Poynting v Strathfield Municipal Council

[2000] NSWLEC 147

Land and Environment Court

of New South Wales

CITATION:

Poynting v Strathfield Municipal Council [2000] NSWLEC 147

PARTIES:

APPLICANT:
Poynting

RESPONDENT:
Strathfield Municipal Council

FILE NUMBER(S):

10117 of 2000

CORAM:

Bignold J

KEY ISSUES:

Question of Law :- whether provisions of LEP specifying minimum size of an allotment upon which a dwelling-house may be erected is a development standard.

LEGISLATION CITED:

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 97
State Environmental Planning Policy No 1 - Development Standards

CASES CITED:

Bell v Shellharbour Municipal Council (1993) 78LGERA 429;
Bowen v Willoughby Council [2000] NSWLEC 69;
Fencott Drive Pty Ltd v Lake Macquarie City Council [2000] NSWLEC 146

DATES OF HEARING:

10th May 2000

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

07/12/2000

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:

APPLICANT:
Mr G Green, Solicitor
SOLICITORS:
Pike Pike and Fenwick

RESPONDENT:
Mr T O'Connor, Solicitor
SOLICITORS
Houston Dearn O'Connor

JUDGMENT:

IN THE LAND AND Matter No . 10117 of 2000

ENVIRONMENT COURT OF Coram : Bignold J.

NEW SOUTH WALES 12 July 2000

R. POYNTING

Applicant

v

STRATHFIELD MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

Respondent

JUDGMENT

Bignold J:

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The Council has raised some preliminary questions of law in pending class one proceedings involving an appeal pursuant to the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 97 (the EP&A Act) against the Council’s deemed refusal of a development application to subdivide an existing lot known as lot 91 Deposited Plan 10182 and also known as No 26 Mitchell Road, Strathfield into two lots, each having identical dimensions, including a width of 15.24 m and an area of 557.4 m2 (the appeal site).

2. The questions of law raised by the Council (Exhibit B) are as follows:
1. Does clause 41(2) of Strathfield Planning Scheme Ordinance lay down absolute prohibitions against the erection of the named buildings on land having either of the specified characteristics within zone number 2(a)?
2. Do the provisions of clause 24(b) and 41(2) when read together, prohibit not only the erection of a single dwelling, attached dual occupancy, detached dual occupancy or multiple-unit housing but also the use of land, whether forming the site of a building or not, for the purposes of single dwelling, attached dual occupancy, detached dual occupancy or multiple-unit housing where the area of the allotment of land has an area of less than 560m2 within zone number 2(a)?
3. If the current subdivision application is approved, will the future use of each of the two allotments of land created by the subdivision be prohibited for the purposes of single dwellings, attached dual occupancy, detached dual occupancies or multiple-unit housing?
4. If the dual occupancy development for which Council has previously granted development consent is constructed prior to the subdivision of the land as proposed, do the provisions of clause 24(b) and the Land Use Tables under clause 22 of the Strathfield Planning Scheme Ordinance prohibit the subdivision of the land as proposed?
5. If the proposed subdivision takes place before construction of the said dual occupancy development do the provisions of clause 24(b) and 41(2) prohibit the future construction of the “dual occupancy development”?

3. The Applicant submits that the fourth and fifth questions need not be considered because they relate to an existing development consent granted by the Council on 22 October 1998 for a detached dual occupancy development on the appeal site which the Applicant has not implemented. (Its building application in respect of the approved development having been lodged on 29 June 1998 remains undetermined by the Council). The Applicant further submits that the present development application for the proposed two lot subdivision does not relate to the approved dual occupancy development but that in any event, should the Applicant’s present appeal be upheld and development consent granted for the two lot subdivision of the appeal site, the Applicant has no intention of acting upon the dual occupancy development consent.

4. In these circumstances, I think that it is only necessary to answer questions 1, 2 and 3. Should the appeal ultimately succeed, it will be possible to give effect to the Applicant’s intention not to act upon the dual occupancy development consent by imposing an appropriate condition pursuant to s 80A(1)(l) of the EP&A Act for the surrender of the earlier development consent. The imposition of such a condition would overcome the Council’s concerns at the prospect of there being two possibly inconsistent development consents concurrently applying to the appeal site.

B. THE RELEVANT FACTS

5. An abbreviated version of the relevant facts may be distilled from the parties’ respective versions of the statements of facts (Exhibits 1 and A) as follows:
1. The appeal site is included in the Residential 2(a) Zone in terms of the Strathfield Planning Scheme Ordinance (the LEP).
2. Within that zone, the LEP designates particular “purposes for which buildings or works may be erected or carried out or used only with the consent” (of the Council) and those purposes relevantly include the following purposes

attached dual occupancies which are not subdivided;


detached dual occupancies which are not subdivided;

single dwellings.

(The LEP contains in cl 4(1) definitions of “ attached dual occupancy ”, “ detached dual occupancy ” and “ dwelling ”

3. The Applicant has lodged a development application with the Council proposing the subdivision of the appeal site into two lots—each lot having an area of 557.4 m2. The application is supported by an objection under State Environmental Planning Policy No 1—Development Standards (SEPP No 1).

4. The appeal site has a site area of 1,114.8 m2 , a width of 15.24 m and a depth of 73.15 m.

5. Development of the appeal site is governed by the LEP relevant provisions of which are as follows:

(i.) cl 22 which relevantly provides:

Subject to the provisions of Parts iv, v, vi and vii and to any other special provisions of this Ordinance—

…………

(b) the purposes—

………….

(ii) for which buildings or works may be erected, carried out or used only with the consent of the responsible authority in each of the Zones are respectively shown opposite thereto in column iv of the Table.

Column iv of the Table in respect of the Residential 2A Zone includes the following purposes
attached dual occupancies which are not subdivided; detached dual occupancies which are not subdivided; single dwellings.

(ii.) Cl 24 relevantly provides:

Subject to the provisions of Part iv and to the provisions of any other special provisions of this Ordinance—

………..

(b) land, included in a zone, whether forming the site of a building or not, shall not be used for any purpose for which a building in the same zone may not be erected or used.

(iii) Clause 41 which is contained in Part vii (“ Special Provisions ”) provides as follows::

Allotment sizes within residential zones

41 (1) The Council shall not grant consent to the subdivision of land within Zone No 2(a) or 2(b) which creates allotments intended to be used for the erection of single dwellings, attached or detached dual occupancies, or multiple-unit housing, unless each proposed allotment has an area of not less than 560 square metres and a width at the front building line of not less than 15 metres.

(2) A single dwelling, attached dual occupancy, detached dual occupancy or multiple-unit housing must not be erected on an allotment of land within Zone No 2(a) or 2(b) which has an area of less than 560 square metres or a width at the front building line of less than 15 metres.

(3) For the purposes of subclause (1) and (2), the area of a battle-axe shaped allotment shall not include the area of the access corridor.

(4) Nothing in this clause shall operate to prohibit the erection of a single dwelling in Zone No 2(a) or 2(b) on an allotment of land that was in existence as a separate allotment of land on the appointed day (21 February 1969).

(iv) Clause 43A (contained within Part vii) provides as follows:

A person shall not subdivide any land without development consent.

C. DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTIONS OF LAW

6. Although the three questions of law to be answered are integrally related, for convenience I shall separately consider them.

Question 1—Does cl 41(2) of the LEP contain an absolute prohibition?

7. According to the manner in which the question was addressed by the parties’ competing arguments, the question as formulated by the Council is to be understood in the dialectic sense of “absolute prohibition” as opposed to “development standard” which is amenable to the dispensational power conferred by SEPP No 1.

8. In submitting that cl 41(2) of the LEP is not a development standard but is an absolute prohibition, the Council expressly conceded that by contrast, cl 41(1) of the LEP was a development standard. This concession which directly reflected the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bell v Shellharbour Municipal Council (1993) 78LGERA 429 was, in my respectful opinion, properly made.

9. However, so to acknowledge the appropriateness of the Council’s concession is to immediately expose the difficulty encountered by Council’s argument that cl 41(2) is not a development standard. The question that naturally arises is: what is it, in the content of cl 41(1) and of cl 41(2), that differentiates the interpretive result suggested by the Council’s argument of the former provision being a development standard but the latter not being a development standard?

10. The Council’s answer to this apparent dilemma was to alight upon the presence of cl 41(4) of the LEP. The Council submitted that cl 41(4) provided relief in certain situations against the prohibiting effect of cl 41(2) and its presence (and purpose or function) in the clause excluded the possibility of cl 41(2) being interpreted as a development standard.

11. I do not find this argument to be persuasive. Indeed, it comes perilously close to (if not perpetuating the same) error that had been made by the trial judge in Bell and which was corrected by the Court of Appeal in its judgment—see at pp 431 - p 432.

12. Applying the same reasoning as is expressed in the judgment of Cripps JA in Bell, I would hold that cl 41(4) of the LEP does not impose any implied limitation or inhibition on the applicability of SEPP No 1. Rather, it provides an alternative solution without the need to resort to the dispensational power available under SEPP No 1.

13. Once the Council’s argument based upon the presence of cl 41(4) in the LEP is disposed of, the Council’s argument that cl 41(2) is not a development standard (whereas by concession, cl 41(1) is a development standard) appears, with respect, to be bereft of substance. In so concluding, I am unable to discern any substantive difference (notwithstanding some slightly different language) between the prohibitory effect of cl 41(1) and of cl 41(2) of the LEP.

14. Moreover, even if the Council had not made what I regard as the proper concession concerning cl 41(1) of the LEP, I am of the opinion that cl 41(1) and cl 41(2) of the LEP each imposes a relevant “development standard” within the meaning of the EP&A Act and SEPP No 1. In so concluding, I rely upon the reasoning founding my decision delivered earlier today in Fencott Drive Pty Ltd v Lake Macquarie City Council([2000] NSWLEC 146).

15. I do not repeat what I there have said. (In the course of the hearing of the present case, I had informed the parties that I had recently reserved my decision in the Fencott case where the same question had been substantially argued and I had their concurrence that the decision in the present case, would await the decision in that case). Apart from the Council’s reliance upon cl 41(4) of the LEP in the present case, the argument addressed in the present case basically traversed the same ground that had been traversed in the competing arguments encountered in Fencott.

16. Although it is true that each relevant provision of an environmental planning instrument must be separately construed in order to determine whether or not it is a development standard, there is really no difference between the two cases as to the type of statutory provision requiring interpretation.

17. Accordingly, much if not all, of the reasoning that led me to conclude in Fencott, that the relevant statutory provision was a development standard, applies with equal force to lead me to the same conclusion in respect of cl 41(2) of the LEP.

18. For all the foregoing reasons, I would answer the first question in the negative but for the sake of clarification, I would add the comment that cl 41(2) is a “development standard” within the meaning of the EP&A Act and SEPP No 1.

Question 2—Is the use of the appeal site prohibited?

19. Question 2 is directed to “the use of” the land forming the appeal site (being the focus of cl 24(b) of the LEP) in contradistinction to “the erection” of “a building on the land” (the focus of cl 41(2) of the LEP).

20. However, though the focus of each clause is discrete (namely (i) the use of land and (ii) the erection of a building on the land) the control on “use” of land is both derivative from, and complementary to, the control on the erection of a building.

21. The Council’s Solicitor properly conceded that the answer to this question should be the same (as a matter of legal consequence) as the answer to the first question.

22. Accordingly, since I have answered the first question in the negative, this question is likewise answered in the negative.

Question 3—Is the future development of the subdivided lots prohibited?

23. Question 3 directs attention to the future, upon the assumption that the present proposed subdivision of the appeal site is approved and implemented. In such event, it asks whether the use for residential development of the two created lots will be prohibited or not.

24. In a real sense, this question is the most relevant and fundamental on the facts of the case, because the Council’s concession that cl 41(1) of the LEP is a development standard inevitably means that there is no legal reason precluding the upholding of the present appeal, and the grant of development consent to the proposed subdivision.

25. In so concluding, I have discounted any possible application to the facts of this case of s 80(2) of the EP&A Act for the reasons that led me to a similar conclusion in Bowen v Willoughby Council [2000] NSWLEC 69 where the possible effect of the EP&A Act, s 80(2) was fully argued.

26. Nonetheless, the answer to this question obviously is integrally related to the answers to questions 1 and 2 and ultimately, the answer to this question must be seen to be the inevitable consequence of my answers to those earlier questions.

27. Accordingly, I would answer this question in the negative.

D. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERS

28. For all the foregoing reasons, I answer the questions of law as follows:

Question 1—	Does cl 41(2) of the LEP contain an absolute prohibition?	No. Cl 41(2) of the LEP is a development standard within the meaning of the EP&A Act and SEPP No 1.
Question 2—	Is the use of the appeal site prohibited?	No.
Question 3—	Is the future development of the subdivided lots prohibited?	No.
Questions 4 and 5—	Do not require to be answered on the facts.