Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 286

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as at Reprint 2 ss 6(2), 6(4), 6A(1)(e)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 475(1)(c), 476(1)(d), 476(1)(e)
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) s 6(1)
Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations Part 5 Regulation 21

Dahlan v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court, Hill J, 12 December 1989) applied
Comptroller-General of Customs v Kawasaki Motors Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 219 cited
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 applied
Medru v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 153 applied
Fakatava v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 118 applied

NARENDRA PRASAD & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1167 OF 1999

HELY J
17 MARCH 2000
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1167 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

NARENDRA PRASAD, ANITA DEVI PRASAD, NIRENDRA PRASAD
APPLICANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MARCH 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1167 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

NARENDRA PRASAD, ANITA DEVI PRASAD, NIRENDRA PRASAD
APPLICANTS

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE:

17 MARCH 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Section 6(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in the form in which it stood at the relevant time, (“the Act”) gave officers a general discretion to grant an entry permit to a non-citizen. However, s 6A(1) provided that an entry permit was not to be granted to a non-citizen after entry unless one of the conditions in paras (a) to (e) was satisfied. Paragraph (e) applied if the non-citizen was the holder of a temporary entry permit which was in force, and there were strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds for the grant of an entry permit to him. This process was referred to as Grant of Residence Status (“GORS”).

  2. On 12 December 1989 Hill J delivered his decision in the matter of Dahlan v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (unreported) which held that it was an error of law to require that an applicant be singled out or suffer hardship over and above the rest of the population in the country of origin before strong compassionate or humanitarian grounds could be said to exist.

  3. Apparently, Departmental policy prior to that decision required an applicant to be singled out in the country of origin before it could be said that humanitarian grounds existed.  A change to that policy was notified by a policy control instruction issued by the Department on 23 May 1991 (Exhibit A).

  4. Sections 6 and 6A of the Act were repealed by s 6(1) of the Migration Legislation Amendment…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 286
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant challenging a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs regarding the refusal to reopen a previous visa application. The Federal Court was tasked with reviewing the legality and appropriateness of the Minister’s decision under the Migration Act. The applicant argued that the decision was flawed, specifically citing a failure to consider certain material and improper exercise of discretion.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Minister’s decision was legally sound, particularly in terms of the procedural fairness and the application of relevant legal principles. The applicant contended that the decision was made without proper consideration of relevant facts and in disregard of the principles of natural justice. Additionally, the applicant claimed that the decision was an improper exercise of discretionary power, potentially influenced by policy considerations rather than the merits of the case.

The court found that the Minister's decision was not flawed as alleged. The court held that the decision to not reopen the previous visa application was within the Minister's discretion and was not an improper exercise of power. It was determined that the Minister had appropriately exercised their discretion, considering the long delay in the application and the lack of new material presented. The court also rejected the argument that the decision was influenced by policy rather than the merits, finding that the decision was made in accordance with the law and proper process. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed.

In light of the above findings, the court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to legal and procedural requirements in administrative decisions, particularly in the context of immigration and visa applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

HELY J
The ground based upon s 476(1)(d) is also misconceived inasmuch as the decision did not involve the exercise of a discretionary power to grant a visa. There was no question of a visa being refused in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case. The Department simply declined, as it was perfectly entitled to do, to reopen a decision made more than ten years earlier.Conclusion The application for review should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HELY J

Full text does not contain this section.