SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Pratt v Parker [2013] QSC 147
PARTIES:
ROHAN PRATT
(Respondent/Plaintiff )v
ROBERT JOHN PARKER
(Applicant/Defendant )
FILE NO/S:
73/2013
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Cairns Supreme Court
DELIVERED ON:
6 June 2013
DELIVERED AT:
Supreme Court Cairns
HEARING DATE:
31 May 2013
JUDGE:
Henry J
ORDER:
1.Leave is given for the filing of a notice of intention to defend and defence (and any counterclaim) by no later than 4pm on 13 June 2013.
2.If a notice of intention to defend and defence is filed by that time the application is allowed and the default judgment of 26 April 2013 is set aside.
3.The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the application on the indemnity basis.
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE – APPLICATION – DEFAULT JUDGMENT – SETTING ASIDE – where defendant made application to set aside default judgment pursuant to r 290 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules – whether defendant entitled to have default judgment set aside
Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) s 367
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 59
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) r 290
Aboyne Pty Ltd v Dixon Homes Pty Ltd [1980] Qd R 142
Marek v Australasian Conference Association Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 521
National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd v Oasis
Developments Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 441
COUNSEL:
Jonsson MA for the plaintiff
Trevino J for the defendant
SOLICITORS:
Williams Graham Carmen for the plaintiff
Preston Law for the defendant
The defendant makes application pursuant to r 290 UCPR to set aside a default judgment given for the plaintiff against the defendant on 26 April 2013.
Background
The action was commenced against the defendant on 15 February 2013. The plaintiff seeks to recover a sum of $115,000 plus interest for monies loaned and advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant.
On 27 February 2013 I authorised and directed the plaintiff to serve his claim and statement of claim on the defendant by electronic transmission to an identified email address. Information before the Court at that time indicated the defendant was residing overseas. The plaintiff served his material in accordance with that direction. He subsequently also forwarded the materials in hard copy to the defendant’s supposed home address in the Philippines.
The defendant asserts he had ceased use of the identified email address, did not receive the Court documents by email and only received them for the first time when they were received in hard copy at his home address in the Philippines on 22 April 2013.
The application for default judgment was heard on 26 April 2013. The defendant failed to file a notice of intention to defend or to otherwise appear before the Court and default judgment was entered against him.
The discretion
The Court is empowered by r 290 to set aside the default judgment.
The considerations relevant to the exercise of the discretion conferred by r 290 include:
a) whether or not the…
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- Case
- [2013] QSC 147
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central issue before the court was whether Parker was entitled to have the default judgment set aside. Parker argued that they had a bona fide defence to Pratt’s claim and that there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to respond in time. The court had to consider whether Parker’s application was made within a reasonable time, whether Parker had a bona fide defence, and whether setting aside the default judgment would result in substantial injustice to Pratt. Additionally, the court considered whether there were any other compelling circumstances that warranted setting aside the default judgment.
In determining Parker’s application, the court noted that the application was made promptly and that Parker had provided a plausible explanation for their failure to respond. The court was also satisfied that Parker had a bona fide defence to the claim and that setting aside the default judgment would not cause substantial injustice to Pratt. The court found that all the necessary criteria for setting aside the default judgment were satisfied. Therefore, the court granted Parker’s application and allowed them to file a notice of intention to defend and a defence by no later than 4pm on 13 June 2013. If Parker complied with this order, the default judgment would be set aside. The court also ordered that Parker pay Pratt’s costs of and incidental to the application on the indemnity basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.Leave is given for the filing of a notice of intention to defend and defence (and any counterclaim) by no later than 4pm on 13 June 2013.
2.If a notice of intention to defend and defence is filed by that time the application is allowed and the default judgment of 26 April 2013 is set aside.
3.The defendant pay the plaintiff’s costs of and incidental to the application on the indemnity basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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