Potschick v Bruce
[2018] WADC 107
•31 AUGUST 2018
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: POTSCHICK -v- BRUCE [2018] WADC 107
CORAM: GETHING DCJ
HEARD: 3 AUGUST 2018
DELIVERED : 31 AUGUST 2018
FILE NO/S: APP 14 of 2018
BETWEEN: HILDEGARD POTSCHICK
Appellant
AND
MATTHEW BRUCE
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: MAGISTRATE WILSON
File Number : ARM/RO/422/17
Catchwords:
Magistrates Court Appeal - Restraining Orders - Whether the magistrate erred in fact in finding that the respondent was not likely to commit an act of abuse against the appellant in the future
Legislation:
Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA), s 11A
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | In Person |
| Respondent | : | In Person |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Not applicable |
| Respondent | : | Not applicable |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172
Badran v Public Transport Authority of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 28
Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36
Butler v Bennett [2007] WADC 107
East Metropolitan Health Service v Martin [2017] WASCA 7
Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87
Ibrahim v The Honourable Justice Carolyn Martin [2012] WASC 338
Jones v Darkan Hotel [2014] WASCA 133
Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65
MTI v SUL [No 2] [2010] WASCA 58
Myles v Carroll [2003] WASCA 160
Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 331 ALR 550
Smart v Prisoner Review Board (WA) [2012] WASC 48
Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534
GETHING DCJ:
Background
The appellant, Ms Potschick, has commenced an appeal from a decision of a magistrate on 18 January 2018 to refuse to make a final violence restraining order in her favour against the respondent, Mr Bruce.
By way of background, at the beginning of last year, Ms Potschick was having issues with her roof. She engaged Mr Bruce to undertake some roof plumbing work pursuant to a written quotation. Mr Bruce undertook this work on 24 March 2017. An employee of Mr Bruce then undertook some further work on Ms Potschick's roof on 27 April 2017 (April Work).
By 1 May 2017 a dispute had arisen in relation to the April Work. Ms Potschick says that Mr Bruce agreed to do the April Work as part of the scope of work already done and covered by the initial quotation. Mr Bruce says that he agreed to undertake the April Work for an agreed price of $180. The dispute escalated to Mr Bruce telephoning Ms Potschick and demanding payment for the April Work. He later attended Ms Potschick's house, climbed onto its roof and removed a down pipe installed as part of the April Work. As a result of those actions by Mr Bruce, the dispute between Ms Potschick and Mr Bruce became physical, with Ms Potschick attacking Mr Bruce with a broom and an umbrella.
As a result of the incident, Ms Potschick was granted an Interim Violence Restraining Order (Interim VRO) against Mr Bruce on 10 May 2017.
Ms Potschick then sought a Final Violence Restraining Order (Final VRO) against Mr Bruce.
The application for a Final VRO was heard on 10 January 2018. The magistrate handed down a decision on 18 January 2018 declining to make a Final VRO (Magistrate's Decision).
The magistrate was satisfied that Mr Bruce committed two acts of abuse against Ms Potschick. The first was Mr Bruce's behaviour in two telephone conversations:
64.I accept and find the telephone conversations the Respondent had with the Applicant or the attendance by the Respondent at the House on 1 and 3 May 2017 were intimidating as they occurred in circumstances where the Respondent made demands to attend the House and remove the down pipe if he did not receive payment for the April Work. I find there can be no doubt, for the Respondent to climb onto the roof of the House and then actually remove the down pipe amounts to intimidation and caused fear in the Applicant.
The second was to assault her:
53I accept the evidence of the Applicant that she returned inside the House and obtained an umbrella and went to the Ute and began to strike it with the umbrella in the hope the Respondent would leave her property. Further, I accept and find the Respondent then climbed down off the roof of the House and proceeded to his Ute in an attempt to stop the Applicant striking the Ute. I also find at the Ute the Respondent was struck by the Applicant with the umbrella on multiple times. I also find the Respondent grabbed hold of the umbrella whilst it was being held by the Applicant and attempted to pull it off the Applicant but he used such force to do so that he pulled the Applicant over causing her to fall to the driveway. In this regard, I find the Respondent applied force to the Applicant in attempting to remove the umbrella from her hands of such a degree that he knew or ought to have known it was highly likely his strength would cause the Applicant to fall. I find these actions by the Respondent amount to an assault within the meaning of the s.222 of the Criminal Code.
