JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: POLICE & NURSES CREDIT SOCIETY LTD -v- WEBER & ANOR [2003] WASC 45
CORAM: ROBERTS-SMITH J
HEARD: 12 MARCH 2003
DELIVERED : 17 MARCH 2003
FILE NO/S: CIV 2682 of 2001
BETWEEN: POLICE & NURSES CREDIT SOCIETY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
ANDREA KATHERINA WEBER
First DefendantTHE REGISTRAR OF TITLES
Second Defendant
Catchwords:
Conveyancing - Land titles under the Torrens System - Caveat - Application by mortgagee in possession for order to remove - Sole registered proprietor and mortgagor the son of caveator - Caveator claiming land only transferred to son for purposes of mortgage - Written acknowledgment that caveator retained full estate and interest - Whether caveatable interest - Whether presumption of advancement - Whether arrangement disclosed to plaintiff - Effect
Legislation:
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA), s 138
Result:
Application refused
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr T J Kavenagh
First Defendant : Mr D R Love
Second Defendant : No appearance
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Corsers
First Defendant : Legal Aid of Western Australia
Second Defendant : No appearance
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
American Cyanimid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396
Bennett v Bennett [1879] 10 Ch D 474
Bomford v Barrett [2002] WASC 304
Cohen v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 68 ALR 394
Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 42
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Corwest Management Pty Ltd [1978] WAR 129
Hortico v Energy Equipment (1985) 1 NSWLR 545
Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84
Meyers v Casey (1913) 17 CLR 90
Moody v Cox & Hatt [1917] 2 Ch 71
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v James [2001] WASC 66
Porter v McDonald and The Registrar of Titles [1984] WAR 271
Re Burman's Caveat [1994] 1 Qd R 123
Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340
Venios v Machon (1986) 3 BCL 171
Case(s) also cited:
ROBERTS-SMITH J: By originating summons filed 29 October 2001 the plaintiff called upon the defendants to show cause why caveat H72622 should not be removed from Certificate of Title Vol 2090 folio 724.
The application was supported by an affidavit of Christine Phelps sworn and filed 29 October 2001.
The first defendant filed an affidavit sworn 14 November 2001 in opposition to the application, an amended affidavit sworn 14 November 2001 and a further amended affidavit sworn 5 July 2002.
On 19 November 2001 Anderson J made orders by consent that the matter be tried on affidavit evidence with a right to each party to cross‑examine witnesses and further orders as to the filing and serving of affidavits and the provision of discovery.
When the matter came on for hearing before me on 12 March 2003 the plaintiff called Ms Phelps and the first defendant gave evidence herself. Each was cross‑examined. No other witnesses were called.
Ms Phelps is the Collections Manager for the plaintiff.
There is no dispute that on 25 October 1996 the first…
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- Case
- [2003] WASC 45
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether Weber had a valid caveatable interest and whether the presumption of advancement applied. It was also necessary to determine whether the arrangement had been disclosed to the plaintiff. The court held that the onus was on Weber to demonstrate that there was a serious question to be tried, in the sense that she had, or may have, a valid caveatable interest. The court found that the caveat was not maintainable as Weber had failed to discharge this onus. The court further found that the presumption of advancement applied, and that the arrangement had been disclosed to the plaintiff.
The court ordered that the caveat be removed and that the Registrar of Titles be directed to remove the caveat from the register. The court held that it was not appropriate to grant an order for costs against Weber, given that the caveat had been lodged in good faith.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The onus lies on the caveator to demonstrate that there is a serious question to be tried, in the sense that she has, or may have, a valid caveatable interest (Custom Credit Corporation Ltd v Ravi Nominees Pty Ltd (1992) 8 WAR 42 per Owen J (with whom Malcolm CJ and Walsh J agreed) at 48 ‑ 50). The caveat was lodged under s 137 of the Transfer of Land Act which affords a person a statutory right to protect a legal or equitable interest in land by way of the lodging of a caveat. Section 138 of the Act gives the registered proprietor or a person applying to be registered as the proprietor, a right to summon the caveator to show cause in this Court why the caveat should not be removed. The court is empowered to make such order as the court may see fit. By s 138C of the Act, where a caveator is served with a notice under s 138B(1) and does not obtain an order under s 138C within 21 days after the day on which the notice is served, the caveat will lapse. Subsection 2 of s 138C empowers the court to extend the operation of the caveat or dismiss it. The caveat is to be extended if the court is satisfied that the caveator's claim has, or may have, substance. Section 138 contains no such qualification. Nonetheless it has been held that it would be unusual for a caveat to be set aside pursuant to s 138 of the Act unless the claim to the estate or interest appears to be without any validity or no longer exists. In Porter v McDonald and The Registrar of Titles [1984] WAR 271, Brinsden J pointed out that a large number of the authorities under s 138 and comparative legislation had been discussed by him in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Corwest Management Pty Ltd [1978] WAR 129, particularly at 139 ‑ 141 and reiterated his view that in such an application as had been made in Porter, where the existence of the caveatable interest was not challenged and the caveat by its terms sought to protect that interest, there was no room for an argument based on the balance of convenience that the caveat should be ordered to be removed (274). In Porter, Rowland J said (at 276):"The practice with respect to the removal of caveats is one of long standing. The caveat will not be removed unless the claim to an estate or interest in the land appears to be without foundation. The courts will not, except in the most exceptional case, decide the matter on summons. I believe that those of us who learned of the Torrens System from Dr Kerr The Australian Lands Titles (Torrens) System (1900) will have no trouble with that statement (see pp 492‑495). Brinsden J in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Corwest Management Pty Ltd [1978] WAR 129 collects many of the authorities.It is true of course that the Transfer of Land Act does not expressly or by implication exclude the power of the courts to grant relief in personam: Walsh v Alexander (1913) 16 CLR 293 at 304 and 306. It is also true that in more recent cases courts have indicated that in the exercise of discretion they will have regard to matters that would be relevant to an application for an interim injunction (see Martyn v Glennan [1979] 2 NSWLR 234; Re Clement's Caveat [1981] Qd R 341; Re Jorss' Caveat [1982] Qd R 458). In all those cases the issue is whether the plaintiff or the caveator had an enforceable or existing interest in land. The Privy Council recently in Eng Mee Yong v Letchumanan [1980] AC 331 said at 335:'The caveat under the Torrens System has often been believed to be a statutory injunction of an interlocutory nature restraining the caveatee from dealing with the land ending the determination by the court of the caveator's claim to title to the land in an ordinary action brought by the caveator against the caveatee for that purpose. Their Lordships accept this as an apt analogy with its corollary that caveats are available in appropriate cases for the interim protection of rights to title to or registrable interest in land that are alleged by the caveator but not proved.'At 341 they reiterated the old rule 'in the normal way it is not appropriate for a judge to attempt to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit."