Pirt Biotechnologies Pty Ltd v Pirtferm Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE FULL COURT (WA)

CITATION:   PIRT BIOTECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD -v- PIRTFERM LIMITED & ORS [2001] WASCA 96

CORAM:   IPP J

MURRAY J
OWEN J

HEARD:   11 DECEMBER 2000

DELIVERED          :   2 APRIL 2001

FILE NO/S:   FUL 29 of 2000

BETWEEN:   PIRT BIOTECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD

Appellant

AND

PIRTFERM LIMITED
First Respondent

STANLEY JOHN PIRT
Second Respondent

MARGARET WATTS PIRT
Third Respondent

Catchwords:

Contract - Whether concluded oral agreement established - Intention to create legal relations - Whether there was agreement upon essential terms - Certainty - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr M J McCusker QC & Mr G J Archer

First Respondent           :     Mr R L Hooker

Second Respondent      :     Mr R L Hooker

Third Respondent          :     Mr R L Hooker

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Eley Palmer Archer

First Respondent           :     Blake Dawson Waldron

Second Respondent      :     Blake Dawson Waldron

Third Respondent          :     Blake Dawson Waldron

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540

Devries v Australian National Railways Commission (1993) 177 CLR 472

Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349

State Rail Authority (NSW) v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (In Liq) (1999) 160 ALR 588

Toyota Motor Corp Aust Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

Case(s) also cited:

Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167

Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Frost Holdings Pty Ltd [1989] VR 695

Australian Capital Territory v Badcock (2000) 169 ALR 585

JC Williamson Ltd v Lukey (1931) 45 CLR 282

Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cases 467

McBride v Sandland (1918) 25 CLR 69

Ogier v Booth (1889) 9 VLR (E) 160

Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422

Woodside Offshore Petroleum Pty Ltd v Atwood Oceanics Inc [1986] WAR 253

  1. IPP J:  I have read the reasons of the Hon Justice Murray.  I am in agreement with those reasons and have nothing further to add.

  2. MURRAY J:  This is an appeal from a judgment of Wheeler J dismissing the appellant's claim against the respondents.

  3. The first respondent is a company of which the directors are the second respondent, Professor Pirt, a retired Professor of microbiology, and the third respondent, his wife, Dr Pirt.  It is the owner of the intellectual property in a waste disposal process invented by Professor Pirt.  It holds, or has applied for, patents in respect of this property in a number of countries.  A company called Glaxo Operations UK Ltd ("Glaxo") is the grantee of a non‑exclusive licence to use the process in return for the payment of a royalty.  Glaxo has not yet made use of the process so as to incur a liability to pay the royalty, but it is conceded by all parties that the process is potentially one of considerable value to its owner and to a licensee or…

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Details
Case
[2001] WASCA 96
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Pirt Biotechnologies Pty Ltd, the appellant, brought proceedings against Pirtferm Ltd, the respondent, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The case centred around the existence of an oral agreement for the establishment of a joint venture company to commercially exploit a process technology. The appellant argued that the respondent had breached this agreement, while the respondent contended that no binding agreement had been made.

The central legal issue was whether the parties had concluded an oral agreement that established a joint venture and whether this agreement was intended to create legal relations. The court needed to determine if there was an intention to create legal relations and if the essential terms of the agreement were certain enough to form a binding contract. The court had to examine the communications between the parties and the surrounding circumstances to determine the existence of such an agreement.

The court held that the parties did not intend to create legal relations through the oral agreement. The letter of intent dated 10 October 1996, which outlined the parties' understanding and commitment towards the establishment of a joint venture, did not create a binding contract. The court found that despite the detailed terms of the proposed agreement, there was no clear intention to create legal relations. The onus was on the appellant to establish the existence of the contract and the intention to create legal relations, which it had not discharged. Therefore, the court ruled in favour of the respondent.

The court ordered that the respondent was not liable for breach of the alleged oral agreement. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was not required to pay any damages to the appellant.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MURRAY J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MURRAY J

By "intention" in this context the law is concerned with an objective intention, imputed to the parties who are said to have contracted, from a consideration of what was said and done in the course of their dealings. It is not a subjective intention of the parties individually, and so it will be irrelevant for any party giving evidence to say that he or she either did or did not mean to form a binding agreement. Relevant evidence will be concerned with the terms of their agreement and what inference may be drawn therefrom. In that context, if it should be the case that there is uncertainty about important aspects of the proposed transaction, ambiguity or the omission of important terms, that may aid the drawing of a conclusion that there was to that point no intention to create a binding legal agreement. In that way, the question of factual uncertainty may relate to the question of the formation of the agreement as well as the enforceability of a contract which has been made. But however that may be, it remains the objective intention imputed to the parties collectively with which the court is concerned: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v XIVth Commonwealth Games Ltd (1988) 18 NSWLR 540 per Gleeson CJ, with whom Hope and Mahoney JJA agreed, at 548 ‑ 550. Of course it may be the case that the parties have expressed their collective intention one way or the other and to such an expression of intention, the court will ordinarily give effect. The letter of intent dated 10 October 1996 and its reference to the understanding and commitment of the parties "towards the establishment of a joint venture company to commercially exploit the process technology" together with the inclusion of Article 23, to which I have referred above, would be a clear example of such a situation. There was no intention to create legal relations by the execution of that document, despite the quite detailed terms of agreement between the parties as to how they proposed to proceed. It does not necessarily follow that because there is detailed agreement, it will be appropriate to infer the existence of a binding contract expressing an intention to create legal relations in that way. In a commercial case such as this, it is often said, relying upon Megaw J in Edwards v Skyways Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 349, 355, that "the onus is on the party who asserts that no legal effect was intended, and the onus is a heavy one." Thus it is sometimes said that the intention to create legal relations in such a situation will be presumed, but the presumption is rebuttable. For myself, I prefer the view that the legal onus to establish the existence of the contract and the intention to create legal relations remains upon the party asserting it, in this case, the appellant. I accept that the onus may be readily discharged in the case of commercial negotiations where agreement on important matters might readily persuade the court that a contract was made. It may be said then that an evidentiary onus will shift to the defendant to rebut that conclusion, but that is only a matter of evidence and in my opinion if the inference of an intention to create legal relations is to be drawn, it will be because the party asserting that it is so has discharged the onus of persuading the court: Toyota Motor Corp Aust Ltd v Ken Morgan Motors Pty Ltd [1994] 2 VR 106, particularly per Tadgell J at 177.