as trustee determined whether such interest formed part of his estate that vested in the trustee in bankruptcy. After taking possession of the South Terrace property the respondent arranged for its sale at public auction on 23 September 2017. However, before the auction could be held, on 20 September 2017, the appellant arranged for a caveat to be placed on the title. Backtracking momentarily, prior to entering and taking possession of the South Terrace property, the respondent, in purported compliance with s 55A(1) of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA), served a default notice upon the mortgagors alleging that the appellant was a bankrupt. Subsequently, the respondent realised that s 302 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) prohibited reliance upon the fact of the appellant’s bankruptcy to support the action taken under s 55A. By summons dated 20 October 2017 the respondent sought to remedy matters by instituting proceedings in this Court seeking an order under s 55A(2a) of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) dispensing with the requirement to give notice as required by s 55A(1). In the same proceedings the respondent sought an order under s 191(1)(d) of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) directing the Registrar-General to remove the caveat that the appellant had lodged from the certificate of title to the South Terrace property. In what follows I refer to the respondent’s action as the substantive proceedings. It is in the substantive proceedings that the appellant made the two interlocutory applications subject of this appeal. On 7 December 2017 the Master dismissed the respondent’s application to dispense with the requirement to comply with s 55A(1) of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA), but granted the application under the Real Property Act 1886 (SA). Consequently, the caveat was removed and the South Terrace property was sold. Settlement took place on 25 January 2018. It is necessary to say something more about the substantive proceedings and that aspect of them instituted under s 191 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA). In Stone v Leonardis White J said:[1]Apart from allowing a caveator voluntarily to withdraw a caveat (s 191(h)), s 191 provides two means by which a caveat may be removed: subs (d) and subss (e)-(g). The latter provisions permit the caveatee to warn the caveat whereupon the caveat will be removed unless the court, on the caveator’s application, extends the period of 21 days. In Whallin v Bailbart Investments Pty Ltd, Cox J recommended a procedure for “the general run of [such] cases”. The effect is that applications under s 191(g) are commonly dealt with as interlocutory applications and in a manner similar to applications for an interlocutory injunction.A number of matters indicate that a similar approach is appropriate on applications under s 191(d).[footnotes omitted][1] (2011) 110 SASR 503 at [20]-[21].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Lastly, this was an inappropriate forum for the appellant to seek a declaration binding on the trustee in bankruptcy as to the beneficial ownership of the South Terrace property. Consideration Focussing on FDN 36, the power contained in r 242 SCCR is not as broad as a literal understanding of the rule suggests. The breadth of r 242 SCCR remains to be determined.[26] Whatever its ambit, it is discretionary.[26] Keung v Abbott (No 2) [2019] SASCFC 39. When FDN 36 was heard by the Master the appellant’s focus was upon attempting to persuade the Master that she should, in effect, entertain his arguments afresh as to there being a serious issue to be tried warranting the retention of the caveat in the meantime. The appellant’s evidence was new but not fresh in the sense that lawyers use those terms. Of course, the caveat had been removed and settlement had taken place on the South Terrace property. In my view the Master was right to refuse the application. Not only do I detect no error in the exercise of the discretion to re-open, assuming the power extended to permit her to do so, I consider the Master was right in her conclusion. Near on six months had passed, the appellant had his opportunity to contest the removal of the caveat, no sufficient reason was given that warranted granting him a second opportunity (assuming that could be done), and in any event, settlement having occurred, the application was futile. The whole purpose of the caveat was to preserve the subject of the cause. That could no longer be achieved. The appeal against the dismissal of FDN 36 must be dismissed. The fate of FDN 12 cannot be separated from FDN 36 in that unless the orders of 7 December 2017 are set aside there is no cause in which to introduce the cross-action. Accordingly, the appeal against FDN 12 must also be dismissed. In this Court in the course of the appellant’s reply the following interchange occurred;HIS HONOUR: The first argument put against you as I understood it is you appeal orders not reasoning.MR PSEVDOS: Yes. I’m asking for a correction to the judgment.HIS HONOUR: That in a way is not a correction to orders made, but to the reasoning, factual reasoning. So the other way you can deal with that is to say it’s wrong and that it’s led to a wrong conclusion, the order. Not - because if it doesn't lead to a wrong conclusion then -MR PSEVDOS: Well it has led to a wrong conclusion and the power does vest with this court to make correction.HIS HONOUR: But you don’t complain about the order and the order is spent.MR PSEVDOS: Well it would be futile to change an order that’s spent. But it also would be unjust to leave an order, a ruling in play, in place, or reason of ruling that the order was effectively relying upon.To accept this proposition that the order has been spent and there’s no utility in making a correction or a declaration that it was in fact - well what's come before the court now, confirms that this is a trust asset, to me is an injustice. …