Potter and Potter
[2004] FMCAfam 250
•28 May 2004
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| PHILLIPS & PHILLIPS | [2004] FMCAfam 250 |
| CHILD SUPPORT – Application for departure from a Child Support Agreement – whether there has been any significant changes in the parents’ means and/or the children’s needs since the agreement was entered into – what was reasonably anticipated by the parents at the time – whether the agreement created an unjust and inequitable obligation of financial support by the father. Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989, s.117 Liu & Chen [2003] FMCAfam 322 |
| Applicant: | MR PHILLIPS |
| Respondent: | MS PHILLIPS |
| File No: | BRM8705 of 2002 |
| Delivered on: | 28 May 2004 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Hearing date: | 25 June 2003 |
| Judgment of: | Baumann FM |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Kirk SC |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Philippa Power Solicitor |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Baston |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Mitchell Lawyers |
ORDERS
The Child Support Departure Application filed by the father on
14 November 2002 be dismissed.Any written submissions in respect of costs be filed and served within 14 days.
Any written submissions in response to the application for costs be filed and served within 14 days thereafter.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Phillips & Phillips is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRM8705 of 2002
| MR PHILLIPS |
Applicant
And
| MS PHILLIPS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By Child Support Agreement dated 30 January 2002 and subsequently registered with the Child Support Agency, the Applicant Father
Mr Phillips and the respondent mother Ms Phillips, the parents agreed that the father would pay periodic Child Support for the three children of the marriage in :-
“The total sum of $8,000 per calendar month (calculated at $2,666.67 per child per calendar month)”
Additionally the payment was to be reviewed annually and varied by reference to the CPI increases. Paragraph 4.2 of the Agreement further provided that the father:-
“shall in addition pay all school fees for the children at the schools they are currently attending, or comparable schools”
The father’s application to the Court is for the Agreement to be discharged retrospectively from 1 July 2002, including any arrears, and that there be no payment for child support other than:-
“(a)That each of the father and the mother shall fully support the children when in their care.
(b)That the father pay all school fees and related educational costs.”
The mother opposes the application and seeks that it be dismissed with costs.
Each party was represented by Counsel and filed extensive material. Both parents were cross examined.
The grounds for the application do provide a choice summary of the father’s argument, namely:-
“1.In the special circumstances of this case the provisions of the Agreement dated 30 January 2002 are an unjust and inequitable obligation of financial support, which ought be provided by the Father for the children, because:-
(a) of the income earning capacity, property and financial resources of the Mother;
(b) the provisions made for the Property Settlement by the Father for the Mother and contained in the Order made by Consent on 31 January 2002 and the Financial Agreement dated 30 January 2002.
(c) The real needs of the children.
2.At the time the Agreement was signed the provisions were neither proper, nor adequate having regard to the children’s needs and the financial position of the parents.
3.The payments required to be made by the father were excessive.
4.There have been changes in the circumstances of the children and the parents which justify a variation since the Agreement was entered into, including:-
(a) that [X] has resided with the father through much of the period since the agreement was made and moves freely between the homes of the Mother and the Father and is likely to continue to do so.
(b) The children [Y] and [Z], reside equally with the father and the mother;
(c) The children are substantially financially subsidised by the Father, in addition to the provisions contained in the Agreement.
(d) The mother’s financial circumstances have changed and significantly improved since the agreement was entered into.
5.The payments required of the Father in the Agreement are manifestly unjust and bear no resemblance to the real expenses and needs of the children.
6.At the time the Child Support Agreement was signed the Father was under inordinate pressure from the Mother in respect of their overall financial settlement and it would be a hardship if in light of that settlement, that the Agreement were enforced, collected and not discharged as sought by the Father.
7.It would be proper to make the Order sought by the Father, having regard to the nature and duty of the Mother to maintain the children, the proper needs of the children, the income and earning capacity, property and financial resources of the Mother, as well as the commitments of the Mother to support herself.
8.The Orders sought by the Father do not in any way affect any income tested pension, nor take into account the manner in which the children have been expected by the Mother and the Father to be cared for, educated and trained and their special needs.”
Background
The parties married in 1987 and separated in September 2001. The marriage produced three children, [X] (now aged 15); [Y] (now aged 10) and [Z] (now aged 8).
The parties signed the said Child Support Agreement and a Financial Agreement (under section 90C of the Family Law Act) on 30 January 2002. On 31 January 2002 a consent order was made in the Family Court of Australia. The husband asserts that the effect of the division of property was that the mother received net assets to a value of $4.48 million, whilst the father retained net assets of $9.3 million. At the time of the order, the father was the CEO of a well known publicly listed company.
The Mother says the agreements and orders reached were a total package negotiated to resolve all issues arising from the breakdown of the marriage. The father says he didn’t regard the arrangements as one package.
The father and the mother by June 2002 were embroiled in a dispute over property orders (particularly a property “[R]”) and chattels. Those issues do not require consideration by me, however it is clear that by
1 July 2002, (5 months after the Agreement), the father had instructed his solicitors that because:-
“significant changes in the circumstances of the parent’s means and the children’s needs have occurred since it [Child Support Agreement] was entered into”
it is appropriate for significant variations to be made to the Agreement.
The father’s solicitors letter of 1 July 2002 alleged that:-
“Since the Agreement was made, [X] has moved between the two family homes. We are further instructed that the two younger children, [Y] and [Z], spend about 3 ½ days per week with your client and about the same time with our client. Our client is continuing to pay all school fees for the children and all expenses when they are with him. The time with him is more expensive, on our instructions, because he has the children on the weekends, spends a lot of his personal time with them, takes them to entertainment, activities and out for meals, more than your client does.
To add to the incongruity of this situation, we are instructed your client’s financial position has dramatically increased since the Agreement was signed, whereas our client’s position has remained about the same. At the time since the Agreement was entered into, your client’s financial position had not been stabilised and she did not have a regular source of income in the structure way she does now. We are instructed that her income, for example, from shares and similar is at least $80,000 after tax per annum and she has substantial returns from rental property , as well as very significant capital assets, which have increased very significantly in value since the Agreement was signed. Our client’s position has not improved, because basically he had to divest himself of most of his real estate assets to provide the cash for your client to acquire hers.”
“The agreement was specifically worded to allocate an amount of $2,666.67 per child. It is imperative that a proper adjustment, based on the parents’ means and the children’s needs should also be made.
If it be that your client says she still has a need beyond the income and capital backing she has herself for support for the children, then we ask that she provide a budget and/or list of expenses to justify and maintain that need.
In the meantime, we are instructed any monthly remittance will be adjusted to allow for these changes.”
The mother refused to supply information and through her solicitor, indicated the mother expected the father to comply with the agreement.
The conflict between the parties clearly escalated, shaped by the father’s actions in reducing payments of child support; the mother ensuring the Child Support Agency commenced action for enforcement and recovery; ongoing litigation and correspondence were commenced. After dismissing the father’s application for a stay on 5 February 2003, I directed the mother to file and serve an affidavit setting out the reasonable needs of the children.
It was expressed in the Agreements that the children “reside at various times with the Husband and the Wife”. The father says he expected the children would spend their time predominantly with the mother, however he says the children now spend up to 71% of the number of “child days” (the number of days in the month multiplied by three). This has been reflective of the oldest child [X] choosing to spend more time with the father – electing (the father says with the mother’s consent) to remove all her personal possessions from the mother’s home on 26 May 2003.
The father acknowledged that for the financial year ending 30 June 2002 he had a taxable income exceeding $1.2 million. He controls a trust which has assets of approximately $14 million and estimated personal assets exceeding $5.5 million. His Financial Statement filed 20 June 2003, discloses an income by way of salary of approximately $8,000 (gross) per week. He says that in addition he receives distributions from trading trusts and discretionary trusts (a significant source of which is dividends from shares held in the public listed company of which he is a CEO), and that the “amounts of distributions are variable and not possible to quantify, being determined after net profit has been calculated at the end of each financial year.”
The father says he has resigned as CEO of the company effective in August 2003 because of health issues and the responsibilities of caring for the children.
The mother asserts in her Financial Statement filed 28 May 2003 and discloses net assets of approximately $5 million. The assets comprise substantially of real property which are not generating significant income. She says her major source of income is the child support paid by the father to her. It should be recalled that paragraph 19 of the consent order provided that, pursuant to section 77A of the Family Law Act, $1 million of the value of the assets, property and financial resources to be received by the mother under the order was attributable to the maintenance of the mother.
A great deal of attention was directed to the assessment of the children’s reasonable needs. The mother says with the assistance of her accountants she prepared a detailed spreadsheet (annexed to her affidavit filed 16 April 2003). The “living expenses” were assessed on the assumption that the children were living with her on a full week “every other week”. The estimation for the year ended 30 June 2003 was $125,209 per annum and for the year ended 30 June 2004 an amount of $158,959 per annum. The mother was substantially challenged by Mr Kirk SC, Counsel for the father, on her estimations and the foundation for them.
The relevant law
I adopt as a succinct statement of the relevant law in matters of this kind the remarks of CFM Bryant in Liu & Chen [2003] FMCAfam 322 where she said at paragraphs 9-12 that:-
“9.Pursuant to section 95 and section 98 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act, the child support agreement takes effect as if it was an order of the court and may be discharged, suspended, revived or varied in the same manner and circumstances in which the court could so treat an order of that kind. In other words, the provision in the child support agreement for payment of periodic amounts of money can be varied in the same way as a departure order for the payment of periodic amounts of money made under the Child Support (Assessment) Act.
10.In the case of Gilmour & Gilmour (1995) FLC 92-591, the Family Court of Australia was faced with the task of determining whether or not, by virtue of section 100 of the (Assessment) Act, section 66N(2) of the Family Law Act was imported into the act and therefore required as a threshold the applicant to show a change in circumstances. The Full Court in Gilmour & Gilmour (1995) FLC 92-591 determined that section 100 of the Family Law Act does not apply the principles or provisions in the Family Law Act into a division of the Child Support (Assessment) Act in which those provisions have not been given express legislative statement. In other words, the Full Court concluded that it was not a precondition to a successful application under the Child Support (Assessment) Act to establish that there had been a change in circumstances. Conversely, it seems to me a change in circumstances alone would not necessarily therefore be sufficient to provide a ground on which an agreement may be varied or discharged.
11.The principles to be considered therefore when considering the basis upon which a child support agreement can be varied are those which relate to the variation or discharge or departure from the provisions of a child support assessment made under the Child Support (Assessment) Act in relation to periodic payments of child support. Those provisions are to be found in section 117 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act.
12.In Gyselman & Gyselman (1992) 15 Fam LR 219 at 225 the Full Court set out the manner in which the court must approach an application for departure. The three steps to which I have referred must be addressed by the court each in turn, namely: first, whether one or more of the grounds for departure in section 117 is established. If so, secondly, whether it is just and equitable within the meaning of section 117(4) to make a particular order, and, thirdly, whether it is otherwise proper within the meaning of section 117(5) to make a particular order.”
Such a summary of the law has been confirmed and explained by later decisions of the Full Court in Liesert v Nutsch (1996) FLC 92-665; Bryant (1996) FLC 92-690 and Wild v Ballard (1997) FLC 92-771. Relevantly in my view in Bryant (supra) at 83,169-70 the Full Court observed that:-
“In the case of a child support agreement which has been accepted by the Registrar, and which provides for the payment of periodic child support, such an agreement takes effect as a departure order made by consent (s.95(2)), and before the agreement can be varied by the Court, the Court must, again in our view, be satisfied that there has been some change which would give rise to one of the grounds for departure in paragraphs 117(2)(a), (b) and (c). Again there is nothing in Liesert v. Nutsch to the contrary.
If the situation was not as we have just proposed in the last two paragraphs, there would be nothing to stop a party who did not accept the terms of a departure order from immediately approaching the Court to have the matter re-heard, or to stop a party who thought better of the agreement which he or she had made, immediately seeking to vary the agreement.” (Emphasis added)
Further in Wild v Ballard, the Full Court stated, after referring to the Full Court’s determination in the case of Bryant, said at pages 84-492 and 493:
“The requirements of s 117 as explained in Bryant obliged his Honour, when dealing with the husband’s application for the reduction in his obligation to pay periodic child support, to determine firstly whether by reason of a change of circumstance, a ground for departure existed, and then required his Honour to determine whether it would be just and equitable and otherwise proper to make an order departing from the existing assessment.”
This is the law which must be applied in this case.
The father’s grounds for variation
Although the father’s application relied on a number of grounds for departure, however Mr Kirk’s synopsis of the argument ultimately relied upon the following:-
A.Ground One
Under s.117(2)(a) of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Act”), the father’s capacity to pay has been significantly reduced by reason of the child support payment being made for [X] who now resides permanently with him and is being duly supported by him.
B.Ground Two
Under s.117(2)(c), since the Agreement the mother’s financial position has improved markedly.
C.Ground Three
Under s.117(2)(c), since the Agreement the children have spent greater periods of time in the father’s care than was originally anticipated.
D.Ground Four
At the time of the Agreement, the child support was not representative of the reasonable needs of the children or any of them and that remains the position today.
E.Ground Five
Under s.117(2)(c)(ii), since the Agreement was made the mother has received her property settlement from the father such as to make the payments being made under the Agreement unjust and inequitable.
Mr Kirk SC for the father conceded in the final submissions he could not succeed on a ground of departure under s.117(2)(b) of the Act.
I propose to deal with these grounds sequentially before turning to an assessment of whether special circumstances exists.
Ground One
Since separation the child [X], the eldest of the children, has elected to spend more time with the father. There is evidence to infer she has a preference for the parenting style of the father. The father says she moved out “permanently” from the mother’s home about six weeks before trial.
Although the father alleges the child’s relationship with the mother is somewhat estranged, the child was scheduled to spend a week shopping with her mother shortly after the hearing, during school holidays. The mother had, consistent with the lifestyle this family has enjoyed, budgeted to spend some $1,000’s on the trip to Sydney with her daughter.
I agree with Mr Baston, Counsel for the mother, that it is too early to predict with confidence or certainty that this teenage girl’s current choice is a permanent one, or that even if permanent will mean the child’s desire to spend time with the mother (and her younger siblings who live predominantly at her residence), would be significantly less than 50%.
In any event, considering the best evidence of the father’s income at the time of hearing was his taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2002 ($1.2 million), the additional impact of [X] spending extra time with him could not objectively be said to had had a “significant” reduction on his capacity to pay.
Ground Two
Although I am satisfied the mother’s financial position has improved since the agreement was made (essentially it seems through investment in property and the buoyant capital improvement that has occurred), that improvement was, in my view, a reasonably anticipated result of the mother adopting sensible and informed investment strategies.
It is clear that the manner in which the mother has chosen to increase her assets, is to gear her property (and share investment). It seems clear she learnt a lot from the highly successful business approach of the father. The period since the agreement was made and the extent and reasons for her improved capital position, does not establish of itself a ground for variation (departure) at this time in my view.
Ground Three
In some ways this ground is similar to the Ground One – although cast in more general terms. There are no parenting orders in this matter. All the agreements reflect it was anticipated that the father, because of his extensive business commitments (some of it, it seems, involving regular overseas and interstate travel) would be less available than the mother.
The parents have, to their credit, encouraged since separation a flexible sharing of care. Although the father’s decision to resign as CEO of the Company may increase his availability as he predicts, there was at the time of the hearing no certainty about how other business activities might fill up that availability. Just because he is more available does not mean the children will spend less time with the mother. At the time of the hearing of this matter, I did not regard the actual changes that had occurred as so significantly different with what might reasonably have been anticipated by the parents at the time of the Agreement.
Ground Four
This ground really is the crux of the father’s case. He says that the quantum of child support he agreed to pay is excessive and does not represent a fair assessment of the children’s needs.
It is difficult for the Court to make some comparison between the costs and needs of the children at the time of separation; the time of the agreement; at the time of the hearing and into the future for a number of reasons including:
a)There is no reliable evidence of what the expenses for the reasonable needs of the children were at the time of separation. The Agreement suggest they are the same (equal) for [X] at 15, as they are for [Z] at 8. The best evidence is that the father had agreed, and was voluntarily paying to the mother, $10,000 each month. Additionally the mother had access to some lines of credit (eg American Express). I also assume from the tenor of the evidence that from separation there was still a significant “intermingling” of payments for general expenses.
b)The parties “apportionment” of the monthly payment, as to $8,000 for child support and $2,000 for the Mother (as a form of spousal support) is a guide to what the parents regarded at the time as fair. Apart from the attempted reconciliation in late 2001, it seems (as already observed) that parenting responsibilities and care were shared as required.
c)The mother was clearly reluctant to make any finite assessment of what the children’s needs might be. It must, of course, be acknowledged that over and above the amount paid under the Agreement, the father pays school fees (and other expenses added on to the school account) and meets the children’s needs when they are with him. He asserts in his Affidavit, that the children often came to him poorly clothed and requiring pocket money. Whilst I am not required to make a finding on that issue, the father’s perceptions certainly fuelled this litigation and his view that the children were not going to benefit from the “excessive” child support he believes he is paying under the Agreement.
d)The mother, with the assistance of her accountant (and based on the assumptions identified at the beginning of the reports attached to her Affidavit filed 16 April 2003), gave an estimate of expenses and projected expenses. One of the assumptions is that the children are to maintain the same standard of living in both homes – including holidays, gifts and access to high quality (and regularly updated) electronic equipment. Mr Kirk SC, in his cross examination of the mother on these estimates (none of which were supported by corroborative evidence produced to the Court) sought some expenses he regarded as plainly excessive or not relating to the children including:
i)The adopted apportionment of some expenses for the children with the mother of ¾;
ii)Boat mooring and maintenance expenses for the mother’s $380,000 catamaran;
iii)Children’s photography of $3,000 every 3 years;
iv)Gifts for the children (in addition to clothing etc of $10,000 per annum) of $3,000;
v)Replacement car allowance of $13,750 per annum;
vi)In future years, the incorporation in expenses (anticipated around November 2003), of a New Sound System ($11,250) and “Set up of Cinema” ($22,500).
In his final submissions, Mr Kirk SC says even adopting the expenses claimed by the mother (which he doesn’t concede) and adjusting for boat expenses, holidays, clothes, gifts, etc, that the amount reduces from $129,381 per annum to a figure of approximately $70,000 per annum. That figure, in his submissions, needs further adjustment for a more accurate apportionment of expenses between the mother’s needs and the children’s needs and a further adjustment for the fact that [X], from
6 weeks before hearing, is predominantly living with the Father.In reply Mr Baston of Counsel for the mother says the exercise undertaken by Mr Kirk SC is not necessary. The amount was agreed, however it was estimated and the mother has no obligation to account to the father for the use of those funds, unless the proper needs of the children are not being met through a contribution of:
a)The father’s paid child support;
b)The mother’s own contributions;
c)The father’s additional contributions whilst the children are with him.
I have formed the view, even allowing for an almost fairytale lifestyle enjoyed by these children, that the mother cannot demonstrate that the children’s current reasonable needs, whilst in her care amount to $96,000 per annum.
That however, is not in my view, the end of the matter. I have little doubt that, if required to spend $8,000 per month on her children she could do so, with lavish holidays, accommodation, clothing, gifts, etc. Whether these children would actually benefit from such extravagances is a matter of unnecessary conjecture.
It seems to me that the children have probably never needed that level of support from their father (in addition to the other contributions) – however he agreed to pay it in circumstances where, I infer, he must have known that the expenses were never that high.
I am, of course aware, that child support payable to the Mother is not taxable in her hands – nor is it tax deductable to the father. That gives any payment some additional attraction to the mother.
I also observe, that even at the level of $96,000 per annum, based on the father’s taxable income of over $1.2 million – this represents less than 8% of his gross income. Again it is hard to accept that a highly experienced businessman and negotiator such as the father had himself not considered the figure.
The discussions on this ground neatly flows into the last ground relied upon by the father.
Ground Five
When the final attempt at reconciliation proved unsuccessful, the father, it seems, moved quickly into negotiations on all issues.
The letter from the father’s solicitors of the 6 November 2001 bear careful reading. It is a very detailed proposal. It referred to an earlier one-page agreement dated the 28 June 2001 (prepared by the parties) where the father agreed to continue to:
“pay an amount of $10,000 per calendar month from this day forward until further negotiated.”
What is clear from the letter was that the commencing negotiation was for the mother to receive $8,000 per month “for the children.”
It is neither necessary nor possible for this Court to embark on some speculation as to whether the ultimate package (for I am satisfied that was exactly what it was), was too generous to the mother as the father now suggests.
Clearly there were significant assets including substantial property interests, complex trusts and over 26 million shares in a well performed publicly listed company – a company substantially involved in the property section and which reported an operating revenue of $215 million (up 26.1%) and earnings per share of 12.9 cents (partly franked) for the year concluded 30 June 2002.
Significant contingent liabilities are discussed in the letter. More importantly the package of agreements entered into, copies of which are annexed to the father’s Affidavit filed 14 November 2002 are extremely detailed (as would be expected) and are accompanied by Certificates by the specialist family lawyers retained by the parties (pursuant to section 90g of the Family Law Act) that before the section 90C agreement was signed the effect, advantages, prudency and reasonableness of the terms were explained.
The father say he was under a lot of pressure to effect a resolution of all issues with the mother. The negotiations were impacting on his work performance – and there was a concern that a disruption could affect the value of the shareholdings in the publicly listed company. He says at paragraph 10, that in these circumstances:
“I did not fully consider the consequences of the provisions in the Child Support Agreement and the manner in which expenditure for the children should be dealt with fairly between the parents, both having the ability to support them.”
Quite properly the father’s property, income and financial resources are superior to that of the mother. This reflected his special contributions to the accumulation of the asset pool at the time of the Agreement. The father has not established this ground of variation (departure).
Has the father established special circumstances by reason of which there should be a variation to the agreement?
Section 4(3) of the Assessment Act, subtitled “Private arrangements for Financial Support”, records as follows:
“It is the intention of the Parliament that this Act should be construed, to the greatest extent consistent with the attainment of its objects:
a.to permit parents to make private arrangements for the financial support of their children;
b. to limit interference with the privacy of persons.”
This is an important provision. Mr Baston of Counsel for the mother submitted that for parents entering into agreements there needs to be a sense of integrity and finality – although he acknowledges that the Act cannot of course be circumvented.
In my view, even though section 4(2)(a) of the Assessment Act prescribes that the particular objects of the Act include and ensure:
“that the level of financial support to be provided by parents for their children is determined according to their capacity to provide financial support and, in particular, that parents with a like capacity to provide financial support for their children should provide like amounts of financial support,”
If the parents agree to contribute to the maintenance of their children in a particular manner, then the Court should not lightly interfere with an agreement voluntarily entered into by them.
This view is consistent with the remarks of the Full Court in Bryant emphasised at paragraph 19 of these reasons.
Although the facts of this case are unusual, has the threshold establishment of “special circumstances” been proved by the father.
That Full Court in Gyselman (1992)FLC 92-299 at 79,064-5 discussed the words “in the special circumstances” and said:
“Whilst it is not possible to define with precision the meaning of that term, as a generality it is intended to emphasise that the facts of the case must establish something which is special or out of the ordinary. That is, the intention of the Legislature is that the Court will not interfere with the administrative formula result in the ordinary run of cases. (It has been held) that “special circumstances” were “facts peculiar to the particular case which set it apart from other cases”. The approach to the interpretation and application of the particular grounds in section 117(2) must be guided by that qualification.”
I have formed the view that at the time of hearing this mater and on the whole of evidence, the father has not established a ground for variation or a special circumstance.
Because of this finding, I am not required to consider section 117(4) or section 117(5) of the Assessment Act. I am however prepared to say that if I am wrong in deciding no special circumstance exists and further wrong that a ground of variation (departure) has been established, I would not find on the facts before me that it is just and equitable at this time to order a variation.
Essentially my view is based on my findings that there was really no significant change of circumstance between the date of the Agreement (31 January 2002) and the hearing some 17 months later that these highly resourced parents should not have reasonably anticipated.
I am bound to dismiss the Application.
I will direct that any application for costs be filed and served by written submission within 14 days and replied to by written submission within 14 days thereafter.
I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Baumann FM
Associate:
Date:
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