Police v Blackwell (a pseudonym)

MAGISTRATES COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:	Police v Blackwell (a pseudonym)
Citation:	[2024] ACTMC 5
Hearing Dates:	5 March 2024
Decision Date:	19 March 2024
Before:	Magistrate Temby
Decision:	See [157]
Catchwords:	JUDGEMENT AND PUNISHMENT – SENTENCE – Family Violence – Stalking with intention to harass – Threat to distribute intimate images– Contravention of a family violence order
Legislation Cited:	Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 ss 10(2) 33(1)(w), 33(1)(za) Crimes (Sentencing Administration) Act 2005
Cases Cited:	R v EP (No 3) [2019] ACTSC 242 Morrison v Maher (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 63 R v Elliott (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 390 Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194 Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288 Mun v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 234 Georgopolous v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 246 R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9 R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115 O’Brien v R [2015] ACTCA 47 R v Deng; Carberry v The King [2023] ACTCA 32
Parties:	Andrew Bishop (Informant 1^st series) Caleb Marcus Boxx (Informant 2^nd series) John Blackwell (a pseudonym) ( Defendant)
Representation:	Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Tiffen-Oaks ( Defendant)
File Numbers:	CC 12412 of 2022 CC 1012 of 2023 CC 10800 of 2022 CC 10798 of 2022 CC 5322 of 2022 CC 5321 of 2023

MAGISTRATE TEMBY:

Introduction:

1․The Defendant is to be sentenced in relation to the following offences:
First Series
(a)CC2022/12412 – Stalking with intention to harass, in contravention of a court order (maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment);
(b)CC2023/1012 – Stalking with intent to harass in contravention of a court order, aggravated as a family violence offence (maximum penalty of 7 years’ imprisonment);
(c)CC2022/10800 – Threaten to distribute intimate images of another person, aggravated as a family violence offence (maximum penalty of 400 penalty units and/or 4 years’ imprisonment);
(d)CC2022/10798 – Contravention of a Family Violence Order (FVO) (maximum penalty of 500 penalty units and/or 5 years’ imprisonment);

Second Series
(e)CC2022/5322 – Contravention of a FVO (maximum penalty 500 penalty units and/or 5 years’ imprisonment);
(f)CC2023/5321 – Attempt to contravene a FVO (maximum penalty of 500 penalty units and/or 5 years’ imprisonment).

2․In considering the matter, I note that:
(a)I must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of any fact which might be relied on in aggravation of the offence for which the Defendant is charged; and
(b)I must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities of any facts which I take into account in mitigation of the offences or in mitigation of the sentence.

Nature and circumstances of offence
Agreed Facts
3․The Defendant and the complainant were married in 2008 and separated in 2022. They have four children.
4․On 24 May 2022, the complainant obtained a FVO (FVO 448/2022), protecting herself and her children from the Defendant. The parties’ eldest child (the child protected person) was 14. Relevantly, the FVO prohibited the Defendant from contacting the protected persons except, in relation to the complainant, in writing or by SMS only for the purposes of facilitating contact or handover of their children or to discuss their safety and welfare.
5․On 2 June 2022, the Defendant was served with FVO 448/2022 and its terms were explained to him.

CC2022/12412

6․Between 3 June 2022 and 16 August 2022, the Defendant sent the complainant a total of 250 messages which were in breach of FVO 448/2022. In general terms, the messages related to:
(a)arrangements made between the parties for the Defendant to access his property by gaining access to the garage of the former matrimonial home;
(b)apologies and declarations of love from the Defendant to his family;
(c)requests by the Defendant for the complainant to assist him with housing;
(d)requests by the Defendant to reunite with the complainant;
(e)requests by the Defendant to have contact with his children;
(f)text messages by the Defendant about his future business endeavours; and
(g)messages that were critical of, and harassing to, the complainant.

7․During the period when the Defendant sent these messages, the complainant asked the Defendant to leave her alone and to accept that there was no prospect of rehabilitation between herself and the Defendant. The complainant asked the Defendant to stop contacting her and told him that the contact was in breach of the FVO.

CC2023/1012

8․Between 17 August 2022 and 7 November 2022, the Defendant sent the complainant a total of 341 messages which were in breach of FVO 448/2022. In general terms, the messages related to:
(a)arrangements made between the parties for the Defendant to collect his belongings;
(b)requests from the Defendant for contact;
(c)the Defendant sharing music videos;
(d)the Defendant making declarations of love; and
(e)expressions of the Defendant’s frustrations, including with the complainant. One of those messages, sent on 29 August 2022, read (in part):
… to just eject me like that, this, it’s unjustifiable all round. It’s a poor decision, and if you ever realise how cruel, mean, unwarranted, and undignified it actually is, it’ll make you cry on the inside a lil, that’s if you ever even cared about me. My babies miss me, just like I miss them. They’ll hate you for it possibly, don’t you realise this also?

9․On 29 September 2022, the complainant responded to one of the Defendant’s messages. She told him that she was scared of him and wanted to be left alone. She told the Defendant that he needed to stop contacting her.
10․Four of the Defendant’s messages, sent on 5 September 2022, were lengthy. They involved 2,971 words, in which the Defendant wrote out his life story.
11․290 of the messages sent in this period were sent on 11 October 2022. In a number of those messages, the Defendant threatened to crush anyone who stood between him and his objectives in family law proceedings between the parties, including the complainant’s family lawyer. Amongst other messages, he said: “I have dirt on her [the complainant’s family lawyer’s] personal life that she cannot deny”, “I will make Julia cry”, “I’ll make Julia probably take a leave of absence” and “I will fuck Julia in her fat crackhead blonde butt hole”.
12․In another message, he said: “Give me my kids, or I will ruin your life” and “Fcuk u for being against me”. He said “I’m not scared of your poof police” and “after I make Julia my bitch, I’ll go after Bobby”, “He will pay, and you’ll delete this message if you care about our daughter”. The Defendant called the complainant an ice user and intimated that he would implicate the complainant in some sort of criminal activity of his to which he considered the complainant was an accomplice.
13․These messages caused distress to the complainant, who became fearful for her safety and the safety of her children. She contacted the Domestic Violence Crisis Service (DVCS) for support. The DVCS subsequently contacted the police.

