Prescott and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

[2017] AATA 515

Prescott and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2017] AATA 515 (20 April 2017)

Division: GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:           2017/0125

Re:Noah Prescott

APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member T. Tavoularis

Date:20 April 2017

Place:Brisbane

The decision under review is affirmed.

.......................[sgd]..................................

Senior Member T. Tavoularis

SOCIAL SECURITY – YOUTH ALLOWANCE – Dependant rate was reduced upon reassessment of parents’ income – Application for independent rate of payment was rejected – Tribunal to consider whether special or other exceptional circumstances exist – whether extreme family breakdown – whether other similar exceptional circumstances – none apply – Decision under review affirmed.

Legislation

Social Security Act 1991, ss 556, 1067A, 1067G

Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, s 78

Cases

Gunning and Secretary, Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education [2013] AATA 595
Ness and Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (1998) 50 ALD 295; [1998] AATA 110

Simakovic and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 812

Secondary Materials

The Guide to Social Security Law

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member T. Tavoularis

20 April 2017

INTRODUCTION

1. This is an application by Noah Prescott (“the Applicant”) seeking review of a decision by the Social Services & Child Support Division (“SSCSD”) of this Tribunal. The decision of the SSCSD dated 5 January 2017 affirmed a decision to refuse payment of youth allowance at the independent rate to the Applicant and consequently, affirmed the decision to subject the calculation of his youth allowance rate to a parental income test.  

2. The decision under review has important financial ramifications for the Applicant. It resulted in a reduction of his rate of youth allowance by approximately $250 per fortnight.

   THE FACTS

3. The factual sequence of this case is adequately particularized at paragraphs [3] to [11] of the Respondent’s Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions.[1]

   [1] Exhibit 4.

4. In summary, this is how the matter has evolved:

   1)from 17 February 2014 to 14 November 2016, the Applicant received youth allowance at the rate of a non-independent person;

   2)on 14 November 2016, Centrelink re-assessed the rate of youth allowance paid to the Applicant due to the updated parental income of his mother and stepfather;

   3)this updated assessment resulted in reduction of the youth allowance payments by about $250 per fortnight;

   4)on 21 November 2016, the Applicant applied to be paid youth allowance at the independent rate, on the grounds it was ‘unreasonable to live at home’;

   5)on 24 November 2016, Centrelink refused the application for payment at the independent rate and resumed paying the Applicant at the non-independent rate;

   6)on 2 December 2016, that decision was reviewed and affirmed by an Authorised Review Officer (“ARO”);

   7)on 5 January 2017, the SSCSD affirmed the decision to reject the Applicant’s request to be paid youth allowance at the independent rate, and that it was correct to apply the parental income test when calculating the rate of his dependent youth allowance;

   8)on 10 January 2017, the Applicant requested a Second Review by this Tribunal. It is that Application that is now before me.

   THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

   Preliminary Provisions

5. Section 556 of the Social Security Act 1991 (“the Act”) specifies that to work out the rate of youth allowance to be paid, the youth allowance rate calculator in section 1067G of the Act should be used. Section 1067G–A1 sets out the method of calculating the rate. It assumes a predetermination of whether the recipient is ‘independent’. This predetermination can result in two outcomes, if an Applicant is determined as:

   1)not independent - the parental income test will apply;

   2)independent - a greater or the “maximum” rate of youth allowance is payable.[2]

   [2] This is subject to the contemporaneous application of an income and assets test.

   Operative Provision

6. The critical provision for this Application is section 1067A of the Act. Section 1067A is the sole legislative provision for any determination of when a person should be regarded as independent. Applied to the present facts, a successful application of section 1067A would result in payment of youth allowance at the independent rate if the Applicant can demonstrate that it is unreasonable (arising from specific circumstances) for him to live at home, or a number of other factors.[3]

   [3]

7. The relevant subsection 1067A(9) provides the grounds for being independent if it is ‘unreasonable to live at home’:

   “(9) A person is independent if:

   (a)the person cannot live at the home of either or both of his or her parents:

   (i)because of extreme family breakdown or other similar exceptional circumstances; or

   (ii)because it would be unreasonable to expect the person to do so as there would be a serious risk to his or her physical or mental well-being due to violence, sexual abuse or other similar unreasonable circumstances; or

   (iii)because the parent or parents are unable to provide the person with a suitable home owing to a lack of stable accommodation; and

   (b)the person is not receiving continuous support, whether directly or indirectly and whether financial or otherwise, from a parent of the person or from another person who is acting as the person’s guardian on a long-term basis; and

   (c)the person is not receiving, on a continuous basis, any payments in the nature of income support (other than a social security benefit) from the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory.”

8. Subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) of the Act contains two concepts, perhaps, more correctly for present purposes, alternate thresholds to be met by this Applicant. He must show an entitlement to payment at the independent rate because circumstances of either “extreme family breakdown” or “other similar exceptional circumstances” cause him to not be able to live at the home of his mother and stepfather.

9. In the alternative, the Applicant could rely on subsection 1067A(9)(a)(ii) of the Act and argue he cannot live at the home of his mother and stepfather due to an unreasonable expectation of an exposure to risk of harm to his physical or mental well-being due to violence, sexual abuse or other similar or unreasonable circumstances.

10. My understanding of the evidence is that:

    1)the Applicant does not seek to rely on the further alternative provided for in  subsection 1067A(9)(a)(iii); and

    2)the Respondent concedes subsections 1067A(9) (b) and (c) are met by the Applicant and are not otherwise in contention.

    CONSIDERATION

    Can the Applicant demonstrate the necessary independence pursuant to subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) of the Act on the basis of ‘extreme family breakdown’?

11. The Applicant sought to demonstrate his independence due to being unable to live at home because of circumstances amounting to “extreme family breakdown”. The Respondent helpfully referred the hearing to several authorities where this Tribunal considered this concept.

12. The first of those authorities is Ness and Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (1998) 50 ALD 925.[4]  In that case, the Tribunal thought circumstances of extreme family breakdown were evident when:

    “…from whatever cause and because of whoever’s fault, that no reasonable adjustment of the student’s behaviour will mend the family breakdown, then, at that stage, it is unreasonable that the student live at the home of his or her parents because of extreme family breakdown.” [5]

    [4] Also cited as: Ness and Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs [1998] AATA 110.

    [5] Ibid at [37].

13. In Simakovic and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 812, the Tribunal thought the concept of extreme family breakdown “… must be extreme when considered in the context of the whole family situation”. Importantly for the consideration of this case, the Tribunal also thought “Ongoing conflict with a parent, or a parent’s refusal to allow the young person to return home, alone, is insufficient grounds to constitute an extreme family breakdown under the Act”. [6]

    [6] Simakovic and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 812 at [27].

14. In Gunning and Secretary, Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education [2013] AATA 595, the Tribunal focused on the meaning of the word “extreme” and concurred with the Oxford dictionary meaning of the word to include “reaching high or the highest degree; exceedingly great or intense”.[7]  Also importantly for the purposes of this case, the Tribunal noted the provisions of the Guide to Social Security Law (“the Guide”) which suggests ongoing conflict alone as being insufficient to constitute extreme family breakdown and grant independence.[8]

    [7] Gunning and Secretary, Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education [2013] AATA 595 at [20].

    [8] The Guide to Social Security Law, [3.2.5.40]; and see Gunning at [15] and [20].

15. The Respondent referred to Instruction 3.2.5.40 of the Guide which, also relevantly for present purposes, provides that even “if parents refuse to allow the young person to live at home, this does not constitute ‘extreme family breakdown’ unless there is evidence of extreme and enduring family conflict”.[9]

    [9] See Exhibit 4:  Respondent’s SFIC, paragraph [22]; and the Guide to Social Security Law [3.2.5.40].

16. At the hearing, during cross-examination, the Applicant was referred to the “Youth Allowance – Unreasonable to live at home – Statement by Young Person” form that he completed on 20 November 2016.[10]  When specifically referred to the fourth page of the form, he confirmed the “letter” referred to at answers 23, 24 and 26 is the joint letter his parents wrote on his behalf on 20 November 2016.[11] This was in response to Centrelink’s decision to reduce his youth allowance due to updated parental income. In his evidence, the Applicant confirmed he agreed with the content of this letter.

