Pitman & Hynes
[2021] FamCA 300
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| PITMAN & HYNES | [2021] FamCA 300 |
| FAMILY LAW – COURTS AND JUDGES – Recusal application on the basis of apprehended bias – Whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide – Application dismissed. FAMILYLAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for an adjournment – Where the applicant filed a Notice of Constitutional Matter pursuant to s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – Whether the Judge made violated the judicial oath by continuing to engage with representation of the father which was granted by way of s 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the notice does not “really and substantially” raise a matter under the Constitution or involving its interpretation – Application dismissed. FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Review of Registrar’s decision – Purported Application contempt – Where mother sought review of a decision of a Registrar to reject for filing a document purporting to alleged contempt of the Court by the father – Where mother sought variation to parenting orders – Where clearly inappropriate process used by the mother – Where mother purported to apply under s 112AP of the Act, rather than Division 13A of Part VII – Application for review dismissed. FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Joinder of children as parties to proceedings – Where mother alleges children are necessary parties – Where the mother made no submission in support of her application – Where mother filed and served no evidence in support of her application – Application dismissed. FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Stay of orders – Where the mother makes no submission in support of her application – Where mother filed and served no evidence in support of her application – Where no basis for a stay disclosed by evidence or argument – application dismissed. |
| Constitution Family Law Act1975 (Cth) ss 26, 69C, 100B, 102NA, 112AP Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 6.02 |
| ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Limited Australian Securities and Investment Commission v White (Fed C of A, Drummond J, 16 July 1998, unreported) Doughty-Cowell v Kyriazis [2018] VSCA 216 Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Johnson v Johnson (2000) CLR 488; 174 ALR 655 Nagel & Clay [2020] FamCA 326 Narain v Parnell (1986) 9 FCR 479 Nikolic v MGIC [1999] FCA 849 Re An Application by Public Service Association (NSW); Re Industrial Union of Employees (Commissioned Police Officers) Award (1947) 75 CLR 430 The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 Valdez & Fraser [2017] FamCAFC at 18 Xuarez & Vitela [2017] FamCAFC 139 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Pitman |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Hynes |
| INTERVENOR: | Ms O’Donnell |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: |
| FILE NUMBER: | WOC | 772 | of | 2011 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 19 April 2021 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Harper J |
| HEARING DATE: | 19 April 2021 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | In person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: | Mr Reeves |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT: | El Baba Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Rebehy |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms O’Donnell |
AMENDED on 20 April 2021 pursuant to r 17.02 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)
Orders
Leave be granted to the Applicant to file in Court an Application in a Case emailed 19 April 2021 and supporting affidavit sworn on 19 April 2021.
The Application in a Case filed on 19 April 2021 be dismissed.
The Applicant’s oral application requesting the proceedings be adjourned on the basis of her Notice of a Constitutional Matter filed on 19 April 2021 be refused.
The Application in a Case filed on 17 July 2020 by the Applicant, seeking a review of a decision by Registrar Ryan to reject a Contempt Application be dismissed.
The Application in a Case filed on 17 March 2021 seeking to join the subject children, being X born … 2003 and Y born … 2004, to the proceedings be dismissed.
The Application in a Case filed on 15 November 2019 by the Applicant, seeking a stay of orders made on 5 December 2018 by Justice Baumann and orders made by Justice Harper on 5 November 2019 be dismissed.
Leave be granted to the Independent Children’s Lawyer to apply to Chambers to relist the proceedings on 7 days’ notice.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Pitman & Hynes has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNY |
FILE NUMBER: WOC 772 of 2011
| Ms Pitman |
Applicant
And
| Mr Hynes |
Respondent
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
In these long and acrimonious proceedings, there were listed for hearing three Applications in a Case filed by the Applicant Mother [(“the mother”)].
