Police v Rose
[2023] SASC 151
•19 October 2023
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeal: Criminal)
POLICE v ROSE
[2023] SASC 151
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bampton
19 October 2023
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - ASSAULT
Appeal against the respondent’s acquittal by a Magistrate of assault by accosting contrary to s 20(1)(e) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) – where Magistrate found respondent was entitled to obtain the details of the driver of a motor vehicle enforcing the driver’s “obligations under the Australian Road Rules” – whether Magistrate’s reasons were adequate – whether the respondent’s alleged conduct was justified under the Australian Road Rules.
Held: Appeal allowed – acquittal set aside in respect of count 2 – trial of count 2 remitted to Magistrates Court for rehearing before another Magistrate.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 85(4), 20(1)(e), 20(2), 5B; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42; Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ); Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA) rr 2.2(5), 185.1; Australian Road Rules (SA) rr 287, 287(3)(b), 287(2), 287(3), 287(4); Road Traffic (Road Rules - Ancilliary & Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2014 (SA) reg 39, referred to.
Baird v New Zealand Police [2001] NZHC 448; Police v Baker (2015) 123 SASR 468; Weinel v Rojas Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Olsson J, 10 June 1994; Semple v Williams (1990) 156 LSJS 40; Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) v Brown (1994) 72 A Crim R 527; Theophilus v Police (2011) 110 SASR 420; Nasr v Police [2017] SASC 138, considered.
POLICE v ROSE
[2023] SASC 151Magistrates Appeal: Criminal
BAMPTON J: On 13 December 2022, Norman Rose was acquitted of two offences charged on a Magistrates Court Information arising out of what the trial Magistrate referred to as “a road rage incident”.
By count 1, Mr Rose was charged with threating to damage the property of Jane Kronitis (“Ms Kronitis”) on 24 August 2020 without lawful excuse and being recklessly indifferent as to whether a fear that the threat would be or was likely to be carried out was aroused, contrary to s 85(4) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (“the CLCA”). By count 2, Mr Rose was charged with assaulting Ms Kronitis on 24 August 2020, contrary to s 20(1)(e) of the CLCA.
On 10 January 2023, the Commissioner of Police (“the Commissioner”) filed a notice of appeal against the acquittal in respect of count 2 only.
Mr Rose was legally represented during the Magistrates Court trial. As Mr Rose was unrepresented on appeal, the hearing of the appeal was adjourned on 5 April 2023 to allow Mr Rose the opportunity to seek legal advice and obtain representation. Mr Rose appeared unrepresented at the adjourned hearing on 28 July 2023.
A preliminary point
Before I discuss the grounds of appeal, I will deal with Mr Rose’s complaint that the appeal was filed out of time. To address this issue, I will set out the hearings before the Magistrates Court.
The Magistrates Court hearings
The trial commenced in the Magistrates Court on 23 June 2022. The prosecution called two witnesses. Mr Rose did not give or call evidence. At the conclusion of the trial, the Magistrate reserved his decision and informed the parties that he would deliver published reasons in court on 31 August 2022.
On 31 August 2022, Mr Rose appeared but there was no appearance by his solicitor. The Magistrate informed the parties he had intended to deliver ex tempore remarks but considered it was undesirable to deliver his decision in the absence of Mr Rose’s solicitor. His Honour adjourned delivery of his decision to 22 September 2022 and said;
I have now had an opportunity to publish reasons so what I will do is prepare those. If we’re ready earlier than the 22nd then I will have my clerk contact you and we can arrange to have the matter called on at an earlier date.
Following the hearing on 31 August 2022, the Magistrates Court forwarded an email to Mr Rose’s solicitor informing him that the matter was listed for hearing on 22 September 2022 at 9:30 am.
On 20 September 2022, the Magistrates Court forwarded an email to Mr Rose informing him that due to the public holiday on Thursday 22 September 2022 the matter was adjourned to 27 October 2022 at 9:30 am.
