Programmed Maintenance Services Limited v The Shell Company of Australia Ltd

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: Programmed Maintenance Services Limited v. The Shell Company of Australia Ltd [2000] QDC 249
PARTIES: PROGRAMMED MAINTENANCE SERVICES LIMITED (Plaintiff)
v.
THE SHELL COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LTD (Defendant)
FILE NO/S: D1972 of 2000
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING: Application in a proceeding
ORIGINATING COURT: District Court Brisbane
DELIVERED ON: 4 August 2000
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
HEARING DATE: 28 July 2000
JUDGE: McGill DCJ
ORDER: Application dismissed with costs.  Conditional Notice of Intention to Defend struck out;  extend time for filing of Notice of Intention to Defend
CATCHWORDS:

PRACTICE – stay of proceedings – whether court in Victoria the appropriate court to determine the matters in issue – Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cwth) s.20.

Rick Cobby Pty Ltd v. Padesta Transport Pty Ltd (1997) 139 FLR 54 – followed
Re: Currie (1899) 25 VLR 224 - cited
Traders Finance Corporation Ltd v. Bradshaw (1963) QWN 48 - followed
Valkama v. Jamieson (1994) 11 SR(WA) 246 – followed
Huddart Parker Ltd v. The Ship “Mill Hill” (1950) 81 CLR 502 – cited
Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v. Fay (1998) 165 CLR 197 – cited

COUNSEL: P.R. Franco for defendant applicant
A.M. Daubney for plaintiff/respondent
SOLICITORS: Minter Ellison for defendant
Macrossans Lawyers for plaintiff
  1. By a claim filed on 17 May 2000 the plaintiff claimed  $87,181.77 for breach of contract from the defendant.  The attached Statement of Claim alleged that under a contract evidenced by an exchange of facsimiles the plaintiff agreed to supply and install for the defendant a sign at Packinham for a particular price, and that the contract was subsequently varied in a way which increased the price.  It is alleged that the sign was installed, that a credit from the contract price was allowed, and the balance of the contract price, being the amount of the claim, is due and payable to the plaintiff in Queensland, but has not been paid. 

  1. On 16 June 2000 the defendant filed a conditional Notice of Intention to Defend which disputed the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that the contract was made in Victoria, the subject matter of the contract is situated in Victoria, and the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant contains a jurisdiction clause which provides that the competent jurisdiction for any dispute under the contract is Victoria.  As required by r.144, the defendant on 30 June filed an application seeking an order that the proceedings be stayed pursuant to s.20 of the Service and Execution of Process Act 1992.  This would be an order within para. (g) of r.16. 

  1. Section 20 provides relevantly as follows:

“(2)  The person served may apply to the court of issue for an order  staying the proceeding.

(3)The court may order that the proceeding be stayed if it is

satisfied that a court of another state that has jurisdiction to determine all the matters in issue between the parties is the appropriate court to determine those matters.

(4)The matters…

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Details
Case
[2000] QDC 249
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Programmed Maintenance Services Limited (plaintiff) brought an action against The Shell Company of Australia Ltd (defendant) in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The plaintiff sought recovery of a debt for the supply, delivery, installation and commissioning of RVI Signage at Shell retail outlets. The defendant argued that the court in Victoria was not the appropriate court to determine the matter and sought a stay of proceedings. The defendant relied on a contractual clause that stipulated that the courts in Victoria have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute.

The court was required to determine whether the contractual clause that stipulated exclusive jurisdiction for the courts in Victoria deprived the court of jurisdiction. The court examined the basis for the defendant's submission that the contract contemplated was for the supply of all the company’s RVI Signage requirements, with the defendant committing to the purchase of signage for particular sites from time to time during the period. The court also considered whether the fact that there was a contract governing the relationship between the parties was inconsistent with the existence of a separate contract between the parties for the supply and erection at a particular price of a particular sign.

The court found that there was no doubt that there was a contract formed, through the acceptance of the plaintiff's tender. The court held that the fact that there was a contract governing the relationship between the parties was not inconsistent with the existence of a separate contract between the parties for the supply and erection at a particular price of a particular sign. The court held that the contractual clause stipulating exclusive jurisdiction for the courts in Victoria did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The court dismissed the defendant's application for a stay of proceedings and struck out the conditional Notice of Intention to Defend. The court also extended the time for filing of Notice of Intention to Defend.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed with costs. Conditional Notice of Intention to Defend struck out; extend time for filing of Notice of Intention to Defend

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to (d), this was the principal matter in issue because the defendant alleged that it was a term of a contract between the parties that the courts in Victoria have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute. Such a clause would not deprive this court of jurisdiction, although it would be an important factor in determining whether the requirements of s.20(3) are satisfied and the proceeding in this court ought to be stayed: Traders Finance Corporation Ltd v. Bradshaw [1963] QWN 48; Huddart Parker Ltd v. The Ship “Mill Hill” (1950) 81 CLR 502 at 509; Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v. Fay (1998) 165 CLR 197 at 231. It is therefore necessary for me to examine the basis for this submission more carefully. Although the claim refers to a contract to supply and install a particular sign for a particular price, the contractual relationship began with the acceptance of a tender from the plaintiff to the defendant for the supply, delivery, installation and commissioning of RVI Signage at Shell retail outlets for a period of 3 years. The plaintiff submitted such a tender, a copy of parts of which is Exhibit MJT-1 to the affidavit of Ms. Toomey. It appears from that document that the contract contemplated was for the supply of all the company’s RVI Signage requirements, with the defendant committing to the purchase of signage for particular sites from time to time during the period: s.4, p.2. The contract was to be awarded on the basis of an offtake order with prices submitted in accordance with the one off price as listed in the tender documents, or as a commitment/blanket order with prices submitted in accordance with the prices for multiple units as listed in the tender documents: s.1, p.2. It appears from p.2 of the contents section that the conditions of contract in s.3 included “general conditions of purchase revision C November 1994”, although these are not reproduced in the Exhibit. However, by a letter dated 11 October 1995, the defendant substituted “general conditions of purchase – revision D September 1995” and this substitution was accepted by a facsimile dated October 1995: Exhibit MJT-3. There were further negotiations between the parties and the defendant accepted the plaintiff’s tender on or about 13 December 1995 when they entered into a form of contract which appears at p.2 of section 8 of Exhibit MJT-1. That sheet also bears the date 5 September 1995, but neither party suggested that this was of any significance; apparently it was the date on which the tender was submitted: A/Toomey, para. 3. I think that there is no doubt that there was a contract formed, through the acceptance of this tender, although it is not necessarily the only contract between the parties. It is possible to have a contract which governs the relationship between the parties, under which particular supplies of goods or services take place in accordance with separate contracts formed between the parties in accordance with the framework laid down by the overall contract. See for example the Bill Facility Letter of Offer considered by the Court of Appeal in Queensland Cement Limited v. Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Appeal 24/95, 1.8.95, unreported). The fact that there is this contract is therefore not inconsistent with the existence of a separate contract between the parties for the supply and erection at a particular price of a particular sign.