Poole Island Holdings Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources

[2001] QLAC 64

[2001] QLAC 64

 

IN THE LAND APPEAL COURT HELD AT TOWNSVILLE

Re:     Appeal against a decision of the Land Court – Determination of Unimproved Value –

Local Government – Bowen (RV98-913)

BETWEEN

Poole Island Holdings Pty Ltd AND

Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources

Appellant

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Delivered at Brisbane this Twenty-fifth day of June 2001

1. The appellant holds a Special Lease over the whole of Poole Island which is located about 1.3 km east of the Town of Heronvale which, in turn, is located about 15 km south of the Town of Bowen. The island covers an area of 20.23 ha. The respondent Chief Executive had, as at a relevant date of 1 January 1996, placed a value of $124,000 on that land pursuant to the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944. The appellant contended for a valuation of $25,000 before the Land Court, however that appeal was dismissed and the valuation of the Chief Executive was affirmed. The present matter comprises an appeal from that decision.  The grounds of the appeal may be summarised as follows:

   ·          A combined sale of four lots for $22,500 introduced by the appellant below provides a better basis for valuation than the sales relied upon by the Court at first instance. The Court relied on sales numbered 3 and 4 contained in a valuation provided by the Chief Executive.

   ·          Sale of part of Clairview Island may have been to an associated company of the vendor company and therefore ought to have been disregarded by the Land Court. This is Sale 3 in the Chief Executive's valuation.

   ·          Increases in rent levels and local authority rates for the subject Special Lease are too high and have increased at too great a rate.

1. Dr Ronald Rosanove appeared and made submissions in support of this appeal. We understand that he is a principal of the appellant company and acts as its agent in this matter. His major concern appears to be associated with the level of local authority rates imposed on the land and with the proposition that services are not provided at a level consistent with the level of rates payable.

1. The jurisdiction of this Court on appeal and the Land Court at first instance does not extend to a consideration of such matters as rates or rent, but is confined to valuations made under the Valuation of Land Act 1944. That was made clear by the Land Appeal Court in Tow v. Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 378 where the Court said at 381:

   "The Valuer-General and  the Court are concerned  with finding unimproved value and not with the amount of rates that may be levied as a result. Rates are fixed by Local Authorities and may be  varied annually according to the fiscal requirements of the Local Authority concerned. Any such variation may be made at any time during a valuation period and may be entirely independent of a new and increased valuation."

1. Similarly, rent which is calculated on the basis of unimproved value and in accordance with the provisions of the Land Act 1994 is not a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the third ground of appeal mentioned above is dismissed.

2. The first-mentioned ground of appeal appears to have been based on a misunderstanding of the valuation evidence provided by the Chief Executive at first instance. Dr Rosanove understood  that evidence as showing  that Sale  3 was  a transaction that involved Heytesbury Properties Pty Ltd as vendor to an unnamed purchaser. The Record of Proceedings in the Land Court shows, however, that a vendor and purchaser is included for Sale 3 (as well as the other sales) and that Heytesbury is the vendor in Sale 1, not Sale 3. In any event, we were not taken to any evidence in the  record, nor  was any  tendered  to  us  which might  have  led  to a conclusion that there was a relationship between any vendor and purchaser in the Chief Executive's sales evidence which would render any such sale suspect for the purpose of valuation. It is not sufficient for a party to raise a possibility of the type concerned with this ground of appeal and to expect a conclusion in its favour without the aid of cogent evidence. This ground of appeal is therefore dismissed. We now turn to consider the first ground of appeal.

3. In the Land Court the appellant provided evidence of the sale of four blocks of land which, it was submitted, provided better evidence of value than sales evidence, in particular Sale 4 introduced by the Chief Executive. The Sale 4 property is located on the Esplanade at Brisk Bay and sold for $85,000. This price was analysed to an unimproved figure of $84,500 in the valuation provided by the Chief Executive. The four lots introduced by the appellant comprise Lots 409 to 412 inclusive, located at Pitcairn Avenue, Brisk Bay.   These  lots were  sold together for  a total  price of

$22,500.

1. The learned Member  at  first instance  expressly  considered  the appellant's submission concerning these sales and concluded that the better guide to valuing the land under appeal was to utilise Sale 4 in addition to the Sale 3 property included in the Chief Executive's valuation. To succeed in an appeal such as this the appellant must show that:

   ·          the Court below acted on a wrong principle of law; or

   ·          that the Court's valuation was entirely erroneous.

2. These requirements are contained in the judgment of Mason J in the High Court case of Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. St. Helen's Farm (ACT) Pty Ltd (1980-81) 146 CLR 336:

   "Nevertheless, I am unwilling to disturb his Honour's finding on valuation. This Court has consistently applied the rule that on a question of valuation an appellate tribunal is not justified in substituting its own opinion for that of the court below unless it is satisfied that the court below acted on a wrong principle of law or that its valuation was entirely erroneous … As with the assessment of damages, especially in personal injury cases, the valuation of property by a court has many of the characteristics of a discretionary judgment." (at 381)

1. This authority was followed by this Court in Chief Executive, Department of Transport v. Hibiscus Holdings Pty Ltd (1997-98) 18 QLCR 105. Now there is nothing apparent on the face of the record nor in the submissions made to us by Dr Rosanove which leads us to the view that the Member at first instance acted on a wrong principle of law or made a judicial valuation which was entirely erroneous. This ground of appeal is also dismissed.

2. The result is that the appeal is dismissed and the valuation of the Chief Executive is affirmed.

(Cullinane J) JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

(JJ Trickett) MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT

(RP Scott) MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT