POLIK & POLIK

[2015] FamCA 299

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

POLIK & POLIK [2015] FamCA 299

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – BINDING FINANCIAL AGREEMENT – Enforcement – Where the husband and wife are not separated – where the wife seeks to enforce an obligation imposed upon the husband by a provision of a financial agreement entered into by the parties – where it is found that the wife unilaterally incurred expense in relation to the children of the parties outside of her contractual right pursuant to their deed of agreement to require the husband to pay it – where it is found that by paying that expense, where not contractually obligated to do so, the husband has already paid the wife, in advance, money that he was otherwise contractually bound to pay – where he has a defence to the enforcement application to the extent of that amount

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – s 90G, s 90KA
Family Law Rules 2004
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – s 31, s 32

Kostres & Kostres (2009) FLC 93-420
Sanger & Sanger (2011) FLC 93-484
Senior & Anderson (2011) FLC 93-470

APPLICANT: Ms Polik

RESPONDENT: Mr Polik

FILE NUMBER: BRC 6338 of 2011

DATE DELIVERED: 28 April 2015

PLACE DELIVERED: Brisbane

PLACE HEARD: Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF: Forrest J

HEARING DATE: 13 April 2015

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Galloway of Counsel

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: B J Sheehy Solicitor

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr G Wilson HopgoodGanim Lawyers

Orders

1. The Respondent shall pay the Applicant the sum of $731.56 plus interest pursuant to the Family Law Rules on the sum of $300 from 24 February 2015 until payment and on the further sum of $431.56 from 3 March 2015 until payment.

2. Should the parties be unable to agree as to how the costs of and incidental to this application are to be borne, each shall file and serve written submissions as to costs within twenty-one days hereof.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Polik & Polik has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 6338 of 2011

Ms Polik

Applicant

And

Mr Polik

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This matter, an application to enforce an obligation imposed upon the Respondent by a provision of a written agreement that both parties agree is a financial agreement made under s 90C of the Family Law Act, was commenced by way of an Initiating Application filed on 12 February 2015. By the application, the Applicant seeks identical orders on an interim basis and a final basis. In her application, she seeks orders that the Respondent pay her the amount of $6,000 she asserts is owing to her pursuant to a clause of the financial agreement, or such further amount as the Court finds to be owing to her at the date of the hearing, as well as interest on such amount pursuant to the Family Law Rules.

2. That the orders are sought on an interim and final basis masks the reality that it is a once only enforcement application that I am determining. There can be little doubt that my decision finalises the matter between the parties.

3. The circumstances of the case are unusual. Though remaining married and living together as a couple with their three children in the family home, the parties entered into a very comprehensive written agreement, presented as a Deed, on 6 November 2013. Both were legally represented and the agreement was prepared and signed after they had attended a mediation conducted by a former Judge of this Court.

4. The parties agree that their agreement is one that contains a financial agreement under s 90C of the Family Law Act 1975, a superannuation agreement under s 90MH of the same Act, a binding child support agreement under s 80C of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 and a parenting plan under Division 4 of Part VII of the Family Law Act. A copy of the Deed was adduced into evidence before me.

5. The parties apparently also agree that the financial agreement is binding on them having regard to the operation of s 90G(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (“the Act”), and thus ousts the jurisdiction of the Court to make orders pursuant to Part VIII of the Act as between them.

6. In any event, it is not to the provisions of Part VIII of the Act that either party looks on this application. Relevantly, section 90G(2) of the Act deals with the enforcement of a financial agreement that is binding on the parties. It provides as follows:

   A court may make such orders for the enforcement of a financial agreement that is binding on the parties to the agreement as it thinks necessary.

7. The Applicant wants an order that the Respondent pays her money she asserts he owes her pursuant to the financial agreement. The Respondent simply wants the Applicant’s application dismissed. He says that he has, effectively, already paid her that money.