…
63.The Respondent did not deny he pulled the Application over in the course of him trying to stop the Applicant from striking him and the Ute with her umbrella. I have found that action by the Respondent amounted to an assault upon Claimant. The Applicant was entitled, pursuant to s. 244 of the Criminal Code, to use all necessary force to remove the Respondent from her property. The Applicant did so and the Respondent left the property of the Applicant. I also find the removal by the Respondent of the down pipe and the lifting of tiles causing the mortar around ridge capping on the roof of the House amounted to damage.
However, the magistrate was not satisfied to the requisite standard that, in all of the circumstances of the case, Mr Bruce was likely to behave in a similar manner towards Ms Potschick in the future.
Further, the magistrate was also not satisfied to the requisite standard, in all of the circumstances of the case, that the granting of a Final VRO was justified. As Ms Potschick and Mr Bruce were not in a family relationship, it was open to the magistrate to make a Misconduct Restraining Order (MRO) in lieu of a Final VRO.[1] The magistrate was also not satisfied that, in all of the circumstances of the case, the granting of a MRO was justified.
[1] Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) ROA s 35A, s 43.
Accordingly the magistrate cancelled the Interim VRO and dismissed Ms Potschick's application.
District Court Appeal
A decision of a magistrate to refuse to make a Final VRO under the Restraining Order Act 1997 (WA) (ROA) may be the subject of an appeal to the District Court.[2] The appeal is to be made in accordance with the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) (MCCPA), pt 7.[3]
[2] ROA s 64(1)(b)(ii).
[3] ROA s 64(2).
By appeal notice dated 8 February 2018 (Appeal Notice) Ms Potschick commenced an appeal from the magistrate's decision. The appeal was commenced within the prescribed 21 day time period.[4]
[4] MCCPA s 40(3).
On 10 April 2018 Mr Bruce filed a Notice of Respondent's Intention to Defend in which he advised the court that he would argue that the Magistrate's Decision should be upheld on the grounds relied on by the magistrate.
The District Court must decide the appeal on the material and evidence that was before the Magistrates Court.[5] The court can give leave to admit other evidence, but only in exceptional circumstances.[6] By application dated 18 May 2018, Ms Potschick applied to adduce further evidence in the appeal. I heard this application on 11 June 2018 and declined to permit Ms Potschick to adduce the evidence. My reasons for doing so are set out in the transcript of that hearing.[7]
[5] MCCPA s 40(4)(a).
[6] MCCPA s 40(4)(b), s 40(5).
[7] District Court ts 27-31.
The appeal is by way of a 'reconsideration of the evidence' that was before the Magistrates Court.[8] This is to be undertaken by way of a rehearing.[9] As a rehearing, the appellate powers of the District Court are only exercisable if the appellant demonstrates that the decision made by the magistrate the subject of the appeal was the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error.[10] The onus is on the appellant to demonstrate this error.[11]
[8] District Court Rules 2005 (WA) (DCR) r 50(1).
[9] Brocklehurst v Wolinski [2015] WADC 36 [14] (Derrick DCJ);Butler v Bennett [2007] WADC 107 [6]‑[10] (Bowden DCJ)
[10] Robinson Helicopter Company Incorporated v McDermott [2016] HCA 22; (2016) 331 ALR 550 [43] (judgment of the court); Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 [23] Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow & Hayne JJ).
[11] Jones v Darkan Hotel [2014] WASCA 133 [31] (judgment of the court).
Issues arising for determination
Ms Potschick annexed a document setting out her grounds of appeal. The essence of the appeal is that the Magistrate's Decision was 'not in accordance with the weight of the evidence'. I set out the more detailed explanation for this ground of appeal below ([23]). This is the sole issue in the appeal.
In determining the appeal, I am conscious that Ms Potschick is a litigant in person. As such, she is entitled to some leniency in relation to compliance with the court rules.[12] I approach the documents in which she articulates her appeal with some flexibility.[13] I need to be astute to ensure that, in a poorly expressed or unstructured document in which she sets out her case, there is no viable case which, with appropriate amendment or permissible assistance from the court, could be put into proper form.[14] At the same time, I also need to ensure that any latitude given to Ms Potschick does not deprive Mr Bruce of his rights to procedural fairness and a fair hearing.[15] I also need to extend the same latitude to Mr Bruce, again with the caveat that I ensure that, in doing so, I do not deprive Ms Potschick of her rights to procedural fairness and a fair hearing.
[12] Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87, [10] (reasons of the court).
[13] Wentworth v Rogers(No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, 536 - 537 (Kirby P), 543 (Hope & Samuels JJA agreeing); Smart v Prisoner Review Board (WA) [2012] WASC 48 [10] (Pritchard J).
[14] Ibrahim v The Honourable Justice Carolyn Martin [2012] WASC 338 [21] (Beech J); Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288 [15] (EM Heenan J, with whom Murray & Le Miere JJ agreed).
[15] Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65 [51] (Judgment of the court); MTI v SUL [No 2] [2010] WASCA 58 [42] – [43] (Newnes JA, with whom Pullin & Buss JJA agreed); Glew [10].
The central issue in the appeal is whether the magistrate erred in finding that Mr Bruce was not likely to commit an act of abuse against Ms Potschick in the future.
Did the Magistrate err in finding that Mr Bruce was not likely to commit an act of abuse against Ms Potschick in the future?
Before the power of the court to grant a Final VRO was enlivened, the court has to be satisfied both that Mr Bruce had committed an act of abuse against Ms Potschick and that he 'is likely again to commit such an act against' her.[16] As I have noted, the magistrate was satisfied that Mr Bruce had committed acts of abuse against Ms Potschick.
The onus was on Ms Potschick as the applicant to satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that Mr Bruce was likely to commit an act of abuse against her in the future.[17] However, as EM Heenan J observed in Myles v Carroll, in doing so, the court must have regard to the seriousness of the allegations made:[18]
For a court to be satisfied of the existence of one or more of the grounds for making a restraining order it must be satisfied of the existence of that ground or grounds on the balance of probabilities – s 3. This has long been accepted as constituting the civil standard of proof which, however, necessarily has regard to the seriousness of the allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, and the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding in affecting the question of whether the allegation has been proved - Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362. This means that in civil litigation the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities remains even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud, but that the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. This reflects the conventional perception that members of society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding, on the balance of probabilities, that a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct – Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170.
The Magistrate's Decision on this issue is in the following terms:
[16] ROA s 11A(a).
[17] ROA s 3; Myles v Carroll [2003] WASCA 160 [12] (EM Heenan J).
[18] Myles [12].
65.Notwithstanding the above, I accept the evidence of the Respondent and have no doubt in finding that he accepts his decision to climb onto the roof of the House and remove the down pipe, causing damage to the tiles was ill-conceived and silly. I further find those actions of the Respondent occurred in circumstances where he was angry with the Applicant because she declined to pay him for the April Work. I accept the evidence of the Respondent that he now appreciates the dispute he had with the Applicant should have been dealt with in another way.
66.Further, I accept the evidence of the Respondent that he does not intend to communicate further with the Applicant or attend the House in respect to any money he considers may be due to him. In accepting that evidence of the Respondent as being credible, it is noted the Respondent has not commenced any civil action against the Applicant despite that being an option open to him. I also note there has been no evidence of any further contact, communication or other issues between the Applicant or the Respondent in respect to the matters that give rise to this application by the Applicant, in the face of the IVRO.
67.Despite finding an act of abuse was perpetrated by the Respondent upon the Applicant on 3 May 2017, I am required to consider whether the Respondent is likely to commit such acts again or is likely to intimidate the Applicant or act in an offensive manner to the Applicant or damage to the property of the Applicant again. I am also required to consider whether the making of a FVRO or an MRO is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
68.In that regard, I have considered those matters relevant to the circumstances of the parties contained within s. 12 and s 35 of the Act and have also had regard to the decision in Myles v Carroll (supra) and particularly the following:
Accordingly, the court is required to reach a standard of persuasion about the reliability of a future prognostication. It is to the probability of repetition of violent, offensive or intimidatory conduct occurring in the future that attention must be directed, not to an analysis of the significance or effect of some conduct, isolated or continuing, which has taken place in the past. What has occurred in the past is, unquestionably, relevant and material but only to the degree to which it justifies the formation of a conclusion about the likelihood of future occurrence of behaviour which the legislation prohibits. This is not so much an exercise in determining the proof of past events but of concluding what, if any, significance can be attached to them when considering the probability of future conduct occurring.
69.Having considered all of the matters I am required to consider, both contained within the Act and the application of the common law, I find the conduct of the Respondent toward the Applicant in May 2017 has shaken the confidence and trust of the Applicant, but was an isolated incident linked to the circumstances of the dispute that then prevailed between the Applicant and the Respondent. I find it is unlikely there will be any future occurrence of a similar type of behaviour by the Respondent toward the Applicant given no civil actions have been commenced by the Respondent in respect to the claim that gave rise to the incident, the Respondent is remorseful and regrets the circumstances that prevailed between him and the Applicant and the Respondent genuinely states he intends to have no communication or contact in the future with the Applicant.
70.For those reasons, I am not satisfied to the requisite standard that, in all the circumstances of this case, the Respondent is likely to behave in a similar manner toward the Applicant. Further, I am also not satisfied to the requisite standard, in all the circumstances of the case, the granting of either a FVRO of an MRO is justified.
In her Appeal Notice, Ms Potschick makes the following points in relation to relevant portions of the Magistrate's Decision:
…
Point 67:
·The Magistrate, Mr Wilson, can't read the thoughts of a human being. A person with a good character would have never done what this respondent did. His high CRIMINAL ENERGY, to return after 72 hours with the strong will to trespass, damage and assault several times with a high power a woman, nearly double of his age shows, that this man is unpredictable and a danger in every community. This man is not 16 or 18 years of age. (Normally a child has to learn from early age how to respect others).
·The Magistrate, Mr Wilson, never considered the serious influence on the applicant. The applicant suffers under a psychological and physiological trauma for months.
·The applicant, a concession card holder, has to struggle with financial hardship by costs for medical treatments and organizing the repairs of a damaged roof and damaged downpipes.
Point 69:
·The Magistrate, Mr Wilson: 'I find it is unlikely there will be any future occurrence of a similar type of behaviour by the Respondent toward the Applicant …'
How does Mr Wilson know what will happen into the future …? – Only God will know …
Please check the verbal cross examination on 10.1.2018 in the Magistrate Court in Armadale between the applicant and the respondent: The respondent confirmed that he will react again in the same way to 'abnormal people' like me, the applicant!
The respondent didn't show any responsibility for his wrong doing. He did NOT say SORRY in any way that he did something wrong, NOT about his threats, Not about his trespassing, NOT about his damaging of property of the Applicant, NOT about the attack against the applicant!
Point 70:
·Considering all the circumstances the IVRO/MRO had to be granted by the Magistrate. This outcome/result would be a signal by authorities to an aggressive perpetrator that his action are NOT ACCEPTED IN A COMMUNITY.
·A granted IVRO/MRO is further an important signal to the community that there is trust in the decision making of the court employees, who have to look after the victims (especially the weak ones), offer protection and stop the perpetrators.
The finding of the magistrate that he was not satisfied that Mr Bruce was likely to behave in a similar manner towards Ms Potschick in the future is a finding of fact. In an appeal against a finding of fact made by a magistrate, Ms Potschick, as the appellant, must do more than show that an alternative finding was available on the facts.[19] Rather, she must show that a factual error was made by the magistrate.[20] An appellate court should not interfere with a magistrate's findings of fact unless they are demonstrated to be wrong by 'incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony', or they are 'glaringly improbable' or 'contrary to compelling inferences'.[21]
[19] Badran v Public Transport Authority of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 28 [65] (reasons of the court).
[20] Badran [65].
[21] Robinson Helicopter [43]; Badran [65]; East Metropolitan Health Service v Martin [2017] WASCA 7 [99] (reasons of the court).
The approach which the court should take in assessing the probability of the repetition of an act of abuse was considered by EM Heenan J in Myles. His Honour observed: [22]
[22] Myles [38].
It is to be appreciated that before a restraining order can be granted the court must be satisfied, to the requisite degree on the balance of probabilities, that if it is not granted the respondent would act in a particular manner.
EM Heenan J then continued with the passage quoted by the magistrate in his reasons for decision which I have extracted above ([22]).[23]
[23] Reasons for Decision, par 17.
In my view, there was ample evidence from which the magistrate was entitled to conclude that: [24]
[24] Magistrates Court ts 41-42, 45 - 47, 56.
(a)Mr Bruce accepted that his decision to climb on to the roof of Ms Potschick's house was ill-conceived and silly;
(b)Mr Bruce now appreciates that the dispute he had with Ms Potschick should have been dealt with in another way;
(c)Mr Bruce does not intend to communicate with Ms Potschick further in relation to any moneys that may be due to him; and
(d)there was no evidence of any further contact, communication or other issues between the two of them.
It is sufficient to support the conclusion in the previous paragraph to quote two passages from the transcript of the trial. The first is from the evidence-in-chief of Mr Bruce (with the magistrate asking the questions):[25]
[25] Magistrates Court ts 41-42.
I understand there's no civil action over anything to do with you, from your perspective? - - - I was going to it, but I just want to put it all behind me.
Yes? - - - I'm done with it, to be honest.
So is it your intention to have any contact with Ms Potschick or go around to her house at all? - - - Was it my intention?
No now? Definitely not. Last thing I want to do is get involved in anything. I like to travel. I've got a small family. I don't want to do anything.
The second is from Mr Bruce's cross examination by Ms Potschick:[26]
[26] Magistrates Court ts 46-47.
You got the money in March and you didn't finalise the job. And you came up with the idea of the debt collector? - - - That - - -
Why didn't you go ahead with the idea of the debt collector where you realised I agreed? - - - Well, hindsight, I – I should have went for the debt collector.
Why didn't you? - - - Because, you – you wouldn't talk to me. You wouldn't listen to me.
Why didn't you talk with the debt collector about the problem? - - - I should have done that. I didn't. That was a mistake on my behalf.
But why not? - - - Because I didn't. I just didn't
Okay. You didn't. So there were two days from 1 May to 3 May. Did you think about the solution, maybe a peaceful solution? - - - I - I did, but you wouldn't answer the phone. And when I came to the house, you wouldn't answer the door. So I didn't think there was any other way.
So that means it's not a way to send a debt collector? - - - Well, I said, in hindsight, I should have done that.
On the evidence at trial as a whole, Ms Potschick has not satisfied me that the magistrate erred in making the findings set out at par 69 of his reasons and in drawing the conclusion that he was not satisfied 'in all the circumstances of this case, the Respondent is likely to behave in a similar manner towards' Ms Potschick. Ms Potschick has not demonstrated that these findings are wrong by 'incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony', or that they are 'glaringly improbable' or that they are 'contrary to compelling inferences'.[27]
[27] Robinson Helicopter [43]; Badran [65]; East Metropolitan Health [99].
In the circumstances of the present appeal, I would make the same observations which EM Heenan J did in relation to the appeal in Myles:[28]
[28] Myles [42] – [43].