On 19 April 2021 the mother filed in Court an Application in a Case seeking the following orders:
(1)That Harper J recuse himself from presiding over the matter of WOC772/2011, Pitman & Hynes, on the grounds of bias and engaging in multiple and intentional acts of judicial misbehaviour and incapacity.
(2)Order that Harper J, recuse himself from presiding over the matter of WOC772/2011, Pitman & Hynes, on the grounds of bias and perverting the course of natural justice.
It can be seen from the proposed orders that the mother raises or purports to raise issues of bias, judicial misbehaviour, incapacity and perversion of the course of “natural” justice.
These proceedings concern two children, one being X, born in 2003, and Y, born in 2004. It can be seen that X will reach his majority in 2021, that is, within a few months, and Y will reach her majority in 2022.
The material relied upon by the mother in support of her recusal Application was set out in her affidavit of 19 April 2021. She also made a short submission orally which made reference to section 26 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which specifies the nature of the judicial oath that a judge of this Court must swear upon their appointment. The affidavit relied upon by the mother makes assertions that on over 20 occasions I have been unable to understand the submissions she is making, that I accused her of calling me a “cunt” on one occasion and making an official note of that fact.
The affidavit also purports to identify judicial misbehaviour and incapacity by a reference to something called a “Formal Judicial Complaint” that the mother included in a document called a “Notice of Constitutional Matter”, which she filed on Friday, 16 April 2021. That document includes a copy of an email, which is headed “Formal Judicial Complaint”, which apparently was sent to the Federal Attorney-General, the Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia, the Attorney General of New South Wales and the Chief Executive Officer of Legal Aid New South Wales.
As best I could understand it, in that complaint the mother asserts that by reason of making an order for the application of section 102NA(2) to these proceedings, I, as a judge of the Family Court of Australia, in some fashion have misused Commonwealth funds and have perverted the course of justice by permitting the father to have representation in these proceedings. In my view, nothing that the mother has pointed to or asserted, either in writing or orally could on any rational basis, be characterised as judicial misconduct, incapacity or be characterised as a perversion of the course of natural justice.
The mother's affidavit of 19 April 2021 makes reference to standard authorities concerning the apprehension of bias. The mother does not appear to rely upon an allegation of actual bias in the sense that she contends that my mind is not open to persuasion. In the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507, Gleeson and Gummow JJ, made clear that in relation to an allegation of actual bias against a judicial decision-maker, the question is not whether the decision-maker's mind is blank but whether it is not open to persuasion.
The mother relies upon authorities concerning a reasonable apprehension of bias. The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias has been articulated in a number of well-known High Court decisions. Where there is an allegation of apprehended bias, the test is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide: Johnson v Johnson (2000) CLR 488; 174 ALR 655; [2000] HCA 48 (“Johnson”); and the well-known decision of Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; 176 ALR 644; [2000] HCA 63 (“Ebner”) . In Ebner, the High Court held that the test of apprehended bias requires satisfaction of a two-step process.
First, the identification of what it is said might lead a decision-maker to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits and, secondly, there must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. It should be emphasised, as I said in Nagel & Clay [2020] FamCA 326 at [137], that the relevant reasonable apprehension is not that of, and is not determined by, the subjective perceptions of any party to the proceedings. It is objectively determined reasonable apprehension of a hypothetical fair-minded observer. Nonetheless, the impression that might reasonably be made on one or other of the parties by the facts is not completely ignored, as Kirby J said in Johnson at [52]:
The presumptive state of mind of the hypothetical observer has been the subject of judicial commentary in Smits v Roach, where Kirby J described this observer as a hypothetical construct who will be familiar with the general nature and course of the proceedings, its outcome and the suggested disqualifying elements.
Many other decisions have commented upon this putative state of mind. For example, in the Victorian Court of Appeal decision of Doughty-Cowell v Kyriazis [2018] VSCA 216 at [52] - [53] the Court said:
The level of knowledge and sophistication which a fair-minded observer hypothetically brings to the question is that of a layperson (not a lawyer) informed as to the relevant facts of the case and sufficiently knowledgeable and informed to be capable of bringing a rational and reasonable assessment to bear.
In light of those well-established principles, I am not satisfied that the mother has identified anything that would lead a fair-minded lay observer to conclude that I would not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question that will be placed before me in these proceedings. Although the mother points to what she contends are 20 occasions where I did not understand what she says, they were occasions in which the somewhat confused submissions she made were the subject of questioning by me so that I could give her the opportunity to explain to me, as carefully as possible, what her arguments actually entailed.
The present Application is an example of what appears to be the mother confusing a number of different elements which lead her to form the view that somehow there has been judicial misconduct which indicates an apprehension of bias. The basis, shorn of its unnecessary verbiage, appears to be that I, by making an order pursuant to section 102NA(1)(c)(iv), somehow mishandled government funding which has been put in place for the purpose of providing representation in circumstances where the Court orders section 102NA(2) to apply to proceedings.
A fair-minded lay observer could not sensibly form the view that the asserted matters, in any way, indicated an apprehension of bias. Furthermore, a reference to the terms of the asserted official or formal judicial complaint seems, in essence, to show that the mother canvassed in that complaint precisely the same matters which she has identified as constituting judicial misconduct in her affidavit, leading once again back to the order made for the application of section 102NA(2).
In those circumstances, I am not persuaded that any order should be made for me to recuse myself and accordingly I dismiss the Application in a case filed in Court by the mother on 19 April 2021.
The Applicant Mother on 16 April 2021 also filed a document entitled Notice of Constitutional Matter which purports to raise a contention that the proceedings involve a matter arising out of The Constitution or involving its interpretation within the meaning of section 78B of the Judiciary Act1903 (Cth). I note that the mother also contends that on 12 October 2020 she filed an earlier Notice of Constitutional Matter in these proceedings. There is no record of such a document being filed in these proceedings, although it does appear it was filed in related appeal proceedings.
In any event, there is no evidence that any state or Federal Attorney-General responded to any notice filed on 12 October 2020 in these proceedings. The mother contends that, by reason of filing her Notice of Constitutional Matter that the three interlocutory applications listed for hearing before me on 19 April 2021 cannot proceed. Her contention appears to be that by the very fact of filing the notice, the proceedings must be adjourned.
As noted, these are parenting proceedings which involve the two children, X and Y. The proceedings have been listed for final hearing before me twice, once in April 2020 and then again on 18 January 2021. Each time, by reason of the COVID-19 pandemic, the final hearing was adjourned. It was common ground between the parties that it was very important that the proceedings be dealt with face to face in light of the various allegations made in the proceedings.
I note that on 10 July 2020, I made orders that section 102NA(2) of The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) apply to the proceedings. I made this order by reason of the mother making numerous contentions that the father had engaged in family violence towards her during the course of the relationship, noting that, despite that, the children have lived with their father since about 2016 and have consistently, while the proceedings have been before me, expressed their views through the Independent Children's Lawyer that they do not wish to spend time with their mother.
It has been well settled since at least the decision in Re An Application by Public Service Association (NSW); Re Industrial Union of Employees (Commissioned Police Officers) Award (1947) 75 CLR 430; [1947] HCA 31, that an ostensible constitutional point must be really and substantially raised by a Notice of Constitutional Matter so that the Court could be satisfied that it does involve a matter arising under The Constitution or involving its interpretation. In Narain v Parnell (1986) 9 FCR 479; 64 ALR 561 at 486 - 489, Burchett J said:
Section 78B only operates when the circumstances it postulates are made to appear to the Court. It does not operate simply because a party asserts those circumstances. It is clear, from the reference to the possibility of intervention or removal of the cause to the High Court upon the initiative of an Attorney-General that what the section contemplates is a constitutional question which is a live issue in the proceedings.
The question of adjournment of proceedings because of section 78B of the Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) was considered by French J (as he then was) in ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Limited [1999] 167 ALR 303 where his Honour said at paragraph 14:
Section 78B does not impose on the Court a duty not to proceed pending the issue of a notice, no matter how trivial, unarguable or concluded the constitutional point may be. If the asserted constitutional point is frivolous or vexatious or raised as an abuse of process, it will not attach to the matter in which it is raised the character of a matter arising under the constitution or involving its interpretation.
French J cited Nikolic v MGIC [1999] FCA 849 and Australian Securities and Investment Commission v White (Fed C of A, Drummond J, 16 July 1998, unreported).
In Xuarez & Vitela [2017] FamCAFC 139, the Full Court at [11] – [12], after citing the relevant authority said:
[11] The word "matter" in section 78B has the same meaning as in chapter 3 of the constitution. Assertion or non-assertion of a constitutional question is not determinative of the character of the matter. Where the assertion is made, it is nonetheless a matter for the Court to be satisfied that the challenge does not involve a matter arising under the constitution or involving its interpretation.
[12] Section 78B will not be engaged merely because a party is interested in the resolution of a particular question. For the provision to be engaged, the resolution of the constitutional question becomes necessary upon the ascertained facts of the case. In other words, the facts relied upon are raised bona fide and are sufficient to raise the question.
As I understood the argument of the mother by reference to her Notice of Constitutional Matter, she contends that there is a constitutional issue raised because I violated my judicial oath by continuing to engage with the representation of the father, which she contends is representation that he has only by reason of an order for the application of section 102NA(2) made by me on 10 July 2020. She argues that because that order is the source of any funding for representation of the father, I am somehow responsible for his representation in the Court before me both on 19 April 2021 and on earlier occasions. The mother contends that the order of 10 July 2020 was made only in relation to proposed hearing dates on 18 to 20 January 2021 and because of their subsequent adjournment by reason of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was no basis for the father's continuing representation before me and that somehow that was a matter which I, in proper discharge of my judicial oath, should intervene with and dismiss his representation from my presence in the courtroom.
The mother's argument appears to be to the effect that, by reason of the order for the application of section 102NA being made by reference to specific hearing dates in the future and only in relation to cross-examination, it was illegal for me to engage with any representation or lawyers of the father in other circumstances, including in relation to the applications before me today.
The mother appears to labour under the misapprehension that because it is the Court's role to either determine the mandatory application of section 102NA(2) or exercise a discretion to make an order that it apply that, therefore, the Court somehow controls the representation thereby afforded to a party in the proceedings. The basis upon which the father obtains representation for his case in this Court is not a matter in which this Court would generally become involved and certainly nothing pointed to by the mother suggests that there is any basis for me to question, or refuse to engage with, the father’s representation that appears for him.
The mother seemed to make the remarkable contention that in fact it was somehow a perversion of the course of justice for the father to be allowed to have representation before me, because her view was that the way the funding scheme for representation to support orders section under 102NA should be conducted or administered was to prevent such representation being available.
The mother, in submissions made a number of different ways, conceded the father was entitled to have representation or appear for himself. What she contends he is not allowed to do is take the advantage of a funding scheme which has been put in place to support section 102NA orders and in this specific case, her contention appears to be that, by reason of the adjournment of the hearing on 18 January 2021, it is illegal for him to continue to be represented by lawyers who have been engaged through the scheme supporting section 102NA orders.
Those contentions are not ones which I consider to have any merit. As I put to the mother in the course of submissions, they appeared to confuse the role of the Court and the role of those who administer the funding schemes to support the operation of section 102NA. The assertion which appears to be made that, by engaging with lawyers representing the father today or by adjourning the proceedings on 18 January 2021, I somehow violated my judicial oath, is something that I reject.
It became clear during the course of submissions which the mother made a number of times during the course of delivery of this judgment that she was under the impression that the scheme or program of funding which supported the operation of section 102NA was somehow under the control or administered by the Court or by me. That misapprehension seems to lie at the heart of the various assertions she has made and it is, of course, utterly incorrect.
Turning to the terms of the Notice of Constitutional Matter, on its face, in my view, for the reasons given, it raises no matter concerning the interpretation of the constitution. I am not satisfied that the Notice of Constitutional Matter document really and substantially involves a matter arising under the constitution or involving its interpretation. The document borders on the vexatious, making allegations which border on scandalising the Court and are based, in my view, clearly upon misapprehensions which have been nursed by the mother relating to the funding of representation to support the operation of section 102NA.
I make one further point. Within his helpful submissions in support of Applications listed before me today, Mr Reeves addresses the issue of representation in connection with section 102NA. As he points out section 102NA has nothing to say about when and where a legal representative may appear. The only effect upon proceedings is to prohibit cross-examination by parties personally. Mr Reeves further submitted that the scheme can have no effect on the Court's procedure as it is simply a means to provide funding for parties to obtain legal representation and not legislation altering the Court's powers. I agree.
Accordingly, I refuse the mother's Application to adjourn the proceedings on the basis of her purported Notice of Constitutional Matter.
As noted, there were listed before me, on 19 April 2021, three applications which had been brought by the mother. These were an Application for a stay of orders of 5 November 2019 and 5 December 2018, together with various other procedural parenting orders, an Application in a Case seeking a review of a decision of a registrar refusing the filing of a document entitled Application - Contempt and an Application in a Case filed by the mother on 17 March 2021 seeking to join the children the subject of the proceedings as parties.
As already made clear, prior to proceeding to hear and determine the Applications, the Court dealt with an Application for recusal filed in Court on 19 April 2021 by the mother, which was refused, and an application to adjourn the proceedings on the basis of a Notice of Constitutional Matter filed by the mother on 16 April 2021, which was also refused. After the determination of those applications, the mother was invited to make submissions in relation to her Applications in a Case but she declined to engage any further in the proceedings and left the courtroom. I note that orders had previously been made for the parties to file case outlines in relation to the three applications that were listed today.
Counsel appearing for the father and the Independent Children's Lawyer both provided helpful submissions. The mother filed nothing in support of her own Applications in a Case.
Dealing first with the registrar's decision to refuse the filing of an Application - Contempt, the document in question, whilst entitled an “Application – Contempt”, appears to be something of a hybrid document because rather than simply seeking orders for the contempt to be suitably punished, it goes to some length in setting out what the mother contends should be alternative parenting orders in respect of the children the subject of the proceedings.
The oldest child, X, will turn 18 in 2021 and the younger child will turn 18 in 2022. As already noted in my earlier reasons for judgment, both children have expressed clear views, through the Independent Children's Lawyer, that they wish to have nothing to do with their mother and the older boy in particular has made the point that if he wishes to re-engage with her once he has become an adult, then he will make his own decision at that time. The mother confirmed that the Application - Contempt was brought pursuant to section 112AP of the Act rather than pursuant to Division 13A of Part VII, which deals with contraventions of parenting orders.
The Rules make specific provision for the appropriate document to be filed. Where section 112AP is relied upon, the document is an Application - Contempt, whereas where the provisions of Division 13A are relied upon, the appropriate document is said to be an Application in a Case. It seems to me that the decision of the registrar was correct in refusing to allow the filing of the mother's document because it confused relief available under section 112AP with relief available for contraventions of parenting orders pursuant to the provisions of Division 13A of Part VII, including the possibility of varying existing parenting orders.
The father contended that, on its face, the Application - Contempt was frivolous, citing Valdez & Fraser [2017] FamCAFC 18 together with the authorities cited therein, pointing out that the mother's contention was that there had been some flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court by the father. She provided no coherent evidence, indeed, no evidence at all that she identified to support such a contention. I do note that in some of her material there appeared to be assertions about events that happened in 2016 involving agencies in Queensland but it was entirely mysterious as to how the father was said to have engaged in a flagrant challenge to the authority of the Court or had otherwise committed a contempt.
