Poulos v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2)

[2023] NSWCA 307

Court of Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Poulos v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWCA 307

Hearing dates:

On the papers

Date of orders:

13 December 2023

Decision date:

13 December 2023

Before:

Ward ACJ; Adamson JA

Decision:

1.   The Registrar of the Court of Appeal be directed to refer the matter to the Attorney-General for consideration as to the making by him of an application for a declaration that the applicant is a vexatious litigant.

Catchwords:

APPEALS – Procedure – Vexatious litigants – Where recommended that Attorney-General make an application for a declaration that the applicant is a vexatious litigant

Cases Cited:

Poulos v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2023] NSWCA 262

Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 4) (2011) 81 NSWLR 711; [2011] NSWCA 324

Category:

Procedural rulings

Parties:

Patricia Poulos (Applicant)
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
Applicant (self-represented)
M Hall (Respondent)

Solicitors:
Dentons Australia (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2023/00127571

Publication restriction:

Nil

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

Supreme Court of New South Wales

Jurisdiction:

Equity Division

Citation:

[2023] NSWSC 362

Date of Decision:

11 April 2023

Before:

Ball J

File Number(s):

2022/00297409

JUDGMENT

1. THE COURT: On 1 November 2023, this Court dismissed as incompetent the applicant’s summons seeking leave to appeal from the summary dismissal of proceedings brought by her in the Equity Division in which the applicant made serious allegations of fraud, conspiracy, perjury and fraud on the Court (see Poulos v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2023] NSWCA 262). The applicant was seeking, among other relief, orders setting aside earlier judgments in the Equity Division striking out her amended pleading and summarily dismissing earlier proceedings in which the same issues of fraud had been raised.

2. The orders made on 1 November 2023 included a direction that the applicant file submissions within 14 days as to why the matter should not be referred to the Attorney-General for consideration as to whether to make an application for the applicant to be declared a vexatious litigant. The applicant has filed submissions, which the Court has considered. For the following reasons, we are of the opinion that such a referral should be made and we will direct the Registrar of the Court of Appeal to do so.

3. The applicant submits that there is no justification for the making of an order referring the matter to the Attorney-General. In essence, the applicant’s submissions reiterate her complaints as to the asserted fraud and her focus on the “fresh evidence” to which reference was made in the proposed grounds of appeal that the applicant had sought to prosecute. We have summarised the applicant’s contentions in this regard in our previous reasons and do not repeat that summary here.

4. Suffice it to note that, in her submissions as to why a referral to the Attorney-General should not be made, the applicant contends that vital evidence of material significance was intentionally concealed by the respondent from the applicant and the courts for more than thirty-eight years; that the judgments impacted by that evidence were tainted by fraud; and that this fresh evidence was not revealed until 4 November 2022. The applicant contends that had that evidence been available there would have been a different outcome in the earlier proceedings before Sully J and the Court of Appeal, as well as the proceedings before Needham J (see the chronology of proceedings summarised in our previous judgment).

5. Further, the applicant complains as to the reading of Order 4 “in a Courtroom of Barristers”, which the applicant says “ensures difficulties in obtaining legal assistance”. The decision was published on 1 November 2023 in the ordinary course in open court. There is little point speculating as to the likely impact of the reading of the order on the willingness of barristers who may have been in court at the time to take on instructions for the applicant (even were she to be seeking that they do so); and the number of barristers in the room would hardly be a drop in the ocean of available barristers at the bar in New South Wales.

6. The applicant also notes that “leave to the High Court is being filed”. That is a matter for the applicant. It has no bearing on whether or not the matter should be referred to the Attorney-General at this stage.

7. Nothing has been put forward by the applicant that provides a sound reason for this Court not taking the course foreshadowed in our previous judgment. The fact remains that the applicant is persisting in repeated applications re-agitating very serious issues of fraud and perjury. The making of Teoh (Teoh v Hunters Hill Council (No 4) (2011) 81 NSWLR 711; [2011] NSWCA 324) directions to date has not been effective in deterring the applicant from such applications. It is appropriate to refer the matter to the Attorney-General for consideration as to the making by him of an application for a declaration that the applicant is a vexatious litigant.

8. The Court therefore orders that:

1. The Registrar of the Court of Appeal be directed to refer the matter to the Attorney-General for consideration as to the making by him of an application for a declaration that the applicant is a vexatious litigant.

**********