The circumstances asserted by the Applicant

1. For the Applicant it is said that in the recitals of the financial agreement  (F(c)(3)(B)(i)) the following appears:

   (c)The agreement [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik] have reached with respect to final property settlement and maintenance will apply to the whole of the Property and the Financial Resources of the parties and to the maintenance of the parties, now and in the future and specifically provides:

   …

   (3)      During the Relationship [Mr Polik] will:

   …

   (B)     provide maintenance for [Ms Polik]:

   (i)payment of the sum of $600 per week;

   (ii)payment of [Ms Polik]’s nephew’s school fees and internet costs;

   (iii)payment of all expenses of [Mr Polik], [Ms Polik] and their children;

   (C)     provide child support (and adult child maintenance):

   (i)Payment of all expenses of the Children of the Relationship;

   in terms of the agreement reached at mediation.

2. Clause 2 of the financial agreement, headed ‘Definitions and interpretation’ says:

   [Ms Polik’s] spousal maintenance amount means the sum of $600 per week payable by weekly or monthly deposit to [Ms Polik’s] … Bank account BSB … account number … or such other account as [Ms Polik] may notify to [Mr Polik] from time to time.

3. The same clause says further:

   [Ms Polik’s] spousal maintenance during the marriage means:

   (a)[Ms Polik’s] spousal maintenance amount;

   (b)[B’s] school fees and internet costs [[B] is [Ms Polik]’s nephew]; and

   (c)All expenses of [Ms Polik] during the marriage;

4. The Applicant refers to clause 7.2 of the financial agreement, headed ‘Maintenance component’ and specifically to sub-clause (c)(1) of that clause. It says:

   (c)[Mr Polik] covenants with [Ms Polik] that [Mr Polik] will pay to [Ms Polik] as and by way of maintenance for [Ms Polik]:

   (1)[Ms Polik’s] spousal maintenance during the marriage, commencing within 7 days of the date of this Deed and terminating on the Date of Breakdown of the Relationship;

5. The Applicant’s case is that the Respondent ceased paying the sum of $600 per week to the Applicant after she received a payment of $600 on 26 November 2014 and that the weekly payments of that amount only started again with a payment to her on 11 March 2015. The Applicant asserted at the hearing that the sum of $8,231.56 is, accordingly, outstanding and due.

6. The Applicant, represented by counsel at the hearing before me, submitted that pursuant to s 90KA of the Act this Court may enforce a financial agreement “as if it were a contract”. He submitted the Court can order payment of a liquidated sum and also interest.

7. He effectively submitted that it is a straight forward case; that the financial agreement required payment of $600 per week; that did not happen for the particular weeks already referred to and, therefore, the Respondent should now be ordered to pay the total sum equal to the unpaid weekly amounts plus interest.

The circumstances asserted by the Respondent

1. The solicitor representing the Respondent who resists the application submitted that clause 12.1 of the Deed is also relevant to the determination. It is part of what is described as “The Binding Child Support Agreement” and is headed “[Mr Polik’s] Child Support Obligations”.  It says, relevantly:

   (a)[Mr Polik] covenants and agrees with [Ms Polik] to provide child support for the Children of the Relationship, pursuant to section 84(1)(d) and section 84(1)(e) of the CSAA [the Child Support (Assessment)Act 1989], as follows:

   (1)[Mr Polik] will provide the Child Support expenses as and when such payments and expenses fall due;

   (2)       …

2. Clause 2.1 defines “Child support expenses” as “the following child support expenses in respect of the children of the Relationship:

   (a)All expenses of the Children of the Relationship including

   (1)      Future Health Expenses of the Children …

   (2)Future Education Expenses of the Children means all costs of and incidental to the children attending:

   (A)the kindergarten facility as agreed between [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik] from time to time;

   (B)such Primary School as agreed between [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik] from time to time; and

   (C)such Secondary School as agreed between [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik] from time to time including but not limited to:

   (i)the administration fee paid on enrolment;

   (ii)the enrolment deposit;

   (iii)the tuition fee;

   (iv)the school building levy;

   (v)accommodation;

   (vi)the requisite school clothing (including sport and extra curricular activities) as advised to [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik] by the said schools from time to time;

   (vii)all requisite text books and stationery (and book hire fees and levies);

   (viii)the costs associated with such extra curricular activities of the children associated with the children’s schooling, as agreed between [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik], including sport, music, art and drama, including:

   ·tuition fees;

   ·any other fees and levies;

   ·requisite instrument sand equipment; and

   ·requisite clothing and footwear.