There was no appearance by Mr Rose on 27 October 2022. The Magistrate recorded on the transcript that Mr Rose had been legally represented at trial but understood that he had terminated his instructions to his solicitor. The Magistrate again indicated he was prepared to give an ex tempore decision but did not consider it appropriate in the absence of Mr Rose and adjourned the matter to 13 December 2022 at 9:30 am. The Magistrate ordered a warrant to lie and that the Registrar of the Magistrates Court notify Mr Rose that if he failed to attend on 13 December the Court may proceed in his absence or issue a warrant for his arrest.
On 13 December 2022, Mr Rose appeared in person and the Magistrate acquitted him of counts 1 and 2, and published his reasons.
Time to appeal
The Commissioner, pursuant to r 185.1 of the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA) (“the Rules”), was required to institute the appeal within 21 days after the date of the Magistrate’s decision. Pursuant to r 2.2(5), time does not run between 25 December and 1 January for the purpose of filing an appeal. The notice of appeal filed 10 January 2023 was filed within 21 days after the Magistrate’s decision delivered on 13 December 2022 and accordingly was filed within time.
Mr Rose’s argument is that the Magistrate, in his view, made the decision earlier than 13 December 2022. As is clear from my recitation of the hearings held by the Magistrate, his Honour intimated he was in a position to deliver his decision on 31 August 2022 and 27 October 2022, but did not do so until 13 December 2022 at the time he published his reasons.
Prosecution appeals pursuant to s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA)
Prosecution appeals from a decision of a Magistrate to acquit are considered differently to other appeals heard by the Supreme Court.[1] The Court will only interfere, on appeal, with decisions of Magistrates to acquit following a hearing on the merits in exceptional circumstances for the purpose of correcting manifest error. The question for my determination is whether, having conducted a real review of the evidence given in the Magistrates Court and the reasons for decision, the Magistrate has erred in law or fact. The appeal can only be allowed if I find there has been a miscarriage of justice.[2]
[1] Police v Baker (2015) 123 SASR 468 at [6]; Weinel v Rojas (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Olsson J, 10 June 1994). Olsson J expressed similar views in Semple v Williams (1990) 156 LSJS 40 and in Director of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth) v Brown (1994) 72 A Crim R 527.
[2] Theophilus v Police (2011) 110 SASR 420.
The grounds of appeal
The Commissioner contends, by ground 1 of the appeal, that the Magistrate erred in acquitting Mr Rose of count 2 on the basis that Mr Rose’s conduct was justified or excused by the law. By ground 2, the Commissioner complains that the Magistrate’s reasons are inadequate in that:
a.The reasons do not explain adequately or at all how the Magistrate resolved the conflict between the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and [Mr Rose].
b.The reasons do not explain adequately or at all how the Magistrate reached the conclusion that [Mr Rose’s] conduct was justified or excused by law.
The circumstances giving rise to the charge of assault
Ms Kronitis
On 24 August 2020, the complainant, Ms Kronitis, drove to the Park Holme Shopping Centre with her friend, Carol Duncan (“Ms Duncan”), in the front passenger seat. Ms Kronitis parked in the carpark of the shopping centre, got out of her car, and went to the post office, leaving Ms Duncan in the car. Ms Kronitis noted a man, whom she did not know, in the post office yelling and talking to someone on his phone. She identified Mr Rose during the trial as the man she saw in the post office.
Ms Kronitis said she returned to her car from the post office and drove out of the carpark, turned left onto Marion Road, then left onto Pildappa Avenue to collect her son from Ascot Park Primary School. Having collected her son, Ms Kronitis drove back to and turned left on Marion Road, then right onto Fourth Avenue.
Ms Kronitis gave evidence that she first noticed a van behind her car when she was about to turn right at Railway Terrace from Fourth Avenue. She looked in her rear‑vision mirror and noted the driver was:
… like beep, beep, beep, waving his arms, yelling and whatever, and I automatically just thought I left my purse on the roof of the car, or something, you know what I mean?
Ms Kronitis said the driver was angry and was “like ‘Pull over. Fucking pull over’” and was waving his arms. She told the Magistrate that she recognised the driver of the van as the man she had seen in the post office a few minutes earlier. I will refer to the man as Mr Rose in detailing Ms Kronitis’s evidence.
Ms Kronitis said she turned left onto Daws Road from Railway Terrace. She was travelling in the righthand lane on Daws Road and Mr Rose was behind her car continuing to beep. Ms Kronitis said she could see him in her rear vision mirror saying, “fucking pull over, fucking pull over”. She saw Mr Rose’s van go from behind to the left side of her car, and he was still beeping and screaming.
Ms Kronitis said she continued driving until she came to a stop behind banked up traffic around the location of the train line on Daws Road. At this point Mr Rose got out of his van, Ms Kronitis locked her car doors, and reassured her son saying, “It’s okay” as he was starting to panic. She said Mr Rose came running up to her window yelling and screaming, saying “Fucking open the door, fucking get out of the car” and “Your mum fucking smashed my car”. Ms Kronitis said as the traffic started to move, she started to drive, and decided to go to the Sturt police station.
Ms Kronitis came to another stop at the Winston Avenue and Daws Road junction, as the lights were red for eastbound traffic on Daws Road. She said she was thinking “please don’t hit my car ... where my son is” as Mr Rose was travelling on the left-hand side of her car and her son was in the left-hand rear passenger seat. When Ms Kronitis came to the stop at the lights, Mr Rose, whose van was next to her car, got of the van and approached Ms Kronitis’ window. Mr Rose was yelling and swearing. Ms Kronitis said that she heard him yell that he was going to smash her car. Ms Duncan, who was in the front passenger seat of Ms Kronitis’ car, used her mobile phone to take a photograph of Mr Rose.
When the lights turned green, Ms Kronitis drove east on Daws Road, turned right at Goodwood Road made her way to the Sturt police station where she and Ms Duncan provided statements to the police regarding the incident.
Ms Kronitis said in cross-examination that she did not recall seeing Mr Rose or his van in the Park Holme Shopping Centre carpark. Nor did she recall him calling out to her as she pulled out of the carpark.
Ms Duncan
Ms Duncan gave evidence that whilst Ms Kronitis was in the post office, she remained in the front passenger seat of Ms Kronitis’ car, on her phone looking at Facebook. She said when Ms Kronitis returned to the car, they drove to the Ascot Park primary school and picked up Ms Kronitis’ son.
Ms Duncan said as they were travelling down Railway Terrace, Ms Kronitis said she had noticed a vehicle beeping behind them. Ms Duncan said she did not see the vehicle, but she heard beeping. She said when they got to Daws Road, a white van came up to her side of the car and the person was beeping and yelling, “Pull over. Pull over”. She described the person’s demeanour as angry and “radical”. She said:
… at this stage I put the window down and I said ‘What’s the problem?’, and that’s when he proceeded to say ‘You hit my car’ and I just said ‘No. No, we didn’t’.
Ms Duncan said the person kept on saying, “Pull over. Pull over. You hit my car”.
She identified the person as Mr Rose in the courtroom.
Ms Duncan said Ms Kronitis kept on driving and when they came to a stop light Mr Rose’s van was behind them. Mr Rose got out of the van and came up to Ms Kronitis’ window and started pointing saying, “You hit my car. You hit my car”. Ms Duncan said he appeared quite angry. Ms Duncan said she told Ms Kronitis to make sure her window was up and her door was locked. She then got her phone out and took a photograph of Mr Rose.[3] Ms Duncan said she recalled the man saying, “You hit my car. I’m gonna get you. I’m gonna get your car”.
[3] Exhibit P3, copy of the photograph taken by Ms Duncan.
In cross-examination, Ms Duncan was asked whether Ms Kronitis got out of her car at the shopping centre carpark and opened another door to her car. She said “No, she didn’t” and she did not recall seeing Mr Rose’s van parked at the shopping centre carpark.
Ms Duncan was asked whether she could have heard the words, “How would you feel if I damaged your car”. Ms Duncan said she did not recall those words.
The record of interview
During his interview with police,[4] Mr Rose acknowledged an interaction with a female driver and her passenger on 24 August 2020. Mr Rose told police he just had his Mercedes van detailed and was about to sell it. He told the police he pulled up at the Park Holme Shopping Centre and went into the post office. When he came out of the post office, he saw a car parked alongside his van and he saw the passenger in the car open the back door onto the driver’s side of his van causing damage. Mr Rose said he saw the driver get back into the car and drive off. He told police, “And they have [gouged] the car, I tried catching up to her and she just cut it left right and centre”.
[4] Exhibit P4, transcript of record of interview.
It was put to Mr Rose during the interview that he had followed the car, to which he responded, “I tried to get her to pull over, but she wouldn’t pull over she kept going”. It was put to Mr Rose that the driver of the car and her passenger had alleged he had made a couple of threats, whereupon Mr Rose told the police officer, “Nah I’m not going to do anything to them man, all I wanted was her details” and “she just kept on darting through streets and then she just took off up Daws Road”.
The prosecution case in respect of count 2
It was the prosecution case at trial that Mr Rose’s actions and words satisfied the elements of count 2, namely, an assault by accosting or impeding another in a threatening way contrary to s 20(1)(e) of the CLCA.
Section 20(1)(e) of the CLCA provides that a person commits an assault if the person accosts or impedes another person in a threatening manner without their consent.
It was submitted that Mr Rose’s conduct in driving close behind Ms Kronitis’ car, gesticulating for her to stop, vigorously using the horn, using verbally abusive and expletive-riddled language, alighting from his van, approaching the side door of Ms Kronitis’ car whilst stationary in busy traffic, and continuing to berate the occupants while they were seated in the car constituted “accosting”.
The Magistrate’s reasons
The Magistrate stated in his reasons that having consisdered the evidence, the submissions of counsel, and the decision of the High Court of New Zealand in Baird v New Zealand Police[5] referred to by the prosecution, he was not satisfied the prosecution had proved count 1 and count 2.
[5] [2001] NZHC 448.
In respect of count 1, his Honour accepted that it was a reasonable possibility that Mr Rose did not use the words “I will smash up your car”. His Honour considered it was possible Mr Rose had said in his frustration at Ms Kronitis’ driving away, “How would you feel if I smashed up your car”.
The Magistrate accepted Mr Rose’s solicitor’s criticism of Ms Kronitis’ evidence as somewhat histrionic. He accepted the evidence of Ms Duncan was more balanced and that Mr Rose may have said, “How would you feel if I smashed up your car”. His Honour accepted that this did not indicate an intention to damage Ms Kronitis’ car, but an explanation as to what he wanted Ms Kronitis to do, that is, pull over so he could exchange details.
The Magistrate concluded:
[38]In my view whilst the conduct could have amounted to “an assault by reason of accost” as identified in the New Zealand cases. I accept that Mr Rose was entitled to obtain the detail of the occupants of the other car – in particular the driver – and enforcing the obligations under the Australian Road Rules.
Accordingly, the Magistrate found that neither count 1 nor count 2 were proven and acquitted Mr Rose.
Grounds of appeal
As stated above the Commissioner only appeals the acquittal in respect of count 2.
The Commissioner submitted there are two possible interpretations for the Magistrate’s reasons at [38] set out above, either that the offence was not made out because Mr Rose’s conduct was justified or excused by law, or that the offence was not made out because both the offence had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and Mr Rose’s conduct was justified or excused by law.
The Commissioner submitted that irrespective of what interpretation is adopted, the Magistrate’s reasons are inadequate and the decision is plainly wrong. It was contended the evidence before the Magistrate supported a finding that the prosecution had proven the assault beyond reasonable doubt, subject to any lawful justification or excuse. It was argued the Magistrate’s reasons are inadequate because they do not consider adequately, or at all, the antecedent question of whether Ms Kronitis and Mr Rose were involved in a crash[6] at the Park Holme Shopping Centre carpark. Further, the reasons do not explain the basis for finding the alleged conduct was justified or excused under the Australian Road Rules (“ARRs”) in circumstances where Mr Rose’s conduct would otherwise have amounted to an assault.
[6] A crash is defined in the dictionary to the Australian Road Rules to include a collision between two or more cars.
The Commissioner submitted there was no lawful justification or excuse for Mr Rose’s conduct and that the Magistrate misconstrued the nature of r 287 of the ARRs. Even if it was accepted that Ms Kronitis had been involved in a crash (thus enlivening her obligation to provide her details to Mr Rose under the ARRs), contrary to the Magistrate’s decision, Mr Rose was not entitled to enforce that obligation by accosting Ms Kronitis in a threatening manner.
Accost by any other name would be …[7]
[7] William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II.
As identified by the Commissioner, there has been little judicial consideration of conduct where a person accosts another in a threatening manner contrary to s 20(1)(e) of the CLCA.
In Baird v New Zealand Police,[8] the New Zealand authority referred to by the Magistrate, Doogue J discusses previous judicial consideration and the various dictionary meanings of the word “accost”. The matter before Doogue J concerned an appeal against conviction of a breach of a protection order under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 (NZ). The appellant, who was subject to a protection order, was found guilty of accosting his son, who was a protected person. The appellant was found to have accosted his son in circumstances where the physical proximity between him and his son was approximately 15 feet and the appellant told his son to “hop into” his car, but his son did not do so. The appellant told a police officer, when asked about the incident, that he only wanted to say “hello” to his son. In his reasons for dismissing the appeal, Doogue J considered where there was physical proximity between the appellant and his son and there was an element of interaction in that the appellant addressed his son, it was open to the Judge at first instance to find that the appellant accosted his son.
[8] [2001] NZHC 448.
I agree with the Commissioner’s submission that s 20(1)(e) of the CLCA encompasses confrontations initiated by persons in similar circumstances to this matter, including in the context of road rage incidents.[9]
[9] Nasr v Police [2017] SASC 138 (The salient conduct involved the defendant approaching the victim after a court hearing with an aggressive and threatening demeanour and shouting words which included “Why are you doing this to me?”, “I’m going to get you”, and “Why are you lying?”).
The ordinary meaning of “accost” includes “to approach for any purpose”. It connotes some element of interaction between persons which usually, but not always, takes the form of a confrontation being initiated in physical proximity to another person.
The words “threatening manner” in s 20(1)(e) of the CLCA confines the interactions which would result in a person who accosts committing an offence. The ordinary meaning of the word “manner” includes a person’s “outward bearing; way of behaving towards others”.[10]
[10] Macquarie Dictionary (online at 19 October 2023), ‘manner’ (def 7).
As submitted, the characterisation of a person’s manner requires consideration of the circumstances of the accost. This would include any evidence regarding the person’s gestures, expressions, mannerisms, and the nature and context of statements made by that person. It was submitted the evidence, particularly that of Ms Duncan, supported a finding that the prosecution had proven the assault beyond reasonable doubt, subject to any lawful justification or excuse.
The defence of lawful excuse or justification
Mr Rose had a defence to the charge of assault in circumstances where his conduct was within s 20(2) of the CLCA, which provides:
(a)conduct that lies within limits of what would be generally accepted in the community as normal incidents of social interaction or community life cannot amount to an assault; and
(b)conduct that is justified or excused by law cannot amount to an assault.
To establish the defence, Mr Rose bore the onus of proving the excuse for his conduct on the balance of probabilities and the prosecution must disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. Pursuant to s 5B of the CLCA, in the absence of such proof it will be presumed that no such excuse existed for his conduct.
Rule 287 of the ARRs
The Commissioner took issue with the Magistrate’s finding that Mr Rose was “entitled to obtain the detail of the occupants of the other car – in particular the driver – and enforcing the obligations under the [ARRs]”.[11] Rule 287 of the ARRs sets out the duties of a driver involved in a crash:
(2)The driver must stop at the scene of the crash and give the driver’s required particulars, within the required time and, if practicable, at the scene of the crash, to—
(a) any other driver (or that driver’s representative) involved in the crash; and
(b) any other person involved in the crash who is injured, or the person's representative; and
(c) the owner of any property (including any car) damaged in the crash (or the owner's representative), unless, in the case of damage to a car, the particulars are given to the driver of the car (or the driver's representative).
[11] At [38].
Rule 287(3)(b) of the ARRs obliges a driver to give the required particulars within 24 hours to a police officer if “the driver does not, for any reason, give the driver’s required particulars to each person mentioned in [r 287(2)]”.
It is to be noted that reg 39 of the Road Traffic (Road Rules – Ancillary & Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2014 (SA) (“Road Traffic Regulations”) provides that, for the purposes of r 287(3), a crash is required to be reported to a police officer by a driver involved in the crash if real or personal property (other than an animal) is destroyed or damaged except where—
(a)the only property destroyed or damaged is property owned by the driver; or
(b)a fair estimate of the cost of making good the damage to property is not more than $3 000.
“Required particulars” are defined in r 287(4) as:
required particulars, for a driver involved in a crash, means—
(a)the driver’s name and address; and
(b)the name and address of the owner of the driver’s car; and
(c)the car’s registration number (if any); and
(d)any other information necessary to identify the car,
The “required time” is defined as meaning “as soon as possible but, except in exceptional circumstances, within 24 hours after the crash”.
As submitted by the Commissioner, the Objects of the ARRs are to:
(a)provide uniform rules across Australia for all road users; and
(b)specify behaviour for all road users that supports the safe and efficient use of roads in Australia.
Did Mr Rose’s conduct have a lawful excuse?
The question for determination is whether Mr Rose seeking to obtain Ms Kronitis’ details could amount to a lawful excuse, within the meaning of s 20(2)(b) of the CLCA, for accosting her.
As contended by the Commissioner, the Magistrate did not make any finding as to whether Ms Kronitis and Mr Rose were involved in a crash at the Park Holme Shopping Centre carpark. Such a finding required the Magistrate to resolve the conflicting evidence of Ms Kronitis and Ms Duncan on the one hand and Mr Rose’s version of events told to police during his interview on the other. As detailed above, Mr Rose told police that the passenger of the car had opened the back door and had gouged the side of his van. As pointed out by the Commissioner, it is unclear whether the reference to the passenger was a reference to Ms Kronitis or Ms Duncan.
Mr Rose’s submissions
Mr Rose maintained the appeal was out of time. He asserted the Magistrate got it right and that Ms Kronitis lied. He said he did not agree one bit with the submissions of the Commissioner’s counsel and if the matter was sent back for a retrial he could prove the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to be false.
Conclusion
Ms Duncan gave evidence in cross-examination that there was no incident involving Mr Rose’s van being hit by Ms Kronitis’ car. She said Ms Kronitis stepped out of her car, did not open another door of her car, and walked straight to the post office. This evidence is inconsistent with Mr Rose’s account to police. As submitted by the Commissioner, considering this conflict in the evidence, it was incumbent on the Magistrate to make a finding about what occurred in the carpark as it was a necessary antecedent to the possibility of lawful justification or excuse.
The Magistrate’s reasons do not discuss whether r 287 of the ARRs conferred on Mr Rose a right to compel compliance with the rule in a manner that could otherwise constitute a criminal offence. I accept the submission that, even if it was accepted Ms Kronitis had been involved in a crash and had left the scene without providing particulars in accordance with r 287(2) of the ARRs, Mr Rose was not entitled to enforce Ms Kronitis’ obligation by accosting her in a threatening manner.
As submitted, the law may not prohibit a person asking another person for their personal details in response to a crash. However, the law plainly restricts how such information can lawfully be obtained. This includes the prohibition of the extraction of that information by means of assault.
The grounds of appeal have been made out. There was no finding about what occurred in the Park Holme Shopping Centre carpark and whether a crash occurred, which was a necessary antecedent to the possibility of the defence under s 20(2) of the CLCA. Further, the Magistrate did not explain how he resolved the conflict between the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and Mr Rose, nor did he explain how he reached the conclusion that Mr Rose’s conduct was justified or excused by law. Rule 287 of the ARRs does not confer a right to compel compliance with the rule in a manner that could otherwise constitute a criminal offence. Accordingly, the finding that Mr Rose’s conduct was justified or excused by the law was in error.
The prosecution appeal should be allowed for the purpose of correcting error.
I therefore make the following orders:
1.I allow the appeal.
2.I set aside the acquittal in respect of count 2.
3.I remit the trial of count 2 to the Magistrates Court for rehearing before another Magistrate.
0
6
0