Accordingly, I dismiss the Application filed on 17 July 2020 seeking a review of the decision of the registrar.
I turn then to the Application seeking joinder of the children to the proceedings. There is no prohibition on children being parties in parenting proceedings in which they are children of a marriage. It is specifically provided in section s 69C(2)(b) that children may institute proceedings. The mother appeared to rely upon Rule 6.02(1) which provides that:
A person whose rights may be directly affected by an issue in a case, and whose participation is necessary for the Court to determine all issues in dispute must be included as a party to the case.
There are however well-known restrictions upon the participation of children in proceedings. For example, section 100B provides that a child must not swear an affidavit unless they are seeking to become a party or by order of the Court, nor may they be called as a witness in the proceedings without an order of the Court. As submitted by counsel for the father, this is consistent with the paramountcy principle. But in any event, there has been an Independent Children's Lawyer appointed for these children, who has appeared and presented their position a number of times to the Court with clarity and clear understanding of what the children's views are.
For that reason alone, but more broadly in the circumstances of this case, it seems to me it could not be contended sensibly that the children are necessary as parties to the proceedings when their interests are ably protected by an Independent Children's Lawyer. Accordingly, I dismiss the Application in a Case filed on 17 March 2021 by the mother seeking to join the children to the proceedings.
That leaves the Application in a Case filed by the mother seeking the stay of earlier orders of the Court.
The orders earliest in time in respect of which the mother purports to seek a stay are those of Baumann J dated 5 December 2018.
The reason why the mother sought a stay of those orders was not made clear by her in any submissions which she deemed it appropriate to provide to the Court. The orders in question, in broad terms, were in the nature of interim orders for the children to live with the father, for him to have sole parental responsibility and to spend no time with the mother, with restraints upon the mother contacting the children. The reasons why the mother now sought a stay of those orders after such a long delay was not explained. I infer that it is likely she perceived that a stay of those orders may precipitate a situation where the Court was forced in some way to permit a reunification session between her and the children, which is something she has consistently sought but which I note was advised against by the senior consultant in her memorandum dated 27 February 2020.
I am not satisfied any stay should be ordered in respect of the orders of Baumann J.
The second orders in respect of which stay is sought are orders that were made by me on 5 November 2019. Those were orders in the nature of procedural orders, including the filing of consolidated trial affidavits and leave for the Independent Children’s Lawyer to issue subpoenas. The purpose of the stay sought by the mother completely eludes me and no basis has been demonstrated by her, either through evidence or argument for such a stay. As pointed out by counsel for the father, Orders 1 to 3, which form part of the orders which the mother seeks to stay, in particular have been superseded by further orders.
Accordingly, I also dismiss the mother's Application in a Case filed on 15 November 2019.
I should not leave this matter before pointing out that the children the subject of these proceedings have now laboured under the burden of litigation for about 10 years. They have expressed clear views through the Independent Children's Lawyer that they are happy with the current arrangements and do not wish to spend time with or communicate with their mother. It has been pointed out to the mother on several occasions, when the matter has been before the Court, that it is unlikely that the Court would be persuaded it was in their best interests to make orders compelling them to spend time with the mother, bearing in mind their age, particularly the oldest boy, X, and strong views that they have expressed.
Nonetheless, the mother has filed numerous interlocutory applications, as the reasons for judgment delivered today demonstrate. Be that as it may, the proceedings are not finalised and until the mother either consents to the current orders becoming final or some other final parenting regime is put in place, they remain on foot. Accordingly, the matter must be listed in the future so I grant leave to the Independent Children's Lawyer to apply to have the matter relisted on seven days’ notice for the purpose of allocating further final hearing dates.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Harper delivered on 19 April 2021.
Associate:
Date: 13 May 2021
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