Poignand and Comcare (Compensation)
[2018] AATA 3864
•31 July 2018
Poignand and Comcare (Compensation) [2018] AATA 3864 (31 July 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2016/5670
Re:Billie Poignand
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Mark Hyman, Member
Date:31 July 2018
Place:Canberra
The tribunal has jurisdiction in this matter to consider the applicant’s injuries from 3 July 2014 to 18 May 2016.
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Mark Hyman, Member
Catchwords
COMPENSATION – jurisdiction – later aggravation or development of original condition for which compensation is sought – whether scope of claim includes the later development or aggravation - whether Comcare’s construction of the claim should be followed – whether Comcare has construed the claim too narrowly – whether the tribunal’s jurisdiction extends to the broader claim – tribunal’s jurisdiction extends to the later developments
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss 37, 42D, 43
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4, 5A, 5B, 14, 16, 19, 53, 54, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 72
Cases
Abrahams and Comcare [2006] FCA 1829
Australian Postal Corporation v Sellick [2008] FCA 236
Comcare vBromham [2017] FCA 174
Comcare v Muir [2016] FCA 346
Durham and TNT Australia [2011] AATA 802
Irwin v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2009] FCAFC 33
Kennedy v Comcare [2014] FCA 82
Lees v Comcare [1999] FCA 753
Smith v Comcare [2013] FCAFC 65
Szabo v Comcare [2012] FCAFC 129
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Kotevski [2013] FCA 27
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mark Hyman, Member
31 July 2018
The applicant, Mr Billie Poignand, has claimed compensation from Comcare in respect of a psychological condition which he says was occasioned by his employment at Geoscience Australia. Mr Poignand lodged a claim on 25 May 2016. The claim gave the date at which he first noticed symptoms as 3 July 2014, and gave the same date as that on which he had first sought medical attention. Mr Poignand continued to receive treatment for his condition, and to experience difficulties in the workplace, into 2015. In 2016 Mr Poignand suffered a worsening of his condition which he attributes to further workplace events, occurring on 18 May 2016. On 28 July 2016 Comcare made an initial determination denying liability under the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the SRC Act). That determination stated that events in May 2016 had been considered but would need to be the subject of a separate claim. Mr Poignand requested reconsideration on 11 August 2016, and the determination was affirmed in a reconsideration determination dated 14 September 2016. Mr Poignand applied for review by this tribunal on 26 October 2016.
This decision is about whether the tribunal’s jurisdiction in this matter extends to the events of May 2016. The applicant contends that it does; the respondent argues that jurisdiction does not extend beyond mid-2015. Immediately before a telephone directions hearing on 4 July 2018 the applicant made a submission seeking the broader jurisdiction for which he contends. The tribunal directed that the respondent should make a submission in response on the jurisdictional issue and ruled that the tribunal would decide the question on the papers. Documentation includes the documents (the “T-documents”) submitted under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act) and the submissions of the parties.
The decision does not touch in any substantive way on the merits of Mr Poignand’s claim. Its scope is strictly limited to the jurisdictional question outlined above.
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The legislation governing this matter is the SRC Act, which provides for compensation to be paid in respect of injuries occasioned by employment. As noted above, this decision does not deal with the merits of Mr Poignand’s claim, but rather with the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, which in turn derives from the scope of the original claim. Nevertheless, an outline of the operation of the Act provides important context for the determination of jurisdiction.
Two kinds of injury occasioned by a person’s employment are covered by the SRC Act. A “disease” is covered by section 5B and an “injury other than a disease” by section 5A. Section 5A defines an injury to mean either a disease, or an injury (other than a disease) (an injury may be physical or mental) or an aggravation thereof; for an injury (other than a disease), or an aggravation of such an injury to be compensable it must arise out of or in the course of employment. But any injury (including a disease) is excluded if it is suffered “as a result of reasonable administrative action reasonably taken in respect of the employee’s employment”. Subsection 5A(2) elaborates on the meaning of “reasonable administrative action”. Section 5B defines “disease” to mean an ailment or an aggravation of such an ailment that was “contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee’s employment”. Subsection 5B(2) lists matters that may be taken into account in determining whether the person’s employment contributed to the requisite degree to the ailment or aggravation. Subsection 5B(3) states that “significant degree” means “substantially more than material”.
