JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: PRAZMO -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2024] WASC 386
CORAM: ARCHER J
HEARD: 17 DECEMBER 2024
DELIVERED : 23 DECEMBER 2024
FILE NO/S: SJA 1018 of 2024
BETWEEN: KRZYSZTOF PRAZMO
Appellant
AND
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE R YOUNG
File Number : PE 30222/23
Catchwords:
Appeal against conviction - Duty of court to self-represented litigant - Denial of procedural fairness - Substantial miscarriage of justice
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Leave to appeal granted and appeal allowed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | M L Wong |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | In person |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Armet v Stephen Browne [2024] WASCA 44
Bennett v Carruthers [2010] WASCA 131
Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138
Fujita v City of Bayswater [2022] WASC 101
Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375
In the Marriage of Johnson (1997) 139 FLR 384
McCagh v Rural Bank (a division of Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd) [2024] WASCA 68
Michael v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 100
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597
Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65
Morgan v Cramer [2019] WASC 68
Nafranec v Nicol [2012] WASC 436
Re F Litigants in Person Guidelines (2001) 27 Fam LR 517; (2001) 161 FLR 189
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1
Sethi v Bhavsar [2020] WASCA 52
Stone v Braun [2015] WASCA 103
Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; (2007) 17 VR 100
Wyman (on behalf of Bidjara People) v Queensland [2015] FCAFC 108
ARCHER J:
Overview
On 13 February 2024, Mr Prazmo was convicted after trial of stealing a bottle of men's cologne from the Myer store in Perth city. The trial took place in the Perth Magistrates Court. Mr Prazmo was unrepresented.
Mr Prazmo has appealed against his conviction on the ground that there was a miscarriage of justice. The respondent concedes that there was.[1] This concession was rightly made. Mr Prazmo did not get a fair trial.
[1] Respondent's Outline of Submissions filed 13 September 2024 (Respondent's Submissions) [2] and [4] ‑ [5]. The respondent's concession was based upon the cumulative effect of the magistrate's refusal to adjourn the trial entirely or partly, the fact that Mr Prazmo was unwell and had only just been released from rehabilitation the previous day, and the fact that Mr Prazmo was denied the opportunity to question a material witness.
Under the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), a person may seek leave to appeal against a conviction in the Magistrates Court on, among other grounds, the ground that there has been a miscarriage…
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- Case
- [2024] WASC 386
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to decide were whether the trial judge's conduct constituted procedural unfairness and whether such unfairness led to a substantial miscarriage of justice. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the trial judge failed to give the appellant a reasonable opportunity to answer the case against him and whether the judge's failure to assist the appellant, who was not legally trained, in overcoming procedural disadvantages constituted procedural unfairness.
The court found that the trial judge's conduct did constitute procedural unfairness, as the appellant was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. The court noted that procedural fairness requires, among other things, that an accused be given a reasonable opportunity to answer the case against him or her. Additionally, the court found that the judge's failure to assist the appellant in overcoming procedural disadvantages, as well as the failure to grant a reasonable request for an adjournment, also constituted procedural unfairness. The court emphasised the importance of avoiding practical injustice and maintaining a fair and just trial. The court concluded that the appellant was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case, and thus, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed.
The court ordered a retrial of the appellant, ensuring that the trial judge would provide the necessary assistance to the appellant to overcome procedural disadvantages and maintain a fair and just trial. The court also emphasised the importance of maintaining impartiality and neutrality as between the parties while providing the necessary assistance to the self-represented litigant.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Procedural fairness requires, among other things, that an accused be given a reasonable opportunity to answer the case against him or her.[48][48] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; (2002) 209 CLR 597 (Bhardwaj) [40]. A failure to assist a self‑represented litigant to overcome, so far as is reasonably practicable, the procedural disadvantages a self‑represented litigant faces by reason of not being legally trained, can constitute procedural unfairness.[49] A failure to grant a reasonable request for an adjournment can also constitute procedural unfairness. The question is whether the party was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case.[50] The concern of the law is to avoid practical injustice.[51] In Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd, the Court said:[52]What a judge ought do to assist a litigant in person depends on the litigant, the nature of the case, and the litigant's intelligence and understanding of the case. The boundaries of intervention are flexible but the lodestar is a fair and just trial. It is clear, however, that a judge must not intervene to such an extent that he or she cannot maintain a position of neutrality or as to give an unrepresented litigant a positive advantage over another party. The advice and assistance which a litigant in person ought to receive from the court should be limited to that which is necessary to diminish, so far as this is possible, the disadvantage which that litigant will ordinarily suffer when faced by a lawyer, and to prevent destruction from the traps which the adversarial procedure offers to the unwary and untutored. (citations omitted)[52] Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65 [51]. This passage was endorsed by Beech J, with whom Buss JA and Mazza JA agreed, in Stone v Braun [2015] WASCA 103 [63]. As explained by the Court of Appeal in Zerjavic v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd:[53]There are a number of recent occasions in which this court has examined what should be done by a trial judge to ensure a fair and just trial where one of the parties is a self‑represented litigant. The subject has been considered countless times in the New South Wales Court of Appeal and, in the important decision of In the Marriage of Johnson, by the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia. The application of the general principles varies depending on the particular circumstances of the case; for example, the nature of the case and the nature of the litigant including his or her understanding of the case. One abiding difficulty is the tension between the duty of a trial judge to ensure a fair and just trial and the requirement that the court maintain a position of neutrality and impartiality as between the parties. At all times a trial judge must remain an impartial adjudicator measured against the touchstone of fairness. For this reason the assistance a self-represented litigant ought to receive should be limited, ordinarily, to that necessary to overcome, so far as is reasonably practicable, the procedural disadvantages a self-represented litigant faces by reason of not being legally trained. (footnotes omitted)[53] Zerjavic v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 40 [74].