Land and Environment Court
of New South Wales
CITATION:
Port Stephens Shire Council -V- Grivas and Ors. [1999] NSWLEC 135
PARTIES
APPLICANT:
Port Stephens Shire CouncilRESPONDENTS:
Grivas and Ors.
NUMBER:
40219 of 1998
CORAM:
Bignold J
KEY ISSUES:
Costs :- Class 4 proceedings—settled by consent orders granting Applicant relief claimed—Whether costs should be awarded to Council on basis of settlement outcome.
LEGISLATION CITED:
DATES OF HEARING:
05/12/1999
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE:
05/12/1999
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:
RESPONDENTS:
APPLICANT:
Mr J Maston, Barrister
SOLICITORS:
Sparke Helmore
Mr T Moore, Barrister
SOLICITORS:
Marshall and Partners
JUDGMENT:
IN THE LAND AND Matter No. 40219 of 1998
ENVIRONMENT COURT OF Coram: Bignold J.
NEW SOUTH WALES 12 May 1999
PORT STEPHENS COUNCIL
Applicant
v.
PETER GRIVAS
First Respondent
ANN ELIZABETH GRIVAS
Second Respondent
BRADLEY GRIVAS
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
Bignold J:
1. On 13 November 1998 Port Stephens Shire Council (the Council) commenced proceedings in this Court against the three Respondents, Mr and Mrs Grivas and their son, seeking a declaration that the Respondents were carrying out development upon property known as No 8 George Street, Fullerton Cove, without development consent and a consequential injunction restraining the Respondents from carrying out unauthorised development on the property. The proceedings were concluded save for the question of costs when orders were made by the Court by consent on 27 April this year.
2. The orders made by the Court were that the Respondents be restrained from carrying out or causing to be carried out development, being a truck depot, a truck and trailer parking storage area, a truck driving school and or a home industry for one or more of such purposes upon the aforesaid property until such time as development consent, pursuant to Part 4 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 from the Port Stephens Shire Council had been granted. That order, in the nature of a prohibitory injunction, reflects the relief claimed in an amended class 4 application served upon the Respondents on or about 18 March 1999 and the comparison between the originally claimed injunction and that claimed in the amended application and subsequently granted by the Court's consent orders is obvious inasmuch as the original claim was in respect of unspecified, unauthorised development, whereas the amended claim reflected in the consent orders particularises the offending development in the words that I have earlier mentioned, namely “truck depot, truck and trailer parking storage area, truck driving school and/or home industry for one or more of those purposes”.
3. In making those consent orders the Court, also by consent, reserved the question of costs and it is that matter alone that has been argued before me today. The Council seeks an order for costs on the basis that it has been entirely successful in the proceedings inasmuch as relief granted to it by the consent orders, being the prohibitory injunction, entirely vindicated the Council's claim to injunctive relief as set forth in the original class 4 application and particularised more precisely…
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- Case
- [1999] NSWLEC 135
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Council argued that it was entitled to an order for costs as the successful party in the litigation. In contrast, the respondents contended that each party should bear its own costs, relying on the principle that where both parties act reasonably and the litigation is settled, the court should not make an order for costs. The respondents also argued that the Council had acted unreasonably by commencing the proceedings without giving a further warning letter and by failing to provide sufficient particulars of its claims.
Bignold J held that the Council's conduct in litigation was reasonable, both in commencing the proceedings and in sustaining them. The judge noted that the respondents' offer to settle the case on 14 April 1999, though reasonable, did not establish that the respondents acted reasonably throughout the litigation. The judge found that the settlement order manifestly vindicated the Council, entitling it to the usual order for costs as the victorious party.
Accordingly, the Court ordered the respondents to pay the Council's costs in the proceedings as agreed, or failing agreement, as assessed. The order was made against all respondents, jointly and severally.