Piggin v The Queen

[2005] HCATrans 500

[2005] HCATrans 500

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M309 of 2003

B e t w e e n -

ANTHONY PIGGIN

Applicant

and

THE QUEEN

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

Publication of reasons and pronouncement of orders

McHUGH J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 5 AUGUST 2005, AT 8.47 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

McHUGH J:   The applicant was convicted by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria of conspiracy to commit an armed robbery.  The Court was unanimous in its rejection of the applicant’s claims that the trial judge had erred with respect to the admission into evidence of certain recorded phone conversations, and in refusing to adjourn proceedings so that the accused could return home to obtain his hearing aid and refusing to discharge the jury in light of the course of the trial after the refusal to adjourn.  The Court also rejected the applicant’s claims that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence, and was unsafe and unsatisfactory.  The applicant seeks special leave to appeal against that decision.

The applicant was represented by counsel at the trial and in the proceedings before the Court of Appeal.  In that Court, counsel submitted that the trial judge erred in finding that there was reasonable evidence that the applicant was a party to a conspiracy of the kind alleged and that his Honour further erred by admitting evidence of acts and declarations of his co-conspirators, even made in the applicant’s absence, as evidence against him.  The applicant relies on this argument in the present application.  Chernov JA, with whom Charles and Eames JJA agreed, found that there was “evidence, independent of the acts and declarations of alleged co‑conspirators, which at minimum is capable of supporting a finding that the accused was a participant in the unlawful enterprise”:  see The Queen v Anthony Piggin [2003] VSCA 174 at [62]. The evidence in question included, inter alia, weapons and clothing retrieved by police upon intercepting the vehicle in which the co‑accused were travelling on the day that the planned robbery was to occur. The Court of Appeal was clearly correct in its conclusion that this was reasonable evidence sufficient to ground a finding that the applicant was a participant in the planned robbery. Accordingly, the applicant’s present arguments in relation to that evidence must be rejected.

The remaining submissions do not raise questions of law, but are rather assertions that the way in which the evidence was dealt with was deficient.  Given that the trial judge had correctly admitted certain evidence, it was for the jury to determine the weight to be given to that evidence, and to decide whether it was sufficient to prove the applicant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the trial judge correctly directed the jury that they must be satisfied of the existence of any facts relied upon by the Crown, before they could draw inferences from the existence of those facts, and that the inference must be the only reasonable inference available.  This is not a case where there is any real doubt that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, and certainly not a case where the admission of certain evidence has led to a miscarriage of justice. 

Accordingly, the application for special leave must be dismissed.

The application for special leave is dismissed.

Pursuant to r 41.11.1 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order that the application is dismissed.  I publish our joint reasons.

AT 8.47 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED