Prasad and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 384 (8 June 2016)
Division
TAXATION & COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number(s)
2015/2401
Re
Atish Prasad
APPLICANT
And
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Professor R Deutsch, Deputy President
Date 8 June 2016 Place Sydney The decision of the Respondent to ban the Applicant from providing financial services is varied, the term of the ban is reduced from 3 years to 18 months. In all other respects the decision under review is affirmed.
..........................[sgd]..............................................
Professor R Deutsch, Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
CORPORATIONS – providing financial services – banning order – failure to provide statement of advice – lack of detail in statement of advice – applicant not adequately trained to provide financial services – seriousness of breaches – length of ban varied – decision varied and affirmed
LEGISLATION
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 920A, 920B, 946C, 947C, 947D, 961B, 961G
Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth)
CASES
Fraser and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2011] AATA 944
Hickie and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AATA 853
Musumeci and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 524
Seagrim and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2012] AATA 583SECONDARY MATERIALS
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Regulatory Guide 98, Licensing: Administrative action against financial services providers, July 2013
REASONS FOR DECISION
Professor R Deutsch, Deputy President
8 June 2016
INTRODUCTION
On 24 April 2015 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Respondent, issued an order under sections 920A and 920B of the Corporations Act 2001 (“the Act”) banning Mr Atish Prasad (“the Applicant”) from providing financial services for 3 years.
The reasons for the Respondents decision for making the banning order were based essentially on three aspects of the Applicant’s behaviour:
· First, the Applicant failed on a number of occasions to provide a Statement of Advice (“SOA”) within the prescribed timeframe as required by law;
· Secondly, the Applicant failed on a number of occasions to provide the required level of detail in the requisite SOAs; and
· Thirdly, the Applicant was not adequately trained to provide financial services.
As a result of these breaches, the Respondent determined that it had the power to make the banning order under:
·s.920A(1)(e) of the Act as the Applicant had not complied with a financial services law; and
·s.920(1)(da) of the Act as the Applicant was not adequately trained.
The Respondent also determined that:
·The Respondent was not able to find that the Applicant had failed to comply with the obligation to act in the best interests of his clients as required by s 961B of the Act;
·The Respondent was not able to find that the Applicant had failed to provide appropriate advice as required by s 961G of the Act; and
·It was not necessary to make findings as to whether there was reason to believe that the Applicant was likely to contravene a financial services law: s 920A(1)(f).
FACTS – THE PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 15 May 2015, the Applicant lodged with the Administrative…
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- Case
- [2016] AATA 384
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine whether the applicant was adequately trained or competent to provide financial services, whether he had complied with financial services law, and whether ASIC had reason to believe he was likely to contravene financial services law. These were the bases upon which ASIC’s power to make a banning order was enlivened. The applicant sought to argue that the three-year banning order was manifestly excessive.
The Tribunal found that while the applicant had not adequately addressed each of the specific breaches alleged by ASIC, his conduct in preparing statements of advice (SOAs) demonstrated a "complete disregard for the law." This was particularly evident in SOAs that were predominantly blank, undated, and did not identify the client, suggesting a "could not be bothered" attitude. Although the Tribunal agreed with the applicant that there were no serious matters suggesting he had not acted in the best interests of his clients, the material and serious failings in the preparation of SOAs were significant. The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that direct comparisons could be made with other cases involving less severe banning orders, emphasizing that each case is fact-dependent.
The Tribunal varied the banning order, reducing its duration from three years to eighteen months. This variation was based on the Tribunal's assessment of the seriousness of the breaches, particularly the inadequate preparation of SOAs, while acknowledging that the applicant had not been found to have acted against the best interests of his clients.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Accordingly the Applicant argues that a banning order in this case of 3 years is manifestly excessive.TRIBUNAL’S CONSIDERATION The Respondent has raised a number of serious breaches in this matter and whilst the Applicant has sought to argue a number of matters in response to those allegations it is regrettable that the Applicant has not specifically and sequentially directly addressed each of the five breaches specified above. Rather, the Applicant has sought to put forward various general arguments that go to some of these breaches and more general comments applicable to all of them. In relation in particular to the specific breach which lead to the Respondent concluding that the Applicant had conducted himself in a manner which was in “complete disregard of the law”[3] this related to advice which had been provided which “did not identify the client, and was undated”[4] and was “predominantly blank”.[5][3] T-documents, p49.[4] T-documents, p47.[5] T-documents, p47. Whilst I accept that there may be different views as to the seriousness of this matter, I do not think it is hyperbolic, melodramatic or unsupported by the evidence to suggest that someone preparing an SOA who leaves the contents predominantly blank without mentioning the name of the client and also leaves the document undated, is demonstrating a complete disregard for the law. The law does require such statements to be completed largely for the benefit of the client and the extent of the failings, in this regard, were material and serious. Quite frankly, reviewing the manner in which the documents were completed, suggests that the Applicant adopted what could only be described as a “could not be bothered” attitude to the preparation and completion of such documents. They were generally poorly completed, if completed at all, often left unsigned and contained inaccuracies and inconsistencies such as wrong dates being inserted and risk profile descriptions being used which did not accord with risk profile descriptions in other documents. In relation to Breach 4, s 961B(1) provides a safe harbour in that the Applicant can show he has acted in the best interests of clients by establishing all the matters referred to in s 961B(2). However, the Applicant argues and I agree that is not the only way in which acting in the best interests of the client can be demonstrated. In this case, I do not believe there are any serious matters that would suggest that the Applicant has at any given time not acted in the best interests of his clients even though he has clearly not followed the requirements spelt out in the legislation. I have also considered in detail the Applicant’s argument that there are other cases where more egregious behaviour has resulted in banning orders of less than 3 years duration. In this context I do not accept that direct comparisons of this nature can or should be made. Each case is heavily fact dependent and the duration of banning orders cannot therefore be easily compared without more detailed analysis of the facts.