SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
POLICE v MOTT; POLICE v RHODES
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice White and The Honourable Justice Layton)
14 December 2005
TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - ALCOHOL AND DRUG RELATED OFFENCES - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - EVIDENCE
Appeals by the South Australia Police against decisions removing the statutory presumption as to the reliability of breath analysis evidence (Road Traffic Act 1961 s 47G(1)) - in each case the issues on appeal relate to whether mistakes made by the Police in completing the "request form" required under s 47G(2a) constitute departures from the "requirements and procedures" of the legislation for the purposes of s 47G(1) - appeals allowed.
Road Traffic Act 1961 s 47A(1), s 47B, s 47G, s 47E, s 47EB, s 47F; Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 1999 reg 8A, reg 10, reg 11, Sch 2, Sch 3, referred to.
Taylor v Daire (1982) 30 SASR 453; Lloyd v Police (2004) 89 SASR 383; Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; Semmens v Police [1999] SASC 176; Police v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429; Police v Henwood (2005) 92 SASR 15; Police v Fountaine (1999) 74 SASR 26; Parker v Police (2002) 83 SASR 67, discussed.
POLICE v MOTT; POLICE v RHODES
[2005] SASC 474Full Court: Doyle CJ, White and Layton JJ
DOYLE CJ: The Court heard two appeals, each of which involves a challenge to a Magistrate’s decision to dismiss a charge of driving a motor vehicle while there was present in the defendant’s blood the prescribed concentration of alcohol, contrary to s 47B of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) (“the RTA”).
Each appeal raises yet again the issue of whether failure by a member of the police force to comply with a particular aspect of the legislation and regulations, relating to the analysis of the breath of the driver of a motor vehicle, has the consequence that the statutory presumption raised by s 47G(1) of the RTA, relating to the result of the breath analysis, is not available as an aid to proof. The point in issue is the same in each case.
In each case the Magistrate held that a member of the police force had made a mistake in completing the details in a “request form”. The form is used to record a request made by a defendant for an approved blood test kit. Such a request can be made pursuant to s 47G(2a) of the RTA.
In each case the Magistrate held that the mistake in the “request form” had the consequence that the prosecution had not established for the purposes of s 47G(1) of the RTA that “the requirements and procedures in relation to breath analysing instruments and breath analysis under [the RTA], including sub-sections (2) and (2a)” had been complied with.
It followed, the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Police v Mott; Police v Rhodes and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2005] SASC 474
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the completion of the "request form" was a condition for the statutory presumption under s 47G(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA). The court concluded that the form was not integral to the statutory procedures beyond the initial request for a blood test kit. It held that the form's completion was not essential for the admissibility of evidence under s 47G(1a). Therefore, the errors made by the police in filling out the form did not preclude the presumption from applying. The appeals were allowed, and the cases were remitted to the Magistrates Court for further hearings.
The court's decision emphasised that the form's completion was not a critical condition for the statutory presumption, and minor errors did not invalidate the presumption. The form's role was limited to the initial request process and did not impact the admissibility of breath analysis evidence. The appeals were allowed, and the cases were remitted for further hearings. The court also indicated it would hear the parties on the question of costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In support of his overall submissions, Mr Edwardson relies on the well known cases dealing with the presumption created by s 47G(1), and the effect of it requiring compliance with the requirements and procedures referred to, as a condition of the availability of the presumption. The main cases are referred to by White J in Lloyd at [72]-[75]. In Police v Henwood [2005] SASC 209; (2005) 92 SASR 15 at [31]-[37] I briefly summarised the operation of the statutory presumption. Consideration of submissions I accept Mr Kourakis’s submission that the “request form” does not call for the member of the police force to insert the time of taking the breath sample which is, by operation of reg 8A(3), taken to be the reading produced by the breath analysis instrument (because it is the lower of the two readings obtained). The form refers to the time at which the person “submitted to a breath analysis”. That is not a precise expression. It might refer to the time when the person first exhales after the first direction given to exhale into a breath analysing instrument: s 47E(2d). It might be taken as referring to the period of time during which the person provides two samples of breath for analysis as required by reg 8A(1). Commonsense would suggest that the reference is to the former, being the first process which would fit within the description, but the latter would also comply with the requirements of the form. The time recorded on the “request form” need not be the time of the analysis of the sample relied on by operation of reg 8A(3), as submitted by Mr Edwardson. It follows that in Mr Rhodes’ case the time inserted by the police officer was a sufficient compliance within the requirement of the form (subject to the mistake as to the year). I consider that the completion of the “request form” is the means by which a person makes a request “in accordance with the Regulations”: s 47G(2a)(b). Regulation 10 permits (and indirectly requires) an oral request (the making of which is not recorded on the form) followed by the signing of the “request form”. A person who does not make a request at all, or who refuses to sign the form and deliver a copy of the signed form to a member of the police force, is probably not entitled to the delivery of a breath test kit. But the “request form” need play no further part in the statutory procedures relating to breath analysis or analysis of a blood sample or in proceedings alleging an offence contrary to s 47B of the RTA. The person who requests the blood test kit is not required to retain the form or to produce the form as a condition of presenting evidence in reliance on s 47G(1a). If the person’s entitlement to give such evidence is challenged, the person can give oral evidence of the oral request, and of the fact of completion of the form and of delivery of an approved blood test kit. The person could call for production of the original form of request if it is still held by the Minister: see reg 10(2). The form need be kept by the Minister only for 12 months. Production by the person of that person’s copy of the “request form” would, of course, be permissible and helpful. My point is that it is not essential before evidence can be led under s 47G(1a).