Police v Morton
[2023] ACTMC 16
•16 June 2023
MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Police v Morton |
Citation: | [2023] ACTMC 16 |
Hearing Date: | 17 May 2023 |
DecisionDate: | 16 June 2023 |
Before: | Magistrate Temby |
Decision: | See [93] |
Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Committal –- test to be applied by Magistrate in determining whether to commit defendant for trial – whether possible to commit with respect to statutory alternative to charged offence. CRIMINAL LAW – Obtain property by deception – theft – electronic transaction. |
Legislation Cited: | Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 192B, 192E Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 308, 325, 326, 330, 332, 372 Justices Act 1902 (NSW) s 41 Legislation Act 2001 (ACT) s 190 Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 94 |
Cases Cited: | Armstrong v R [2021] NSWDC 537 Bakes v Alexander [2022] ACTMC 10 Belan v R [2020] NSWDC 715 Ex parte Dowsett Re Macauly (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 40. Forsyth v Rodda (1988) 37 A Crim R 50 Hughes v R [2021] NSWCCA 238; (2021) 291 A Crim R 252 Kolalich v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1991] HCA 47 R v Sam Scott [1993] FCA 398; (1993) 173 CLR 222 Re Geoffrey Thomas Briot; Leonard Noel Briot and John Maitland Grahame v Arthur Manning Riedel and Shane Francis Castles [1989] FCA 55 Thorp v Abbotto [1992] FCA 112; (1992) 106 ALR 239 |
Parties: | Sarah Trick ( Informant) Emma Morton ( Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel Mr Berents ( Defendant) |
| Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ( Informant) Kamy Saeedi Law ( Defendant) | |
File Number: | CC 2274-2296 of 2021 CC 2549-2574 of 2021 CC 7757, 7883-7912 of 2021 CC 3951-3980 of 2022 |
MAGISTRATE TEMBY
Introduction
The Defendant has been charged with 110 counts of obtaining property by deception, contrary to s 326 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (the Criminal Code).
There are four series of charges, described by the Prosecution as having been laid in tranches:
(a)Tranche 1 comprises charges 2274/2021 to 2296/2021;
(b)Tranche 2 comprises charges 2549/2021 to 2574/2021;
(c)Tranche 3 comprises charges 7757/2021, 7883 to 7912/2021; and
(d)Tranche 4 comprises charges 3951/2022 to 3980/2022.
Each charge within Tranches 1 to 3 is put in terms that the Defendant, in the Australian Capital Territory, on a particular date (or within a particular date range), did, by deception, dishonestly obtain property, namely a thing in action to a particular value, belonging to Projects on Parkinson Limited, trading as Weston Creek Children’s Centre, with the intention of permanently depriving that organisation of the property.
The charges within Tranche 4 are put in very similar terms, save that the property is not defined as a thing in action, but just as a particular sum.
The maximum penalty for each offence is ten years’ imprisonment, a fine of $160,000, or both. As the offences are punishable by imprisonment for longer than two years, they are indictable offences: section 190 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT).
A committal hearing was held on 17 May 2023 before me. Mr Brown appeared for the Prosecution and Mr Berents appeared for the Defendant.
The documents that the Prosecution served on the Defendant in compliance with s 90 of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) (Magistrates Court Act) were admitted into evidence pursuant to s 90AA of the Magistrates Court Act as Exhibit 1.
The volume of material that was admitted into evidence is significant. There are seven volumes of printed material, together with certain electronic material that could not be printed.
In general terms, the evidence comprises:
(a)statements given by officers of particular businesses where a debit card of Projects on Parkinson Limited (POP) is alleged to have been used by the Defendant or to whom particular sums of money was allegedly transferred by the Defendant, with respect to purchases of personal items by the Defendant;
(b)receipts produced by businesses where the debit card had been used;
(c)receipts showing the transfer of particular sums from a POP account to a business;
(d)statements given by Ms Kylie Goodwin, an administrative officer of POP whose responsibilities include payroll, reconciling bank statements, processing invoices to families, dealing with Centrelink, general administrative tasks and managing waiting lists for the centre. It was Ms Goodwin who first identified possible unauthorised transactions made by the Defendant;
(e)statements given by two of POP’s Directors, Ms Kylie Kook, and Ms Louisa Oswald;
(f)statements and transaction printouts for the bank accounts POP held with St. George Bank;
(g)statements provided by businesses with whom POP had leasing arrangements;
(h)entries from POP’s MYOB software;
(i)text messages and emails between Ms Goodwin and the Defendant;
(j)POP end of year financial statements;
(k)the Defendant’s employment agreement with POP;
(l)email communications between the Defendant and Board Members of POP;
(m)an audit report which identified the number and total value of suspected fraudulent transactions carried out by the Defendant;
(n)an affidavit affirmed by an officer of the National Australian Bank annexing various records, including transaction histories, of accounts held in the name of the Defendant, and in the names of the Defendant and her husband, Mr Philip Morton;
(o)statements from staff members of POP;
(p)an affidavit sworn by an officer of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia annexing various records, including transaction histories, of accounts held in the name of the Defendant;
(q)a record of an interview conducted by police with the Defendant on 26 February 2021;
(r)statements given by police officers who have carried out investigations in relation to the possible misuse of POP funds by the Defendant;
(s)a forensic financial report prepared by the AFP in relation to the impugned transactions, including the use of POP accounts and the use of accounts held in the name of the Defendant, and in the names of the Defendant and her husband; and
(t)photographs of the Defendant’s house and items found in the Defendant’s house by police.
The Defendant did not apply to cross-examine any of the prosecution’s witnesses and did not give evidence herself or call any witnesses.
Both parties made submissions.
The Law
Whether the Defendant is to be committed for trial is to be determined by reference to the test set out in s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act. Section 94 reads:
94 Discharge or committal for trial
(1) When all the evidence for the prosecution and the defence have been taken in relation to the indictable offence with which the accused person is charged, the court must –
(a) if the court is satisfied, having regard to all the evidence before it, that there is no reasonable prospect that the person would be found guilty of an indictable offence – if the person is in custody in relation to the offence, immediately order that the person be released from custody in relation to the offence; or
(b) if the court is not satisfied as mentioned in paragraph (a) – commit the person for trial.
Mr Brown relied on the Federal Court decision of Thorp v Abbotto [1992] FCA 112 as providing guidance as to the appropriate threshold for committing a person for trial. In that decision, which concerned the application of the relevant Victorian legislation, Lockhart and Gummow JJ noted, at [19], that: “The test defining the satisfaction which a Magistrate must have before committing a person for trial is expressed in different terms in legislation relating to committal proceedings in the States and Territories of Australia”. Their Honours then identified the legislative tests applicable in the various jurisdictions.
At [28] their Honours stated that:
The task of a committing Magistrate is essentially to sift the wheat from the chaff: cases so weak that a jury properly instructed could not possibly convict the defendant and cases where it could. It is not the task of a Magistrate conducting a committal proceeding to assume the role of the jury at a criminal trial.
Although their Honours’ summary of the task of a committing Magistrate followed a consideration of a decision Wilcox J in Forsyth v Rodda (1988) 37 A Crim R 50, which was concerned with a previous version of the relevant Victorian legislation, Mr Brown submitted that the summary nevertheless provided helpful guidance as to the approach to be taken in making a decision under s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act.
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code are as follows:
300 Definitions – ch 3
“dishonest” means –
Dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people; and
Known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people.
308 Theft
A person commits an offence (theft) if the person dishonestly appropriates property belonging to someone else with the intention of permanently depriving the other person of the property.
325 Definitions – pt 3.3
“deception” means an intentional or reckless deception, whether by words or other conduct, and whether as to fact or law, and includes –
a deception about the intention of the person using the deception or anyone else; and
conduct by a person that causes a computer, a machine, or an electronic device to make a response that the person is not authorised to cause it to do.
326 Obtaining property by deception
A person commits an offence (obtaining property by deception) if the person, by deception, dishonestly obtains property belonging to someone else with the intention of permanently depriving the other person of the property.
330 Money transfers
(2) If a person (A) causes an amount to be transferred from an account held by someone else (B) to an account held by A –
(a) the amount is taken to have been property that belonged to B; and
(b) A is taken to have obtained the property for A with the intention of permanently depriving B of the property.
(3) If a person (A) causes an amount to be transferred from an account held by someone else (B) to an account held by a third person (C) –
(a) the amount is taken to have been property that belonged to B; and
(b) A is taken to have obtained the property for C with the intention of permanently depriving B of the property.
(4) An amount is transferred from an account (account 1) to another account (account 2) if –
(a) a credit is made to account 2; and
(b) a debit is made to account 1; and
(c) the credit results from the debit or the debit results from the credit.
(5) A person causes an amount to be transferred from an account if the person induces someone else to transfer the amount from the account (whether or not the other person is the account holder).
331 General deficiency for div 3.3.2
A person may be found guilty of an offence of obtaining property by deception involving all or any part of a general deficiency in money or other property even though the deficiency is made up of a number of particular amounts of money or items of other property that were obtained over a period.
372 Alternative verdicts – theft and obtaining property by deception
(2) If, in a prosecution for an offence of obtaining property by deception, the trier of fact is not satisfied that the defendant committed the offence but is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an offence of theft, the trier of fact may find the defendant guilty of theft, but only if the defendant has been given procedural fairness in relation to that finding of guilt.
“Property” is defined in the Legislation Act 2001 as follows:
property means any legal or equitable estate or interest (whether present or future, vested or contingent, or tangible or intangible) in real or personal property of any description (including money), and includes a thing in action”.
Note: A thing in action is an intangible personal property right recognised and protected by law. Examples include debts, money held in a bank, shares, rights under a trust, copyright and right to sue for breach of contract.
It was not in dispute between the parties that, on the facts alleged by the Prosecution, the Defendant obtained “property” as defined.
Facts
Background facts
The factual background relevant to the charges that have been brought against the Defendant are helpfully set out in a document prepared by the Prosecution, titled ‘Prosecution Contested Committal Aide’, dated 16 May 2023 (Committal Aide Document). At least for the purposes of the committal hearing, the Defendant did not take issue with anything set out in the Committal Aide Document.
Paragraphs 8 to 20 of the Committal Aide Document read as follows, excluding footnotes. The footnotes identify the witness statements or other documents that support particular statements that are made in those paragraphs.
8. Projects on Parkinson Ltd (“POP”) is a not-for-profit public company limited by guarantee, incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory (“ACT”) on 6 June 2017 under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). It is a charity, registered with the Australian Charities and Not-for Profits Commission (“ACNC”). POP operates the Weston Creek Children’s Centre, a childcare centre, which is located at 8 Parkinson Street, Weston in the ACT.
9. Prior to the formation of POP, the Weston Creek Children’s Centre operated under the Weston Creek Community Association.
10. Emma Morton, the defendant, was the Director of the Weston Creek Children’s Centre. As at February 2021, she had held that position for approximately 22 years. The defendant’s mobile number was …
11. Under its constitution, POP must always have three directors, unless resolved otherwise. If there are fewer than three directors, the remaining directors may only act for the purpose of increasing the number of directors to three (or higher, if required for a quorum) or calling a general meeting.
12. Directors must not be paid fees for acting as a director. However, directors may be paid for work they do for POP, other than as a director, if the amount is no more than a reasonable fee for the work done. Directors may also be reimbursed for expenses properly incurred in connection with the affairs of POP. Any such payments must be approved by the directors.
13. Between September 2018 and June 2020, the defendant, Louisa Oswald, and Kylie Kook were all on the board of directors of POP. In June 2020, Ms Oswald resigned from the board of directors. On 9 September 2020, Ms Kook resigned from the board of directors. As at 26 November 2020, the defendant was the only person on the board of directors.
14. POP maintains two bank accounts with St George Bank.
15. The first account is used as an operating account for both payments and expenses. The account number is … and the BSB is … (the “Operating Account”). The Operating Account can be accessed via the St George Business Banking Online System (the “BBO system”). Access to the BBO system is controlled by a username and password, the latter of which is updated approximately every six weeks.
16. In order to use the BBO system to make transfers, pay bills, or process payroll, the user must obtain a security number from a token which is linked to the account. As at February 2021, only the defendant and an administrative assistant, Kylie Goodwin, had access to the BBO system. The defendant predominantly had access to the token, except on Tuesdays, when Ms Goodwin would be given the token to process payroll.
17. There is a VISA debit card function linked with the Operating Account. The cards issued for that account were issued in the name of “Emma Morton POP”. As at February 2021, the card number issued for that account was …
18. The second account is used as a savings account. The account number is … and the BSB is … (the “Savings Account”). This account was not often used.
19. POP uses MYOB, a piece of business and accounting software. POP uses MYOB to create entries for the purposes of reconciling the Operating and Savings Accounts, and for producing profit and loss statements. An entry created in MYOB regarding an expense is accompanied by certain details, including whether the expense was incurred through use of the VISA card or by electronic funds transfer, what account the expense is linked to, along with a description of the expense. Only the defendant and Ms Goodwin had access to the MYOB program. Access is controlled by login details. Ms Goodwin’s login details were …
20. Mahasivam Ravishanker began working for the Weston Creek Childcare Centre as an auditor in about 2001. During this time, Mr Ravishanker would conduct an annual audit of the centre’s financial assets. Mr Ravishanker’s last audit of the centre’s financial position was completed in around September 2019. In July 2020, Mr Ravishanker contacted the defendant regarding the audit for the 2019 – 2020 financial year. The defendant informed Mr Ravishanker that POP would not be undertaking an audit that year.
Impugned transactions
I have summarised below what the evidence available to the Court reveals in relation to each of the tranches of charges. I note that I was aided significantly in my consideration of the evidence by the Committal Aide Document, which was a very clear and thorough document.
Tranche 1
The charges which were laid as part of Tranche 1 reflect the following kinds of transactions:
(a)a transaction by which it appears that the Defendant transferred money to an account in her name that did not match the bonus/recognition payments that had been approved to be paid to her; and
(b)transactions by which it appears that the Defendant transferred money from the Operating Account to an account in the name of the Defendant, with:
(i)an account description that gave the impression that the transaction was for a business-related purpose (eg., “Charity submission”, “ASIC”, “Annual payment” or “PAYG Projects on Park”) that does not appear to reflect the nature of the transaction (as a transfer to the Defendant’s personal account);
(ii)an accompanying entry in POP’s MYOB software that gave the impression that the transaction was for a business-related purpose and was to a payee other than the Defendant (eg., a description of “Legal Fees” and “ACNC” as payee, a description of “Equipment Repl., Toys” and “Modern Teaching Aids” as payee, or a description of “Payroll Liabilities” and “Australian Taxation Office” as payee);
(iii)for the majority of the transactions, the available bank and company records demonstrating that there were no payments made by POP that matched the MYOB entries;
(iv)the results of a forensic analysis appearing to show that amounts debited from the Defendant’s account in the days following the impugned transfer were for personal reasons (and not for business-related purposes); and
(v)for some of the transactions, additional documents appearing to demonstrate, specifically, the use that the Defendant made of the money that had been transferred to her account.
Tranche 2
The charges which were laid as part of Tranche 2 primarily reflect the following kinds of transactions:
(a)transactions by which it appears that the Defendant transferred money from the Operating Account to an account in the name of the Defendant and her husband; and
(b)transactions by which it appears that the Defendant transferred money from the Operating Account to an account in the name of the Defendant.
The available evidence in relation to the Tranche 2 transactions is of the same kind as exists in relation to the Tranche 1 transactions with respect to account descriptions and MYOB entries (although I note that, for one of the transactions, there is no evidence as to a related MYOB entry). However, for most of these transactions there is not the additional evidence that exists in relation to the Tranche 1 transactions, such as evidence of the forensic analysis undertaken in relation to the Defendant’s account.
As is the case in relation to the Tranche 1 transactions, the Tranche 2 transactions also include a transaction by which it appears that the Defendant transferred money to an account in her name that did not match the bonus/recognition payments that had been approved to be paid to her.
In addition, the Tranche 2 transactions include three transactions by which it appears that the Defendant transferred money from the Savings Account to an account in the name of the Defendant and her husband, in circumstances where the Defendant claims that she made the transactions on the advice of an auditor, but where the evidence suggests that the Defendant had not received any advice from an auditor to do so.
Tranche 3
The charges which were laid as part of Tranche 3 reflect transactions by which it appears that the Defendant used the Operating Account to purchase:
(a)personal items for herself at various retail stores; and
(b)accommodation for herself, including both holiday and ongoing rental accommodation.
For these transactions, the evidence establishes the sum of money spent, the transaction date, clearance date, seller name and items purchased.
Tranche 4
The charges which were laid as part of Tranche 4 reflect transactions by which it appears that the Defendant used the POP debit card that had been issued to her to purchase personal items for herself at various retail stores.
For these transactions, the evidence establishes the sum of money spent, the transaction dates and the apparent identity of the seller.
Issues in dispute
The Defendant conceded, for the purposes of the committal hearing, that the offence of theft could be made out on a prima facie case, however she submits that there is no relevant act of deception such as to make out the offences charged.
The relevant elements of the two offences are helpfully set out in the Committal Aide Document. I have set them out below in table form to enable ease of comparison:
Obtaining Property By Deception Theft 1 The accused obtains a thing The accused appropriates something 2 The accused intends to obtain a thing The accused intends to appropriate something 3 The thing is property The something that is appropriated is property 4 The accused is reckless as to the fact that the thing is property The accused is reckless as to the fact that what is appropriated is property 5 The property belongs to someone else The property belongs to another person 6 The accused is reckless as to the fact that the property belongs to someone else The accused is reckless as to the fact that the property belongs to another person 7 The property was obtained by deception 8 The accused was reckless as to whether the property was obtained by deception 9 The obtaining was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people The appropriation is dishonest according to standards of ordinary people 10 The accused knew that the obtaining was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people The accused knows the appropriation is dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people 11 The accused intended to permanently deprive the other person of the property At the time the accused appropriates the property, the accused intends to permanently deprive the person to whom the property belongs of the property
As may be seen, the elements of the two offences are very similar, except for the deception elements that need to be established to make out the offence of obtaining property by deception.
The Defendant further submitted that, if I am not satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of a jury finding that the Defendant engaged in deception, and therefore being found guilty of the offence charged, I cannot commit the Defendant for trial under s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act. The Defendant takes this position even if I am satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of theft.
The Prosecution’s position is that:
(a)it is not the case that there is no reasonable prospect of a jury finding that the Defendant engaged in deception (and that she is guilty of the offence charged); and
(b)even if I were to take a different view as to the prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of obtaining property by deception, s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act nevertheless requires that the Defendant be committed for trial as the evidence is such that it is not the case that there is no reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of theft.
I note that the offence of theft, contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code, is punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years and is therefore also an indictable offence.
The position taken by the parties gives rise to three questions:
(a)am I satisfied, on the evidence before the Court, that there is no reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of the offence of obtaining property by deception (the Obtaining Property By Deception Question)?
(b)am I satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of theft (the Theft Question)?
(c)If the answer to the Obtaining Property By Deception Question is yes, but the answer to the Theft Question is no, does s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act require me to commit the Defendant for trial (the Section 94 Question)?
Reasonable prospect of guilt
Given the similarity of the elements between the offences of obtaining property by deception, and theft, it is convenient to deal with the Obtaining Property By Deception Question and the Theft Question together.
In this respect, I am not satisfied, on the evidence before the Court, that there is no reasonable prospect of a jury finding that elements numbered 1 to 6, and 9 to 11, in the above table at [32] are satisfied. On the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of a jury finding that each of those elements are satisfied with respect to each of the impugned transactions.
The evidence is untested, however there is nothing in the evidence which causes me to doubt the credibility of any of it. On its face, it shows that the Defendant:
(a)deliberately transferred an amount from a POP bank account to:
(i)her personal bank account (or an account in her name and her husband’s name); and
(ii)accounts of third parties from whom the Defendant had purchased personal items for herself,
in circumstances where the Defendant was at least reckless as to the fact that the amounts transferred were property, and was at least reckless as to the fact that the property belonged to POP; and
(b)deliberately used a POP debit card to make purchases of personal items for herself, through which she caused amounts to be debited from a POP bank account and credited to the accounts of those third parties, in circumstances where the Defendant was at least reckless as to the fact that the amounts were property and was at least reckless as to the fact that the property belonged to POP.
Pursuant to s 330 of the Criminal Code, the amounts transferred are taken to have belonged to POP and the Defendant is taken to have intended to permanently deprive POP of the amounts.
While the evidence before the Court does not include any policies with respect to the use of POP bank accounts and debit cards by its officers and staff, I am satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of a jury finding that the Defendant acted dishonestly by obtaining property for herself (or for third parties who, in exchange, provided goods to the Defendant) that she knew belonged to POP and knew she was not using for work purposes. This is particularly so, in circumstances where it appears from the evidence that she had engaged in a course of conduct by which she entered an account description, and made entries in the MYOB software, for a number of transactions that gave the false impression that the transfers were for work purposes.
The Theft Question – Whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of theft
As a consequence of the above, I am not satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of a jury finding the Defendant guilty of the offence of theft. I am satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect that she would be found guilty of theft on the evidence before the Court in relation to all charges.
The Obtaining Property By Deception Question – Whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of obtaining property by deception
Whether a jury could find that the Defendant obtained the relevant property by deception, and could therefore find the Defendant guilty of obtaining property by deception, is less clear.
The Defendant relies on the decision of Magistrate Theakston in Bakes v Alexander [2022] ACTMC 10, in which, relevantly, his Honour considered a no case submission with respect to a number of charges that had been brought against Mr Alexander alleging that he obtained property by deception. Similar to the present circumstances, Mr Alexander was authorised to operate the bank accounts of a particular entity, the Gungahlin United Football Club, and to use a debit card that was issued to him in his role as president of the club. The Defendant transferred funds from the club’s bank account to other accounts (including his own) for his personal purposes.
The key aspects of his Honour’s reasons for present purposes are set out at [21] – [23]:
21. Clearly, the prosecution was relying upon the extended definition [of “deception” in s 325(b) of the Criminal Code]. In response, the defendant contended there was no deception because the relevant ‘authorisation’ in his case was that of the bank and not of the club. The defendant argued that there was no evidence the bank had any interest in why the defendant was transferring funds from the account and was probably only concerned with who was initiating those transactions. There is no suggestion that the bank looked at the purpose or intention behind any transaction initiated by someone authorised by the club to operation [sic] their account …
22. In the absence of the extended definition, it is clear there was no relevant deception of anyone when the defendant used the debit card or transferred money from the club’s account. The bank was not misled, nor was the club. That was the case notwithstanding the defendant exceeding any limits on the use of the club’s funds imposed by the club’s executive committee. There may have been dishonesty, but that is a different element. The bank may have been surprised and the club alarmed to subsequently learn of the transactions, but the obtaining of the funds, on each occasion, could not be said to be a consequence of the defendant deceiving anyone …
23. When applying the extended definition, the authority of concern must be the bank’s with respect to the operation of the accounts in a general sense. That is because the technology offered by the bank was used to essentially replace officers of the bank. It was not a substitution for the operations or governance of the club. If that is the case, then the defendant could not be said to have caused the technology to make a response that he was not authorised to cause it to do.
As was the case in Bakes v Alexander, the Prosecution in this case relies on the definition of deception contained in s 325(b) of the Criminal Code. Similar to the argument advanced by Mr Alexander, the Defendant says that she was authorised to operate POP’s bank accounts and to use the debit card that had been issued to her. The Defendant says that there was no act of deception in her use of the electronic token that allowed her to access POP’s bank accounts, nor in the use of the debit card because she is expressly authorised to use those things.
The Defendant says that, whatever limits existed as to her use of POP funds (for work purposes), those limits were a feature of her relationship with POP. She submits that, as between the bank and POP, or as between the bank and herself, there were no limits on her authority to access POP funds. Accordingly, the Defendant submits that she did not deceive the bank into effecting the transfer of funds from the POP bank account in the manner that the Defendant directed.
I agree that the way that s 325(b) is phrased requires that the deceptive conduct be the cause of the transfer of funds, which obviously gives rise to the question whether the person causing the transfer had authority, from the bank’s perspective, to operate the relevant account. However, there are a number of decisions of NSW Courts which may support the proposition that this is not the only authority that is relevant, and that the authority of a person to effect the particular transaction which is the subject of a charge may also be relevant.
While these authorities, which I discuss below, do not consider the meaning of deception as that concept is defined in s 325(b) of the Criminal Code (or as defined in the NSW equivalent of that provision), they confirm that a person may act deceptively in operating a bank account, or using a debit card, beyond their authority – that is, deception is not limited to circumstances where there is an absence of any authority. These authorities may inform how the ACT Supreme Court interprets s 325(b) of the Criminal Code in relation to the charges that have been brought against the Defendant. Of course, the Prosecution may also elect not to tie itself to s 325(b) of the Criminal Code on a trial of the Defendant.
The elements of the offence of fraud (which comprises the offences of obtaining property by deception and obtaining a financial advantage by deception) in s 192E of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (NSW Crimes Act) are in similar terms to the offence of obtaining property by deception under s 326 of the Criminal Code and obtaining a financial advantage by deception under s 332 of the Criminal Code. The definition of deception in s 192B of the NSW Crimes Act is in similar terms to s 325 of the Criminal Code although, as I have noted above, the cases I discuss below do not rely on the meaning of deception set out in s 192B of the NSW Crimes Act.
In Armstrong v R [2021] NSWDC 537, Ms Armstrong was found guilty of a number of offences, including dishonestly obtaining property by deception, as well as dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception, contrary s 192E of the NSW Crimes Act. The evidence showed that Ms Armstrong had transferred money from the account of an organisation for whom she worked (on a voluntary basis), to her personal account or to the account of a third party from whom Ms Armstrong had purchased personal items, using false payment descriptors. For some transfers, Ms Armstrong also produced false invoices. The course of conduct took place over 13 months and involved 50 separate transactions. The Court found that each of the offences involved Ms Armstrong dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage or property by deception.
In Hughes v R [2021] NSWCCA 238, the Defendant pleaded guilty to a rolled-up count of obtaining a financial advantage by deception, through the fraudulent transfer of money. Ms Hughes was employed by a medical centre and was responsible for all financial payments and transactions conducted by the business. She was required to keep accurate accounting records using the MYOB software.
Ms Hughes transferred funds from the company’s bank account to one of her personal accounts on 329 occasions over a six-year period. She had no authority from her employer to make those transactions. Each transaction was falsely described by Ms Hughes in the MYOB records. As the matter proceeded by way of guilty plea, however, there was no evidence as to how the transfers were effected or whether the MYOB records of the transfers were made before, after or concurrently with the bank transfers.
Despite her plea of guilty, she sought leave to appeal her conviction on the basis that the conviction was wrong in law because the elements of s 192E of the NSW Crimes Act could not be satisfied. She contended that the element of deception was not established on the facts tendered at her sentencing hearing.
Payne JA (with whom Wilson J agreed) concluded that this was “not a case where upon the facts admitted by the plea the applicant could not in law have been guilty of the offence”.
At [31], his Honour noted Ms Hughes’ contention as follows:
The applicant submitted that the only possible “deception” was the making of the MYOB entries, and the charge of an offence against s 192E can only be good in law if it can be said that the making of the MYOB entries allowed her to “keep” a financial advantage within the meaning of s 192D(1)(c). The applicant submitted that she did not deceive any person before she made the transfers to herself, the MYOB entries did not need to be made before the transfers, and “presumably” many of them were not. It was submitted that the applicant did not need any person’s supervision or approval to make the transfers …
After his Honour dealt with the evidentiary limitations which existed, in relation to Ms Hughes’ contentions, in an application to set aside a conviction following a guilty plea, his Honour said, at [39] – [43] and [48] – [50]:
39. Even more fundamentally, the applicant’s assertion that her making the false MYOB entries constituted the sole relevant deception was simply not correct. Those fraudulent entries were only part of her conduct. The deception identified by the indictment was not limited to making the fraudulent MYOB entries; it involved an entire course of conduct … The deception engaged in by the applicant involved the applicant falsely representing by her conduct (including written and verbal acts), to the Commonwealth Bank and her employer, that she had been authorised by her employer to transfer particular funds belonging to her employer to her personal accounts. The plea of guilty encompassed this broad ranging deception, on 329 occasions, over the six-and-a-half-year period comprised in the indictment.
40. It is no doubt correct, as the applicant submitted, that the applicant “did not require the approval or supervision of another colleague to make payments” from the medical centre’s bank account. That is because she was in a position of trust. The applicant was not, however, authorised to treat funds belonging to her employer as she liked. She was under an obligation throughout the whole of the period in the indictment to apply funds for the proper purposes of the Moon Street Medical Centre service trust.
41. The applicant’s plea acknowledged that she practised an ongoing deception on her employer and its bank, pretending that she was acting in accordance with her obligations and within the scope of her authority, when in fact she was misappropriating the employer’s funds for her own benefit. The applicant accepted that deception of that kind is sufficient for the purposes of s 192E(1)(b) …
42. Even if, as the applicant submitted, the MYOB entries comprised the universe of the relevant deception, they were in any event causative because the concealment of the individual misappropriations allowed the applicant to continue representing to her employer that she was acting in accordance with her obligations and within the scope of her authority. The concealment of the individual misappropriations by false MYOB entries thereby allowed the applicant to continue in the position from which she was able to commit the further misappropriations.
43. Causation in the context of s 192E(1)(b) is essentially a question of fact … Fundamentally, there was a factual basis for causation available from the agreed facts and all the elements of the offence (including causation) were acknowledged by the applicant in her plea.
…
48. … the relevant conduct identified in the indictment was not limited to the MYOB entries but encompassed the applicant’s false representations to the Commonwealth Bank and her employer about her obligations and authority. There is no requirement that the operative deception be proved by direct evidence. Nor is there a requirement that the deception operated on the mind of a natural person.
49. It is open for the prosecution to prove the relevant deception as a matter of inference … In Flack v R [2011] NSWCCA 167, this Court (Johnson J; McClellan CJ and CL and Hidden J agreeing) summarised the principles relating to proof of deception as follows:
[36] On a prosecution for an alleged offence under s.178BA Crimes Act 1900, it is not necessary for the Crown to establish that it was the person deceived who suffered the relevant loss …
[37] What must be established, however, is a causal connection between the deception used and the financial advantage obtained. The deception must have been the means whereby the financial advantage was obtained, or the effective cause of the financial advantage being obtained …
[38] The question whether the deception was an operative cause of the obtaining of financial advantage, falls to be answered as a question of fact by the members of the jury applying their common sense …
[40] … This inference was available with respect to each of the five counts. It was not necessary that the actual person who processed the loan give evidence.
…
50. Leaving aside the fact that by her plea the applicant established this element of the offence, in the present case there was an overwhelming inference that the Commonwealth Bank paid away funds to which the Moon Street Medical Centre service trust was entitled on the basis that it was induced by the applicant to believe that the applicant was entitled to have those funds deposited in her personal accounts. There is likewise an overwhelming inference that the directors of the Moon Street Medical service trust were deceived by the applicant for the proper purposes of the trust and not deposited in her personal accounts without authority.
Similarly, in Belan v R [2020] NSWDC 715, Mr Belan had been charged with numerous offences of dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception. Some of these charges related to Mr Belan’s use of a credit card that he had been issued in his role as the State Secretary of the National Union of Workers. The evidence established that Mr Belan had established a system by which he controlled the payment of credit accounts.
Mr Belan was found guilty in the NSW Local Court and appealed his conviction to the NSW District Court, which conducted an appeal by way of rehearing.
The Court found, at [83] and [119] – [120], that:
83. Each time the Appellant intentionally used the NUW credit cards for personal non-union purposes, he was by that act alone deliberately dishonestly deceiving the Union in the circumstances that he had so structured the NUW processes that they simply thereafter provided an unchecked rubber stamp. The deception was from the outset of the transaction and continued until the credit card account was met by payment from the NUW in accordance with the processes he had established.
…
119. A repeated submission on behalf of the appellant … is: “There is no evidence from any person as to being deceived.”
120. Section 192E(1)(b) criminalises dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage “by any deception”. The section does not, in terms, require an identified person to be deceived, merely that the obtaining of the financial advantage be “by any deception” and that it be effected “dishonestly”. The word “person” is not used in s 192E(1)(b) which tells against any such limitation: cf. s21(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). In a criminal action, the entity deceived (in this case, the NUW) is identified as part of the presentation of the Crown case. That there be a particular person identified is not, however, an element of the offence …
Having regard to the above authorities, I am not satisfied, as a matter of law, that the fact that the Defendant had general authority to operate POP’s bank accounts and the POP debit card that was issued in her name meant that, when she exercised that general authority, she could not be acting deceptively for the purposes of s 325(b) of the Criminal Code, regardless of whether she had authority to make, or enter into, the impugned transactions. I have had particular regard to the extensive analysis given by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, in Hughes v R [2021] NSWCCA 238, to the manner in which a person may act deceptively in operating a bank account in excess of their authority as an employee to do so – including by “falsely representing by her conduct … to the Commonwealth Bank and her employer, that she had been authorised by her employer to transfer particular funds belonging to her employer to her personal accounts” (emphasis added).
While the view expressed by Magistrate Theakston in Bakes v Alexander may ultimately prevail, I consider that the alternative view is an arguable one. In light of the NSW authorities I have discussed, and in the absence of binding authority supporting the Defendant’s position, I am not satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of a jury finding the Defendant guilty of the offence of obtaining property deception as alleged in the charges that have been brought against her.
Section 94 of the Magistrates Court Act requires the committal of the Defendant for trial
In light of my answer to the Obtaining Property By Deception Question, s 94(1)(b) of the Magistrates Court Act requires that I commit the Defendant for trial in relation to the offences with respect to which she has been charged.
In case I am in error, as to a finding of guilt for the offence of obtaining property by deception being open on the evidence as a matter of law, I have addressed below my consideration of the Prosecution’s submission that I would otherwise have been required to commit the Defendant for trial on the basis that there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of the offence of theft.
Parties’ submissions
The Prosecution submitted that, if I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of the offence of obtaining property by deception, but I am satisfied that there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of the offence of theft, the Defendant is to be committed for trial. The Prosecution made this submission on two bases:
(a)the primary basis is that s 94(1)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act requires the Court to consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of “an” offence, not whether there is a reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty of the offence with which she is charged;
(b)the secondary basis is that, if there needs to be a limit on how the word “an” in s 94(1)(a) is to be interpreted, it is at least limited in this case to the fact that, pursuant to s 372 of the Criminal Code, theft is an alternative verdict to a charge of obtaining property by deception. The Prosecution notes that, if the charges proceed in the Supreme Court, the indictment would be presented in the same way that the charges have been laid. That is, the statutory alternative of theft can be put without amending the charges.
The Defendant submits that she cannot be committed on the alternative charge as:
(a)proceeding in that way is contrary to how Part 3.5 of the Magistrates Court Act operates – it is contrary to procedural fairness to have the offences with respect to which a person can be committed for trial unbounded;
(b)the word “an” in s 94(1)(a) does have work to do without giving it the meaning “any” – for example in a joint commission liability case, where alternative charges are inherent in the charge; and
(c)s 372 of the Criminal Code is not relevant to my decision – s 372 is only relevant to the task of the trier of fact.
Consideration
Textual consideration
Section 94 of the Magistrates Court Act identifies the decision-making process to be followed once the evidence has been taken in relation to “the indictable offence with which the accused is charged” (emphasis added). “The” indictable offence with which the Defendant has been charged is obtaining property by deception.
Having received that evidence, paragraph 94(1)(a) requires that the Court give consideration to whether there is “no reasonable prospect that the person would be found guilty of an indictable offence” (emphasis added).
The use of the indefinite article “an” in the test set out in paragraph 94(1)(a), in juxtaposition with the use of the definite article “the” at the beginning of s 94(1), indicates that the Court is not to restrict its consideration of whether there is no reasonable prospect of the Defendant being found guilty, in discharging the function required of it by s 94(1)(a), to the offence with which the Defendant has been charged.
That is, on a textual consideration of s 94, the word “an” in s 94(1)(a) should be interpreted as meaning “any”.
Contextual consideration
This interpretation of s 94 might seem surprising, given the way that Part 3.5 of the Magistrates Court Act provides for committal proceedings for indictable offences to progress. I note, in particular that, the defendant, having been charged with particular offences, the informant is required, under s 90, to serve a copy of all statements proposed to be tendered at the committal hearing.
As a matter of practicality at least, these statements will be directed to the charged offences. This is reflected in s 91, which provides for the defendant to be given an opportunity to lead evidence and/or make submissions, “When all the evidence offered by the prosecution in relation to the indictable offences with which the accused is charged has been taken” (emphasis added).
Having regard to the process established by Part 3.5, there is merit in the Defendant’s submission that s 94 cannot leave the Defendant exposed to being committed for any offence at all.
However, I consider that the textual interpretation of s 94(1)(a) – that it does not limit the basis for a defendant’s committal to the offence with which he or she is charged – is supported by the legislative history of the provision and judicial consideration of like provisions in NSW, subject to the caveat that interpreting “an” to mean “any” does not mean any offence at all, but any offence arising from the material before the Court and about which the defendant has been given an opportunity to be heard. My discussion below of the relevant legislative history of the committal power is subject to that qualification.
The Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance 1930, made 21 November 1930, included the following committal power (emphasis added), which was drafted in similar terms to the s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act:
94. When all the evidence for the prosecution and the defence has been taken –
(a) if the Court is of the opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to put the defendant upon his trial for any indictable offence, it shall forthwith order the defendant, if he is in custody, to be discharged as to the information then under inquiry; and
(b) if, in the opinion of the Court, the evidence is sufficient to put the defendant upon his trial for an indictable offence, it shall commit him to take his trial for the offence …
In terms, s 94(a) clearly directed the Court’s attention to whether there was sufficient evidence to put the defendant on trial for any indictable offence, and the use of the word “an” in s 94(b) is to be understood in that context.
Over time, changes have been made to the committal power, particularly in relation to the test to be applied (in terms of the satisfaction the Court needs to hold before committing a person for trial). However, but for one short-lived amendment, none of the changes have changed the focus of inquiry from a consideration of whether the defendant might be found guilty of “any” or “an” offence in determining whether the defendant is to be committed.
The relevant amendments that have been made to the committal power are set out below. As may be seen, with one exception, none of the amendments have limited the court’s consideration to whether the defendant might be found guilty of the offence with which he or she has been charged in order to commit the defendant for trial:
(a)the Magistrates Court (Amendment) Act 1987 amended s 94 of the Magistrates Court Ordinance 1930, such that the court was required to consider whether “a jury would not convict the defendant on an indictable offence”;
(b)the Statute Law Amendment Act 2005 substituted a new s 94 into the Magistrates Court Act, such that the court was required to consider, having regard to all the evidence that had been taken in relation to the indictable offence with which the accused person had been charged, whether a jury would not convict the person of an indictable offence;
(c)the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 substituted new subsections 94(a) and (b) into the Magistrates Court Act, with the result that it appears to have required consideration of whether the defendant might be found guilty of the offence with which he or she had been charged. The amendments resulted in the court being required to consider, having taken all the evidence in relation to the indictable charge with which the accused person had been charged, whether there was “a reasonable prosect that the person would be convicted of the offence”; and
(d)the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2009 again substituted new subsections 94(a) and (b) into the Magistrates CourtAct, reverting to the use of the words “an offence”. It required the court to consider, having regard to all the evidence taken in relation to the indictable charge with which the accused person had been charged, whether “there is no reasonable prospect that the person would be found guilty of an indictable offence”. This is the wording of the current version of s 94 of the Magistrates Court.
Accordingly, the interpretation of s 94 that a plain reading of the words produces is supported by the legislative history chronicled above.
Interpreting “an offence” as meaning “any offence” (and not restricted to the offence with which the defendant is charged) is also supported by judicial interpretation of the committal power that existed in NSW prior to 2018. (As a result of amendments made to the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 in 2018, the court is no longer required to make a decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence before committing a person for trial in NSW.)
I note that the Federal Court commented in R v Sam Scott [1993] FCA 398, at [20], in considering s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act, that: “The powers of the Magistrate in the Australian Capital Territory are relevantly no different from the powers under consideration in Grassby v The Queen”. Grassby v The Queen [1989] HCA 45 was decided when the committal process in NSW was governed by the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) (NSW Justices Act).
Prior to 2018, the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) and the NSW Justices Act both required the Court to consider whether there was “a reasonable prospect that a jury … would convict the [accused person/defendant] of an offence”. This is, of course, similar to how s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act is framed.
Section 41 of the NSW Justices Act was considered by the Federal Court (Einfeld J) in Re Geoffrey Thomas Briot; Leonard Noel Briot and John Maitland Grahame v Arthur Manning Riedel and Shane Francis Castles [1989] FCA 55. At [76], his Honour stated that:
… like section 41(2) which speaks of an opinion on the commission of “an indictable offence”, section 41(6)(a) requires an opinion on the likelihood of conviction of “an indictable offence”. Thus any indictable offence will ground the receptive opinions even if not the offence charged: see inter alia Ex parte Dowsett Re Macauly (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 40.
The case of Ex parte Dowsett Re Macauly (1943) 60 WN (NSW) 40, cited by Einfeld J, concerned the question whether a court could, pursuant to the NSW Justices Act, receive evidence in committal proceedings that was directed to an offence other than the offence with which the defendant had been charged. The court held, at 42, that:
It is clear that a magistrate hearing the evidence against a person charged with an indictable offence, notwithstanding that the particular charge is not made out, is entitled and bound to commit the accused for trial for any indictable offence which is prima facie established by the evidence before him. Cases of this nature frequently arise, however, it normally appears that the evidence admitted was relevant to the charge the substance of which was contained in the information before the magistrate but that while failing to support that charge it did indicate the commission of another offence … If, however, in the course of an enquiry on an information as to one offence evidence is deliberately admitted not to substantiate or assist the case as to that offence but for the sole purpose of showing the commission of some other offence as to which no charge has been made, then I think the receipt of that evidence for that purpose is outside the jurisdiction of the magistrate. Otherwise the hearing of an information as to the commission of an indictable offence might become a roving enquiry as to whether the accused had ever committed any indictable offence …
In Kolalich v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [1991] HCA 47, the High Court also considered the interpretation to be given to s 41 of the NSW Justices Act. In that case, the person had been charged with murder, but committal proceedings resulted in his committal for trial on the lesser charge of manslaughter. The court noted that, pursuant to s 23(1) of the NSW Crimes Act, manslaughter was an alternative verdict to murder if the jury would have found the person guilty of murder but for a finding that the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation.
Paragraphs [9] to [11] of the judgment of Mascon CJ, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ are instructive for present purposes. After stating, at [8], that: “Whether provocation is also a matter to which regard may be had in the course of committal proceedings depends on s.41 of the Justices Act 1902 (N.S.W.)”, their Honours continued:
9. Section 41 of the Justices Act provides for committal proceedings with respect to indictable offences. It appears from s.41(1) that such proceedings are instituted after the accused has been charged on information with a specific offence. The first part of the proceedings involves the taking of the prosecution evidence. Section 41(2) governs the position at the end of the prosecution case in these terms:
“When all the evidence for the prosecution has been taken, the Justice or Justices shall, after considering all the evidence before the Justice or Justices –
(a) if not of the opinion referred to in (b) – forthwith order the defendant to be discharged as to the information then under inquiry; or
(b) if of the opinion that, having regard to all the evidence before the Justice or Justices, the evidence is capable of satisfying a jury beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed an indictable offence –
(i) if the defendant is present – proceed as provided by subsections (4), (5) and (6); or
(ii) if the defendant is not present – proceed as provided by subsection (6).”
It is clear from s.41(2) that, notwithstanding that the accused has been charged with a specific offence, the proceedings extend beyond “the information then under inquiry” to embrace any indictable offence. However, s.41 does not disclose the steps which are to be taken in the event that an opinion is formed that the evidence cannot sustain the charge in the information but can sustain some other charge.
10. … By s.41(6) the Justice or Justices is or are required to:
“after considering all the evidence …
if of the opinion that, having regard to all the evidence before the Justice or Justices, a jury would not be likely to convict the defendant of an indictable offence – forthwith order the defendant to be discharged as to the information then under inquiry; or
if not of that opinion – commit the defendant for trial.”
Again, s.41(6) distinguishes between “the information then under inquiry” and “an indictable offence”. And again, the steps which are to be taken in the event that an opinion is formed that a jury would not be likely to convict on the charge in the information but would be likely to convict of some other offence are not disclosed …
11. The direction in s.41(6) of the Justices Act to form an opinion, having regard to all the evidence, whether a jury would be likely to convict of an indictable offence clearly requires that, in a case such as the present, regard be had to whether a jury would be likely to convict of murder, that being an “indictable offence” by reference to which category of offences s.41(6) operates. And that necessarily requires a consideration of the issue of provocation, which, as earlier indicated, is not restricted to the confines of a trial.
In my view, the passages set out above provide further support for interpreting s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act as directing the attention of the court to whether there is a reasonable prosect of a jury convicting the defendant of any indictable offence arising from the evidence before the Court (and not just whether he or she might be found guilty of the offence with which he or she has been charged).
Of note, however, the cases also laid down a broader set of principles which governed the exercise of the committal power in s 41 of the NSW Justices Act (which I consider apply to the exercise of the power in s 94 of the Magistrates Court Act). They are:
(a)the Court is required to consider whether there is a reasonable prospect of the defendant being found guilty of any indictable offence (not just whether he or she might be found guilty of the offence with which he or she has been charged);
(b)the Court is not precluded, in its consideration of the range of offences for which a defendant might be found guilty, from having regard to considerations to which the trier of fact will need to have regard, such as provisions which provide for statutory alternative verdicts; and
(c)however, if the defendant is to be committed for trial with respect to an indictable offence other than that with which they have been charged, the offence must arise from the evidence that was taken in relation to the offence with which the defendant was charged.
I would add, to these principles, that the defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in relation to his or her possible committal for an offence other than the one with respect to which he or she has been charged.
Having regard to the above, if I am in error as to my conclusion that it would be open to a jury, as a matter of law, to find the Defendant guilty of the offences with which she has been charged (of obtaining property by deception), it is my view that I would be required to commit the Defendant for trial for offences of theft. As I have identified above, I am not satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect that the Defendant would be found guilty of the offences of theft.
I do not consider that there would be any unfairness to the Defendant in committing her for trial for offences of theft, in circumstances where:
(a)theft is a statutory alternative verdict to an offence of obtaining property by deception;
(b)the Prosecution identified in its submissions at the committal hearing that it sought to have the Defendant committed for trial for offences of theft, as an alternative to its primary position that the Defendant should be committed for trial for the offences with respect to which she has been charged;
(c)the Defendant had an opportunity to respond to those submissions; and
(d)the Defendant conceded, for the purposes of the committal proceedings, that the evidence that was taken at the hearing with respect to the obtain property by deception charges made out the offence of theft to a prima facie standard.
Order
Pursuant to s 94(1)(b) of the Magistrates Court, I commit the Defendant for trial, on each of the charges before the court.
| I certify that the preceding ninety-three [93] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Decision of his Honour Magistrate Temby. Associate: Mason Britton Date: 23 June 2023 |
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