Section 4 defines “ailment” to mean “any physical or mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition (whether of sudden onset or gradual development)”.
Section 14 of the SRC Act is the gateway provision for compensation. It provides that liability to pay compensation arises in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if it results in death, incapacity for work or impairment (subject to exclusions not presently relevant). Later sections provide for various forms of compensation to be paid, for example section 16 provides for compensation for medical expenses and section 19 provides for payment where an injury makes an employee incapacitated for work.
The process for making a claim for compensation is set out in Part V of the Act. Section 53 states that the Act does not apply to an injury to an employee unless written notice of an injury is given to the appropriate authority as soon as practicable after the injury. Section 54 states that compensation is not payable unless a claim is made in accordance with the approved form and accompanied by a medical certificate; substantial rather than strict compliance with the requirement to make a claim in accordance with the approved form is sufficient.
Part VI of the Act deals with review of claims. Section 61 requires a determining authority, having made a determination, to provide notice to the claimant with reasons and advice on rights of review. Section 62 allows a determining authority, on its own motion or at the request of the claimant or another interested party (such as the employer), to reconsider a determination made under section 61; a request for reconsideration must set out the reasons for the request. The result of reconsideration is a decision affirming, revoking or varying the determination. Under section 63, notice of and reasons for a decision taken under section 62 (defined as a “reviewable decision” in section 60) must be provided to the claimant along with information about rights of review by this tribunal. Section 64 provides for applications to be made to the tribunal for review of reconsideration decisions (i.e. those taken under section 62).
The tribunal’s jurisdiction with regard to a claim, then, is determined by the scope of the reconsideration determination; the scope is in turn influenced by the terms in which the claimant made the claim. Subsection 43(1) of the AAT Act gives the tribunal, for the purposes of undertaking its review, all the powers and discretions conferred on Comcare by the SRC Act.
Under paragraph 69(a), Comcare is to determine claims accurately and quickly; under section 72, Comcare, in doing so, is to be guided by “equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities”.
MR POIGNAND’S CLAIM AND ITS ASSESSMENT
Mr Poignand filled out and submitted a hazard incident report form (T5) on 18 May 2016, reporting an incident that occurred, according to the form, at 3.35 pm on that day. The “injury details” are given as “Aggravation of pre-existing work related psychological injury”. The form nominates the date and time of the report of the injury as 3.40 pm on 18 May 2016. A description of the event, running to two and a half pages, follows, detailing events of that day and extending to the immediately preceding days and a month or more beforehand.
Mr Poignand provided a medical certificate (T6) for the period 19 to 23 May 2016, signed by Associate Professor Malcolm Moore and dated 19 May 2016. In the certificate Professor Moore states that he examined Mr Poignand on 19 May “in relation to the injury stated as occurring in mid-2014” and lists the condition for which it is issued as “Anxiety”. Professor Moore adds that, based on the information available to him, this was caused by “Stressful incident while supervising a group”. The certificate also notes a pre-existing or contributing factor as “Anxiety”. With regard to treatment Professor Moore notes “Referred for counselling with Dr Kingsley Tonkin – psychologist. I expect this will be ongoing for 6 months.” The condition was to be reviewed again on 23 May. Mr Poignand duly saw Professor Moore on 23 May and was issued a further certificate (T7), this time only for that day. The diagnosis was once again given as “Anxiety”, but additional information about pre-existing factors, causation and treatment was omitted.
Mr Poignand’s claim form (T8) is dated 25 May 2016. The date on which Mr Poignand first noticed symptoms is given as 3 July 2014; the date at which he sought medical treatment is given as 3 July 2014 from Dr Tuck Meng Soo, a general practitioner. Mr Poignand nominated the condition for which he claimed compensation as “psychological injury” and denied any previous illness of that kind or any earlier medical treatment. Mr Poignand ticked boxes on the form indicating he had attached a medical certificate (presumably that of 19 May and possibly that of 23 May); and a statement outlining the events supporting the claim (apparently the statement is the letter of 4 August 2015 to Mr Stephen Cook, described below).
Following lodgement of the claim, Comcare proceeded in the usual way to gather medical and other evidence to enable determination of the claim. Professor Moore provided a report (T11) dealing with the events of May 2016, dated 2 June 2016. The report said that “Mr Poignand presents with symptoms of an anxiety disorder” and “This condition has been present since 2014”. Professor Moore said that in his opinion “the incident that triggered Mr Poignand’s recent consultation with me was an aggravation of his pre-existing anxiety disorder”.
Comcare sent Mr Poignand to see a medico-legal psychiatrist, Dr Catherine Oelrichs. In a report dated 13 July 2016 Dr Oelrichs surveyed Mr Poignand’s history as presented to her and arrived at a diagnosis “consistent with a major depressive episode with prominent anxiety factors”. She also concluded that Mr Poignand was likely to have suffered clinically identifiable symptoms of anxiety “at least in 2014”; noted from treating psychologists reports that Mr Poignand had presented with moderate and severe levels of depression and anxiety at different times in mid-2015 and extremely severe levels in June 2016. She concluded that “Mr Poignand is likely to have developed increasingly an episode of depression over a period of time since mid-2015 and worsening into his current presentation”.
Preceding the above events, Mr Poignand wrote to his work health and safety manager, Mr Stephen Cook, on 4 August 2015 (T4b). In this letter Mr Poignand detailed a number of events occurring in his workplace between 12 May 2014 and July 2015, with particular emphasis on events of 3 July and 8 July 2014. Mr Poignand reported that because of these events he had suffered a “psychosocial injury”. On the same day he submitted to Ms Cathy Tiller, Director of People and Culture at Geoscience Australia, a report on bullying, discrimination and harassment by his manager, Dr Keith Sircombe, and another colleague, Ms Janice Trafford; that report covered some of the same ground but in the context of the roles of Dr Sircombe and Ms Trafford. The letter to Mr Cook includes a list of medical appointments and related matters such as certificates. Mr Poignand lists clinical psychology consultations beginning on 9 September 2014 and proceeding to 28 April 2015, with a total of ten consultations.
On 1 Jun 2016 Mr Bryce McNicol, Acting Director, People and Culture at Geoscience Australia, wrote to Comcare (T10) providing two documentary assemblies. The first was a report of an investigation into the complaint against Dr Sircombe and Ms Trafford by HBA Consulting (T10a), dating from September 2015; the second is a group of statements by Mr Poignand’s colleagues, all relating to the events of May 2016 (T10b to T10j).
Comcare’s determination denying liability is dated 28 July 2016 (T19). It was prepared taking into account not only the claim form but also the reports of Professor Moore and Dr Oelrichs; the hazard incident report form and medical certificates from May 2016; an “Employee Statement” dated 4 August 2015, which, from the later discussion, appears to be the letter to Mr Cook of that date (the discussion in the statement of reasons for the decision quotes the date as 4 August 2016 but I assume that is a typographical error); clinical notes from the Airport General Practice, covering 2014-2016; and the assembled material at T10 put forward by Geoscience Australia and described above. The statement of reasons refers to all the above documents but focuses on the events of 2014. It concludes that Mr Poignand sustained a psychological injury, which was significantly contributed to by his employment, but that the claim fell within the exclusionary provisions of the SRC Act. A final paragraph notes that “As outlined above, events relating to an incident dated 18 May 2016 and onwards have been considered however will need to be assessed as a separate claim”.
Mr Poignand requested reconsideration of that determination on 11 August 2016 (T23a). His statement of reasons for the request (T23c) elaborates on the events of 2014 that were the focus for the decision denying liability, although it refers to and attaches two documents from April 2015 (T23e, T23f) that relate to Mr Poignand’s efforts to obtain a performance and development plan and to identify a role and function within the Geoscience Australia laboratory.
Comcare’s reconsideration determination (T25) dated 14 September 2016 affirmed the initial determination. The delegate noted Professor Moore’s opinion that the injury sustained on 18 May 2016 was an aggravation of an injury sustained in mid-July 2014; summarised the report by Dr Oelrichs, including the conclusion that the clinically identifiable symptoms appeared by at least 2014, developed over the period up to mid-2015 and worsened after that time up to the time of the claim; accepted the diagnosis by Dr Oelrichs of “major depressive disorder with prominent anxiety”; was satisfied that Mr Poignand suffered symptoms of an “aggravation of a major depressive disorder, recurrent episode” and that symptoms became clinically significant in 2014; and recounted in moderate detail the events of July 2014. The delegate stated the following:
Whilst I note you submitted an Incident Report in relation to the incident on 18 May 2016, you have claimed you first noticed your condition in the afternoon of the 3 July 2014. There is no evidence before me to support your condition resolved at any time during the period from 2 July 2014 to 18 May 2016, but equally the evidence does not confirm that your symptomatology was outside the boundaries of normal mental functioning until mid 2015 when you presented to your psychologist. Therefore, I will consider the incidents leading up to 3 July 2014 to determine if your condition resulted from reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner in respect of your employment, but note that it may be open to assess events up to mid 2015.
CONSIDERATION
There is a substantial body of case law dealing with the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, especially where there is variation in the scope suggested in the claim and associated documents, the initial determination and the reconsideration determination. It is clear, as the applicant concedes, that new claims entirely outside the scope of the reconsideration determination, introduced at the level of the tribunal’s review, will normally lie outside jurisdiction: Lees v Comcare [1999] FCA 753. But the cases considered here involve matters that fall within an initial claim on one reading and outside it on another. In Abrahams and Comcare [2006] FCA 1829 (Abrahams), Madgwick J, asserting that it was reasonable to allow a claim to be flexibly interpreted, enunciated the following principles (at [18]):
1. In construing a document purporting to be a notice of injury under the Act, a broad, generous and practical interpretation should be made, consistent with both the beneficial purposes of the Act and the likelihood that laypeople of differing levels of education, differing levels of medical advice and differing levels of legal advice (indeed in most cases they would not have any) will be giving the notice.
2. In deciding what injury it is, as to which a claimant has given notice, the purposes of giving notice must be borne in mind. These are to enable Comcare, with the aid of the relevant employing agency, to determine whether the claim should be met.
3. The powers of an original decision-maker would extend to regarding informal notice as having been given in amplification of a notice formally given.
4. Those powers would further extend to enabling a consideration of a claim better explaining, or better justifying, a claim in respect of an injury in respect of which notice had been fairly given.
5. There is not always a bright dividing line available to assist in the decision whether powers of the kinds mentioned are being exercised in aid of a better understanding of a claim made in respect of an injury of which notice has been given, or whether the changed notice is sufficiently fundamental as to indicate that a different injury is being asserted, which will require a different decision from a decision in respect of the originally claimed injury under consideration. In determining that matter, considerations of the purpose of giving notice of injury, and more generally of enabling the decision-maker to have a fair opportunity to investigate the claim properly, are paramount.
Other cases dealing with related issues include Comcare v Muir [2016] FCA 346 (Muir); Szabo v Comcare [2012] FCAFC 129 (Szabo); Durham and TNT Australia [2011] AATA 802 (Durham); Kennedy v Comcare [2014] FCA 82 (Kennedy); Australian Postal Corporation v Sellick [2008] FCA 236 (Sellick) and Comcare vBromham [2017] FCA 174. Although in each case the scope of jurisdiction turns on the particular facts of the matter, some general rules can be discerned (treating the authority as Comcare in each case):
·a broad approach should be taken to determining the scope of the claim (and therefore, potentially, the tribunal’s jurisdiction on review) (Abrahams at [18]; Kennedy at [53]);
·it is up to the tribunal to determine the scope of its jurisdiction; it is not constrained by the way Comcare has chosen to construe the claim (Durham at [51]-[53]);
·the tribunal on review has the same powers as the reviewing decision-maker and the original decision maker (Abrahams at [16]);
·the claim must be construed as a whole, drawing not only on the claim itself but also on the notice of injury, medical certificate and other documentation submitted at the time (Durham at [60]);
·the scope of the claim aligns with the claimant’s condition as determined through later investigations, rather than being limited to the condition originally nominated on the claim form (Abrahams at [20]-[23]);
·the circumstances of the case, and the nature of the condition for which compensation is claimed, may necessitate that the period in which causation is explored is well beyond the dates mentioned in the claim form (Smith v Comcare [2013] FCAFC 65 at [38] (Buchanan J)).
But the scope to adjust the tribunal’s jurisdiction to accord with the claim and the development of the condition covered by the claim is quite constrained. Most cases involve either temporal extension (to dates before or after the date of initial injury notified on the claim form) or to conditions different from those nominated on the form:
·where the applicant has consistently claimed and pursued a claim on a narrow basis, that may have the effect of limiting the scope of the claim and therefore the tribunal’s jurisdiction on review (Szabo at [35]-[40], Muir at [37]);
·the flexibility available to the tribunal in determining its jurisdiction does not extend to allowing a claimant to re-characterise a claim to avoid the effect of exclusionary and other provisions (such as the “reasonable administrative action” exclusion in section 5A of the Act) (Muir at [30]);
·any extension of the scope of a matter must logically flow from the facts, and adequate reasons must be given, for example to justify inclusion of a secondary condition, or the tribunal is at risk of exceeding its jurisdiction (Sellick at [70]-[72]).
The applicant argues as follows (taking account of the submission, the addendum to the submission and the submission in reply):
·any condition for which a claim is made under the SRC Act may involve more than one element - a single event may give rise to a multiplicity of injuries, or one condition may deteriorate over time to generate a secondary condition, or an initial condition may be aggravated by further events in the workplace;
·the case law supports the conclusion that nothing in the SRC Act prevents a claim from extending to such multiple conditions, although a second condition claimed for at a later stage of the process may require a new claim;
·under the statutory provisions governing the claim process, in particular sections 53 and 54 of the SRC Act, Mr Poignand’s claim and associated documents made clear that the ambit extended to the events of May 2016;
·the claim should not be narrowly construed and sections 69 and 72 of the SRC Act require a fair and objective assessment rather than a reading down of the claim, especially given that the SRC Act is beneficial legislation;
·the case law generally supports the proposition that a narrow construction by Comcare does not limit the jurisdiction of the tribunal; an exception is the judgment of Flick J in Muir, but that is inconsistent with other cases, was softened in any case by the judgment of Flick J in Bromham, and the issue is in any case covered by the Full Federal Court in Smith.
The respondent argues as follows:
·although Comcare accepts that a claim should not be narrowly construed, it is important to balance that requirement against the purpose of the claim and associated documentation, which is to allow Comcare to determine whether the claim should be met;
·Mr Poignand’s attached statement referred to in his claim and identified as an account of how he became injured, is limited to events in 2014 and up to mid-2015;
·other supporting information, including medical reports, focuses on events in 2014 as the basis of the claim;
·given the framing of the claim, the decision in the original determination to limit the claim to the period from 2014 to mid-2015 was appropriate;
·Mr Poignand’s request for reconsideration raised no objection to the exclusion of the 2016 events and focused only on the events of 2014;
·if Mr Poignand is permitted to amend the basis for his application now he is effectively following the course condemned by Flick J in Muir.
The tribunal’s jurisdiction arises under section 64 of the SRC Act; the extent of the jurisdiction is decided by the reconsideration determination (section 62 of the SRC Act), which in turn is governed by the scope of the original claim and the documents associated with it (sections 53, 54 of the SRC Act). The authorities quoted above suggest that some flexibility attends the determination of the scope of a claim, with adjustments being made for such matters as the outcome of investigations of a person’s medical condition and the way in which the medical condition may have developed over time. It is for the tribunal, in reviewing a reconsideration determination, to decide the scope of its jurisdiction; it is not limited to or bound by the scope adopted by Comcare.
Comcare has argued (and the applicant appears to have accepted) that the judgment of Flick J in Muir runs contrary to the line of reasoning in other cases that the scope of a claim may be treated flexibly, but I read that judgment differently. My understanding is that the reasoning in the case derives from its particular facts: it was held that the claimant was attempting to evade certain provisions of the Act by urging the reformulation of the claim after the event. That is quite distinct from reformulating the claim on the basis of its original presentation but in terms different from its construction by Comcare.
When Mr Poignand submitted his claim he nominated July 2014 as the date at which he had first noted symptoms, but the accompanying documentation mostly referred to dates in May 2016. The letter that Mr Poignand wrote to Mr Cook dealt with events only up to mid-2015, but the explanation for that is that the letter was written at that time (it is dated 4 August 2015) and it was attached to provide an answer to the question “What happened and how were you injured?”, i.e. it explained the initial incident from which things began. I do not see it as limiting the period that should be taken into account, given the remainder of the documentation provided. Professor Moore’s report and that of Dr Oelrichs deal with the course of his psychological condition from July 2014 through to May 2016. Indeed Dr Oelrich’s report presents the condition as arising at least by 2014 and then gradually developing and deteriorating up to the time of claim. The initial determination, however, without offering any reasons, determined that the events of May 2016 would need to be assessed under a separate claim, despite having taken into account and considered in some detail materials relating to events at that time.
Comcare’s argument for a narrower and more limited scope is given greatest weight by the request for reconsideration that Mr Poignand lodged. In the reasons for that request he dwelt almost exclusively on the events of July 2014; there is no mention of events in 2016. Comcare relies heavily on that in its submission, and draws on Muir in support. It seems likely that Mr Poignand was focused on contesting the arguments used in the determination to deny liability, and is not clear that at this time he had the benefit of legal advice. But in my opinion that narrow focus does not, of itself, serve to limit the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction: the reconsideration decision also deals both with events of 2016 and the medical reports of Professor Moore and Dr Oelrichs, which set out a continuum of Mr Poignand’s medical condition over the entire period from mid-2014 to mid-2016. I do not believe the medical evidence allows me at this time to determine whether the events of May 2016 led to a development in the original condition or an aggravation of that condition, but nor does it seem to me that that distinction is critical to determining whether the later events fall within the original claim. In either case the earlier events flow plainly into the later events: the medical evidence points clearly to the very close relation between them, and Mr Poignand describes the events of May 2016 as a “flare” in his psychological state, suggesting an elevation of an existing condition. I am persuaded that the entire period from 2014 to 2016 was within the scope of Mr Poignand’s claim, and therefore squarely before the initial decision maker. The initial determination, in excluding the events of 2016, was an implied rejection of that part of his claim (Irwin v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2009] FCAFC 33; Telstra Corporation Ltd v Kotevski [2013] FCA 27; Kennedy at [59]).
It is clear from the statement of reasons that the entire claim – including developments in 2016 - was also before the delegate in the reconsideration determination, as the events of 2016 featured prominently in the reasons for the decision. In affirming the initial determination, the reconsideration determination also impliedly rejected the claim for the events of 2016. The paragraph quoted above at [19] is somewhat confusing but does not, in my view, lead to a different outcome. The paragraph raises questions about whether or not the psychological condition had resolved before May 2016 and at what point it had reached beyond the boundary of normal functioning. Both issues may be relevant in determining the matter at hearing but no case is made by the paragraph for deciding the jurisdictional question on the basis of these considerations.
The tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claim not only for the events of 2014 and extending up to mid-2015, but also extending to the events up to and including May 2016.
Comcare has asked that, should I have arrived at this decision, I remit the decision to Comcare for reconsideration under section 42D of the AAT Act; or alternatively adjourn the matter for two months so that Comcare can gather the evidence needed to deal with the extended jurisdiction. The events of 2016 have not been the subject of Comcare’s decision-making to this point, but, as I have just found, they are before the tribunal. Given that a good deal of material relating to the later events is already included in the papers, I am not persuaded that remitting the matter is the most efficient way to proceed. Nor can I see that an adjournment to allow Comcare to complete its case occasions any unfairness to the respondent. Accordingly, the hearing currently listed is vacated and the registry will make a new listing at least two months later than the present dates.
The applicant’s submission raised a question of the applicant’s costs in the event of the matter succeeding at hearing. Any issue of costs can be considered in the context of the substantive hearing.
I certify that the preceding 34 (thirty-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Member Mark Hyman
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Associate
Dated: 31 July 2018
Date of hearing: Hearing on the papers Solicitors for the Applicant: Elringtons Lawyers Solicitors for the Respondent: McInnes Wilson Lawyers
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