However, in the present case where the evidence adduced at trial was not regarded as sufficient to persuade the learned Magistrate that, on the balance of probabilities, there was a likelihood that unless restrained, the respondent would in the future behave in a manner which the statute prohibited, it is very difficult to reach a contrary conclusion unless some clear error or omission by the learned Magistrate is shown to have occurred. This is not suggested in this case, rather the appellant's case is that insufficient weight was attributed to the evidence by the learned Magistrate and insufficient weight attributed to the past behaviour of the respondent and the effect that this would have upon the appellant. With all respect, I cannot accept these submissions for it seems to me that the learned Magistrate was fully aware of the statutory criteria and addressed them directly. It is not just the appellant's reaction to the past conduct of the respondent and her fears and apprehensions, however real, about the risk of repetition which is determinative. The court must reach its own conclusion as to whether or not the respondent is likely to commit a violent personal offence against the applicant, in the case of a VRO, or to behave in a manner that could reasonably be expected to be intimidating or offensive to the applicant and would in fact so intimidate or offend her, in the case of an MRO, or to behave in the future in a manner that could reasonably be expected to cause the appellant to fear that he would commit such a violent offence (in the case of a VRO) and so on. It is the estimate of the likelihood of the commission of such future conduct which the court must make and this is clearly what the learned Magistrate in this case addressed at the end of the trial.
As there has been no error of law or principle shown to have been committed by the learned Magistrate at the trial, nor any evidence overlooked or misconstrued, I do not see that there are any grounds which have been demonstrated to overrule or vary any of the findings which were made in this case.
What final orders are appropriate?
A finding by the magistrate that Mr Bruce was not likely again to commit personal violence against Ms Potschick meant that one of the preconditions to the power of the court to make a Final VRO was not present.[29] That was a sufficient basis on which to dismiss her application for a Final VRO. Accordingly, it was not strictly necessary for the magistrate to go on and find that he was not satisfied that the granting of a Final VRO was justified. No doubt that observation was made for the purposes of completeness. In any event, given that I am not prepared to disturb the finding as to Mr Bruce's likely future conduct on appeal, there is no statutory basis on which this court could order a Final VRO as an outcome in the appeal.[30]
[29] ROA s 11A.
[30] ROA s 11A; MCCPA s 43(7).
The magistrate also concluded that he was not satisfied that the granting of a MRO was justified.
The power to grant a MRO is set out in ROA s 34:
34. Grounds for misconduct restraining order
A court may make an MRO if it is satisfied that —
(a) unless restrained, the respondent is likely to —
(i) behave in a manner that could reasonably be expected to be intimidating or offensive to the person seeking to be protected and that would, in fact, intimidate or offend the person seeking to be protected; or
(ii) cause damage to property owned by, or in the possession of, the person seeking to be protected; or
(iii) behave in a manner that is, or is likely to lead to, a breach of the peace; and
(b) granting an MRO is appropriate in the circumstances.
Again, the power does not arise in the present case unless there is a factual finding that Mr Bruce is likely to engage in conduct in the future of the kind specified. The magistrate's factual finding also meant that the precondition to grant a MRO under ROA s 34(a) was not established. As with the Final VRO, given that I am not prepared to disturb the finding as to Mr Bruce's likely future conduct on appeal, there is no statutory basis on which this court could order a MRO as an outcome in the appeal.[31]
[31] MCCPA s 43(7).
Further, given how central the issue of Mr Bruce's likely future conduct is to the appropriateness to grant a Final VRO or a MRO, there is no utility in considering the hypothetical situation of whether, had this finding been overturned and the jurisdiction to make an order enlivened, the magistrate erred in the exercise of this discretion in not making an order.
The appeal should be dismissed.
At the hearing on 3 August 2018 I heard from the parties as to costs. Neither had engaged a legal practitioner in relation to the appeal. Mr Bruce did not incur any filing fees in defending the appeal. The appropriate costs order is that there be no orders as to costs.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
AR
ASSOCIATE TO JUDGE GETHING24 OCTOBER 2018
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