   (ix)school camps;

   (x)school excursions;

   (xi)school photographs; and

   (xii)school formals and other functions of the school.

   (3)the Extra Curricular activities of the Children means the extra curricular activities of the children outside of their schooling, as agreed between [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik], including sport, music, art, drama and other recreational activities and hobbies of the Children including:

   (A)tuition fees;

   (B)any other fees and levies;

   (C)requisite instruments and equipment; and

   (D)requisite clothing and footwear.”

3. The solicitor also submitted that a dispute resolution clause included in the agreement was relevant to the determination. Clause 13.4 headed “Dispute Resolution” says, relevantly:

   (a)      [Mr Polik] and [Ms Polik] mutually covenant that:

   (1)save where there is a specific procedure for resolving disputes between the parties provided in this Deed, all and any future difference, disagreement or dispute arising out of or under this Deed will be referred in the first instance to mediation;

   (2)the mediator will be agreed between them within one calendar month of the difference, disagreement or dispute arising and failing agreement, then a mediator will be appointed by the Chairperson for the time being of the Australian Institute of Family Law Arbitrators and Mediators;         

4. The Respondent put forward the following facts as relevant to the determination of the application:-

   (1)In February 2014 a dispute arose between the parties as a result of the Applicant unilaterally enrolling the parties’ two young sons to attend and receive extra-curricular tuition from a private, commercial provider of tutoring for children;

   (2)The Respondent had not been asked about that tutoring taking place nor had he agreed to it;

   (3)The Applicant had enrolled the boys for a one year program costing a total of $15,000 and had paid the first instalment of $6,745 on a credit card that she carried and was authorised to use but for which the Respondent pays on a monthly basis;

   (4)In February 2014, after he learned of this, the Respondent informed the Applicant of his objection to the boys’ attendance at the tuition and that he was not prepared to pay the tuition fees;

   (5)After some correspondence between the solicitors for the parties and the parties, the Respondent agreed to pay the amount charged to the credit card statement and he informed the Applicant that he would “reluctantly” meet payment of the fees for the boys’ attendance at the tuition of 2014. The Respondent informed the Applicant that he required to be consulted and involved in the decision making process for such decisions, particularly any further private tuition, in the future;

   (6)In November 2014, the Respondent discovered, on reviewing credit card statements, that the Applicant had again used the credit card to pay $7,500 for the boys to be enrolled for more tutoring in 2015 and he learned that she had again unilaterally made the decision to enrol them for another year;

   (7)The Respondent then wrote to the Applicant and complained to her about this action. He told her to ask the private provider to refund the $7,500 immediately and for the enrolment of the boys to be put on hold, whilst they met with the boys’ school staff to discuss the need for such tuition so as to try to agree on a common approach;

   (8)The Applicant did not respond to the request to suspend the enrolment and to ask for a refund of the $7,500;

   (9)Having failed to get a satisfactory response to his request from the Applicant, the Respondent decided to suspend the weekly payments of $600 to the Applicant for her maintenance and told her he was offsetting that weekly amount against the $7,500 that she had incurred on the credit card for the tutoring, which he had already paid;

   (10)The Respondent continued to write to the Applicant asking her to consult him with respect to the tutoring issue. He also sent her a spreadsheet showing his calculations of the offsetting approach he took and he recommenced paying $600 per week from 3 March 2015;

   (11)No mediation took place between the parties before the application for enforcement was filed, or before the hearing.

5. I do not understand that any of these facts are disputed by the Applicant. She filed a further affidavit by leave on the morning of the hearing in which she deposed responsively to the Respondent’s affidavit. As she did not put any of the facts listed above in issue, I accept those are all non-controversial facts.

6. For the Respondent, it is submitted:

   (i)That the Respondent was not obliged pursuant to the terms of the binding child support agreement pay the sum of $7,500 towards the 2015 tuition fees because the Applicant unilaterally incurred that cost and he is only obliged to pay for extra-curricular activities of the children outside their schooling as may be agreed between him and the Applicant;

   (ii)That, therefore, he has already paid the Applicant money that he otherwise would have to pay her pursuant to the spousal maintenance provisions of the financial agreement;

   (iii)Further, or alternatively, that it is legitimate for him to set-off against amounts he was obliged to pay pursuant to the financial agreement an amount equal to the amount that was unilaterally incurred by the wife on the credit card that he then paid ($7,500), plus interest on that sum of $731.56.

The Applicant’s affidavit and further submissions in response

1. In her affidavit filed by leave at the hearing, the Applicant simply deposed to paying the subject tuition fees of $7,500 on a credit which is in the Respondent’s name, but for which she is an authorised signature. She also deposed to paying for “all other expenditure” as well as the tuition fees on that credit card.

2. Counsel for the Applicant further submitted that the Deed the parties entered into gives the Respondent no right to off-set the sum of $8,231.56 against his obligation to pay the Applicant $600 per week. As I understood counsel’s submissions, he went on to argue that the payment of the tuition fees by the Applicant using the credit card is, in any event, actually caught within the Respondent’s obligation to pay spousal maintenance as it falls within the meaning of “all expenses of [Ms Polik] during the marriage” which the Respondent is expressly obliged to pay having regard to the covenants and definitions set out above.

3. Counsel argued that the Respondent simply has no case for a set-off and that the application should succeed.

4. I accept, at least, that if the payment of the tuition fees by the Applicant falls within the meaning of “all expenses of [Ms Polik] during the marriage” that counsel is correct in submitting that the Respondent is obliged to pay them, in addition to the $600 per week.

Applicable Principles  

1. Pursuant to s 90G(1C) of the Act, s 90KA applies in relation to any enforcement application. Accordingly, questions as to the enforceability and effectiveness of a financial agreement are to be determined by the Court according to the principles of law and equity that are applicable in determining the enforceability and effect of contracts, with this Court having the same powers and being able to grant the same remedies as the High Court in connection with contracts in its original jurisdiction.

2. The Full Court of this Court set out those powers of the High Court in [56] of Kostres & Kostres (2009) FLC 93-420 extracting sections 31 and 32 of Part IV of the Judiciary Act 1903. They provide as follows:

   31.      Judgment and execution

   The High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may make and pronounce all such judgments as are necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and may for the execution of any such judgment in any part of the Commonwealth direct the issue of such process, whether in use in the Commonwealth before the commencement of this Act or not, as is permitted or prescribed by this or any Act or by Rules of Court.

   32.      Complete relief to be granted

   The High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in any cause or matter pending before it, whether originated in the High Court or removed into it from another Court, shall have power to grant, and shall grant, either absolutely or on such terms and conditions as are just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto are entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them respectively in the cause or matter; so that as far as possible all matters in controversy between the parties regarding the cause of action, or arising out of or connected with the cause of action, may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters may be avoided.

3. The solicitor for the Respondent submitted that s 90G(2) gives the Court the discretion that it has in enforcement applications generally. Whilst that may be the case, I am nevertheless of the view that such discretion in the enforcement of a financial agreement is, by operation of s 90G(1C) and s 90KA, to be exercised within principled bounds. By those sections, the “general principles of law and equity that are applicable in determining the enforceability and effect of contracts and purported contracts…”[1] are imported into the determination of applications for enforcement of financial agreements in this Court. I am satisfied that both the solicitor for the Respondent and counsel for the Applicant acknowledged that.

   [1]          See Senior & Anderson (2011) FLC 93-470 per May J at [34] and Strickland J at [106]

4. Consideration of the submission of counsel for the Applicant that the payment of the tuition fees by the Applicant falls within the expression “all expenses of [Ms Polik] during the marriage” involves, in my view, contractual interpretation. In Sanger & Sanger (2011) FLC 93-484 at [63] the Full Court relevantly said:

   The principles governing the interpretation of contracts are not in doubt and do not require extensive restatement for present purposes.

1. Reference was then made by their Honours in that case to J W Carter, Carter on Contract (Lexis Nexis Australia, online, at October 2011) in which a “convenient summary of the principles applicable to the construction of contracts” is said to be provided. At [64] that summary, including seven principles of contractual interpretation, was set out. It was as follows:-

   The function of courts is to give effect to the bargain and not to deny its efficacy by a restrictive technical analysis. This finds its expression in a number of ways. These include the following.
   First, in order to determine the meaning or legal effect of a particular term, the whole contract must be construed. This applies both to express and implied terms and requires implied terms to be taken into account when construing express terms.
   Second, a commonsense approach is taken to the interpretation of commercial documents.
   Third, a presumption is applied that the parties did not intend the terms of their contract to operate in an unreasonable way.
   Fourth, rules have been developed to govern the forensic material which can be received to assist in the construction process.
   Fifth, albeit somewhat belatedly, the role of context (surrounding circumstances) in determining meaning is acknowledged in the concept of the ‘factual matrix’.
   Sixth, account is taken of the fact that there is more to contract law than linguistic meaning: more often than not, the ultimate concern is with the legal effect of a contract term.
   Seventh, the general approach is to apply the same construction rules no matter what the form or nature of the clause or contract, so that the relevant principles do not depend on whether the contract is for the sale of goods or the provision of services and so on. (original emphasis) (footnotes omitted)

2. In determining the meaning of “all expenses of [Ms Polik] during the marriage” in the context of determining the Respondent’s obligation to pay spousal maintenance pursuant to the provisions of the financial agreement, I consider it both necessary and appropriate to also have regard to the terms of the binding child support agreement contained within the same contractual document, the Deed the parties signed. Expenses such as those incurred in obtaining for the boys extra-curricular private tutoring outside of, and not associated with their schooling are, in my view, clearly intended by the parties to be caught within “child support expenses” that the Respondent is obliged to pay, conditioned upon the extra-curricular activity that incurs the expense having been agreed between the Applicant and the Respondent. 

3. I do not accept that the terms of the Deed relating to child support and spousal maintenance, when considered together, can be construed to mean that any monies unilaterally spent by the Applicant in respect of the children, not caught by the clauses of the binding child support agreement in the Deed, are meant to be treated as “expenses of [Ms Polik]” for spousal maintenance purposes. I do not accept that the parties intended that to be the case.

4. Accordingly, I respectfully reject the submission of counsel for the Applicant that the expenditure of the amount of $7,500 on extra-curricular tuition for the boys is an “expense of [the Applicant]” within the meaning of the term used in the financial agreement simply because she paid for it on the credit card she carries and is authorised by the Respondent to sign.

Is it then as simple as the Respondent being ordered to meet his contractual obligation to pay $600 per week for the weeks he missed?

1. The Respondent’s solicitor said that if pleadings were required in proceedings in this Court that his client “would plead set-off and counterclaim” in this matter. The Respondent simply seeks an order that the Applicant’s application be dismissed. He does not seek an order, as he might if he was actually counter-claiming, that the Applicant pay him $7,500 plus interest.

2. In B C Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure (Lawbook Co, 10^th ed, 2014) 7.180 on p 268 it is said:

   A set-off is a defence that precludes the plaintiff enforcing the claim, either in full or in part. A counter-claim is a separate proceeding in its own right.

   Further on, in 7.190 on p 269 it says:

   A set-off does not operate as a denial of the debt. It tacitly assumes the existence of the debt, and then alleges reasons why the plaintiff is not entitled to payment. Pleas of payment or of accord and satisfaction assert that the claim no longer exists. This is not the case with a set-off, the claim continues until judgment is given.  Re K L Tractors [1954] VLR 505 at 507.

3. I understand that in seeking dismissal of the application the Respondent is effectively arguing set-off. By this, he acknowledges the debt to the Applicant but seeks to set-off what he asserts is a debt the Applicant owes him for $7,500 plus interest. I also understand him to be arguing, in the alternative, that the debt to the Applicant does not in fact exist as she already received from him the benefit of the sum of $7,500 that he was not obligated to pay to her pursuant to the Deed that regulates all of their financial relationship, such that what he owed her in the form of periodic payments of $600 per week was paid in advance for many weeks. I understand this to be a plea of payment, which is different to set-off.

