Plyable Pty Ltd v Go Gecko (Franchise) Pty Ltd

Link copied
Case Copied 36 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Plyable Pty Ltd & Anor v Go Gecko (Franchise) Pty Ltd & Ors [2016] QSC 249

PARTIES:

PLYABLE PTY LTD

(first plaintiff)

WILLIAM DAVID FEA

(second plaintiff)

v

GO GECKO (FRANCHISE) PTY LTD

(first defendant)

NOEL PATRICK SCULLY

(second defendant)

JOHN MCKINSTRY

(third defendant)

GEOFF EDWARD DOYLE

(fourth defendant)

WAYNE LESLIE HOCKEY

(seventh defendant)

NEM AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD

(eighth defendant)

FILE NO/S:

SC No 988 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Applications for security for costs

DELIVERED ON:

31 October 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

17 May 2016

JUDGE:

Bond J

ORDER:

In relation to the application by the first defendant, the orders of the Court are that:

1.       By 4.00pm on 11 November 2016 the plaintiffs provide security for the first defendant’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding up to and including the first day of the trial of this proceeding in the amount of $205,621.01.

2.       The security to be provided pursuant to the previous order be given by:

(a)     delivery to the Registrar of an irrevocable bank guarantee, in the amount of $205,621.01, drawn in favour of the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court at Brisbane and which guarantee is otherwise on terms satisfactory to the Registrar; or

(b)     payment into Court of the sum of $205,621.01.

3.       The plaintiffs and the first defendant have liberty to apply in relation to the terms of the previous two orders upon first giving seven (7) clear business days written notice to the other parties.

In relation to the application by the second, third and eighth defendants, the orders of the Court are that:

1.      By 4.00pm on 11 November 2016, the first plaintiff provide security for the second, third and eighth defendants' costs of and incidental to this proceeding up to and including the first day of trial, in the amount of $205,621.01.

2.      The security to be provided pursuant to the previous order be given by:

(a)     delivery to the Registrar of an irrevocable bank guarantee, in the amount of $205,621.01, drawn in favour of the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court at Brisbane and which guarantee is otherwise on terms satisfactory to the Registrar; or

(b)     payment into Court of the sum of $205,621.01.

3.      The first plaintiff and the second, third and eighth defendants have liberty to apply in relation to the terms of the previous two orders upon first giving seven (7) clear business days written notice to the other parties.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SECURITY FOR COSTS – FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – PLAINTIFF’S OR APPLICANT’S IMPECUNIOSITY – GENERALLY – where first defendant applies for security for costs against second plaintiff – whether it is appropriate for natural person to provide security in the circumstances

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SECURITY FOR COSTS – FACTORS RELEVANT TO EXERCISE OF DISCRETION – JUSTICE OF THE CASE – where second plaintiff made a series of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Plyable Pty Ltd v Go Gecko (Franchise) Pty Ltd and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] QSC 249
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Plyable Pty Ltd v Go Gecko (Franchise) Pty Ltd, the first defendant applied for security for costs against the second plaintiff. The application was made pursuant to rule 670 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), and the court had to determine if it was appropriate for a natural person to provide security in these circumstances. The court also had to consider whether the justice of the case supported a security for costs order, given the second plaintiff's statements that revealed an oppressive attitude towards litigation. Additionally, the court needed to assess whether the defendants' evidence was cogent and supported the quantum of costs claimed, as the plaintiffs had contested the estimates provided by the defendants.

The court considered several factors in its decision, including the impecuniosity of the plaintiffs, the unpaid costs from prior proceedings, and the personal undertaking offered by the second plaintiff to pay costs. The court found that the second plaintiff's statements indicated an oppressive attitude towards litigation, which was a relevant consideration in exercising its discretion. Furthermore, the court determined that the defendants' evidence was cogent and supported the quantum of costs claimed, despite the plaintiffs' material contesting those estimates. The court ultimately decided that the plaintiffs should provide security for the defendants' costs.

The court ordered that the plaintiffs provide security for the first defendant's costs in the amount of $205,621.01 by a specified deadline. The security could be provided either by an irrevocable bank guarantee or by a payment into court. Additionally, the court ordered that the first plaintiff provide security for the second, third, and eighth defendants' costs in the same amount. The security could also be provided in the form of a bank guarantee or by a payment into court. The parties were granted liberty to apply in relation to the terms of these orders upon giving the required notice to the other parties.

Orders

Orders of the court

In relation to the application by the first defendant, the orders of the Court are that:

1. By 4.00pm on 11 November 2016 the plaintiffs provide security for the first defendant’s costs of and incidental to this proceeding up to and including the first day of the trial of this proceeding in the amount of $205,621.01.

2. The security to be provided pursuant to the previous order be given by:

(a) delivery to the Registrar of an irrevocable bank guarantee, in the amount of $205,621.01, drawn in favour of the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court at Brisbane and which guarantee is otherwise on terms satisfactory to the Registrar; or

(b) payment into Court of the sum of $205,621.01.

3. The plaintiffs and the first defendant have liberty to apply in relation to the terms of the previous two orders upon first giving seven (7) clear business days written notice to the other parties.

In relation to the application by the second, third and eighth defendants, the orders of the Court are that:

1. By 4.00pm on 11 November 2016, the first plaintiff provide security for the second, third and eighth defendants' costs of and incidental to this proceeding up to and including the first day of trial, in the amount of $205,621.01.

2. The security to be provided pursuant to the previous order be given by:

(a) delivery to the Registrar of an irrevocable bank guarantee, in the amount of $205,621.01, drawn in favour of the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court at Brisbane and which guarantee is otherwise on terms satisfactory to the Registrar; or

(b) payment into Court of the sum of $205,621.01.

3. The first plaintiff and the second, third and eighth defendants have liberty to apply in relation to the terms of the previous two orders upon first giving seven (7) clear business days written notice to the other parties.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Plyable Pty Ltd v Go Gecko (Franchise) Pty Ltd revolves around an application for security for costs made by the first defendant against the second plaintiff. The plaintiffs, Plyable Pty Ltd and others, filed a lawsuit against the defendants, including Go Gecko (Franchise) Pty Ltd. In response, the first defendant, along with the second, third, and eighth defendants, applied for an order that the plaintiffs provide security for their costs up to the first day of the trial. The application hinged on various factors, including the impecuniosity of the plaintiffs, the oppressiveness of the litigation from the plaintiffs' perspective, and the plaintiffs' ability to pay the costs.

The matter came before the court following an application for security for costs made by the first defendant under rule 670 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). This application was the focal point of the proceedings. The court had to consider the various factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to order security for costs. Prior to this application, there were no significant procedural steps or decisions that need to be noted as they pertain specifically to this application for security for costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether it is appropriate for a natural person to provide security in the circumstances of this case.
2. Whether the justice of the case supports a security for costs order given the second plaintiff's statements that reveal an oppressive attitude towards litigation.
3. Whether there is reason to believe that the second plaintiff's personal undertaking to pay costs is valuable, considering the evidence of unpaid costs from a previous order and the limited evidence of the plaintiffs' assets and liabilities.
4. Whether the defendants' evidence is cogent and supports the quantum of probable costs claimed for the first day of the trial.

Held
1. The court held it is not appropriate for a natural person to provide security in the circumstances of this case.
2. The justice of the case does not support a security for costs order given the second plaintiff's statements that reveal an oppressive attitude towards litigation.
3. There is no reason to believe that the second plaintiff's personal undertaking to pay costs is valuable, considering the evidence of unpaid costs from a previous order and the limited evidence of the plaintiffs' assets and liabilities.
4. The defendants' evidence is cogent and supports the quantum of probable costs claimed for the first day of the trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Base 1 Projects Pty Ltd v Islamic College of Brisbane Ltd [2012] QCA 114 at [18] Margaret Wilson AJA (with whom McMurdo P and Applegarth J agreed) observed (footnotes omitted, emphasis added):[18] The application for security for costs was made pursuant to r 670 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld). As the primary judge observed, the discretion to order security for costs is unfettered and should be exercised having regard to all of the circumstances of the particular case without any predisposition in favour of an award of security. Her Honour observed:“A number of cases have established that it is not possible to ascertain or list all of the matters relevant to the exercise of the discretion because factors clearly vary from case to case and the weight to be given in any circumstances depends on the circumstances of each case.”She referred in particular to the convenient summary of relevant considerations contained in Beazley J’s judgment in KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd:“1. That such applications should be brought promptly. This is a principle of longstanding: … I should state immediately that there is no issue of delay in this case.2. That regard is to be had to the strength and bona fides of the applicant’s case are relevant considerations: …As a general rule, where a claim is prima facie regular on its face and discloses a cause of action, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court should proceed on the basis that the claim is bona fide with a reasonable prospect of success. …3. Whether the applicant’s impecuniosity was caused by the respondent’s conduct subject of the claim: …4. Whether the respondent’s application for security is oppressive, in the sense that it is being used merely to deny an impecunious applicant a right to litigate: see … In Yandil Holdings Clarke J stated the principle in these terms:‘[t]he fact that the ordering of security will frustrate the plaintiff’s rights to litigate its claim because of its financial condition does not automatically lead to the refusal of an order. Nonetheless it will usually operate as a powerful factor in favour of exercising the court’s discretion in the plaintiff’s favour.’This factor is related to the next, namely:5. Whether there are any persons standing behind the company who are likely to benefit from the litigation and who are willing to provide the necessary security: see … The combined effect of these two principles was summarised by Meagher JA in Hession as follows:‘… a company in liquidation against whom an order for security for costs is sought cannot successfully resist such an order merely by proving that it cannot fund the litigation from its own resources if an order for security is made; it must prove that it cannot do so even if it relies on the other resources available to it (the company’s shareholders or creditors) … Finally, whilst it is both true and important that poverty must be no bar to litigation, what that means is that the courts must be astute to see that no person pursuing a claim which is not frivolous is precluded from doing so by the erection of obstacles which poverty is unable to surmount; it does not mean that proof of insolvency automatically confers an immunity from statutory provisions which deal with insolvent plaintiffs.’6. An issue related to the last guideline is whether persons standing behind the company have offered any personal undertaking to be liable for the costs and if so, the form of any such undertaking: …7. Security will only ordinarily be ordered against a party who is in substance a plaintiff, and an order ought not to be made against parties who are defending themselves and thus forced to litigate: see … Weily’s Quarries v Devine Shipping where Zeeman J stated:‘[t]he general proposition that security ought not to be ordered where the proceedings are defensive in the sense of directly resisting proceedings already brought or seeking to halt self-help procedures is no more than that, a general proposition. It ought not to be elevated to being a rule of law. In many cases of that nature it could be considered oppressive to require security and that in itself may be sufficient to refuse to make an order … …’”