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New South Wales |
Case Name: | Potier v Parole Authority of NSW |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2016] NSWSC 39 |
Hearing Date(s): | 5 February 2016 |
Date of Orders: | 9 February 2016 |
Decision Date: | 9 February 2016 |
Jurisdiction: | Common Law |
Before: | Adamson J |
Decision: | (1) Dismiss the summons. |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – parole – serious offender - Parole Authority has power to grant parole after the first eligibility date even if the offender has not applied for parole |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 25 |
Cases Cited: | Animals’ Angels e.V. v Secretary, Department of Agriculture [2014] FCAFC 173; 228 FCR 35 |
Texts Cited: | Second reading speech for the Crimes (Administration of Sentences) Amendment (Parole) Bill, New South Wales Legislative Assembly, (Hansard) 27 October 2004 at 12098ff |
Category: | Principal judgment |
Parties: | Malcolm Huntley Potier (Plaintiff) |
Representation: | Counsel: |
File Number(s): | 2015/332753 |
JUDGMENT
Introduction
Malcolm Potier, the plaintiff, was granted parole on 2 October 2015, to be released no earlier than 16 October 2015 and no later than 23 October 2015. Upon his release, he was taken to immigration detention. On 15 December 2015 he was removed to the United Kingdom. He seeks, by summons and a notice of motion filed on 12 November 2015, relief that includes a declaration that the parole order was invalid and that he ought, accordingly, be returned to custody and remain incarcerated in a gaol in New South Wales unless and until he applies for parole and it is granted, or the term of his sentence expires.
The named defendants are:
(1)The first defendant: the NSW State Parole Authority (the Parole Authority);
(2)The second defendant: the Minister, Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister); and
(3)The third defendant: the New South…
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- Case
- [2016] NSWSC 39
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the offender's participation in the parole assessment process, without a formal application, could be construed as an application for parole under the Act. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Parole Authority had the power to grant parole to a serious offender after the first eligibility date, even in the absence of a formal application. Another point of contention was whether the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s power to issue a criminal justice entry certificate or seek extradition constituted a duty or a mere power, impacting the availability of mandamus relief.
The High Court held that the Parole Authority has the power to grant parole to serious offenders after the initial eligibility date, even if the offender has not made a formal application, provided they have engaged with the assessment process. The court reasoned that the absence of formal requirements for an application in the Act meant that the offender's engagement in the assessment process could be sufficient to be considered an application. Furthermore, the court clarified that the principles outlined in the Act for the Parole Authority's decision-making process did not restrict its discretion to grant parole post the initial eligibility date. Regarding the mandamus relief, the court concluded that the power to issue a criminal justice entry certificate or to seek extradition was discretionary, not a duty, thus mandamus relief was not available.
Given the above, the High Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Parole Authority's decisions and interpretations of the statutory provisions. The court's ruling clarified the legislative intent and the scope of the Parole Authority's discretion in serious offender cases.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Subdivision 3 of Division 2 applies to serious offenders. Section 143, which is contained in Subdivision 3, obliges the Parole Authority to consider whether or not a serious offender (which relevantly includes Mr Potier) should be released on parole at least 60 days before the offender’s parole eligibility date, which is relevantly defined as the date on which the offender first becomes eligible for release on parole. Section 143A relevantly provides:“143A Consideration of parole in subsequent years(1) At any time within 90 days before an offender’s annual review date, the offender, if still eligible for release on parole, may apply to be released on parole.(1A) For the purposes of this section, an “offender’s annual review date” occurs on each anniversary of the offender’s parole eligibility date.(2) After receiving such an application, but not more than 60 days before the offender’s annual review date, the Parole Authority must consider whether or not the offender should be released on parole.(3) Despite subsection (2):(a) if the offender is unlawfully at large following revocation of parole, the Parole Authority is not required to consider the offender’s case until the offender is returned to custody, and(b) if the offender is unlawfully at large for the whole of one or more years following the revocation, the Parole Authority may decline to consider the offender’s case at all in relation to that year or those years, and(c) in any case, the Parole Authority may decline to consider an offender’s case for up to 3 years at a time after it last considered the grant of parole to the offender.” Under s 143B of the Act the Parole Authority is entitled to consider a serious offender’s case at any time after the offender first becomes eligible for parole in circumstances prescribed to constitute manifest injustice. It was not suggested that any of the circumstances prescribed applied in the present case. Sections 143A and 143B were inserted into the Act in 2004. Their purpose is addressed below when the legislative history of Part 6 is considered as an aid to its interpretation. Section 144 requires the Parole Authority, after giving its preliminary consideration to release of a serious offender on parole, to form and record its initial intention. Section 148 sets out the principles on which the Parole Authority’s final decision is to be made in the following terms:“148 Principles on which Parole Authority’s final decision to be made(1) The Parole Authority is to make its final decision as to whether or not to make a parole order on the following principles:(a) that the Parole Authority will confirm its initial intention to make a parole order if there are no submissions to the contrary or if it is not required to seek victim submissions,(b) that the Parole Authority will reconsider its initial intention to make a parole order if there are submissions to the contrary, and will in that event take into account any offender submissions,(c) that the Parole Authority will confirm its initial intention not to make a parole order if there are no offender submissions,(d) that the Parole Authority will reconsider its initial intention not to make a parole order if there are offender submissions, and will in that event take into account any other submissions.(2) The Parole Authority must consider all submissions made in accordance with this Subdivision and, subject to section 185 (2), must disregard all other submissions.”