IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P25 of 2003
B e t w e e n -
ANTHONY JOHN PINKSTONE
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KIRBY J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 8 AUGUST 2003, AT 12.24 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR S.A. SHIRREFS, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear on behalf of the applicant. (instructed by Gary Massey & Associates)
MR K.P. BATES: If the Court pleases, I appear on behalf of the respondent. (instructed by Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Australia))
KIRBY J: We think we would like to hear from Mr Bates first. Mr Bates, we are rather minded to think that this is a matter for special leave. There was a dissenting opinion in the Court of Criminal Appeal. The issue is one of general significance and not without some interest. You might win in the end, but is this not a matter which we should grant special leave to allow the matter to be determined authoritatively by this Court?
MR BATES: In our respectful submission, this was a matter which turned very much on its facts, and the issue in this case will not be of general importance or general application to other cases. Where you have police intervention of this nature so as to alter a consignor’s act of supply, we would submit that that would always fall to be determined on precisely what the police did in the particular circumstances. So we would submit that this particular case turns very much on its own facts, and it really is a question of degree ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: It must be a rather common factual element, that something is sent somewhere and then substituted. It does not seem to me to be a peculiar factual circumstance.
MR BATES: No, we would accept that it is not a peculiar factual circumstance, but we would submit that, on the facts of this case, and on the facts of other cases, it will very much depend upon exactly and precisely what the police did. If I could address the merits in respect of this particular matter, what we say is that the police actions on the facts of this particular case were very limited. They merely facilitated the delivery of the parcel containing the prohibited drug to any person who had authority to collect it in accordance with the applicant’s instructions to Ansett Air Cargo.
We note that the police carried out their roles with the express authority of the Ansett employees. No coercive or other police powers were used, and the only thing that the police did over and above what an Ansett employee would do was to identify and to record the parcel. So we would submit that, on the merits of the matter, the actions of the police on these particular facts…
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- Case
- [2003] HCATrans 273
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in law by failing to adequately direct the jury on the element of deception, specifically concerning the applicant's intention to defraud. The applicant argued that the jury should have been instructed that they needed to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant intended to cause a financial disadvantage to the victim at the time the deception was perpetrated.
The High Court, comprising Kirby J and Heydon J, considered the elements of the offence of obtaining financial advantage by deception under the relevant New South Wales legislation. Their Honours analysed the nature of deception and the requirement for an intention to defraud. The Court concluded that the jury directions provided at trial were insufficient, as they did not clearly articulate that the prosecution bore the onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, that the applicant intended to cause a financial disadvantage to the victim at the time of the deceptive conduct. The legal principle applied was that a conviction for this offence requires proof of both the deceptive act and the specific intent to cause financial disadvantage.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi