NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL
CITATION: Port Stephens Council v Theodorakakis (NO 2) [2006] NSWCA 143
FILE NUMBER(S):
40422/2005
HEARING DATE(S): 23/03/2006
DECISION DATE: 05/06/2006
PARTIES:
Claimant – Port Stephens Council
Opponent – Maria Theodorakakis
JUDGMENT OF: Giles JA Ipp JA Bryson JA
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC 654/03
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Rein DCJ
COUNSEL:
Claimant – Mr P.R. Garling SC & Mr P. Cummings
Opponent – Mr M.R. Aldridge SC & Ms E. Welsh
SOLICITORS:
Claimant – Phillips Fox
Opponent – Bryden’s Law Office
CATCHWORDS:
COSTS -
LEGAL PROFESSION
Cap on costs recoverable in connection with personal injury damages claims - cap applies in appeal unless Court of Appeal makes excluding order - unsuccessful defendant applied for leave to appeal and failed - cap of $13,587.23 on damages probably already exceeded after 3-day hearing in District Court - held by majority (Bryson JA dissenting) it had not been shown that the application for leave to appeal was not reasonably necessary for advancement of claimant's case. Note that this application was made under LPAct 1987 ss.198D and 198G, cf. LPAct 2004 ss 338 and 341 but see now LPAct 2004 s.338A.
LEGISLATION CITED:
Civil Liability Act 2002 s.42
Legal Profession Act 1987 Pt.11 Div.5B ss.198D & 198G
Legal Profession Act 2004 ss. 341, 338 & 737 and Schd.9 cl.18(1).
DECISION:
1. Order that the claimant pay the opponent’s costs of the claimant’s Summons for leave to appeal
2. Order that each party pay its or her own costs of the opponent’s Summons for leave to appeal.
JUDGMENT:
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40422/2005
GILES JA
IPP JA
BRYSON JA5 JUNE 2006
PORT STEPHENS COUNCIL v MARIA THEODORAKAKIS (No.2)
Judgment
GILES JA: The reasons of Bryson JA, which I have had the advantage of reading in draft, describe the costs question arising under s 198G of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (“the Act”). For the reasons which follow, in which I draw upon his Honour’s reasons without unnecessary repetition, I have arrived at a different answer to the question.
An order excluding legal services from the operation of Pt 11 Div 5B of the Act could be made -
“ … if the court is satisfied that the legal services were provided in response to any action on the claim by or on behalf of the other party to the claim that in the circumstances was not reasonably necessary for the advancement of that party’s case or was intended or reasonably likely to unnecessarily delay or complicate determination of the claim.”
Although the question arose at appellate level, the relevant claim was the opponent’s claim for damages for injury suffered when she tripped and fell on the footpath, her “original (and continuing) claim”: Newcastle City Council v McShane(No 3) [2005] NSWCA 431 at [37]. The relevant action on the claim was the claimant’s application for leave to appeal: in its submissions on the costs…
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- Case
- [2006] NSWCA 143
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the costs cap, which generally applies to personal injury damages claims unless an excluding order is made, extended to the proceedings for leave to appeal. The court also considered whether the application for leave to appeal was reasonably necessary for the advancement of the claimant's case, a condition that could potentially allow for an exclusion from the cap.
By majority, the Court of Appeal held that the costs cap had not been shown to have been exceeded by the costs incurred in the District Court hearing, and therefore, the cap would likely apply to the appeal. However, the majority found that it had not been demonstrated that the application for leave to appeal was not reasonably necessary for the advancement of the claimant's case. Consequently, the claimant was ordered to pay the opponent's costs of the claimant's summons for leave to appeal, while each party was to bear their own costs for the opponent's summons for leave to appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Order that the claimant pay the opponent's costs of the claimant's Summons for leave to appeal; 2. Order that each party pay its or her own costs of the opponent's Summons for leave to appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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