Prime Property Investment Pty Ltd v Van Der Velde

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prime Property Investment Pty Ltd v Van Der Velde [2011] FCA 1397

Citation: Prime Property Investment Pty Ltd v Van Der Velde [2011] FCA 1397
Appeal from: In the matter of ACN 103 753 484 Pty Ltd (In liq) formerly Blue Chip Development Corporation Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 64
Parties: PRIME PROPERTY INVESTMENT PTY LTD and PNP REALTY PTY LTD v TERRY GRANT VAN DER VELDE AND DAVID MICHAEL STIMPSON AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF ACN 103 753 484 PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) FORMERLY BLUE CHIP DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PTY LTD and ACN 103 753 484 PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) FORMERLY BLUE CHIP DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PTY LTD
File number: QUD 87 of 2011
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 8 December 2011
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — Application for summary judgment by respondents to an appeal against orders made by a judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland — where respondents had brought claims in Supreme Court for moneys had and received against the appellants (‘the main action’) — where appellants sought stay of the main action pursuant to an arbitration agreement previously entered into by the parties and the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) — where respondents as liquidators brought an action in the Supreme Court seeking leave to disclaim the arbitration agreement pursuant to s 568(1A) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) (‘the disclaimer action’) — where Supreme Court granted leave to disclaim and refused the stay — where appellants filed defences in the main action claiming a set-off on the basis of alleged infringements of copyright pursuant to s 115 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (‘Copyright Act’) — where appellants purported to appeal to Full Court of the Federal Court against the orders made giving leave to disclaim and refusing the stay — where the grounds of appeal related to the decision granting leave to disclaim and there were no separate grounds relating to the decision to refuse the stay — where appeal in the disclaimer action lay to the Queensland Court of Appeal pursuant to s 1337F of the Corporations Act — where upon filing of the appellants’ defences the Queensland Supreme Court began exercising federal jurisdiction conferred by the Copyright Act in the main action — where pursuant to s 131B of the of the Copyright Act an appeal from the decision of a State court made under the Copyright Act lay to the Full Court of the Federal Court — whether main action and disclaimer action were part of single controversy in which an appeal lay to the Full Court of the Federal Court — where federal jurisdiction had not been engaged at the time at which the orders the subject of the appeal were made — whether the Full Court of the Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal

Held: Summary judgment was given and the appeal was dismissed.      

Legislation: Corporations Act ss 568(1A), 1337B, 1337F
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 131B and 131C
Federal Court…
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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1397
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Prime Property Investment Pty Ltd v Van Der Velde involved a complex dispute between the parties over an arbitration agreement, with the main action and disclaimer action being distinct yet interconnected. The respondents sought summary judgment against the appellants' appeal, which pertained to the Supreme Court of Queensland's orders granting leave to disclaim the arbitration agreement and refusing a stay of the main action. The appeal's grounds focused on the decision to grant leave to disclaim, with no separate grounds challenging the refusal of the stay. The jurisdictional issues centered on whether the main action and disclaimer action constituted a single controversy, and if the Federal Court had jurisdiction over the appeal.

The legal issues in the case primarily revolved around the interpretation and application of the Corporations Act 2001 and the International Arbitration Act 1974. The court had to determine whether the appeal from the Supreme Court's decision in the disclaimer action could lie to the Full Court of the Federal Court or if it should be directed to the Queensland Court of Appeal. Additionally, the court examined the impact of the appellants' defences in the main action, which invoked federal jurisdiction under the Copyright Act 1968, on the jurisdictional framework.

The court held that the main action and disclaimer action were not part of a single controversy for the purposes of determining the appropriate appellate court. The jurisdiction under the Corporations Act was not engaged at the time the orders in the disclaimer action were made. The court reasoned that the appeal from the disclaimer action should have been taken to the Queensland Court of Appeal as per the provisions of section 1337F of the Corporations Act. The Federal Court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the application for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the appeal.

The final orders of the court were straightforward: the appeal was dismissed. This outcome reflected the court's determination that the appeal did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, thereby affirming the procedural integrity of the appeal process as delineated by the relevant statutes.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Prime Property Investment Pty Ltd and another (the appellants) were involved in litigation with Van Der Velde and another (the respondents). The appellants had filed claims in the Supreme Court of Queensland for moneys had and received against the respondents. They sought a stay of the main action based on an arbitration agreement under the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). Concurrently, the respondents, acting as liquidators, filed a disclaimer action in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking leave to disclaim the arbitration agreement under section 568(1A) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The Supreme Court granted leave to disclaim the arbitration agreement and refused the stay, prompting the appellants to file defences in the main action, claiming a set-off based on alleged copyright infringements under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). The appellants then filed an appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court against the orders made in the disclaimer action. The appeal grounds related only to the decision granting leave to disclaim and not to the decision to refuse the stay.

The case began with the appellants seeking a stay of the main action in the Supreme Court of Queensland based on an arbitration agreement. The respondents, as liquidators, filed a disclaimer action in the Supreme Court of Queensland seeking leave to disclaim the arbitration agreement under the Corporations Act. The Supreme Court granted the leave to disclaim and refused the stay. Following this, the appellants filed defences in the main action, asserting a set-off claim under the Copyright Act. The appellants appealed the Supreme Court's orders to the Full Court of the Federal Court, challenging the decision granting leave to disclaim. The appeal in the disclaimer action lay to the Queensland Court of Appeal under section 1337F of the Corporations Act, while an appeal from the decision of a State court made under the Copyright Act lay to the Full Court of the Federal Court under section 131B of the Copyright Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There are then a number of grounds of appeal that assert that the primary judge (Boddice J) erred in law in granting leave to disclaim the arbitration agreement (ground 2 subparagraphs (a)-(j)). Ground 3 contains a challenge to findings of fact made by the primary judge about the operation and terms of the arbitration agreement. Ground 4 contains a challenge to the service on other parties to the arbitration agreement of the proceeding in the disclaimer action. There is no suggestion in the notice of appeal that there are grounds for challenging the orders made on the application for a stay in the main action which are independent from the challenge to the orders in the disclaimer action. In other words, if the orders in the disclaimer action stand then the orders in the main action must also stand.ISSUES ON THE APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT It is convenient in terms of identifying the issues and relevant statutory provisions to begin by examining the main action and the disclaimer action as if they are two separate matters. Before the filing by the first appellant of its Defence the main action involved the exercise of State jurisdiction by a State superior court. Within the main action there was an application by the appellants for a stay of the action. The disclaimer action by the first respondent as liquidators of the second respondent involved the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the superior court of a State under the Corporations Act. Chapter 9 Part 9.6A of that Act deals with the jurisdiction and procedure of Courts and it confers civil jurisdiction (jurisdiction with respect to civil matters) arising under the Act on this Court (s 1337B(1)) and, subject to a qualification not presently material, in the Supreme Court of each State (s 1337B(2)). For reasons which will become clear, the appellants drew my attention to s 1337A which deals with the operation of Part 9.6A Division 1 and provides as follows in subsection (5):Nothing in this Division affects any other jurisdiction of any court. Section 1337F deals with appeals and it provides among other things that no appeal from a decision of this Court is to be instituted in a State court and no appeal from a decision of a State court is to be instituted in this Court. The intention of this section appears to be that whilst both State Supreme Courts and this Court may exercise federal jurisdiction in civil matters arising under the Corporations Act, appeals must be taken to the appellate court in the court structure in which the proceeding or action was commenced. If the disclaimer action is considered in isolation the position appears to be that an appeal against the orders made in the action does not lie to this Court by reason of subsection 1337F(3) of the Corporations Act. Any appeal would have to be taken to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland. I return to the main action to examine the effect of the first appellant filing its Defence. Again, I examine the matter as if the main action and the disclaimer action are quite separate.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the two actions separately to determine if they constituted a single controversy. The main action involved claims for moneys had and received and a stay application under an arbitration agreement, while the disclaimer action sought leave to disclaim the arbitration agreement under the Corporations Act. The court found that the disclaimer action involved federal jurisdiction, and appeals from decisions in such matters should be made to the Queensland Court of Appeal, as per section 1337F(3) of the Corporations Act. The court also noted that the appeal grounds were solely focused on the disclaimer action, not the stay application. Therefore, the court held that the actions were not part of a single controversy.

Further, the court held that federal jurisdiction was not engaged at the time the orders were made since the filing of the defences and the assertion of the set-off claim under the Copyright Act occurred after the disclaimer action had been decided. The court relied on section 131B of the Copyright Act, which provides for an appeal from a state court's decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court when federal jurisdiction is engaged. The court distinguished between the timing of the engagement of federal jurisdiction and the time when the orders were made, finding that there was no federal jurisdiction at the time the orders were made. Consequently, the Full Court of the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.