CC2022/10800

14․In several text messages that the Defendant sent to the complainant on 11 October 2022, he said that he had intimate video footage of himself and the complainant engaging in sexual activity. He made a threat that he would show the footage and images to others, including a Magistrate, if his breaches of FVO 448/2022 were reported.
15․He said: “I have plenty of video footage”, “You are having sex with me in there”, “Doggy style I’ll show the magistrate”, “You tell the cops and I’ll show them everything” and “These vids look pretty good, and you are keen for my cock”.

CC2022/10798

16․Between 10 October 2022 and 26 October 2022, the Defendant sent 39 text messages to the child protected person.
17․These messages would, in circumstances where a FVO was not in place, be unexceptional communicates between a father and daughter, although the Defendant was encouraging communications between himself and the child protected person which were not permitted by the FVO. Two of these messages were explicit in that respect, saying: “Can you call me this week some time please? It’s super important. I’ll explain to later, and its not behind mummy’s back. It’s also in your mum’s best interest” and “You should use mummy’s phone to contact me if your screen time is done. Just think of me to, ok?”.

CC2023/5322

18․FVO 448/2022 was changed to a special interim FVO in 2023 as a result of the Defendant being charged with the First Series of offences. That order was served on the Defendant on 9 May 2023.
19․On 12 May 2023, the Defendant entered into bail conditions which included, amongst other things, that he not contact the complainant or the child protected person.
20․In the afternoon of 12 May 2023, the Defendant sent a text message to the complainant. He said he had been served with family court orders and interim FVO. He said that he was allowed to contact her regarding the welfare of their children and asserted that neither he nor the police officers who served the FVO knew which orders he had to follow anymore. He asked the complainant to tell him a bit about each of the children.
21․I note that, in his interview with police, the Defendant admitted that he was aware of the condition of his bail which prohibited contact but considered that asking about the children was relevant to the safety and welfare of the children.
22․The Defendant indicates that police indicated to him that he could send the message that he did as an “ice breaker”. I am not satisfied that the Defendant believed he was permitted to send the message, nor that the police officers who served the FVO did not know what orders the Defendant had to follow.
23․The message made the complainant feel extremely upset, anxious and stressed. She felt that she would never be able to escape the Defendant. She went to bed and cried.

CC2023/5321

24․On 16 May 2023, the Defendant received a missed call from the child protected person. He called her back a couple of minutes later however he did not get through to her. The Defendant was aware that his call to the child protected person was a breach of his bail conditions and a contravention of the FVO, but believed it was an emergency as it was out of character for the child protected person to call him.
25․The child protected person confirmed that she had accidentally “pocket-dialled” the Defendant.

Complainant’s Victim Impact Statement

26․In the complainant’s Victim Impact Statement she describes a range of impacts which she says she has suffered as a result of the Defendant’s actions. There is no reason to doubt what she has described, and the Defendant did not take any issue with the matters contained in the Victim Impact Statement. I have, however, taken into account the fact that the impacts felt by the complainant were experienced in the context of relationship issues that are broader than the conduct which is the subject of the current charges.
27․It is, of course, difficult to distinguish between the impact of the Defendant’s actions on the complainant (as she saw them) prior to her obtaining FVO 448/2022 and the impact of the actions which are the subject of the charged offences. This includes the difficulty of understanding the extent to which the Defendant’s charged conduct has exacerbated feelings and fears which the complainant already had before the complainant obtained the FVO.
28․However, the facts which are agreed between the Prosecution and the Defendant do identify the impact on the complainant of particular aspects of the charged conduct. Further, in the Victim Impact Statement, the complainant expresses clear themes with respect to the impact of the Defendant’s messages. The complainant states that:
(a)she had sought to protect herself and her children but the Defendant refused to let her go; and
(b)she found the Defendant’s threats and constant messages to be overbearing, with the complainant saying “my phone kept letting me know you were there” and “Your words made it clear that you were attempting to bend me to your will and when I didn’t you made it clear that you would make me break and anyone who stood in your way would be broken along with me. If I was not already scared and isolated in those moments, you made me feel like I could not reach out to anyone for the fear that I would be the cause that you would hurt them too ... You told me that no one would stand in your way not my lawyer, not police and not the courts. So, if I did not have my lawyer and if I could not call on the police, who else would protect me and the children?”

29․I am satisfied that the Defendant’s voluminous messaging, and the threats he made, had the impact that the complainant described, particularly in relation to the 17 August to 7 November 2022 communications. Despite FVO 448/2022 being made, she could not escape the Defendant and she felt scared and isolated. I am satisfied that these feelings impacted the complainant’s sleep and caused her to take a number of security measures, including installing security cameras and discussing her fears and escape plans with friends and the child protected person, as she described in her Victim Impact Statement.

Objective seriousness

CC2022/12412
30․This is a serious example of this kind of offence. It occurred over an extended period (2.5 months), it involved a large volume of unlawful communications (250 messages), which I am satisfied the Defendant knew he was not permitted to send, it continued despite the requests of the complainant that he stop, and a number of the communications were critical of the complainant.
31․The complainant was no doubt dismayed by the fact that, despite her efforts to protect herself through FVO 448/2022, the Defendant would not let her go and his messages provided a constant reminder of his presence in her life. This was so, regardless of the fact that the harassment took the form of electronic communications, rather than involving the physical presence of the Defendant.
32․I accept the Defendant’s submission that, for this offence, the fact that the Defendant was charged with intending to harass the complainant, rather than intending to cause harm, or a fear of harm, makes the offence less serious than it would have been had the Defendant’s intention been of one of those kinds.
33․In the spectrum of offending covered by this offence, it falls in the middle of the range.

CC2023/1012

34․This is also a serious example of this kind of offence, even more so than CC2022/12412. It also occurred over an extended period (over 2.5 months), it involved an even larger volume of unlawful communications (341 messages) which, again, I am satisfied the Defendant knew he was not permitted to send and, again, it continued despite the requests of the complainant that he stop. Indeed, not only did the complainant tell him to stop, but the complainant told him that she was scared of him. Several messages were critical of the complainant.
35․Of significance, 290 of the messages were sent on one day. The intensity of those communications, in terms of their frequency, and in terms of their content, caused the complainant distress and caused her to fear for her safety and the safety of her children. They also made the complainant feel isolated and unable to seek help from anyone, including her lawyer and the police.
36․It is obvious why the complainant felt that way. Many of the Defendant’s messages were threatening, offensive and abusive, including threatening to use knowledge the Defendant asserted that he possessed in relation to the personal lives of the complainant and her lawyer as leverage to get the outcome he wanted in family law proceedings. His message demanding that the complainant delete one of his messages if the complainant cared about their daughter had an ominous tone to it.
37․While the Defendant submitted that the fact that the Defendant was charged with intending to harass the complainant, rather than intending to cause harm or a fear of harm, lessens the seriousness of the offence, I do not accept that submission. The Defendant’s harassment was threatening and was engaged in order to force the complainant to agree to what the Defendant was seeking in family law proceedings.
38․In the spectrum of offending covered by this offence, it falls above the middle of the range.

CC2022/10800

39․This, too, is a serious example of this kind of offence. It involved a threat to distribute a particularly intimate kind of image in the form of a video, it was an insidious kind of threat, the carrying out of which could cause the complainant both personal and professional embarrassment, and it was made to dissuade the complainant from disclosing the Defendant’s criminality to police (and, therefore, dissuading the complainant from seeking their help).
40․I do note, however, that the Defendant was charged on the basis that he was reckless as to whether the complainant would fear that the threat would be carried out, and not on the basis that it was his intention that she would have that fear.
41․In the spectrum of offending covered by this offence, it falls above the middle of the range.

CC2022/10798

42․This is a rolled-up charge involving 39 breaches of FVO 448/2022. It also placed the child protected person in an invidious position, given that she was aware that the Defendant was not permitted to contact her, but the Defendant, as her father, was encouraging her to contact him.
43․On the other hand, the communications were, on the whole, plain in their content and do not appear to have caused the child protected person any particular distress.
44․In the spectrum of offending covered by this offence, it falls below the middle of the range.

CC2023/5322

45․At first blush, this does not appear to be a particularly serious example of this offence. To the extent that the Defendant enquired about the parties’ children, the Defendant might have thought it was permitted by FVO 448/2022 and the remainder of the message was short and focused on the fact of the Defendant having been served with family court and family violence orders.
46․However, it needs to be understood in the context in which it was sent, which is that it was sent after the numerous messages that the Defendant sent to the complainant in mid-to-late 2022, after the complainant had taken the risk of speaking to police despite the threats that the Defendant had made and after the Defendant had been charged with offences and prohibited by bail conditions from contacting the complainant at all.
47․It was in that context that the message made the complainant feel extremely upset, anxious and stressed. She felt that she would never be able to escape the Defendant.
48․In the spectrum of offending covered by this offence, it falls at the upper end of the bottom of the range.

CC2023/5321

49․In the spectrum of offending covered by this offence, this offence falls to the bottom of the range. I accept that the Defendant believed that the child protected person had called him in an emergency and that, in those circumstances, it would have been very difficult for the Defendant not to return her call. I also note that the child protected person did not in fact answer the Defendant’s call.

Aggravating features

Defendant on conditional liberty at time of offence (CC2023/5322 and CC2023/5321)

50․It is an aggravating factor on sentence with respect to charges CC2023/5322 and CC2023/5321 that the Defendant was on conditional liberty at the time of the offences.
51․Not only did he betray the opportunity to be in the community in a general sense, but the offences involved a breach of one of the conditions of bail – that he not contact the complainant or the child protected person – that had been put in place to address the offending conduct with which the Defendant had been charged and with which he agreed to comply in order to be granted bail.

Family violence offences

52․CC2023/1012 and CC2022/10800 are, of course, aggravated versions of the relevant offences because they were committed in a family violence context, however that is a statutory factor of aggravation that informs the maximum sentence for the offences, rather than being an aggravating factor on sentence.

Mitigatory features

53․The Defendant says that, over the course of the period covered by the offending conduct he was suffering various mental health conditions, and that he was frustrated that he could not see his children. He says that, on 11 October 2022, when he sent 290 messages, he was also intoxicated.
54․I have separately considered the Defendant’s mental health conditions, and their relevance to the present sentencing exercise, below.
55․I do not accept that the fact that the Defendant was intoxicated on 11 October 2022, or that he was missing his children, mitigates the seriousness of his conduct. While, as discussed below, the Defendant has had issues with alcohol misuse in the past, it was the Defendant’s choice to drink to the point of intoxication on the day in question. While I accept that the Defendant was missing his children, that fact provides no justification for the conduct in which the Defendant engaged, particularly in circumstances where there was a FVO in place which regulated the kinds of things about which he could communicate with the complainant.

Comparable cases

56․Paragraph 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act provides that the Court must have regard to current sentencing practice and patterns when considering how an offender must be sentenced. Consistency does not mean numerical equivalence, but the consistent application of relevant legal principles.
57․However, considering past sentences is also relevant to the achievement of reasonable consistency in sentencing and I note that the Prosecution referred me to several cases in this respect. I have identified below recent cases which are comparable to the objective seriousness of the First Series of offending.

Threatening to distribute an intimate image

R v EP (No 3) [2019] ACTSC 242
58․On 15 February 2018, the offender arrived at his ex-partner’s (TC’s) house and spoke to her briefly before leaving. A short time later, TC received a text message stating “makes a nice poster” after which she walked outside and found a photo of herself, naked from the waist up, on the ground near where the offender had parked on the driveway. On 18 February 2018, TC visited the offender’s house to collect items for their daughter. As the offender provided the items to TC, five laminated intimate images of TC fell to the ground. Later that night, the offender sent a message to TC saying “Oh there[‘s] more of those in her school bag”.
59․The offender had no relevant criminal record and his prior good character was taken into account on sentence.
60․The offender received a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment for the offence of threatening to distribute an intimate image, reduced from nine months for the offender’s guilty plea.

Stalking with intent to harass and contravention of FVO cases

Morrison v Maher (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 63
61․The offender and the victim were previously married and had separated. Amongst other things, the offender:
(a)made 75 calls and sent 280 text messages to the victim in contravention of a FVO between 24 March 2019 and 26 April 2019. Many of the messages were aggressive. The conduct was found to be in the mid-range of objective seriousness and the offender was sentenced (after a 25% discount), to seven months’ imprisonment (concurrent seven month sentences for stalking and contravention of a FVO);
(b)sent eight emails, via his daughter, to the victim in contravention of a FVO between 13 and 18 August 2020, for which he was sentenced (after a 25% discount) to six months’ imprisonment (concurrent six months sentences for stalking and contravention of a FVO). The messages contained declarations of love and expressions of the offender’s frustration. The Court found the conduct to be in the mid-range of objective seriousness; and
(c)sent the victim two letters whilst he was remanded in the Alexander Maconochie Centre. Reading the letters made the victim feel sick and caused her to have a panic attack because of the offender’s continued efforts to breach the FVO and stalk her. The Court found that the conduct was in the low to mid-range of objective seriousness and sentenced the offender to a term of imprisonment of 3 months and 21 days with respect to the sending of each letter, reduced from 5 months for the offender’s guilty plea.

