Police v Eiffe

Case [2007] SASC 178

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

POLICE v EIFFE

[2007] SASC 178

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Vanstone

17 May 2007

MAGISTRATES - APPEALS FROM AND CONTROL OVER MAGISTRATES - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT

EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - STATUTORY PROVISIONS AS TO PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE - AS TO AVERMENTS AND ALLEGATIONS

Appeal against decision of magistrate dismissing charges under the Road Traffic Act of driving at a dangerous speed and failing to stop after accident in which a person is injured - whether respondent was proved to be driver of vehicle involved in accident - whether respondent's instructions could be inferred from cross-examination of victim - whether evidentiary aid found in s 175(1) Road Traffic Act 1961 assisted the prosecution. Held: insufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appeal dismissed.

Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), s 42; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA), s 46, s 43(1), s 175(1)(i), referred to.
R v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424, applied.
R v Robinson [1977] Qd R 387, distinguished.
Ellul v Fauser (1981) 28 SASR 300; Llewellyn v Police (2005) 91 SASR 418, discussed.
R v Wilkes (1948) 77 CLR 511; Thorogood v Warren (1979) 20 SASR 156; Police v Lloyd (1998) 72 SASR 271; Police v A, TG [2006] SASC 299; R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487; Jambajimba v Svikart (1984) 71 FLR 287; Ex parte O'Sullivan; re Craig (1944) 44 SR(NSW) 291, considered.

POLICE v EIFFE
[2007] SASC 178

Magistrates Appeal

VANSTONE J:

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal by the police pursuant to s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 against an order of a magistrate dismissing a complaint which charged Mr Eiffe with driving at a dangerous speed (s 46 Road Traffic Act 1961, now referred to as “the Act”) and failing to stop after an accident in which a person is injured (s 43(1) of the Act).

  2. There was no dispute that on 7 June 2005 on Angas Street, Adelaide just west of Pulteney Street, a collision occurred between a motor car and a bicycle, causing injury to the cyclist. The primary issue in the trial was one of the identity of the driver of the motor car. The appellant argues that the evidence before the court, combined with the aid to proof provided in s 175(1)(i) of the Act proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was the driver of the vehicle and therefore should have been convicted.

  3. The appeal is in the nature of a rehearing and I am to make up my own mind as to the matter and can interfere with the magistrate’s findings without the necessity of identifying error.  However, where, as here, the question is not one of evaluation of evidence, but rather, its sufficiency, there has traditionally been a reluctance to interfere with a magistrate’s finding that there was reasonable doubt:  R…

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AGLC
Police v Eiffe [2007] SASC 178
Case
[2007] SASC 178
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Police v Eiffe, the appeal was brought before the Supreme Court of South Australia. The appellant sought to challenge the decision of a magistrate in relation to a traffic incident that involved a cyclist and a motor vehicle. The central issue was whether the evidence provided was sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent was the driver of the vehicle involved in the incident.

The legal issues the court was required to decide included whether the magistrate’s findings were correct and whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the respondent's identity as the driver. The court had to consider the principles regarding the evaluation of evidence and the sufficiency of the proof needed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Given the nature of the appeal, the court was required to assess the evidence presented without necessarily identifying errors in the magistrate's decision, particularly if the question pertained to the evaluation of evidence rather than its sufficiency.

The court found that the evidence provided by the appellant was circumstantial and did not sufficiently prove the respondent's identity as the driver. The court noted the cyclist's testimony, which described the incident and identified the vehicle, but highlighted inconsistencies and the lack of direct evidence. The court also considered the failure to call a witness who had recorded the vehicle's registration number. Ultimately, the court concluded that the evidence did not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the magistrate's decision that the evidence did not conclusively identify the respondent as the driver.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The appeal is in the nature of a rehearing and I am to make up my own mind as to the matter and can interfere with the magistrate’s findings without the necessity of identifying error. However, where, as here, the question is not one of evaluation of evidence, but rather, its sufficiency, there has traditionally been a reluctance to interfere with a magistrate’s finding that there was reasonable doubt: R v Wilkes (1948) 77 CLR 511; Thorogood v Warren (1979) 20 SASR 156 per Zelling J; Police v Lloyd (1998) 72 SASR 271 per Debelle J. (But see Police v A, TG [2006] SASC 299.)Background Insofar as the appellant sought to implicate the respondent in the collision, its case was a circumstantial one. In order to review the magistrate’s decision that the relevant inference could not be drawn, it is necessary to summarise the evidence called by the appellant. The cyclist gave evidence that the incident occurred at about a quarter to nine one weekday morning as he made his way to work. Although there was some initial hesitation in his evidence as to whether it occurred on 6 or 7 June and as to the location of it – being either Wakefield Street or Angas Street – after reflection the cyclist confirmed that it was the street to the south of Wakefield Street and that it occurred in the entrance to a service station on the Pulteney Street corner. Both of those facts established that it was Angas Street. In addition, the cyclist said he reported the incident at the Adelaide Police Station within two hours and the report was shown to have been made on 7 June. The cyclist described an incident commencing in Pulteney Street. He said he was travelling north in the lane for left, or west, turning traffic when a motor car “lurched” out of the adjacent lane into his path. He had to brake sharply to avoid collision. The traffic lights were red at that point and the vehicle came to a halt in the left turning lane, perhaps third in line. As the cyclist slowly passed the vehicle he “tapped firmly” on the rear left panel adjacent to the rear door of the vehicle to get the driver’s attention and he gestured and shouted to the driver to indicate, in effect, his displeasure at the manoeuvre. The driver shouted back to him. The lights then turned green and the cyclist continued moving, turning left into Angas Street. He then heard a revving engine and felt an impact to his rear wheel which catapulted him from the bicycle. He looked up from the roadway to see “the same car” about 15 to 20 metres from him accelerating away from the point he adjudged to be the point of impact. A number of persons were nearby, including a witness by the name of Smith, who gave his details to the cyclist. Despite doubt in Mr Smith’s mind about the time and date of the incident, he was plainly describing the same event. It is clear from the evidence that another witness recorded the registration number of the departing motor vehicle, but, inexplicably, that witness was not called at the trial.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

I note that in Llewellyn v Police (2005) 91 SASR 418, 426, in dealing with an offence against s 47B of the Act, Gray J found that, there, the allegation that the vehicle in question was a “motor vehicle” amounted to sufficient specification for the purposes of s 175. As I said, since the appellant fails at an earlier hurdle, it is unnecessary for me to reach any firm view.Conclusion In my opinion the magistrate was correct in finding that the evidence identifying the respondent as the driver did not amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt. I consider that neither resort to the evidentiary aid found in s 175 of the Act, nor the content of questions put to the cyclist by the respondent’s counsel added to the prosecution case. For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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