Is the Respondent owed money by the Applicant by way of debt or other claim that can be set-off against his debt to her?

1. On the evidence, as I have already said, I am satisfied the Respondent was not obligated to pay the sum of $7,500 tuition fees incurred by the wife pursuant to the terms of the financial agreement and the binding child support agreement. However, it is reasonably clear on the limited evidence about the matter, that the Applicant possessed authority to use a credit card for which the Respondent was obligated to the issuing bank to pay. When the Applicant incurred $7,500 of expenses on that credit card, the Respondent was, pursuant to his obligation to the issuing bank lawfully obliged to pay that amount to the bank. The Respondent made no argument against that.

2. The Applicant deposed to having the authority to use the credit card for which the Respondent was liable to the issuing bank. She did not, however, adduce any evidence that in any way persuades me that she had a right outside the terms of the financial agreement and the binding child support agreement to expect the Respondent to have to meet any expenses of extra-curricular tuition for the boys that she unilaterally incurred. I consider the onus to do so was on the Applicant.

3. Similarly though, there is no evidence from which I can be satisfied that the Applicant is actually indebted to the Respondent for the $7,500 or that he has a valid contractual or equitable claim against her for that amount. The Respondent did not depose to a collateral agreement that the Applicant would be indebted to him for any amount that she charged to the credit card that he was not obliged to pay pursuant to any of the terms of the Deed. I did not understand any of the submissions made for him to point to and identify any such claim. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that there is a set-off in this case.

What of the submission that the money was paid in advance and there is simply no debt to the Applicant?

1. The Respondent made it clear to the Applicant well in advance of her paying the $7,500 towards the cost of 2015 tuition for the boys that he did not agree to the boys being enrolled for further tuition in 2015 or being responsible for any of the costs thereof. Nevertheless, knowing that, the Applicant unilaterally went ahead and enrolled them again and charged the cost of $7,500 to a credit card that she was aware the Respondent was, by his contractual arrangement with the bank, obliged to pay. The Respondent had no obligation to pay the cost of the tuition pursuant to the financial agreement and binding child support agreement. However, not being able to avoid paying the bank, the Respondent paid off the credit card liability that included the amount of $7,500.

2. As the Applicant had no right, pursuant to the Deed that governs their financial relationship, to require the Respondent to meet the expense, I am satisfied that her actions amounted in reality to a decision to take a lump sum of $7,500 in advance of her entitlement to receive that amount pursuant to the Deed and that she chose to use it by paying for the tuition she unilaterally enrolled the boys in.

3. I am, therefore, satisfied that the Respondent paid the Applicant the sum of $7,500 in a lump sum and that he was entitled to off-set it against payments he was contractually obligated to pay her thereafter. He chose to off-set it against his obligation to pay her $600 per week until the amount was totally off-set. I consider that his right.

4. The Respondent added to the amount of $7,500 interest of $731.56 and withheld weekly payments totalling $8,231.56. In his letter to the Applicant’s solicitor dated 18 December 2014, the Respondent actually said he would reinstate the $600 weekly payment and make good any missed payments when the tuition was cancelled and the $7,500 refunded. He said that his alternative approach to that would be to reinstate the $600 weekly payment once the $7,500 was covered. His adding of interest in the end was contrary to that assertion.

5. I consider the amount of $7,500 is the amount that was paid to the Applicant in November 2014 in advance of the Respondent’s contractual obligations to pay her that amount and that he has a defence to her application to enforce the payment of that much of the $8,231.56 that he then withheld from his weekly payments to her. Her application is for the enforcement of unpaid arrears of $8,231.56, the amount the Respondent actually did not pay her periodically between the end of November 2014 and the beginning of March 2015. I do not consider he has a defence to the non-payment of $731.56.

6. Accordingly, I am satisfied the Respondent owes the Applicant the sum of $731.56. I will order that he pays her that plus interest pursuant to the Family Law Rules on the sum of $300 from 24 February 2015 and on a further $431.56 from 3 March 2015.

I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Forrest delivered on 28 April 2015.

Associate:

Date:  28 April 2015