R v Elliott (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 390
62․On 28 April 2021, a woman with whom the offender had been in a relationship was granted a FVO. The order was served on 7 June 2021.
63․On 10 June 2021, Mr Elliott sent 13 messages abusing the woman and making threats to her. He continued the next day, threatening to kill himself. The woman contacted police to ask them to conduct a welfare check.
64․The Court concluded that the contact formed part of the coercive control the offender sought to exercise over the offender “and thus, if not actually threatening and menacing, at the very least, significantly harassing, especially after she had expressly asked him not to send them. They were aggressive and … threats were made”.
65․The Court found that the offence was a serious one and sentenced the offender to imprisonment for eight months and 10 days, reduced from 10 months for his plea of guilty. The history of family violence committed by the offender against the woman was taken into account in the Court’s assessment of the appropriate sentence.

Subjective Circumstances

66․The Defendant described his personal background to Ms Vanessa Quigley, clinical psychologist, for the purposes of Ms Quigley preparing an assessment report with respect to his mental health (dated 12 October 2023). Ms Quigley’s report is discussed in detail below in relation to the Defendant’s mental health conditions.
67․The Defendant stated to Ms Quigley that he is a 44 year old man who migrated to Australia with his family when he was six years old. He described his mother as giving him unconditional love, but said that he had a difficult relationship with his father.
68․He said that he was physically disciplined by his father, but said that that was not common or forceful. He also said that his father engaged in considerable emotional and verbal abuse, and made him feel that he was never good enough.
69․The Defendant described an awkward childhood, in which he found it difficult to fit in at school, and difficulty finding a job that he liked once he left school. However, he maintained consistent employment aside from a period of unemployment between 2005 and 2013 following a back injury.
70․He told Ms Quigley that he was a stay-at-home dad between 2014 and 2016 and was studying a university. He also reported struggling with alcoholism during that period, having 15-20 standard drinks a day, but said that he rarely drinks alcohol now. He told the authors of the Pre-Sentence Report that he had only consumed alcohol on two occasions within the last 12 months, albeit that one of those occasions had contributed to the current offences.
71․The Defendant reported to both Ms Quigley and the authors of the Pre-Sentence Report using cannabis since he was 15 years of age. He also reports using other drugs over a 20 year period, although less so now than in the past. Having said that, in eight of the 10 tests that the Defendant undertook whilst on bail, he returned a positive test for cannabis and/or benzodiazepines.
72․The Defendant reported to the authors of the Pre-Sentence Report that his current position, operating machinery for an earthworks company, would be available to him long term, however he expressed an intention to start a career in the production of medicinal cannabis.
73․The Defendant reported that he had no significant debts, no gambling problems and no trouble meeting financial commitments. On that basis, the report states that the Defendant would be able to manage a fine if one was imposed.

Application of Bugmy principles

74․The Defendant relies on the principles established in Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571 (Bugmy). He submits that the physical and emotional abuse he suffered as a child affected his capacity to develop and that there was a strong causal link to the offending for which he is to be sentenced. He submits that his moral culpability for the offences is accordingly reduced.
75․Ms Quigley opined that the Defendant “was exposed to significant risks known to compromise child development and long-term mental health and functioning”, and that “The lack of appropriate male attachment figures and caregivers during a crucial development period is also likely to have had a detrimental impact on him and his emotional and cognitive development”.
76․I accept that what the Defendant reported to Ms Quigley was accurate. That is, that the Defendant had a difficult relationship with his father that featured (predominantly) considerable emotional and verbal abuse from his father that made the Defendant feel that he was not good enough. Ms Quigley was not cross-examined and I accept the unchallenged opinion that she expressed in her report.
77․However, the impact of the Defendant’s background, relevantly for present purposes, is not entirely clear. To say, as Ms Quigley does, that it is likely to have had a detrimental impact on the Defendant and his emotional and cognitive development, does not provide much of an explanation as to the actual extent of the detrimental impact on his development. Similarly, it largely leaves the extent to which the Defendant’s background impacted his capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, and to exercise appropriate emotional control when faced with stressful situations, unexplained.
78․Ultimately, I am not satisfied that the Defendant’s background explains his offending conduct. This is particularly the case in circumstances where there are other factors which may have contributed to his offending, including drug and alcohol use, mental health conditions, and a range of life stressors impacting the Defendant at the time of the offending conduct, including the breakdown of his marriage and difficulties in his housing arrangements.

Mental Condition

Defendant’s evidence
79․The Defendant reported to Ms Quigley that he saw a doctor when he was studying at university, who considered that the Defendant was suffering from anxiety and depression, and that the Defendant was on the autism spectrum, but the Defendant said that no formal diagnosis was made.
80․Ms Quigley administered a number of tests to the Defendant, the results of which:
(a)suggested an anxiety disorder, but not PTSD;
(b)reflected the Defendant’s reporting of moderate levels of physical abuse and severe levels of emotional abuse;
(c)provided inconsistent scores with respect to symptoms of ADHD (but Ms Quigley nevertheless considered that it was an appropriate diagnosis for the Defendant);
(d)indicated a low risk level of alcohol use;
(e)indicated a lesser reliance on drugs than in the past, but that there was still a need for outpatient interventions. He acknowledged that drug use was causing him serious problems but is taking steps to address his drug use; and
(f)strongly suggest that the Defendant meets the criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder.

81․Ms Quigley suggested that a diagnosis of Persistent Depressive Disorder is appropriate for the Defendant and noted that the Defendant also meets the diagnostic criteria for Alcohol Use Disorder (severe, in early remission), Cannabis Use Disorder (severe) and Sedative, Hypnotic and Anxiolytic Use Disorder (in sustained remission). She stated that it is also possible that the Defendant meets the diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder.
82․Ms Quigley concluded, in relation to the Defendant’s offending, that:
[The Defendant’s] offending appears able to be understood through a combination of environmental stressors and mental health issues … Due to the nature and severity of previous mental health issues and maladaptive coping strategies, he is someone who is vulnerable to decomposition in mental state in the event of significant triggers. These mental health issues appear to have contributed to reactive decision making and impulsivity, and impaired reasoning. This is likely to have overridden his ability to rationalise and apply consequential reasoning to his decision-making.
83․Ms Quigley also noted that, consistently with the expected impacts of ADHD:
[The Defendant] appears to have significant impairments in aspects of his executive functioning, including his planning, judgement, and decision-making, and with his ability to anticipate consequences and learn from his behaviour. He also struggles to manage his impulses, and his capacity to regulate and control his behaviour is underdeveloped. In the absence of appropriate treatment, a substantial proportion of people diagnosed with ADHD remain significantly impaired into adulthood …”
84․Ms Quigley considers that the Defendant is a low general risk of reoffending given several protective factors. She considers that his risk of repeat offending would also be low if he is able to address his mental heath issues. She states that he would benefit from engagement with a clinical psychologist, ideally one experienced in Autism Spectrum Disorder and personality vulnerability, and from ongoing drug and alcohol support.
85․Finally, I note that Ms Quigley opines that imprisonment would significantly increase his symptoms of anxiety and fear and that he is “likely to find the experience harder and more anxiety provoking than someone without his related impairments”.
86․The Defendant tendered a mental health plan which was prepared by a General Practitioner at Directions Health Services on 22 November 2023 to address the Defendant’s anxiety and depression. His plan, with respect to both issues, was referral to a psychologist. He tendered a letter from Directions Health Services, dated 22 November 2023, to Ms Quigley, attaching the mental health plan and requesting treatment by Ms Quigley in circumstances where the Defendant was experiencing a deterioration in his mental health.
87․The Defendant also tendered a letter from Catholic Care, dated 28 February 2024, certifying that the Defendant attended an assessment appointment with the Next Step Low Intensity Service on 28 February 2024 and had begun engagement with the program.

Defendant’s submissions

88․The Defendant submitted that the matters raised in Ms Quigley’s report give rise to Verdins considerations. He submitted that his mental health conditions contributed to his offending, particularly the offending on 11 October 2022, affecting his ability to know right from wrong. He submitted that it involved obsessive compulsive conduct.
89․He submits that his mental health conditions reduce his moral culpability and moderate the relevance of general and specific deterrence. The Defendant also submits that a custodial sentence would weigh more heavily on him than it would a person who was not suffering from his conditions.

Prosecution submissions

90․The Prosecution accepts that the Defendant was suffering from anxiety and depression, as well as an Autism Spectrum Disorder, but submits that the remainder of the diagnoses given by Ms Quigley are preliminary in nature.
91․The Prosecution also submits that the Defendant could have done something about his mental health conditions, given that he was aware of the conditions from well prior to the offending conduct. He was aware of the need for treatment but did little in that respect other than seeking to self-medicate, including through the use of drugs and alcohol. I note that the Defendant told Ms Quigley that he was taking drugs to treat his mental health in 2011. The Prosecution submits that there were no issues of intelligence or financial hardship that explain why the Defendant did not obtain medical treatment.
92․The Prosecution further submits that, while the Defendant describes his offending on 11 October 2022 as an autistic meltdown, that ignores the contribution of his intoxication and the prior use of violence in the relationship, including coercive control.
93․The Prosecution notes that the Defendant’s proceedings have been in existence for a year, but the Defendant has still not sought to address his mental health issues in any substantial way. The Prosecution points to information in the Pre-Sentence Report which states that an email from Relationships Australia confirmed that the Defendant attended four relationship counselling sessions between March and April 2023, but nil engagement with the service since 14 April 2023.
94․The Prosecution submits that, rather than moderating the need for specific deterrence, its relevance is increased because of the Defendant’s failure to seek and obtain treatment.

Defendant’s reply submissions

95․The Defendant accepts that he could have done more to obtain treatment for his mental health conditions. However, he said that his conditions had not caused him major issues in the past and his understanding of his conditions was not clear. He further noted that it is not easy to obtain treatment for Autism Spectrum Disorder.
96․Ultimately, the Defendant noted that he is taking action now. He notes that he has obtained a mental health plan and has attended one session with the Next Step service, and that he has obtained a referral to a psychologist. He says that he is on the waiting list for Everyman domestic violence counselling and has completed seven sessions with Relationships Australia.

Principles re relevance and impact of mental condition

97․In Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa [2010] NSWCCA 194, McClellan CJ at CL (with whom Simpson J and Barr AJ agreed) said, at [177]:
Where an offender is suffering from a mental illness, intellectual handicap or other mental problems the courts have developed principles to be applied when sentencing ... They can be summarised in the following manner:
Where the state of a person’s mental health contributes to the commission of the offence in a material way, the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced. Consequently the need to denounce the crime may be reduced with a reduction in the sentence ...
It may also have the consequence that the offender is an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence resulting in a reduction in the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed …
It may mean that a custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on the person. Because the sentence will be more onerous for that person the length of the prison term or the conditions under which it is served may be reduced …
It may reduce or eliminate the significance of specific deterrence …
Conversely, it may be that because of a person’s mental illness, they present more of a danger to the community. In those circumstances, considerations of specific deterrence may result in an increased sentence …

Where a person has been diagnosed with an Antisocial Personality Disorder there may be a particular need to give consideration to the protection of the public …

Consideration
98․The Defendant suffers from anxiety and depression, and an Autism Spectrum Disorder. He was suffering from those conditions at the time of the offending conduct and had done so for many years prior.
99․The Defendant also suffers from an alcohol use disorder and a cannabis use disorder. He may also suffer from ADHD and a Borderline Personality Disorder.
100․Whether any of these conditions contributed to the Defendant’s offending and, if so, the extent to which they did so, is unclear. Ms Quigley’s opinion is not unequivocal, opining that the Defendant’s offending “appears” able to be understood through a combination of environmental stressors and mental health issues and that the Defendant “appears” to have significant impairments in his judgement and decision-making.
101․According to the Pre-Sentence Report, at his induction into custody on 17 November 2022, the impression formed by his reviewing psychiatrist was that the Defendant had drug induced psychosis, secondary to long standing polysubstance use disorder, against a background of cluster B personality disorder.
102․It also needs to be understood that the Defendant was frustrated and angry with the complainant, and with the position in which he found himself, that he continued to take drugs and, at least in relation to the conduct he engaged in on 11 October 2022, he was intoxicated. In my view, part of the Defendant’s offending can be explained by the simple fact that he did not care that he was prohibited by FVO 448/2022 from contacting the complainant and the child protected person in the way that he did, and did not care that the complainant asked him multiple times to stop contacting her.
103․I accept that the Defendant’s mental health conditions played some part in his offending conduct, but it is not possible to come to a concluded view as to the significance of those conditions on the conduct he engaged in. I do not accept that they were the major contributing factors.
104․Accordingly, while the Defendant’s moral culpability is reduced somewhat, it is not reduced significantly. There is a corresponding reduction in the need to denounce the Defendant’s conduct but, again, that reduction is not significant. I do not accept that the Defendant’s mental health conditions make him an inappropriate vehicle for general deterrence.
105․The significance of specific deterrence is not reduced as a result of the Defendant’s mental health conditions. Similarly, protection of the public is also an important consideration, given the limited steps that the Defendant has taken towards addressing his mental health conditions.
106․The Defendant has been aware that he has mental health issues since at least 2011, however they did not cause him any major issues and, at least in 2011, he self-medicated through the use of drugs. The abuse of drugs and alcohol has been a feature of his adult life and he continued to use drugs during the period he was supervised by ACT Corrective Services between February and August 2023.
107․The Defendant attended four counselling sessions with Relationships Australia between March and April 2023, after he had been granted bail in January 2023 in relation to the First Series of offences. He then saw Ms Quigley in September 2023 for the purposes of Ms Quigley preparing a report for the Defendant’s sentencing hearing. Ms Quigley produced her report on 12 October 2023.
108․It was not then until 22 November 2023 that the Defendant obtained a mental health plan. The plan itself was limited to obtaining a referral to a psychologist, which the Defendant obtained on that day.
109․The Defendant attended an assessment appointment with the Low Intensity Cognitive Behavioural Therapy Next Steps Service on 28 February 2024 and has begun engagement with that program. There is no information available to me with respect to his level of engagement or progress so far.

Remorse and Contrition – s 33(1)(w)

110․In Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288, at [38]-[39], the court said that:
[38] … a person wishing to rely on remorse as a mitigating factor needs to satisfy the court that there is genuine penitence and contrition and a desire to atone …
[39] If there is evidence of remorse, and if that remorse is genuine, it is a very important element in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Remorse of this kind enhances prospects of rehabilitation and reduces the need for specific deterrence …
[40] But sentencing discounts, and especially significant sentencing discounts, should not be given unless remorse is established by proper evidence, or unless on a proper basis the judge is content to relieve the offender of the need to discharge that burden …
111․The Court is not bound to accept second-hand evidence of what the defendant said to a psychiatrist or psychologist or other professional, let alone testimonials from family or friends, or statements from the Bar table (Barbaro v The Queen [2012] VSCA 288 at [38]). Absent direct evidence from the defendant, remorse would normally not be established (Mun v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 234). A guilty plea is weak evidence of remorse (Georgopolous v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 246).
112․The Defendant submits that his remorse is evident from a character reference given by Warash Aman, from the Pre-Sentence Report and from Ms Quigley’s report.

Character reference

113․The Defendant tendered a letter written by his friend, Mr Aman, dated 4 March 2024. Mr Aman has known the Defendant since 1999 and describes the Defendant as a hard-working, considerate and caring man to his friends.
114․Mr Aman states that the Defendant appeared broken and sad when he told Mr Aman about the charges that had been brought against him. Mr Aman indicates that the Defendant’s presentation was the result of the fact that: “His marriage was over, his relationships with his children were damaged, and he knew it was he himself that mucked up”.
115․Whether the Defendant’s apparent realisation that he mucked up related to the offences, or to his behaviour that led to FVO 448/2022 being made is unclear. Mr Aman suggests that the offences are out of character for the Defendant. As discussed below, that statement finds some support in the Defendant’s criminal history, although it must be understood in the context of the agreed fact that there was a history of family violence in the Defendant’s relationship with the complainant and there was sufficient material before the Court for it to make FVO 448/2022.
116․While the Defendant submitted that the history of family violence could be referring to both parties, I note that the Defendant also reported to Ms Quigley that the complainant obtained an apprehended violence order against him in 2013. Whether or not the complainant had engaged in family violence towards the Defendant, it is apparent that the Defendant had engaged in family violence towards her.
117․Mr Aman notes that the Defendant has undergone a lot of counselling and has shared with Mr Aman what he has learnt through that process. As noted above, in the Pre-Sentence Report, the authors note that the Defendant attended four relationship counselling sessions with Relationships Australia between March and April 2023, but that he did not have any engagement with the service after that time.

Ms Quigley’s report

118․The Defendant reported to Ms Quigley that:
… on the day of the incident related to the largest number of messages that he “started drinking and messaged her … and her response irritated me and I went on”. He reports he “said sorry the next day” and attributed it to “an autistic meltdown” however says “I recognise she must have felt scared, I kept coming and not letting go” … He also stated “I know the messages were bad” but all I could think was “she wasn’t letting me have my children” and “it eats away at me I regret it so much”.
Pre-sentence report
119․Similarly, to the authors of the Pre-Sentence Report, the Defendant stated that he accepted responsibility and verbalised some victim empathy, but justified his actions. He stated that the excerpts from the messages included in the agreed Statement of Facts had been taken out of context and that he had sent the messages out of frustration because he had not been able to see his children. He also stated that the complainant had not been genuinely fearful for her safety.

Prosecution submissions

120․The Prosecution submits that the Defendant’s statements indicate that he has failed to appreciate how harmful his actions were and, to some extent, accept responsibility for them. The Defendant accepts that alcohol use played a part, at least in relation to the messages sent on 11 October 2022, but that the Defendant simply put the incident down to an autistic meltdown.
121․The Prosecution submits that the Defendant’s attitude also raises a question as to whether he will meaningfully engage in treatment. The Prosecution also notes that the Defendant has been on notice as to mental health conditions for many years, but has generally sought to self-medicate rather than seek professional treatment. The Prosecution notes that the Defendant has only attended one session with a psychologist, in November 2023 and has not attended Relationships Australia since April 2023.

Consideration

122․I am not satisfied that the Defendant appreciates how harmful his actions were, nor that he entirely takes responsibility for his actions. I accept that the Defendant feels some regret but I do not accept that there is “genuine penitence and contrition and a desire to atone”. I am not satisfied that the Defendant is remorseful in a way that enhances his prospects of rehabilitation or in a way that reduces the need for specific deterrence.

Criminal History

123․The Defendant has a limited criminal history.
124․He has committed a number of driving offences, but the last of those was in 2014. He has also committed assault offences, but the first of those (in 2006) is dated and even the more recent of them (in 2018) was committed six years ago. The Defendant also pointed to extenuating circumstances giving rise to the 2018 conviction.
125․There are no convictions that are directly relevant to the offences for which the Defendant is to be sentenced, including no previous offences of family violence.
126․The Defendant’s criminal history entitles him to some leniency. It also suggests that he is capable of rehabilitation. Having said that, specific deterrence remains a relevant purpose of sentencing.

Pleas of Guilty

127․The Defendant submits that he should receive a discount of 25% on the basis that his pleas saved the court’s resources and saved the complainant from having to give evidence, noting that he had difficulty obtaining legal representation and the matter was never listed for hearing. At a minimum, the Defendant seeks a 20% discount.
128․On the other hand, the Prosecution highlighted that the Defendant’s pleas were not entered until 11 August 2023, after a brief of evidence was prepared. The Prosecution notes that the pleas that the Defendant entered were in relation to rolled-up charges following negotiations and submits that the Prosecution case was overwhelmingly strong.
129․The Prosecution also notes that the Defendant was represented by a lawyer on almost every occasion that he came before the Court and that Legal Aid arranged a lawyer for the Defendant when Legal Aid itself were conflicted from representing him.
130․For the First Series of offending, the Defendant’s pleas came after he had entered pleas of not guilty and a brief of evidence prepared. Each of the matters were mentioned many times before a plea of guilty was entered (between 12 and 18 times). The Defendant is entitled a discount of 15% for the utilitarian value of his pleas of guilty for these offences.
131․For the Second Series of offending, the Defendant entered pleas of guilty on the seventh mention of the relevant charges, without first entering a plea of not guilty. He is entitled to a 25% discount for these offences.
132․While the Prosecution submitted that the case against the Defendant was overwhelmingly strong, the Prosecution did not develop that submission. While it is clear that the Prosecution case always centred around the Defendant’s sending of the text messages, and while the Defendant accepts that he sent the messages, the Prosecution has not established that an acquittal in relation to the charges that were laid was realistically unlikely.
133․I agree with the Prosecution that the Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of being sentenced on the basis of the reduced number of charges that the Prosecution decided to pursue, following negotiations, and the maximum discount available for an early plea of guilty. As noted in R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9, at [56]:
... s 35(2)(c) [of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005] supports a focus on the utilitarian value that is associated with the timing of a plea of guilty. An offender can benefit either from a substantial discount for the utilitarian value of an early plea, or from a lower sentence flowing from a lesser charge or fewer charges following negotiations, but should not usually benefit in both ways.
Purposes of sentencing
134․The Defendant submits that specific deterrence, to a large extent, has been achieved by the period of time that the Defendant spent in custody in relation to the First Series of offending. He submits that, although he committed further offences following his release from custody on bail, those offences are not serious enough to warrant specific deterrence.
135․The Defendant submits that rehabilitation is important given the mental health conditions from which he suffers. As noted above, he accepts that more could have been done, but says that he is taking action now.
136․The Defendant submits that the risk to the complainant is low. He submitted that he now accepts that the relationship with her is over and appreciates the consequences of breaching FVO 448/2022.
137․The Prosecution accepts that rehabilitation is an important sentencing consideration in this case but, as noted above, queries whether the Defendant is committed to rehabilitation and whether he can meaningfully engage in appropriate treatment. The Prosecution notes that Ms Quigley’s report identifies what the Defendant should do, but says that the Defendant has taken limited steps in that regard.
138․General deterrence and denunciation are important sentencing considerations in relation to the First Series of offences, given the nature of the offending conduct. General deterrence is also relevant to the Second Series of offences.
139․Given the volume and repetition of offending, the fact that the parties are likely to have an ongoing relationship of some kind in order to care for their children, and the absence of genuine remorse, specific deterrence is also important. I do not agree that the Defendant’s remand in custody has achieved specific deterrence to a large degree, particularly in circumstances where the Defendant breached both FVO 448/2022, and the conditions of his bail, in communicating with the complainant following his release from custody. As discussed earlier in these reasons, the breach of the FVO was not as serious an offence as the offences which are the subject of the First Series of offences, however it is not insignificant offending. This is particularly so in circumstances where the Defendant was on conditional liberty and prohibited from communicating with the complainant at all.
140․Of course, recognition of harm done to the complainant is also an important sentencing consideration.
141․Save for the issue of rehabilitation, I have dealt with the parties’ submissions in relation to the impact of the Defendant’s mental health conditions on the purposes of sentencing, including in relation to the protection of the public, earlier in these reasons. I agree that rehabilitation is an important sentencing consideration, given that there are obvious issues that the Defendant could address that would reduce his risk of offending (in terms of addressing his mental health conditions and alcohol and drug use) and, as is oft discussed, rehabilitation is the most durable guarantor of community protection.
142․However, the weight to be given to that consideration is limited by:
(a)the fact that the Defendant has displayed limited interest in pursuing treatment for his mental health conditions in the past, including since these proceedings were commenced and, therefore, I agree with the Prosecution that there is a question as to how committed he is to rehabilitation;
(b)the fact that there is little evidence of the Defendant addressing his alcohol and drug use issues (and, in fact, he breached his bail conditions twice for the use of drugs); and
(c)the limited evidence of remorse that the Defendant has given.

Sentence
143․Ultimately, I must ensure that the Defendant is adequately punished in a way that is just and appropriate.
144․Several principles are relevant to that exercise.
145․Firstly, careful attention to the maximum penalties for the offences is required.
146․Second, in assessing the appropriate sentence, I note that, even though the limit of the Court’s jurisdiction in this matter is lower than the maximum penalty for each of the offences, I am required to conduct an initial assessment of the appropriate sentence without reference to that jurisdictional limit: R v Doan (2000) 50 NSWLR 115.
147․Third, as I will be sentencing for multiple offences, I have had regard to principles of totality and questions of accumulation or concurrence: O’Brien v R [2015] ACTCA 47, at [26]; and the need to avoid a sentence that is “crushing”: R v Deng; Carberry v The King [2023] ACTCA 32 at [92].

Imprisonment

148․Pursuant to subsection 10(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005, the court may only sentence the Defendant to imprisonment if the court is satisfied, having considered possible alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate.
149․Having considered all the sentencing options, it is my view that there is no appropriate alternative to imprisonment with respect to any of the offences, except for CC2023/5321. I note that there was no dispute at the hearing as to the appropriateness of imprisonment with respect to the First Series of offending. It is also my view that that there is no appropriate alternative to imprisonment with respect to CC2023/5322, having regard to the purposes of sentencing, the objective seriousness of the offence and the context in which it was committed (including in breach of bail conditions).
150․The appropriate sentences of imprisonment are as follows (noting that the allowances for the pleas of guilty approximate, but are slightly more than, 15% for the First Series of offences):
(a)CC2022/12412: 5 months, reduced from 6 months for the Defendant’s plea of guilty;
(b)CC2023/1012: 6.5 months, reduced from 8 months for the Defendant’s plea of guilty;
(c)CC2022/10800: 5 months, reduced from 6 months for the Defendant’s plea of guilty;
(d)CC2022/10798: 2.5 months, reduced from 3 months for the Defendant’s plea of guilty; and
(e)CC2023/5322: 22 days, reduced from 1 month for the Defendant’s plea of guilty.

151․The above periods total almost 20 months, however I consider that a period of 18 months better reflects the criminality of the conduct involved and that making some of the sentences concurrent is therefore necessary.

Time in custody

152․The Defendant has spent 80 days in custody in relation to the First Series of offences, two days in custody for the Second Series of offences, and one day in custody referrable to both series. I will take the two days spent in custody for the Second Series of offences into account in the sentence of imprisonment I impose for CC2023/5322, reducing that sentence to 20 days’ imprisonment. I will backdate the sentences of imprisonment by the other 81 days that the Defendant has spent in custody.

Sentence

153․One of the key issues to resolve in determining the appropriate sentence for the Defendant’s offences is whether he should be immediately required to serve any further part of the sentences of imprisonment by way of full time custody. I have decided that that is not the appropriate course to take for three reasons:
(a)the first is that the Defendant has already spent 83 days in custody, which goes some way to meeting the purposes of sentencing;
(b)the second is that, while I have reservations as to the Defendant’s commitment to rehabilitation, the Defendant has commenced psychological cognitive behavioural therapy now and should be encouraged to continue with that treatment; and
(c)the third is that the Defendant has only communicated with the complainant once in the past 14 months, which I hope is indicative of a preparedness to accept the orders of the court and the wishes of the complainant in terms of the contact he is permitted to have with her.

154․I considered whether an Intensive Corrections Order would be an appropriate alternative to full-time custody, however I do not consider that it is. The Defendant’s ongoing drug use may present issues for the Defendant in complying with the conditions of an ICO and there are also likely to be practical issues in the Defendant complying with an ICO if he moves interstate, as he has indicated that he wishes to do. Given that issue, the authors of the Pre-Sentence Report did not undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Defendant’s suitability for an ICO.
155․I consider that a partially suspended sentence is appropriate in this case (providing for the Defendant to be released immediately, having served 81 days in custody to date), coupled with a Good Behaviour Order which provides for appropriate supervision of the Defendant and the performance of Community Service Work. I note that the authors of the Pre-Sentence Report assessed the Defendant as suitable for a Community Service Work condition.
156․The authors of the Pre-Sentence Report concluded that the Defendant is suitable for a medium level of intervention by ACT Corrective Services and that supervision would include strategies to address the following areas of dynamic risk:
(a)Family/marital;
(b)Leisure/recreation;
(c)Alcohol/drug problem;
(d)Emotional/personal;
(e)Attitudes/orientation.

Orders
157․I make the following orders:
(a)On the charge of stalking with intent to harass, in contravention of a court order (CC2022/12412), the Defendant is convicted and sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment, commencing on 29 December 2023 and ending on 28 May 2024.
(b)On the charge of stalking with intent to harass in contravention of a court order, aggravated as a family violence offence (CC2023/1012), the Defendant is convicted and sentenced to 6.5 months’ imprisonment, commencing on 30 April 2024 and ending on 13 November 2024.
(c)On the charge of threatening to distribute intimate images of another person, aggravated as a family violence offence (CC2022/10800), the Defendant is convicted and sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment, commencing on 14 November 2024 and ending on 13 April 2025.
(d)On the charge of contravention of a family violence order (CC2022/10798), the Defendant is convicted and sentenced to 2.5 months’ imprisonment, commencing on 13 April 2025 and ending on 28 June 2025.
(e)On the charge of contravention of a family violence order (CC2023/5322), the Defendant is convicted and sentenced to 20 days’ imprisonment, commencing on 9 June 2025 and ending on 28 June 2025.
(f)These sentences of imprisonment are to be suspended, after the Defendant has served 81 days’ imprisonment, upon entering into an undertaking to comply with his good behaviour obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 for a period of 24 months with the following additional conditions:
1․     During the period of the order, or such shorter period as determined by the Director-General, the Defendant be on probation subject to the supervision of the Director-General and obey all reasonable directions of that person,;
2․     The Defendant report to ACT Corrective Services within 48 hours of entering into the Good Behaviour Order.
3․     The Defendant is to attend such educational, vocational, psychological, psychiatric or other assessments, programs or counselling as directed, particularly in relation to issues such as:
1.family/marital;
2.leisure/recreation;
3.alcohol/drug problems;
4.emotional/personal; and
5.attitudes/orientation.

4․     The Defendant is to supply samples of breath, saliva, blood or urine for alcohol or drug testing if required by a corrections officer.
5․     The Defendant is to undertake medical treatment and assessment as directed.
6․     The Defendant perform 120 hours of community service work within the next 18 months.
(g)On the charge of attempt to contravene a family violence order (CC2023/5321), the Defendant is convicted and ordered to pay a fine of $500.

I certify that the preceding one-hundred and fifty-seven [157] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Decision of His Honour, Magistrate Temby.

Associate: Niamh Dwyer

Date: 15/04/2024

[2024] ACTMC 5

19 March 2024