    [10] Exhibit 5, T Documents, T7, pp 72 – 78.

    [11] Exhibit 5, T Documents, T8, p 79. 

17. In my view, his acceptance of the content of this letter presents serious difficulties for this Applicant’s capacity to establish circumstances of extreme family breakdown. To my mind, a significant portion of this letter takes the Applicant’s circumstances in the home of his parents a long distance away from the “exceedingly great or intense” circumstances required by subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) of the Act.

18. This was borne out in his evidence. He was questioned about his parent’s comment as to the requirements of subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) where they say: “Those grounds are extreme and we honestly do not fit, for that reason I feel we are being penalised, in essence for having been civil and restrained in our dealings within the family e.g. not reverting to violence or ‘kicking him out’.” [12] The Applicant sought to explain this comment on the basis of his parents apparently referring to his own circumstances rather than the more obvious conclusion that they are referring to the requirements of subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i). I have difficulty accepting this evidence.

    [12] Ibid, p 79.

19. This comment by the parents can only be read in one way.  This is confirmed by having regard to the immediately preceding sentence: “In order for Noah to be deemed independent there must be grounds for ‘unreasonable to live at home’.” It is therefore obvious that the parents are referring to the nature of the “extreme family breakdown” required by subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) before making the immediately following comment “Those grounds are extreme and we honestly do not fit ….” [those grounds]. Therefore, I find this comment by the parents does not and never did relate to the Applicant’s own circumstances.

20. When questioned about his living arrangements at his parents’ house and specifically the portion of the letter that says: “From 2010 – 2013 Noah lived in a self-contained granny flat at the family’s home, doing jobs in and around the home in exchange for rent and board.” The Applicant confirmed this granny flat was a stand-alone structure situated some 10 metres from the main dwelling structure. I do not accept the granny flat arrangement is suggestive of any degree of independence of this Applicant from his parents. The granny flat is situated on the same parcel of land to the main dwelling.  Members of the same family unit inhabit the main dwelling and the granny flat.  Neither do I glean any measure of independence by way of financial separation as a result of the Applicant “doing jobs in and around the house in exchange for rent and board.”

21. The parents’ letter of 20 November 2016 makes reference to an expectation that the Applicant would leave home after completion of his Year 12 studies. This expectation is not based on any measure of difficulty or trouble (whether extreme or otherwise) in the home.  The parents are not saying they are “fed up” with any extreme difficulty or violence caused by or relating to the Applicant or the family unit more generally.  It is expressed as a mere expectation. In his evidence, the Applicant conceded this expectation (of his leaving the home after his finishing Year 12) would have prevailed even without the asserted conflict and difficulties now sought to be relied on as extreme.

22. Perhaps the most telling admission by the parents in their letter of 20 November 2016 involves their description of the asserted difficulties and how they were resolved.  They refer to there being “…no physical violence within our family, there has been belligerence, arrogance and hostility causing emotional / physical distress to all”.  With reference to how these issues were resolved, they say they “…intentionally addressed issues and attempted to resolve them in a socially appropriate manner…”   Further, they “…did not seek counselling/support services… Matters were discussed civilly and resolved within the home.  We did not feel the need to involve a third party.”

23. There are two fundamental difficulties with these statements.   First, the description of the asserted difficulties in the household as “belligerence, arrogance and hostility” hardly amount to extreme circumstances of the highest degree that can be regarded as exceedingly great or sufficiently intense to demonstrate an impasse that, in turn, could conceivably result in the breakdown of the family unit.  These comments indicate nothing of the sort.  Indeed, the following comments speak of resolution of those issues in a civil manner. These are hardly greatly intense or extreme difficulties. The comments plainly speak to a resolution of the issues, not to any breakdown.

24. Second, the apparent reluctance to involve a third party to advise on, counsel or mediate the asserted difficulties is, to my mind, also telling.  The lack of involvement of any such third party deprives the Applicant’s case of any corroboration on this point.  If the situation at home was so extreme, why wasn’t a third party (be it a counsellor, priest or other community group) engaged or consulted about it? Evidence could have then been adduced from that third party to corroborate the Applicant’s contention of an extreme situation at home.  The clear inference is that whatever the situation was at home, it was of relatively minor severity and probably did not warrant external intervention.

25. In his evidence, the Applicant sought to explain this lack of any third party corroboration on the basis of his mother’s propensity to keep these things “in house”. He said her upbringing and values apparently caused a certain caution and coyness in her about involving outsiders in family problems. I attach little or no credibility to this evidence. I further consider the lack of corroborative evidence about the asserted situation at home to be a serious deficiency in the Applicant’s case, specifically, that there were extreme circumstances resulting in some type of family breakdown.

26. The parents also spoke of “irregular phone and email contact with [the Applicant] since he left in 2013.”  During cross-examination, it was put to the Applicant that in his Youth Allowance  “Unreasonable to live at home” form, although he described contact with his parents to comprise “sporadic phone and emails”, he nevertheless said his contact occurred “Every 3 weeks, Sharon [his mother] calls or mails”.[13] He said the three week increment in communications was only an estimate and not a hard and fast rule.  He described the telephone calls with his mother as “civil” and “matter of fact” but “not friendly”.  He mentioned that during these calls, his sister would come onto the phone and speak with him. Whatever the frequency of communications may have been, the nature and tone of these communications does not point to any extreme circumstances indicating any breakdown of the family.  On the contrary, any substantiation of extreme circumstances would, to my mind, derive from the parents and/or the sister refusing to speak with him or taking active legal steps to prohibit or injunct such contact.

    [13] Exhibit 5, T Documents, T7, p 76.

27. The parents’ letter also goes on to say that if the Applicant is not paid youth allowance at the independent rate, “…our family’s physical/mental and likely all of our emotional health will be jeopardised.”  Emotive as this commentary may sound, it is of no relevance to any argument seeking to establish sufficiently extreme circumstance pointing to a breakdown of the family unit. The asserted physical and mental jeopardy needs to be apparent before or contemporaneous with any departmental decision to refuse payment of youth allowance at the independent rate. This comment of impending calamity by the parents refers to possible circumstances after any reconsideration of the original decision.

28. The parents provided this letter in response to the initial decision to reduce the Applicant’s rate of youth allowance due to updated parental income. His mother also provided a statutory declaration (dated 23 December 2016)[14] in support of the application for review of this matter that came before the SSCSD on 5 January 2017.

    [14] Exhibit 5, T Documents, T11, p 89.

29. Compared to the letter from both parents, the mother’s tone in this statutory declaration seems more urgent and detailed in its description of the asserted circumstances at home.  She says: “Tensions were very high between [the Applicant], his older sibling and parents.  There were constant arguments, yelling and conflict”.  Further in the statutory declaration, the mother says the Applicant “…would often have arguments with his stepfather and I was scared that these would escalate out of control. He had a notable conflict with his brother which resulted in him attending the police station. I understand that he did not press any charges but none the less the incident was reported.”[15]

    [15] Ibid.

30. As mentioned earlier, there is a palpable difference in the tone of the mother’s evidence between the letter of 20 November 2016 and this statutory declaration. The perhaps milder references to belligerence, arrogance and hostility are now replaced with “notable conflicts”.  According to the statutory declaration, internal resolution of these family issues has apparently given way to things “escalating out of control”.  The statutory declaration discloses the hitherto unacceptable aspect of external involvement in family matters by virtue of an apparent reporting of an incident to the Police. There is also the patent inconsistency between the letter and the statutory declaration as follows.  In the letter of 20 November 2016, the parents unequivocally say “There has been no physical violence within our family.”  In the statutory declaration of 23 December 2016, the mother deposes to a fear of things escalating “out of control” and of actual “conflict” between the Applicant and his brother resulting in (apparently) a report to the Police.

1. To my mind, the escalation of the asserted situation at home in the statutory declaration can be explained on the basis that: (1) the letter was put together to support the application for payment of youth allowance at the independent rate; and (2) the statutory declaration was prepared following the refusal to pay youth allowance at the independent rate (on 24 November 2016) and before the scheduled review of that decision by the SSCSD on 5 January 2017. This inconsistency taints both documents with a significant level of unreliability. I further note, the Applicant’s mother was never called to give evidence at the hearing to clarify her comments or intentions.

2. The Applicant’s explanation of the asserted “notable conflict” with the brother is less than convincing. In his evidence, he spoke of some type of physical altercation with his brother.  He said he actually attended a Police Station and spoke to someone about it.  Yet there is no corroborating Police incident report (or similar document), nor any report from a treating health professional talking about the Applicant’s physical state following the altercation.  It is surely likely that any “notable conflict” in the form of a physical exchange resulting in the reporting of the matter to Police would have conceivably involved physical injuries requiring examination by a health professional.  No medical or other report is proffered by the Applicant. The notable absence of any such corroborative evidence makes any finding of exceedingly great or intensely extreme circumstances such as to give rise to a family breakdown, very unlikely.

3. A similar view can be formed about the Applicant’s relationship with his parents.  In the form relating to his application for youth allowance at the independent rate,[16] his responses to two specific questions are not suggestive of any extreme circumstances pointing to any family breakdown:

   [16] Ibid, p 76.

   ·“Question 28:  Has your relationship with your parent(s)/guardian(s) changed since you left home?

   Answer:          Yes.

   oHas your relationship improved or deteriorated?

   Answer:          Improved.

   ·Question 29:   Have you any contact with your parent(s)/ guardian(s) since you left home?

   Answer:Yes. Sporadic phone and emails;

   Every 3 weeks, Sharon [the mother] calls or mails.”

4. On any reasonable view, these responses are not indicative of any exceedingly great or intensely extreme circumstances leading to a finding of extreme family breakdown.  The only explanation proffered by the Applicant for the improved relationship with his parents was because he “was not there” – that is, at home.

5. The Applicant’s email of 24 February 2017[17] is, by and large, a re-statement of factors with a primary purpose to purportedly demonstrate a level of independence for the requirements of subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) of the Act. For reasons outlined earlier relating to the parents’ letter of 20 November 2016 and the mother’s statutory declaration of
   

   [17] Exhibit 1: Email from Noah Prescott to Brisbane Registry (AAT) dated 24 February 2017.

   23 December 2016, these facts go nowhere near the threshold of demonstrating exceedingly great or intensely extreme circumstances leading to a family breakdown.

6. It is therefore, plainly apparent that neither the parents’ letter of 20 November 2016 or the mother’s statement of 23 December 2016 (or, for that matter, the Applicant’s email of
   24 February 2017) are consistent with any finding of extreme family breakdown so as to activate subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) of the Act.

7. The Applicant’s evidence is, on one view, inconsistent and on another, self-serving.  This is apparent from his concession to the ARO, the SSCSD, and now this Tribunal as to the accuracy of both the parents’ letter of 20 November 2016 and the mother’s statutory declaration of 23 December 2016.[18]  As noted by the Respondent:

   “It is only now before this Tribunal that the Applicant is claiming that he has had no contact with his parents since leaving home except when his rate of payment changed.  He has only now raised an issue with violence between himself and his brother.” [19]

   [18] These concessions are, of course, subject to the Applicant’s evidence at the hearing before me.  My views about that evidence appear in these Reasons.  

   [19] Exhibit 4, Respondent’s SFIC, p 5 at [27].

8. The Respondent concedes two additional things:  (1) the Applicant does not want to live at home and (2) his parents do not want him living at their home. Two things can be said here: (1) whether the Applicant does or does not want to live at his parents’ home is, on its own, no way demonstrative of extreme family breakdown to the necessary threshold; and (2) as the Tribunal made plain in Simakovic: “ongoing conflict with a parent, or a parent’s refusal to allow the young person to return home, alone, is insufficient grounds to constitute an extreme family breakdown under the Act.” [20]

   Can the Applicant demonstrate the necessary independence pursuant to subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i) of the Act on the basis of ‘other similar exceptional circumstances’?

   [20] Simakovic and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 812 at [27].

9. With reference to subsection 1067A(9)(a)(i), the concept of “other similar exceptional circumstances” is addressed at Instruction 3.2.5.40 of the Guide which lists some of the following, as indicators of such circumstances:

   ·     criminal activity or substance abuse by the parents; or

   ·     severe neglect, where adequate food, clothing, shelter, hygiene, medical attention and supervision is not being provided; or

   ·     extreme and abnormal demands placed on the young person.[21]

   [21] Guide to Social Security Law [3.2.5.40].

10. Taking into account the totality of the evidence, I agree with the Respondent’s contentions that there is no evidence to establish any of the above examples or other similar circumstances. Consequently, the Applicant’s circumstances do not constitute other similar exceptional circumstances as anticipated by subsection 1067A(9) of the Act.

    Can the Applicant demonstrate the necessary independence pursuant to subsection 1067A(9)(a)(ii) of the Act on the basis of ‘other circumstances’?

11. At the hearing, the Applicant said all of the physical abuse was from his brother. He added there were some physical threats from his stepfather. The brother no longer resides in the family home and thus is not a relevant consideration for present purposes.

12. The Respondent accepts there is a risk of possible conflict in the family if the Applicant were to return home. However, in the absence of medical or similar evidence, this Tribunal cannot safely make any findings of a serious risk to the Applicant’s physical or mental well-being. At the hearing, the Applicant conceded that no aspect of the asserted physical violence involved him being taken to a counsellor or other treating health professional.

    Section 78 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999

13. The Respondent directed the Tribunal’s attention to section 78 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (the “Administration Act”). That section provides that the Secretary (or in this case, the Tribunal) is to determine that a person’s rate of social security payment is to be increased if it is being, or has been, paid at less than the rate provided for in the social security law.

14. For present purposes, section 78 of the Administration Act does not require application because I have determined that the decision under review was correct. That is, the decision to reject the Applicant’s request to be paid at the rate of an independent person was correct, and additionally that it was correct to adjust his rate of dependent youth allowance in accordance with the parental income test. No change to the payment rate is required consequent upon my findings.

    A fresh application for youth allowance at the independent rate?

15. The Applicant now asserts his parents have moved and that he does not know where they currently reside. He says he indirectly learnt of this development from his brother via social media. He also says he has no other evidence or information proving the parents have moved but that he may perhaps be able to obtain such evidence from an Aunt.

16. The Respondent has helpfully indicated:

    “….. if there has been a recent change in circumstances, it is open to the Applicant to seek review of his rate of payment based on his current circumstances.” [22]

    [22] See Exhibit 4, Respondent’s SFIC, p 6 at [35], and also stated at the hearing.

17. Whether the Applicant proceeds with any such review and/or fresh application is entirely a matter for him.  I note he is presently 21 years of age and will turn 22 later this year. My understanding is that upon attaining the age of 22 years he will automatically qualify for youth allowance at the independent rate.[23]

    [23] See section 1067A(4)(Item 3) of the Act.

    CONCLUSION

18. The Applicant does not satisfy the requirements of subsection 1067A(9) of the Act such as to be found independent on the premise it is ‘unreasonable to live at home’. Therefore he will continue to be paid youth allowance at the dependent rate.

    DECISION

19. The decision under review is affirmed.

I certify that the preceding 49 (forty-nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member T. Tavoularis

.........................[sgd]............................

Associate

Dated: 20 April 2017

Date of hearing:	4 April 2017
Applicant:	In person
Solicitor for the Respondent:	D. Smith, DHS - FOI and Litigation Branch

See section 1067A, independent factors include: (2) member of a YA couple; (3) person with a dependent child; (4) person at least a certain age (ie. 22); (5) orphan; (6) if parents cannot exercise responsibilities;

(7) refugee; (8) person in state care; (9) unreasonable to live at home; (10) people who are self-supporting; (11) people who are disadvantaged; (12) people with a partial capacity to work.