IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P32 of 2020
B e t w e e n -
PILBARA IRON ORE PTY LTD
Applicant
and
DEREK NOEL AMMON
First Respondent
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF MINES
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GAGELER J
EDELMAN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON TUESDAY, 8 DECEMBER 2020, AT 12.30 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
GAGELER J: I will note the appearances.
MR B.W. WALKER, QC with MR M.S. VAN BRAKEL for the applicant. (instructed by Allen & Overy)
MR C.P. SHANAHAN, SC with MR A.P. HERSHOWITZ for the first respondent. (instructed by JDK Legal Services Pty Ltd)
GAGELER J: Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, in 2003, an agreement was reached, the effect of which would have the respondent’s tenement possibly transferred as to an 80 per cent share to my client – return for considerable minimum payment – but, in particular, upon completion of a feasibility study for the prospect. In due course, we asserted that had been achieved, and in accordance with the machinery provisions of the detailed written contract, they were lodged for registration with the appropriate authorities, the appropriate transfer.
Declaration was then sought in proceedings brought against us and, in due course, interlocutory injunction granted in order to restrain that registration – issue raised by those proceedings when first commenced. And, at its core, in those proceedings as they have continued thereafter, was the respondent’s assertion that we had not, in fact, succeeded in completing the feasibility proposal, which was the key event, which would give rise to an entitlement for an 80 per cent share to be enjoyed by us and various choices, depending upon financial and other decisions to be made by the respondent between, say, a Farmin or a royalty or a sale.
GAGELER J: Mr Walker, what is the endgame here? You seem to want a counterclaim to be remitted to the ‑ ‑ ‑
MR WALKER: It is difficult to see that as being a primary part of the endgame. What really matters is what, if anything, should have been remitted. If it is remitted, I cannot say ‑ and you will have seen this in our written material and in the Court of Appeal below ‑ I cannot say that the counterclaim is critical. Can I explain? The counterclaim is simply the obverse of the claim against us which hitherto has failed, that is, it has failed to this point – not all along the way but at the critical point it has failed ‑ that we had failed to complete the feasibility proposal and, therefore, were not entitled to registration.
As you will have seen in the court below, the way I eventually put it concerning the counterclaim was we do not need it because upon it being determined that that claim by our opponents failed, the way to registration was clear for us. So that the endgame…
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- Case
- [2020] HCATrans 215
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was the proper construction of clause 10.1 of the native title agreement. This clause stipulated that the native title holders were entitled to "negotiate" with the appellant regarding proposed mining operations and that the appellant was required to "negotiate in good faith" with them. The High Court had to determine whether this contractual provision imposed a positive obligation on the appellant to reach an agreement, thereby granting a right to veto, or merely an obligation to engage in a process of negotiation.
The High Court held that the language of clause 10.1, particularly the use of the word "negotiate" without further qualification, did not impose a contractual obligation to reach an agreement. Their Honours reasoned that a contractual right to veto would typically be expressed with much clearer and more explicit language, such as requiring consent or agreement. The obligation to "negotiate in good faith" was interpreted as requiring a genuine engagement in the process of discussion and compromise, but not a guarantee of a particular outcome. The Court applied principles of contractual interpretation, emphasising that the plain meaning of the words used in the agreement, read in context, determined the parties' rights and obligations.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the Full Federal Court were set aside.
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