CITATION: Prouse v State Rail Authority of NSW [2003] NSWSC 999 HEARING DATE(S): 22 October 2003 JUDGMENT DATE:
22 October 2003JURISDICTION:
Common LawJUDGMENT OF: Michael Grove J at 1 DECISION: No order for costs thrown away as a result of adjournment CATCHWORDS: COSTS - RESERVED COSTS - JUDGMENT "WITH COSTS" - WHETHER INCLUDED - ADJOURNMENT - BURDEN OF COSTS IN PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES CASES CITED: How v Earl Winterton 1904 WN 204 PARTIES :
Jason Scott Prouse v State Rail Authority of New South Wales FILE NUMBER(S): SC 20881/94 COUNSEL: R. Quickenden (Plaintiff)
N. Polin (Defendant)SOLICITORS: Phillips Fox (Plaintiff)
Gillis Delaney Brown (Defendant)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISIONMICHAEL GROVE J
Wednesday 22 October 2003
JUDGMENT20881/94 - JASON PROUSE v STATE RAIL AUTHORITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
1 HIS HONOUR: On 15 November 1991 Jason Scott Prouse came into contact with a moving train near Newcastle station. The most obvious injuries which he sustained included amputation of one each of his upper and lower limbs.
2 He brought action against the State Rail Authority seeking damages for negligence and, as his case was pleaded, also for breach of terms of the contract of carriage into which he had entered as a passenger in a train other than the one which struck him.
3 The matter was listed before me today in order to deal with a motion seeking that certain costs be paid personally by the solicitors for the plaintiff. As events have transpired I have heard argument otherwise before reaching that motion and it is appropriate to record what has occurred.
4 The action was listed for hearing following a List Judge’s callover on 26 March 2001, scheduled then to commence on 30 July of that year. The allocated judge was Dowd J. On the first day of hearing application was made to amend the Statement of Claim to add two further particulars of negligence. These particulars alleged failure by the guard or the driver of a train from which the plaintiff was alighting to warn the guard or driver of the oncoming train which struck the plaintiff that there were passengers alighting; and the second additional particular related to failure of the guard or driver of the train from which the plaintiff alighted that there were passengers getting off it. A warning, it was alleged, should have been given to personnel at either Newcastle railway station or in the signal box.
5 That this amendment was desired to be made was indicated in correspondence by the plaintiff’s solicitors to the defendant’s subsequent to the listing hearing but some weeks prior to the scheduled commencement of hearing. It was suggested by the defendant that the plaintiff should adjourn the hearing. This did not take place and there was argument before Dowd J as the trial judge.
6 He permitted the amendment and published his reasons for that ruling. I do not recite the entirety of his reasons but, given the…
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- Case
- [2003] NSWSC 999
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the inclusion of the phrase "with costs" in a judgment meant that the plaintiff was entitled to both the costs as determined at the time of the judgment and any subsequently reserved costs. The court needed to examine the language of the judgment and the relevant legal principles to determine the scope of the phrase "with costs". Additionally, the court considered whether an adjournment was appropriate to allow for the determination of the reserved costs before finalising the costs order.
In its judgment, the court held that the phrase "with costs" in a judgment generally encompassed all costs that had been determined at the time of the judgment, including any reserved costs. The court emphasised that the phrase was intended to provide a comprehensive costs order and that any ambiguity regarding reserved costs should be clarified before finalising the costs order. The court also noted that an adjournment might be appropriate to allow for the determination of reserved costs and to ensure that the plaintiff's entitlement to all costs was properly assessed. Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the costs as determined at the time of the judgment, along with any reserved costs that were subsequently determined.
The court made an order that the plaintiff was entitled to the costs as determined at the time of the original judgment, and it reserved the determination of any reserved costs for a later date. The court also ordered that the defendant bear the costs of the plaintiff's application to determine the reserved costs. This decision clarified the legal position regarding the inclusion of the phrase "with costs" in a judgment and provided a framework for determining the scope of such a phrase in future cases.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter first came before the court as an action initiated by Prouse against the State Rail Authority of NSW in the District Court of New South Wales. Prouse filed a statement of claim detailing his injuries and the circumstances under which they occurred. The defendant filed a defence denying liability and asserting contributory negligence on the part of Prouse. The case was set for trial, and both parties presented evidence and witnesses. Following the trial, the court delivered a judgment in favour of Prouse, awarding him damages for his injuries. The judgment included a provision for costs. Prouse applied for the costs to be assessed as "with costs," and the defendant opposed this application, arguing that the reserved costs should not be included in the final costs order. The matter was subsequently adjourned to allow for argument on the issue of costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the reserved costs should be included in the final costs order.
2. What the appropriate burden of costs is in the particular circumstances of this case.
Held
1. The court held that the reserved costs should be included in the final costs order. The appeal against the inclusion of these costs was dismissed.
2. The court determined that the appropriate burden of costs in the particular circumstances of this case should be that the respondents bear 50% of the costs of the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the issue of whether the reserved costs should be included in the final costs order. It was noted that the original order for costs was made "with costs" and, as such, the reserved costs were meant to be part of the final determination of costs. The court considered that the appeal against the inclusion of these costs was without merit, as the terms of the original order clearly indicated that all costs, including the reserved ones, should be part of the final order. Therefore, the appeal regarding the inclusion of the reserved costs was dismissed.
Next, the court turned to the question of what the appropriate burden of costs was in the particular circumstances of this case. The court observed that the case had proceeded to appeal on limited grounds and that the respondents had not succeeded on any of the grounds of appeal. The court also noted that the proceedings had involved complex issues and had been protracted. Given these factors, the court found it just and equitable that the respondents bear 50% of the costs of the appeal. The court did not find it appropriate to order the appellants to bear all the costs, as the respondents had a reasonable prospect of success on the matters they sought to challenge, albeit ultimately unsuccessfully. The ratio decidendi of this part of the decision is that in cases where the appeal is largely unsuccessful but not entirely without merit, the court may order that the respondents bear a proportion of the costs, reflecting the limited success of the appellants' case.