IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M47 of 2018
B e t w e e n -
PLAINTIFF M47/2018
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Defendant
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Defendant
KIEFEL CJ
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
NETTLE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 2019, AT 10.06 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR R. MERKEL, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MR L.T. LIVINGSTON, MR E.M. NEKVAPIL and MS C.G. WINNETT, for the plaintiff. (instructed by Human Rights for All Pty Ltd)
MR S.P. DONAGHUE, QC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia: May it please the Court, I appear with MR P.D. HERZFELD and MS Z.C. HEGER for the defendants. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
KIEFEL CJ: The parties will have received a letter from the Registrar of the Court written at the direction of the Court inquiring as to a preliminary question of fact and, in particular, what inferences the plaintiff seeks to draw from the facts concerning his alleged statelessness and the length of time which he might be detained and whether such inference is available. The parties would appreciate that that issue must necessarily be addressed before the questions in the special case are addressed and the Court would therefore appreciate and would be assisted by argument in that regard before we move to the questions in the special case. Mr Merkel.
MR MERKEL: If the Court pleases. We will address the three questions of the inferences as your Honours have requested. We say in respect of the first inference that we would say can and should be drawn is that there is no real prospect or likelihood that the plaintiff will be removed from Australia potentially in his lifetime, alternatively during his natural life. I will explain the basis for why we are putting it in this way shortly, your Honours.
KIEFEL CJ: The distinction is not entirely apparent to me but perhaps you can come back to that.
MR MERKEL: Yes, your Honour. The second inference is that there is no real prospect or likelihood that the plaintiff will be removed from Australia within the reasonably foreseeable future. Can I ask your Honours to note that we have deleted from both formulations the word “possibility” on the basis that we say real possibility and prospect are superfluous and “prospect” encapsulates what we mean by real possibility as distinct from a mere possibility. I should say that the first two formulations of inferences are based upon the way in which the Court approached the Act in Al‑Kateb.
KIEFEL CJ: The first inference that you seek to draw, just to be clear, is that there is no real prospect or likelihood that the plaintiff will be removed from Australia potentially or during the course of his natural life – is that the terminology?
MR…
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- Case
- [2019] HCATrans 9
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal question before the Court was whether the Minister had the constitutional and statutory authority to grant a visa that would permit the detention of a non-citizen, who had arrived unlawfully, for the purpose of assessing their claims for protection. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) conferred such power, and if so, whether that power was consistent with Chapter III of the *Australian Constitution*, which vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth exclusively in the courts. The plaintiff contended that the RPA visa scheme effectively allowed for executive detention that usurped the role of the courts in determining lawfulness of detention.
The High Court, in a majority decision, found that the Minister did possess the power to grant an RPA visa under the *Migration Act*. The majority reasoned that the Act provided a framework for the management of non-citizens who arrived unlawfully, including the possibility of detention for assessment purposes. Crucially, the Court held that the grant of such a visa did not constitute an exercise of judicial power, as it was an administrative act aimed at managing immigration and border security, rather than a determination of guilt or innocence or the resolution of a dispute between parties in a manner characteristic of judicial proceedings. The Court distinguished this power from the core judicial functions of determining the legality of detention, which remained within the purview of the courts.
The High Court dismissed the plaintiff's application, upholding the validity of the RPA visa and the Minister's power to issue it.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi