JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT (WA) PTY LTD -v- COMMERCIAL N PTY LTD [2023] WASC 91
CORAM: SMITH J
HEARD: 17 MARCH 2023
DELIVERED : 24 MARCH 2023
FILE NO/S: CIV 1126 of 2023
BETWEEN: PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT (WA) PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
CLAUDIA PROPERTIES PTY LTD
Second Plaintiff
ANGELA TILLI
Third Plaintiff
AND
COMMERCIAL N PTY LTD
First Defendant
MAJOR BLUE AIR PTY LTD
Second Defendant
THE REGISTRAR OF TITLES
Third Defendant
Catchwords:
Interlocutory injunction - Mortgagee exercised power of sale - Mortgagor claims Mortgagee did not act in good faith in selling the land in breach of a mortgagee's general law duties or s 420A of the Corporations Act 2001 (WA) - Mortgager claims land sold under value - Proceedings commenced after settlement of the mortgage sale complete but before transfers for the land registered on the titles to the land - Principles that apply to Mortgagee's exercise of power of sale considered - Valuation evidence considered - Inglis principle considered
Property law - Caveat - Withdrawal of Mortgagor's caveat by Mortgagee - Whether power of attorney authorised - Strong prima facie case that power of attorney not in accordance with the form prescribed by the 19th Schedule and s 143 of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)
Caveats - Principles that apply to the removal of a caveat considered
Statutory unconscionability - Section 12CA(1) and s 12CB(1) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Legislation:
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)
Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA)
Result:
Interim injunction not continued
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| First Plaintiff | : | Mr P J Hannan |
| Second Plaintiff | : | Mr P J Hannan |
| Third Plaintiff | : | Mr P J Hannan |
| First Defendant | : | Mr L Firios |
| Second Defendant | : | Mr S D Majteles |
| Third Defendant | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| First Plaintiff | : | Corporate Counsel Lawyers |
| Second Plaintiff | : | Corporate Counsel Lawyers |
| Third Plaintiff | : | Corporate Counsel Lawyers |
| First Defendant | : | Kingston & Partners Pty Ltd |
| Second Defendant | : | McWilliams Davis Lawyers Property & Commercial |
| Third Defendant | : | No appearance |
Cases referred to in decision:
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618
Blundell v Associated Securities Ltd (1971) 19 FLR 17
Brimstone Resources Ltd v Empire Resources Ltd [2018] WASCA 107
Cayne v Global Natural Resources plc [1984] 1 All ER 225
Clazy v The Registrar of Titles (1902) 4 WALR 113
CME Properties (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 231
Emission Assessments Pty Ltd v James Jackson [2022] WASC 60
Farahbakht v Midas Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 1323
Forsyth v Blundell (1973) 129 CLR 477
Harvey v Perpetual Nominees Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1379
Henry Roach (Petroleum) Pty Ltd v Credit House (Vic) Pty Ltd [1976] VR 309
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- Case
- [2023] WASC 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant legal principles, particularly those articulated in Westpac Banking Corporation v Murray Riverside Pty Ltd. The court noted that once the caveator established an arguable caveatable interest, the exercise of discretion by the court would involve balancing the convenience of both parties. The principles were further elucidated in CME Properties (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd, where it was stated that the court should consider the equities of the case, including the extent to which the caveator had an arguable interest and the extent to which the registered proprietor's interest would be prejudiced if the caveat remained. In this case, the court concluded that Commercial N Pty Ltd had established an arguable caveatable interest, and the balance of convenience favoured the removal of the caveat.
The court's reasoning was grounded in the need to balance the equities of the case, taking into account the established principles regarding caveats and the rights of both the registered proprietor and the caveator. The court found that the caveator had demonstrated an arguable interest, and the balance of convenience did not favour leaving the caveat in place. Consequently, the application to remove the caveat was successful.
The final orders of the court were that the caveat lodged by Commercial N Pty Ltd be removed, and the Registrar of Titles was directed to record the decision accordingly. The court also made a declaration that Property Development (WA) Pty Ltd was entitled to proceed with the sale of the property as per the terms of the contract of sale.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In an application to remove a caveat lodged by a registered proprietor to prevent the completion of a sale, the registered proprietor must show there is a serious question to be tried about the legal efficacy of the transfer, and once a caveator establishes an arguable caveatable interest, the court in exercise its discretion will consider where the balance of convenience lies.[80][80] Westpac Banking Corporation v Murray Riverside Pty Ltd [2013] WASC 433. The same considerations apply where an application is made under s 138B of the Transfer of Land Act by a judgment creditor for the Registrar to serve the caveator with a Notice that unless, the caveator obtains a court order to extend the caveat within 21 days it will lapse. In CME Properties (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd, Le Miere J summarised the relevant principles as follows:[81]The duties and requirements of a mortgagee exercising a power of sale were recently considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Boz One Pty Ltd v McLellan [2015] VSCA 68; (2015) ACSR 325. In a joint judgment of Whelan, Santamaria and Kyrou JJA the court made the following observations. A power of sale is given to the mortgagee entirely for its own benefit, the purpose of the power being to enable the mortgagee to realise the property to satisfy its claim and to return whatever balance may remain to the mortgagor. Under the general law, a mortgagee exercising its power of sale has a duty to exercise the power of sale in good faith and for the purpose for which it was conferred, such that a mortgagee could not recklessly or wilfully sacrifice the interests of the mortgagor. Section 420A of the Corporations Act imposes a more rigorous statutory duty which is intended to provide corporate mortgagors with additional protection. The relevant question for the purposes of s 420A is whether the controller has failed to do what a reasonable and prudent person would do, or has done what a reasonable and prudent person would refrain from doing in the circumstances. The onus of establishing a breach of s 420A rests with the complainant. The two limbs of s 420A(1) are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Section 420A(1)(a) applies 'if, when [the property] is sold, it has a market value', otherwise s 420A(1)(b) will apply. The introduction of a category of property that is sold without a market value has presented conceptual difficulties in respect of which limb courts are to apply. Competing approaches have been identified.In my opinion it is not necessary to consider the different approaches that have been adopted to determining which limb of s 420A(1) should apply. The mortgaged properties have no unique or particular characteristics which cause the property not to have a market value. In Boz One the court said that the reasoning of Isaacs J in Spencer v Commonwealth [1907] HCA 82; (1907) 5 CLR 418 in analysing market value has been repeatedly cited with approval in the context of the definition of market value in s 420A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act. The court observed:The sale price of a property may be the best evidence of the market value of the property if the court is satisfied that the mortgagee has taken proper steps in advertising and selling the property. If the process of advertising, marketing and sale of the property is shown to be unsatisfactory or inadequate, valuation evidence may be important to establish whether the price realised was an under value [165].The Court of Appeal said that in deciding whether there has been a breach of s 420A:A court assesses the process that a controller has undertaken in selling the property. The inquiry is whether, in the course of that process, the controller has taken all reasonable care to sell the property for not less than its market value. However, it is not necessary for the court to decide what actually was the market value of the property in order to find that s 420A(1) has been breached - or that the court needs to decide is that the process that was followed was not one where all reasonable care was taken to sell the property for its market value, whatever that market value might be.Accordingly, a breach of s 420A(1)(a) is not established merely because a [controller] fails to realise the property for its market value. However, if it is proved that the price obtained at sale was substantially below the market value of the property, this may be evidence that proper steps were not taken [167] ‑ [168].…In Boz One the Victorian Court of Appeal said at [174] that although it may be prudent for a receiver to obtain independent valuations of the property and advice as to the appropriate method of sale, that is not a rule of law and a controller is not bound to adopt any particular mode of sale, although the court added that a controller ought to take reasonable steps to ascertain the value of the property before selling it.[81] CME Properties (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd [2016] WASC 231 [18] ‑ [21].