Poulos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Poulos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd [2019] NSWCA 241
Hearing dates: 25 September 2019
Date of orders: 04 October 2019
Decision date: 04 October 2019
Before: Payne JA; Brereton JA
Decision:

(1)   Summons dismissed;
(2)   Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs.

Catchwords:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – Court of Appeal – application for leave to appeal – where proceedings dismissed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 13.4 – summons dismissed

  JUDGMENTS – setting aside for fraud – summary dismissal – where relitigation an abuse of process
Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 13.4
Cases Cited: AB v State of NSW [2014] NSWCA 243
Arthur JS Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615
Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464; [1939] HCA 23
Brewer v Brewer (1953) 88 CLR 1; [1953] HCA 19
Clone Pty Ltd v Players Pty Ltd (2018) 92 ALJR 399; [2018] HCA 12
Coffey v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1999) 86 FCR 434; [1999] FCA 375
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Hacide Pty Ltd, (Supreme Court (NSW), Sully J, 28 November 1989, unrep)
Donnelly v Australia and New Zealand Banking Corp [2015] NSWCA 233
Hacide v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (Court of Appeal (NSW), Samuels, Priestley and Clarke JJA, 1 August 1991, unrep); [1991] NSWCA 134
Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313
Macatangay v New South Wales (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 272
O'Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 698; [2013] NSWCA 315
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; [1981] HCA 45
Poulos v Elliott [2019] NSWSC 423
Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665
Sea Culture International v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275
Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1699
State of New South Wales v Williams [2014] NSWCA 177
Tomlinson v Ramsey Foods Processing Pty Limited (2015) 256 CLR 507; [2015] HCA 28
UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 92 ALJR 968; [2018] HCA 45
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Patricia Poulos (Applicant)
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
Applicant (Self-represented)
F Roughley (Respondent)

  Solicitors:
Applicant (Self-represented)
Gadens (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2019/00226568
Publication restriction: Nil
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court of New South Wales
Jurisdiction:
Equity
Citation:
[2019] NSWSC 423
Date of Decision:
12 April 2019
Before:
Kunc J
File Number(s):
2019/00010906

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: Almost 30 years ago, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) obtained a judgment for possession of a property in South Cronulla owned by Hacide Pty Ltd (Hacide), [1] a company controlled by the present applicant Mrs Patricia Poulos and her husband Mr John Poulos, who were also defendants in those proceedings. An appeal to this Court from that judgment was dismissed. [2] In…

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Details
Case
[2019] NSWCA 241
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Poulos, sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of the primary judge who had dismissed proceedings brought against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd. The dismissal occurred under rule 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), which allows for the dismissal of proceedings where a summons has been dismissed.

The central legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the applicant's proceedings and whether the applicant had established grounds to set aside the earlier dismissal of his summons, particularly in light of allegations of fraud and the potential for relitigation constituting an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found that the applicant had not demonstrated any error in the primary judge's decision to dismiss the proceedings. The court considered the applicant's arguments regarding fraud and abuse of process, but concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a sufficient basis for setting aside the earlier dismissal. The court applied principles relating to the finality of litigation and the prevention of vexatious or abusive relitigation, finding that the applicant's attempts to re-litigate issues already determined amounted to an abuse of process.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's summons and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Summons dismissed;

(2) Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Poulos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd revolves around a series of events that began when the applicant, Mr Poulos, filed proceedings against the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (the Bank) seeking to set aside a judgment for fraud. The proceedings against the Bank were initially filed in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. However, these proceedings were dismissed under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rule 13.4, which deals with summary dismissals in cases of abuse of process. The dismissal was based on the grounds that the relitigation of the matter would constitute an abuse of the court process.

Following the dismissal, Mr Poulos lodged a summons in the Supreme Court seeking to appeal the decision to dismiss his initial proceedings. The summons was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal, which held that the application for leave to appeal was without merit. The Court of Appeal found that the relitigation of the fraud allegations against the Bank was indeed an abuse of the court process. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal emphasised the importance of preventing repetitive litigation that would serve no useful purpose and would only waste judicial resources.

In addition to dismissing the summons, the Court of Appeal ordered Mr Poulos to pay the Bank's costs associated with the appeal. The Court of Appeal's decision was grounded in its assessment that Mr Poulos's continued pursuit of the fraud allegations, despite the earlier dismissal, constituted an abuse of the legal process and warranted the imposition of costs against him. This case highlights the courts' reluctance to allow repetitive litigation that serves no productive purpose and underscores the importance of adhering to procedural rules designed to prevent such occurrences.

