IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Registry No C12 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
STUART HEARNE PILKINTON
Applicant
and
FREDERICK GORDON HATTY
Respondent
Application for special
leave to appeal
BRENNAN J
TOOHEY J
McHUGH J
| Pilkinton | 1 | 25/9/92 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 1992, AT 11.11 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MR T.E.F. HUGHES, QC | May it please the Court, I appear in |
this matter with my learned friend,
MR S.F.C. WILCOX for the applicant. (instructed by
Abbott Tout Russell Kennedy)
| MR M.F. ADAMS, QC: | If it pleases the Court, I appear with |
my learned friend, MS J.A. WOODWARD, for the
respondent. (instructed by K.J. Crispin, QC,Director of Public Prosecutions, Australian Capital
Territory)
| BRENNAN J: | Mr Hughes, before you commence, I have a |
certificate from the Deputy Registrar that reads as
follows:
The Director of Public Prosecutions for the
Australian Capital Territory, a respondent in
these proceedings, has filed an appearance
supporting the application for special leave to
appeal.
Is the Director of Public Prosecutions a
respondent?
| MR HUGHES: | The respondent is the prosecutor. | As I |
understand it, the case is in charge of the
Director of Public Prosecutions - - -
| MR ADAMS: | As I understand it, the Director is conducting |
the matter on behalf of the informant. That is as
I understand it, though if there were formal
requirements, I must say I have not seen any such formal requirements, but I think the Commonwealth Director instructed counsel below and the matter
has continued in that way since the first appeal to
the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital
Territory.
| BRENNAN J: Are there two directors involved in this now? | |
| MR ADAMS: | No, there is only one, having regard to the |
institution of the Office of Director of Public
Prosecutions for the Australian Capital Territory,
and he has taken over, so far as this matter is
concerned, what was hitherto the responsibility of
the Director of Public Prosecutions for the
Commonwealth.
| BRENNAN J: | Do I take it that his interests are in your |
hands?
| MR ADAMS: | Yes, that is so, Your Honour. | The form of the |
letter, however, requires some clarification. The indication that we have given is that we do not propose to submit to the Court, with respect to that issue that relates to the question of intent,
| Pilkinton | 2 | 25/9/92 |
that that is not a matter in which this Court
should grant special leave.
In relation to the other issue, namely whether
Davern v Messel applies in these circumstances so
that the appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court from the judgment of Mr Justice Foster was
open, we propose to submit that special leave
should not be granted by this Court in respect of
that question. I am not entirely sure that the appearances filed in the registry make that clear,
but the matter has certainly been made clear
between the parties.
We have distinguished between the two
fundamental…
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- Case
- [1992] HCATrans 273
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine two principal legal issues. The first concerned the question of intent, specifically whether an honest belief that a course of action was required, and an honest belief that one was not misleading the court, would negate the intent necessary to constitute the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The second issue related to the applicability of the decision in *Davern v Messel* to the circumstances of the case, and whether this rendered the appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court from the judgment of Mr Justice Foster open.
The Director of Public Prosecutions indicated that while they would not oppose the grant of special leave on the issue of intent, they would oppose it on the question of jurisdiction, which related to the applicability of *Davern v Messel*. The court noted that the question of whether a belief needed to be reasonable or merely honest, as discussed in *He Kaw Teh*, might be a matter for ultimate determination, but the primary question on the intent issue was whether the applicant intended to mislead the court. The court indicated it would hear from the applicant's counsel before proceeding further.
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