Police v Siviour No. Scciv-01-602

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POLICE  v  SIVIOUR

[2001] SASC 246

Full Court:  Doyle CJ, Perry and Bleby JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ           This is an appeal against a decision by a Magistrate dismissing a charge of a summary offence. The appeal was referred to the Full Court by a Judge of this Court.

  2. The issue on appeal is whether, in the relevant circumstances, a member of the police force had power to require the defendant to submit to an alcotest. The answer turns on whether an offence of driving at a speed in excess of an applicable speed limit, to which offence the defendant pleaded guilty before the Magistrate, is an offence against Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 (SA) (“the RTA”). The power to require the defendant to submit to an alcotest depended upon the member of the police force believing on reasonable grounds that the defendant had committed an offence of contravening a provision of Part 3 of the RTA.

    Facts

  3. On 16 April 2000 the defendant was stopped by police officers who had observed him (using a laser gun) driving a motor car at 138 kph on a road at a place where the speed limit was 100 kph.

  4. One of the police officers required the defendant to submit to an alcotest. He refused to do so.

  5. The defendant was charged on complaint with refusing to submit to an alcotest contrary to s 47E of the RTA and with driving at a speed over the applicable speed limit contrary to r 20 of the Australian Road Rules (“the ARR”). The defendant pleaded not guilty to the first charge and guilty to the second charge.

  6. At the close of the prosecution case, counsel for the defendant submitted that there was no case to answer on the first charge. The Magistrate upheld that submission and dismissed the first charge. The defendant was convicted and fined on the second charge.

  7. The Magistrate held that there was no case to answer because, as he found, in the circumstances the member of the police force did not have the power to require the defendant to submit to an alcotest. That was because the speeding offence in question was not, in the Magistrate’s view, an offence of contravening a provision of Part 3 of the RTA.

    Legislative provisions

  8. Section 47E(1) of the RTA provides as follows:

    “47E(1)Where a member of the police force believes on reasonable grounds that a person, while driving a motor vehicle or attempting to put a motor vehicle in motion -

    (a)has committed an offence of contravening, or failing to comply with, a provision of this Part of which the driving of a motor vehicle is an element (excluding an offence of a prescribed class); or

    (b)(Repealed)

    (c)has behaved in a manner that indicates that his or her ability to drive the motor vehicle is impaired; or

    (d)has been involved in an accident,

    that member of the police force may, subject to subsection (2), require that person to submit to…

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Details
Case
[2001] SASC 246
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal by the Police against the decision of the Magistrate to dismiss a charge against the defendant for refusing to submit to an alcotest. The defendant had been observed driving at a speed of 138 kph in a 100 kph zone and was subsequently required by a police officer to submit to an alcotest, which he refused. The defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of exceeding the speed limit but not guilty to the charge of refusing to submit to an alcotest. The Magistrate dismissed the charge of refusal to submit to an alcotest on the basis that the speeding offence did not fall within Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1961, thereby negating the police officer's power to require an alcotest under section 47E(1)(a) of the RTA.

The legal issue at the heart of this appeal was whether the offence of driving at a speed in excess of the applicable speed limit, which the defendant had pleaded guilty to, constituted an offence against Part 3 of the RTA. This determination was critical as it would establish whether the police officer had the requisite power to require the defendant to submit to an alcotest. The court had to consider whether the speeding offence, which was governed by rule 20 of the Australian Road Rules, was an offence under Part 3 of the RTA, and whether this part of the RTA included statutory instruments made under it.

The court, in its decision, found that the offence of exceeding the speed limit did not fall within Part 3 of the RTA, as the Magistrate had concluded. However, the court disagreed with the Magistrate's reasoning and held that the speeding offence did constitute an offence under Part 3 of the RTA, thereby affirming the police officer's power to require an alcotest. The court reached this conclusion by interpreting section 14BA(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915, which extends the reference in section 47E(1)(a) of the RTA to include contraventions or failures to comply with statutory instruments made under the RTA or any other Act, provided they are relevant to the provision in question. The court found that the speeding offence, as regulated by rule 20 of the ARR, was relevant to Part 3 of the RTA, thus it was an offence under that part.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal of the charge by the Magistrate was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for further hearing and determination. The decision highlights the importance of statutory interpretation and the relevance of statutory instruments to the provisions they are intended to support. The court's decision also suggested that section 14BA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 might require reconsideration by Parliament due to the differing interpretations by the members of the Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The issue on appeal is whether, in the relevant circumstances, a member of the police force had power to require the defendant to submit to an alcotest. The answer turns on whether an offence of driving at a speed in excess of an applicable speed limit, to which offence the defendant pleaded guilty before the Magistrate, is an offence against Part 3 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 (SA) (“the RTA”). The power to require the defendant to submit to an alcotest depended upon the member of the police force believing on reasonable grounds that the defendant had committed an offence of contravening a provision of Part 3 of the RTA.Facts On 16 April 2000 the defendant was stopped by police officers who had observed him (using a laser gun) driving a motor car at 138 kph on a road at a place where the speed limit was 100 kph. One of the police officers required the defendant to submit to an alcotest. He refused to do so. The defendant was charged on complaint with refusing to submit to an alcotest contrary to s 47E of the RTA and with driving at a speed over the applicable speed limit contrary to r 20 of the Australian Road Rules (“the ARR”). The defendant pleaded not guilty to the first charge and guilty to the second charge. At the close of the prosecution case, counsel for the defendant submitted that there was no case to answer on the first charge. The Magistrate upheld that submission and dismissed the first charge. The defendant was convicted and fined on the second charge. The Magistrate held that there was no case to answer because, as he found, in the circumstances the member of the police force did not have the power to require the defendant to submit to an alcotest. That was because the speeding offence in question was not, in the Magistrate’s view, an offence of contravening a provision of Part 3 of the RTA. Legislative provisions Section 47E(1) of the RTA provides as follows:“47E(1)Where a member of the police force believes on reasonable grounds that a person, while driving a motor vehicle or attempting to put a motor vehicle in motion -(a)has committed an offence of contravening, or failing to comply with, a provision of this Part of which the driving of a motor vehicle is an element (excluding an offence of a prescribed class); or(b)(Repealed)(c)has behaved in a manner that indicates that his or her ability to drive the motor vehicle is impaired; or(d)has been involved in an accident,that member of the police force may, subject to subsection (2), require that person to submit to an alcotest or breach analysis, or both.”The offence of failing to comply with a reasonable direction when required to submit to an alcotest is found in s 47E(3). In the present case, the basis for the requirement to submit to an alcotest was s 47E(1)(a) - a belief on reasonable grounds that the defendant had committed an offence of contravening a provision of Part 3 of the RTA. Part 3 of the RTA is headed “Duties of drivers, passengers and pedestrians”. Until 1999, this part of the RTA contained some 70 sections imposing duties on road users. By s 164A contravention of, or failure to comply with, a provision of the RTA is an offence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ PERRY J (dissent) BLEBY J (dissent)
In some cases it will be appropriate to follow that course, but usually that will be so when there is some unfairness to the defendant, at least in a broad sense, if the matter is remitted to the Magistrates Court, or when the defendant’s case has been selected by the prosecutor as a convenient vehicle for a test case. In the present case it was the defendant’s submission that has given rise to the point. Under the circumstances, I do not accept Mr Cuthbertson’s submission.Conclusions For these reasons, the appeal should be allowed, the dismissal of the charge by the Magistrate should be set aside, and the matter should be remitted to the Magistrates Court for hearing and determination. The divergence in the reasons of the members of the Court suggests that s 14BA requires some reconsideration by Parliament. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the reasons for judgment of Doyle CJ in which the circumstances of the case, including the relevant statutory provisions, are identified. I regret that I have reached a conclusion which differs from his. The reasons why I differ may be explained shortly. I am unable, with respect, to accept that the words in s 14BA(1) “a reference in an Act to some other Act ... includes ... reference to statutory instruments made or in force under that other Act”, in some way apply to statutory instruments made or in force under the Act in which the reference appears. Neither do I think that one can reach the same result by looking at the word “Part” where that appears in s 47E(1)(a). In order to read the words “an offence” against “a provision of this Part” to include an offence against a statutory instrument made under that Part, in my view, one could only do so, if at all, by reference to s 14BA(2). But I do not consider that s 14BA(2) avails the appellant either. I accept that by reason of s 14BA(2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915, unless the contrary intention appears, the reference in s 47E(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (“the RTA”) to the committal of “an offence of contravening or failing to comply with a provision of this Part of which the driving of a motor vehicle is an element ...” must be understood to extend to a contravention or failure to comply with a statutory instrument made or in force under the RTA or under any other Act insofar as the statutory instrument is relevant to that provision. The requirement of relevance applies, irrespective of the source of the statutory power to make the statutory instrument in question. It follows, in my view, that even although the relevant statutory instrument, in this case r 20 of the Australian Road Rules (“ARR”), is a rule which may properly be regarded as having been made by the Governor pursuant to the power conferred upon him by s 80 of the RTA, it does not necessarily follow that the rule is within the meaning of s 14BA(2) relevant to a provision of Part 3 of the RTA. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that s 80 of the RTA is within Part 3 of that Act. As I have said, the concept of relevance must be addressed, whether the enabling power is within Part 3 or is to be found outside that Part.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ,

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