PJC and RJC

Case [2008] WASAT 224

JURISDICTION     :   STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM:   HUMAN RIGHTS

ACT: STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT 2004 (WA)

CITATION:   PJC and RJC [2008] WASAT 224

MEMBER:   MR J MANSVELD (MEMBER)

HEARD:   DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS

DELIVERED          :   23 SEPTEMBER 2008

FILE NO/S:   GAA 1809 of 2007

BETWEEN:   PJC

Applicant

AND

RJC
Respondent

Catchwords:

Guardianship and administration - Applicant failed to give proper attention to the basis of the guardianship and administration applications - Costs - Guardianship and administration legislation is protective in its intent - Applicant has a responsibility to consider the substance of (and intent behind) applications for guardianship and administration before proceeding - Applicant to have a reasonable belief, objectively grounded, that the person for whom protection is sought is no longer capable of managing his or her affairs

Legislation:

Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA)
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4, s 4(2)(b), s 16(4), s 43, s 64, s 65
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 47, s 87(1), s 87(2), s 88

Result:

Partial costs awarded to applicant

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr D Taylor

Respondent:     N/A

Solicitors:

Applicant:     David Taylor Solicitors

Respondent:     N/A

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

LC and JS [2007] WASAT 127

Pearce and Germain [2007] WASAT 291 (S)

Re The Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board [2003] WASCA 268

Summerville and Department of Education [2006] WASAT 368 (S)

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL: 

Summary of Tribunal's decision

  1. On 12 November 2007, the Tribunal dismissed applications for administration and guardianship in respect of PJC made by his son RJC under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA).

  2. The applications were dismissed because there was no evidence to support the contention of RJC that PJC was no longer capable of managing his personal and financial affairs.

  3. PJC made an application for costs of $7,058.60 against RJC pursuant to s 87(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).

  4. Despite being put on notice, prior to the hearing of the administration and guardianship applications, that the medical information available to the Tribunal would likely not displace the presumption of capacity under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990, RJC proceeded with the applications.

  5. RJC was unable to provide the Tribunal with any information of probative value both prior to and at the hearing to give weight to his contention that PJC could not manage his affairs other than an assertion that a daughter of PJC was influencing his decision­making.

  6. The Tribunal found that despite the protective intent of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 and the fact that RJC was unrepresented in the proceedings, RJC had failed to give proper attention to the basis of the applications for administration and guardianship.

  7. In the circumstances, the Tribunal ordered that RJC contribute to the legal fees and disbursements incurred by PJC in the sum of $3,697.80.     

Background

  1. These reasons relate to an application for an order for costs under s 87 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act).

  2. The application…

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Details
AGLC
PJC and RJC [2008] WASAT 224
Case
[2008] WASAT 224
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of PJC and RJC, the court addressed applications for guardianship and administration made by RJC against PJC. The dispute involved the capacity of PJC to manage his own affairs and the appropriateness of the applications made by RJC. The court was tasked with deciding whether RJC had acted reasonably in making the applications and whether he was entitled to a costs contribution from PJC. The court's reasoning focused on the need for applicants to have a reasonable belief, objectively grounded, that the person for whom protection is sought is no longer capable of managing their affairs before proceeding with such applications. The court found that RJC's applications were without merit and were made without a reasonable belief that PJC lacked capacity, particularly given the significant medical information suggesting otherwise. Furthermore, the court found that the context of the applications, including RJC's ongoing Supreme Court action against PJC, indicated that the applications were not made in good faith.

The court concluded that RJC's actions were not justified and that he should not have proceeded with the applications without proper consideration of the available evidence. The court's decision emphasised the intrusive nature of guardianship and administration applications and the importance of ensuring that such applications are made with a reasonable belief in the necessity for such intervention. The court held that RJC's failure to properly consider the basis of his applications and the lack of substance in his case warranted an order for costs. As a result, the court ordered RJC to pay PJC $3,697.80 as a contribution to the legal expenses and disbursements incurred by PJC in the proceedings. This decision underscores the court's commitment to ensuring that applications under the Guardianship and Administration Act are made responsibly and with a genuine belief in the necessity for such intervention.

Orders

Orders of the court

In these circumstances I make the following order: o The applicant, RJC, pay to PJC the sum of $3,697.80 by way of costs as a contribution to the legal expenses and disbursements incurred by PJC in the proceedings brought by RJC under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA).

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MR J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MR J

Whilst it is accepted that the primary intent of the GA Act is the protection of adults under a disability (see EM Heenan J in Re The Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board[2003] WASCA 268 at [43] and [44]), and this can result at times, in the making of applications of a somewhat exploratory nature, it is nevertheless the case that an applicant has a responsibility to consider the substance of (and intent behind) the application that he or she is making before proceeding with the application. The making of administration and guardianship applications under the GA Act are very intrusive and lead to the exploration of sensitive issues in a person's life. They should not be made lightly. A fundamental element then, in the task for an applicant, is the need to have a reasonable belief, objectively grounded, that the person for whom protection is sought is no longer capable of managing his or her affairs. In the case before me, the Tribunal found that the applications for guardianship and administration made by RJC were without merit. Moreover, prior to the hearing, RJC was given notice of the significant medical information then before Tribunal which strongly suggested that the presumption of capacity likely could not, on that information, be displaced in respect of PJC. I do not accept the submission of RJC that the information was not current given that PJC's general practitioner of 14 years had provided the Tribunal with his up­to­date assessment of PJC's capacity which was consistent with earlier assessments. RJC was given the opportunity to provide the Tribunal with whatever objective information was available to him to substantiate his contention that PJC was in need of protection, but was unable to do so. I agree with the submission of counsel for PJC, that the information ultimately provided both prior to and at the hearing by RJC was many years old and of no probative value. What was provided by RJC was an assertion that as PJC's daughter, NG, assisted him in various activities, she was therefore effectively making the decisions for him. This issue is dealt with in the October 2007 report of Dr NDF and I accept that his assessment of PJC as capable of managing his affairs was made in the knowledge of the assistance given to him by NG. In these circumstances I find that RJC was aware of the lack of the substance of his case but chose to continue with the applications with no real prospect, on the information then available, of having the Tribunal make the orders he was seeking. I further find that the context in which RJC made the applications was his Supreme Court action against PJC, the fact that these actions (although of many years standing) were progressing to trial and that an order of the Tribunal might assist him in the conduct of the action. If, as RJC submitted, he held a belief that PJC had lost the capacity to manage his affairs many years ago (referencing the alleged conduct of PJC as executor of his late wife's estate), then it would not be unreasonable to have expected him to have made applications under the GA Act much earlier.