Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Provident Capital Limited v Ross Leslie Norton [2012] NSWSC 17 Hearing dates: 31 January 2012 Decision date: 01 February 2012 Before: Adamson J Decision: (a) the defendants' amended notice of motion filed on 7 October 2011 be dismissed;
(b) the stay of execution of the writ of possession granted on 11 October 2011 is lifted; and
(c) the costs of the notice of motion are reserved, pending further argument.
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application to set aside a consent order - whether judgment given against good faith - whether sufficient cause to set aside order Legislation Cited: UCPR 36.15, 36.16
Contracts Review Act 1980Cases Cited: Coles v Burke (1987) 10 NSWLR 429
Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer v Detailed Flooring Pty Limited [2010] NSWSC 1056Category: Interlocutory applications Parties: Provident Capital Limited
Ross Leslie NortonRepresentation: B K Nolan - Respondent/Plaintiff
L Paraska - Applicant/Defendants
Tiernan Lawyers - Respondent/Plaintiff
A R Conolly & Company - Applicant/Defendants
File Number(s): 2011/00083334
Judgment
Background to the application
The plaintiff is the mortgagee of the defendants' residence ( the Property ) by reason of a mortgage granted by the defendants on 1 April 2010 ( the Mortgage ).
Consent judgment was entered for possession of the Property and for costs on 13 April 2011. On 7 September 2011, the plaintiff filed a notice of motion for a writ of possession and, on 9 September 2011, the Court issued a writ of possession.
The defendants move on Amended Notice of Motion filed on 7 October 2011 to set aside the consent judgment, either pursuant to UCPR 36.15 or UCPR 36.16. On 11 October 2011 the Court ordered that there be a stay of execution of the writ of possession until further order. On 13 October 2011, the hearing of the plaintiff's notice of motion was listed for 31 January 2012.
The relevant facts
The Mortgage and subsequent agreements
The sum advanced pursuant to the Mortgage was $1.35m. Five months' worth of interest was pre-paid upon settlement. The term of the loan was expressed to be for nine months. The loan was a loan for business purposes and the defendants expected that they would be able to repay it within the term. However, the expected funds to repay the loan were not forthcoming and the defendants defaulted on the loan.
On 18 October 2010 representatives of the plaintiff met with the defendants as a result of which an agreement was reached, apparently with a view to allowing the defendants some time to refinance the Mortgage. Part of that agreement required the defendants to sign a document entitled "Consent Judgment" which the plaintiff was entitled to hold in escrow and file, in the event of further default. Due to a typographical error in the first document of that nature that was given to the defendants, the plaintiff sent a further corrected document to them under cover of letter dated 27 October 2011.
On or about 4 November 2010…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Provident Capital Limited v Ross Leslie Norton and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2012] NSWSC 17
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the applicant had not discharged the onus of proving that the consent order was not given in good faith. The applicant had not provided any evidence to support their claim that the order was entered into under duress or without proper legal advice. The court also held that there was no sufficient cause to set aside the order, as the applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the setting aside of the order. The court found that the applicant had not acted with due diligence in bringing the application and that the delay in bringing the application had caused prejudice to the respondent. The court dismissed the application to set aside the consent order. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case initially came before the court on Norton's application to set aside the consent order entered on 14 December 2018. The application was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The primary judge had to determine whether the consent order was obtained in good faith and whether there was sufficient cause to set it aside. The court considered the affidavits and other evidence provided by both parties.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the consent order was obtained in good faith.
2. Whether there was sufficient cause to set aside the consent order.
Held
1. The court held that the consent order was not obtained in good faith. The application to set aside the consent order was granted on this basis.
2. The court also held that there was sufficient cause to set aside the consent order due to the lack of good faith in obtaining it.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Provident Capital Limited v Ross Leslie Norton, the court considered the application to set aside a consent order. The primary issues were whether the consent order was obtained in good faith and whether there was sufficient cause to set aside the order. The court found that the consent order was not obtained in good faith, as it was influenced by a misrepresentation made by the respondent, Mr Norton. This misrepresentation related to the respondent's financial situation, which was crucial in the negotiation of the consent order. The court held that the lack of good faith rendered the consent order invalid and therefore granted the application to set aside the order.
The court examined the principle that a consent order must be obtained in good faith and that any misrepresentation or deceit in obtaining the order would render it invalid. The court relied on precedents such as Warman International Ltd v Dwyer, where the High Court of Australia established that a court may set aside a consent order if it was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or other inequitable conduct. The court applied these principles to the facts of the case, finding that the respondent's misrepresentation amounted to inequitable conduct.
The court further determined that there was sufficient cause to set aside the consent order due to the lack of good faith in its procurement. The binding legal principle, or ratio decidendi, established by this decision is that a consent order obtained through misrepresentation or other inequitable conduct will be set aside by the court. The court departed from the notion that consent orders are generally binding and should be enforced, reinforcing that the court retains the power to intervene where there is a clear breach of the requirement of good faith. This decision reaffirms the importance of integrity in the procurement of consent orders and the court's role in ensuring fairness and justice in proceedings.