The proceedings in Poulos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd originated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the plaintiff, Mr Poulos, sought to set aside a judgment for fraud under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Following an unsuccessful application, the matter was dismissed under rule 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), leading Mr Poulos to file a summons in the same court seeking leave to appeal. This appeal was subsequently dismissed, prompting Mr Poulos to file a summons for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Court of Appeal considered the application for leave to appeal, ultimately concluding that the proceedings were an abuse of process due to the relitigation of the same issues. Consequently, the summons was dismissed, and Mr Poulos was ordered to pay the costs of the Respondent. The Court of Appeal's decision hinged on procedural grounds, specifically the misuse of the court process rather than the merits of the fraud allegation itself.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in circumstances where the primary court proceedings were dismissed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 13.4?
2. Was the dismissal of the summons under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 13.4 an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion?
3. What constitutes an abuse of process in the context of relitigation of the same issues?
4. Is setting aside a judgment for fraud an abuse of process when the same issues have already been litigated and determined in a prior proceeding?
5. Are there any exceptional circumstances that warrant the Court of Appeal setting aside the primary court’s decision to dismiss the summons?

Held
1. Does the Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in circumstances where the primary court proceedings were dismissed under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 13.4?
The Court of Appeal concluded that it does not have jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in such circumstances. Appeal dismissed.

2. Was the dismissal of the summons under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 13.4 an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion?
The Court of Appeal concluded that the dismissal of the summons was an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion. Application dismissed.

3. What constitutes an abuse of process in the context of relitigation of the same issues?
The Court of Appeal held that the relitigation of the same issues constitutes an abuse of process. No specific action taken.

4. Is setting aside a judgment for fraud an abuse of process when the same issues have already been litigated and determined in a prior proceeding?
The Court of Appeal concluded that setting aside a judgment for fraud in such circumstances is an abuse of process. No setting aside.

5. Are there any exceptional circumstances that warrant the Court of Appeal setting aside the primary court’s decision to dismiss the summons?
The Court of Appeal concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting the setting aside of the primary court’s decision. Application dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Poulos v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd, the Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether it had the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in circumstances where the primary court had dismissed the proceedings under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) r 13.4. The Court began by examining the scope of its appellate jurisdiction and the specific circumstances surrounding the dismissal. It noted that r 13.4 dismissals are meant to weed out frivolous or vexatious claims, and such dismissals often preclude further appeal unless leave is granted. The Court concluded that it had the inherent jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal, even in cases where the primary court had exercised its discretion under r 13.4.

Turning to the second issue, the Court scrutinized whether the primary court's dismissal of the summons was an appropriate exercise of its discretion. It emphasized that the dismissal under r 13.4 must be justified based on clear evidence that the claim is frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The Court found that the primary judge had adequately considered the relevant factors and provided sufficient reasons for the dismissal, affirming that the dismissal was an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion.

The Court then delved into what constitutes an abuse of process in the context of relitigation of the same issues. It referenced established jurisprudence which holds that relitigation of the same issues is generally an abuse of process, as it wastes judicial resources and undermines the finality of judgments. The Court underscored that the principle of res judicata plays a crucial role in preventing such abuse, ensuring that parties cannot continually relitigate the same claims.

In examining whether setting aside a judgment for fraud is an abuse of process when the same issues have already been litigated and determined, the Court highlighted the distinction between fraud on the court and mere relitigation. While relitigation is typically an abuse of process, fraud on the court, where there is evidence of deception or misrepresentation, may warrant setting aside a judgment. The Court held that the applicant's argument for setting aside the judgment due to fraud required a showing of substantial new evidence or circumstances not previously known.

The Court of Appeal also considered whether there were any exceptional circumstances that warranted setting aside the primary court’s decision to dismiss the summons. It recognized that exceptional circumstances might include newly discovered evidence or significant procedural irregularities. However, the Court found that the applicant had not demonstrated any such exceptional circumstances that would warrant overturning the primary court's decision. The Court emphasized that the onus was on the applicant to clearly establish such grounds, which had not been met in this case.

In summary, the Court of Appeal established that while it has the jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal in cases dismissed under r 13.4, such leave is not automatically granted. The dismissal under r 13.4 must be an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion, which was affirmed in this case. Relitigation of the same issues typically constitutes an abuse of process, but fraud on the court might warrant setting aside a judgment. Finally, exceptional circumstances must be convincingly demonstrated to warrant setting aside the primary court's decision. This case thus reinforces the principles of judicial finality and the importance of sound legal reasoning in granting leave to appeal.