SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
POLICE v SPOONER
[2015] SASC 196
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone
14 December 2015
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - EXCEEDING PRESCRIBED SPEED LIMITS
TRAFFIC LAW - LICENSING OF DRIVERS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - DISQUALIFICATION, CANCELLATION OR SUSPENSION OF LICENCES - CONVICTIONS OF TRAFFIC OFFENCES RELATING TO OTHER MATTERS - DEMERIT POINTS
Prosecution appeal against the order of a magistrate reducing the number of demerit points incurred for speeding offence - respondent exceeded the speed limit by 24 kilometres per hour - the magistrate found proper cause to reduce the number of points incurred from five to one - whether magistrate erred in finding proper cause to reduce points incurred - whether failure of respondent's speedometer rendered offence atypical - whether consequences to the respondent from loss of licence relevant to proper cause.
Held: appeal allowed. The circumstances of the offending did not amount to proper cause. The offence was not atypical. Proper cause may not be found in the effects of licence disqualification upon an offender.
Australian Road Rules Rule 20; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA); Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 98B; Motor Vehicles Regulations 2010 (SA) Schedule 4, referred to.
Gilbert v Owen (1991) 14 MVR 235; Dycer v Police [2010] SASC 241; Holness v Police (2010) 272 LSJS 501; Svilans v Police [2014] SASC 173; Miles v Police [2012] SASC 69, considered.
POLICE v SPOONER
[2015] SASC 196Magistrates Appeal
Criminal
VANSTONE J: The police appeal against the order of a magistrate reducing the number of demerit points to be incurred by the respondent upon his conviction for speeding.
The respondent, Reginald George Spooner, pleaded guilty in the Murray Bridge Magistrates Court to driving his Harley Davidson motor bike over the speed limit contrary to Rule 20 of the Australian Road Rules under the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA).
Pursuant to s 98B of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) the respondent applied for a reduction in the number of demerit points to be incurred. Over opposition by the police prosecutor the magistrate ordered that the number of demerit points incurred be reduced from five points to one point.
The appellant challenges that decision, contending that the magistrate erred in her evaluation of the evidence before her. The appellant argues that the offence was not trifling and that there was no proper cause to reduce the number of points incurred.
Background
The offence occurred on 31 October 2014 on Reedy Creek Road near Palmer. Police stopped the respondent having recorded his speed at 124 kilometres per hour in an area where the speed limit was 100 kilometres per hour. When told of his speed and of the applicable speed limit the respondent was alleged to have said: “Why is it 100 here anyway? Bloody revenue raising”. He also said words to the effect: “Please don’t defect me but my…
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- Police v Spooner [2015] SASC 196
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- [2015] SASC 196
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the magistrate erred in finding proper cause to reduce the number of demerit points incurred by the respondent. The court had to determine whether the failure of the respondent’s speedometer rendered the offence atypical and whether the consequences to the respondent from the loss of his licence were relevant to proper cause. Under Section 98B(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, a court may reduce the number of demerit points if it is satisfied that the offence is trifling, or that any other proper cause exists. The court had to interpret what constituted "proper cause" in this context.
The court held that the magistrate's decision was in error. It found that the circumstances of the offence did not amount to proper cause. The respondent's speed was well over the speed limit, and his speedometer was not working at all. The court emphasised that when a driver’s speedometer is not functioning, it is incumbent upon the driver to ensure they drive well within the speed limit. The court also noted that the hardship caused by the loss of a driver’s licence, while keenly felt, was a known consequence of traffic infringements and did not constitute proper cause. The court concluded that the offence was typical and the respondent should have taken particular care given the circumstances.
In conclusion, the appeal was upheld and the magistrate’s order reducing the number of demerit points incurred was set aside. The court found that proper cause did not encompass the impacts that might be suffered by an offender if the prescribed number of demerit points were incurred, aligning with the preponderance of authority on the matter.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I tend to the view that “proper cause” does not encompass impacts which might be suffered by an offender if the prescribed number of demerit points are incurred. The preponderance of authority favours that view.Consideration In the present matter the magistrate referred extensively to the judgment in Miles. Discussing the nature of the offence, her Honour found that there was no evidence of embarrassment to other road users and that the fact that the speedometer on the respondent’s motor bike was out of order was “an atypical circumstance”. The magistrate held that the circumstances of the offence amounted to proper cause. Relying on Doyle CJ’s judgment, the magistrate further had regard to the difficulties which would be faced by the respondent and his wife were both without their driver’s licences at the same time. Adding those matters to the proper cause already found, determined that the number of demerit points to be incurred should be reduced from five to one point. In my view the circumstances of the respondent’s offending did not amount to proper cause. The offence was a typical one of its kind. The respondent’s speed was well over the speed governing that stretch of road, and indeed, well over even the speed limit which the respondent claimed to believe applied. The respondent’s speedometer was not working at all. It is not even as if he were misled by a speedometer which underestimated his true speed. In circumstances where a driver’s speedometer is not working it is up to the driver to ensure that he or she drives well within the speed limit. That is not something which would be found to be difficult by any but the most inexperienced driver. The respondent put to me that judging speed is harder on a motor bike than in a car. That may be, but it is all the more reason to drive conservatively when the assistance of a speedometer is not available. As I read the magistrate’s reasons the reliance on hardship caused to the respondent was very much secondary to the findings about the offence itself. In any event, the hardship which the respondent testified he and his wife would suffer was, as Doyle CJ in Miles said, very much a hardship which the respondent must have known would result from a further traffic infringement. Those considerations should have caused him to take particular care. The consequences he faced were not unusual ones. The loss of a driver’s licence is keenly felt by almost all drivers. Naturally the impact is greater for those who rely on their licences to facilitate their work, or to get them to their place of work, or to transport members of their family. But all these things are known to the driver and in the usual case cannot be said to amount to undue hardship. In any event, as I observed, strictly, proper cause may not be found in the effects of licence disqualification upon an offender.Conclusion I would uphold the appeal and set aside the magistrate’s order that the demerit points incurred be reduced.