Pierson & Romilly (No 3)
[2025] FedCFamC1F 370
•12 June 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Pierson & Romilly (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 370
File number(s): SYC 9722 of 2024 Judgment of: SIMPSON J Date of judgment: 12 June 2025 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – vexatious proceedings – where the Respondent sought an order pursuant to s 102QB(2) prohibiting the Applicant from instituting further proceedings under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – where there are proceedings on foot in France – where a permanent stay of proceedings was ordered in this Court – where the Applicant thereafter recommenced proceedings and filed further applications – where the Applicant’s most recent Initiating Application was summarily dismissed – where the Applicant seeks to re-litigate aspects of matters that have been heard and determined – where the Court finds that the Applicant has frequently instituted vexatious proceedings since orders were made permanently staying the proceedings – need to protect the finite resources of the court and the public interest – where the Respondent has been unreasonably burdened by the Applicant’s conduct – where s 102QB has a protective purpose – orders made in favour of the Respondent.
FAMILY LAW – COSTS – costs sought by the Respondent on an indemnity basis – where the Applicant has been wholly unsuccessful – where there are justifying circumstances for making a costs order in favour of the Respondent – where the Applicant’s conduct in light of the permanent stay orders creates a special or unusual feature – finding that this matter is exceptional such that the Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs on an indemnity basis.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt XIB, ss 31, 78, 79, 95, 102Q, 102QB, 102QE, 117
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 8.15, 12.13
Cases cited: Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225
Cross & Beaumont (2008) 39 Fam LR 389
Fitzgerald (as child representative for A (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) & Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123
Fowles & Fowles (No 5) [2024] FedCFamC1A 188
Harris & Dewell (No 2) [2018] FamCAFC 180
Morse & Duarte (No 8) [2024] FedCFamC1F 639
Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398
Pierson & Romilly [2019] FamCA 259
Pierson & Romilly [2020] FamCAFC 91
Pierson & Romilly [2025] FedCFamC1F 148
Pierson & Romilly [2025] FedCFamC1A 81
Potier v Attorney General (NSW) (2015) 89 NSWLR 284
Prantage & Prantage (Costs) [2014] FamCA 850
Vang & Chung [2024] FedCFamC1A 25
Yunghanns & Yunghanns (2000) FLC 93-029
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 107 Date of last submission/s: 28 April 2025 Date of hearing: 11 April 2025 Place: Sydney For the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Othen SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Dezarnaulds Basten ORDERS
SYC 9722 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS PIERSON
Applicant
AND: MR ROMILLY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
SIMPSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 JUNE 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 102QB(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), the Applicant wife be prohibited from instituting proceedings against the Respondent husband in any court having jurisdiction under the Act without first obtaining leave pursuant to s 102QE of the Act.
2.The Applicant wife pay the costs of the Respondent husband on an indemnity basis in the amount of $45,738.40 within 90 days of the date of these orders.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Pierson & Romilly has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SIMPSON J:
These are proceedings between the Applicant wife (“the wife”) and the Respondent husband (“the husband”) that have a long history prior to the most recent Initiating Application filed by the wife on 6 December 2024.
The parties have lived in France and in Australia and have property interests in both countries. On 26 April 2019, Stevenson J made orders which permanently stayed the Further Amended Initiating Application filed by the wife on 21 May 2018 (in which the wife had sought certain orders under s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”)). In her reasons for judgment, Stevenson J concluded that Australia was a clearly inappropriate forum for the determination of the property proceedings between the parties (in comparison to proceedings being continued in France, which Her Honour found, had been commenced by the husband in January 2011 – Pierson & Romilly [2019] FamCA 259 at [10]).
Those orders of 26 April 2019 were subsequently the subject of appeal by the wife. That appeal was dismissed by the Full Court on 23 April 2020 (Pierson & Romilly [2020] FamCAFC 91).
As will be detailed further below, the wife then made other applications to this court including filing a second Initiating Application on 20 May 2020 (which was allocated a separate proceeding number). The wife agreed to discontinue the second Initiating Application while engaged in a procedural hearing with a Judicial Registrar on 23 June 2020. Subsequent to discontinuing that second Initiating Application however, the wife made an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia in July 2020, which was refused in October 2020.
On 6 December 2024, the wife filed a further Initiating Application in this court (which was allocated a further proceeding number) seeking, among other orders, to invoke the jurisdiction of this court and to obtain orders relating to a property jointly owned by the parties in Suburb C, NSW (“the Suburb C property”).
In that Initiating Application, the wife sought certain interlocutory orders including procedural orders relating to the management of the matter and certain evidentiary steps. The wife’s relief sought included:
An order pursuant to s 31(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia has exclusive jurisdiction over the property located at [Property D], [Suburb C], NSW […] (“the [Suburb C] property”) and all matters related to its division, including but not limited to…,
which was followed by a series of sub-paragraphs in which she sought certain declarations as to ownership of the Suburb C property and which dealt with responsibility for the maintenance of and payments relating to the Suburb C property. The interim relief sought by the wife also covered other declarations sought by her in accordance with s 78 of the Act.
The husband (in a Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 January 2025) sought the summary dismissal of the wife’s Initiating Application filed 6 December 2024 as well as orders pursuant to s 102QB of the Act, and costs.
The summary dismissal application was heard by Boyle J on 7 February 2025. On 12 February 2025, Her Honour made orders dismissing the wife’s Initiating Application and delivered reasons for judgment (Pierson & Romilly [2025] FedCFamC1F 148). It appears there may have been some delay before the orders and judgment of 12 February 2025 were received or accessed by the wife in written form, but even on her own account, she received the written orders on 7 March 2025 and the written reasons on 12 March 2025.
In her reasons, Boyle J identified that:
(a)The wife was arguing that the court had been misled because (contrary to the findings made by Stevenson J) there were no proceedings on foot in France at the time of the hearing of that (earlier) application;
(b)The wife was in effect seeking to re-litigate aspects of the matters heard and determined by Stevenson J; and
(c)As a consequence of those matters, the wife urged Her Honour to exercise jurisdiction in relation to the Suburb C property.
Boyle J determined that the wife did not have any reasonable prospects of success given that the court had (on 26 April 2019) granted a permanent stay of the Australian proceedings commenced by the wife; that the appeal process had been exhausted by the wife subsequent to those orders; and the proceedings in France remained on foot (Pierson & Romilly [2025] FedCFamC1F 148 at [31]). After dismissing the wife’s Initiating Application, Her Honour recused herself (on 27 March 2025) from hearing the remaining applications (being costs sought by the husband of the summary dismissal application and the hearing of the s 102QB application). Those remaining matters were the subject of further directions and were subsequently listed for hearing before me on 11 April 2025.
The wife filed a Notice of Appeal with respect to the orders made by Boyle J on 12 February 2025 along with an Application in an Appeal. Those appeal matters were listed for a show cause hearing on 7 May 2025. On the day of the show cause hearing, Aldridge J dismissed the wife’s appeal and Application in an Appeal and ordered her to pay the costs of the husband in the fixed sum of $6,442 upon the determination of the property proceedings between the parties.
I have had regard to the judgments of Stevenson J (dated 26 April 2019) and of Boyle J (dated 12 February 2025) which have comprehensively set out the pathway of the proceedings in this court and in France, in which the wife and the husband have been engaged since 2011. It is clear from the judgments and from the material relied upon by each party that they have been engaged in negotiation and, or, litigation about the division of their property following the breakdown of their marriage, for more than 14 years (starting from the date upon which the husband first commenced divorce proceedings in France).
I have also had regard to the reasons for judgment of Aldridge J (dated 7 May 2025) Pierson & Romilly [2025] FedCFamC1A 81.
THE APPLICATION – SECTION 102QB
The husband sought orders to the following effect:
(a)That pursuant to s 102QB of the Act, the wife be declared a vexatious litigant.
(b)That the wife be prohibited from instituting proceedings against the husband under the Act in any court having jurisdiction under that Act without the leave of that court.
(c)Costs on an indemnity basis.
For the purposes of this hearing, the husband’s Senior Counsel indicated that his client relied upon the following documents:
(a)His Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 16 January 2025;
(b)Affidavit of the husband filed 28 February 2025 (“the husband’s affidavit”); and
(c)His case outline document filed 10 April 2025 (which became Exhibit 2).
Certain documents were tendered and made exhibits in his case, including the annexures to the husband’s affidavit (which became Exhibit 1). That bundle included a detailed chronology prepared by the husband which set out the relevant events in the long history between the parties, including as to proceedings in this country and the proceedings in France.
The wife is self-represented. I explained to the wife the process of the hearing and what would occur that day. The wife indicated that she relied upon her affidavit filed on 7 April 2025 (“the wife’s affidavit”).
Much of the wife’s affidavit material was more in the nature of submission and had limited relevance, given the confined nature of the applications before the court. In keeping with r 8.15 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”), I indicated to the wife that I would not take the various exhibits to her affidavit into evidence until she had addressed me as to the relevance of each exhibit upon which she sought to rely (and subject to any objection).
In that process, the wife identified two letters which she had received from Westpac, (which bank holds the mortgage over the home in which she lives being the Suburb C property) as being relevant to her case. Those two letters were made Exhibit 4, without objection. I also accepted a document described as “orders sought” by the wife as Exhibit 5. In doing so, however, I observed to the wife that while the document would be read by me, those aspects of the document which could not be considered responsive to the orders being sought by the husband would instead be taken to form part of the submissions she sought to make in her case. Again, the wife indicated that she understood the process I had proposed.
The orders sought by the wife were to the effect that she opposed the orders sought by the husband and that she opposed the making of any costs order (for this hearing and relating to the summary dismissal proceedings before Boyle J). The wife asserted in that document that the husband’s conduct was vexatious and that she was the victim of his unreasonable court processes and actions.
The law relating to s 102QB
Section 102Q sets out the applicable definitions for Part XIB of the Act (Decrees and orders relating to unmeritorious, harmful and vexatious proceedings). Relevantly, vexatious proceedings include:
(a)Proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal; and
(b)Proceedings instituted in a court or tribunal to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose; and
(c)Proceedings instituted or pursued in a court or tribunal without reasonable ground; and
(d)Proceedings conducted in a court or tribunal in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.
Before making an order under s 102QB of the Act, under subsection (1) I am required to be satisfied as to the following:
(a)A person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australian courts or tribunals; or
(b)A person, acting in concert with another person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is covered by paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in an Australian court or tribunal.
If I am so satisfied, s 102QB(2) sets out the orders which I can make, which include:
(a)An order staying or dismissing all or part of any proceedings in the court already instituted by the person;
(b)An order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings, or proceedings of a particular type, under this Act in a court having jurisdiction under this Act;
(c)Any other order the court considers appropriate in relation to the person.
The court may make a vexatious proceedings order on its own initiative or on the application of a range of interested parties set out at s 102QB(3) of the Act, which includes a person against whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. The husband has brought this application.
The court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving them an opportunity to be heard (s 102QB(4) of the Act). I am satisfied the wife has been given a full opportunity to be heard and that she has fully participated in the hearing.
Section 102QB(6) of the Act sets out as follows:
(6) For the purposes of subsection (1), the court may have regard to:
(a)proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal; and
(b)orders made by any Australian court or tribunal; and
(c)the person’s overall conduct in proceedings conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including the person’s compliance with orders made by that court or tribunal);
including proceedings instituted (or attempted to be instituted) or conducted, and orders made, before the commencement of this section.
The evidence
The husband’s Senior Counsel took me to the husband’s chronology which set out the history of proceedings between the parties, both in this country and in France. Senior Counsel for the husband submitted that, in the context of a permanent stay upon proceedings in this court having been ordered in April 2019, all proceedings brought by the wife after that order was made must be seen in that context (such that every attempt by the wife to re-agitate proceedings here, ought be described as vexatious given that they were “an abuse of process” and, or, were commenced “without reasonable ground”, and thus readily come within the definition of vexatious proceedings in s 102Q(1) of the Act).
I was referred to the judgment of Harper J in Morse & Duarte (No 8) [2024] FedCFamC1F 639 (“Morse & Duarte”) and His Honour’s consideration of the exercise of the court’s power to make vexatious proceedings orders. I respectfully refer to and adopt His Honour’s summary at paragraph 63, of authority about the principles to be applied in exercising power to restrict vexatious proceedings:
The power to prohibit or restrict vexatious proceedings is well known across many jurisdictions. In Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398, Perram J, in a passage followed many times (see for example Pencious & Searle (2017) FLC 93-805 (“Pencious”) at [75]), set out the following principles to determine when proceedings are vexatious, which I respectfully adopt:
2. A comprehensive explanation of what makes a proceeding vexatious is difficult to proffer for the boundary between the persistent and over-zealous on the one hand, and the vexatious on the other, may at times be indistinct. However, the following principles are, at least, well-established. First, the making of such an order is an extreme remedy depriving its object of recourse to the enforcement of the law which is every citizen’s ordinary right. It is, therefore, not lightly to be made.
3. Secondly, the purpose of the order is not to impose condign punishment for past litigious misdeeds; it serves instead to shield both the public, whose individual members might be molested by vexatious proceedings, and the court itself, whose limited resources needs must be carefully managed and protected from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits.
4. Thirdly, as might naturally be expected, such a severe power is not enlivened by the mere single occurrence of a vexatious claim. To err is human and transient lapses of judgment, even serious ones, may be found in the most reasonable of places. Instead, the power to make the order is conditional upon the litigant having commenced not only a single vexatious proceeding but also upon having commenced similar such proceedings in this court or in other Australian courts.
5. Fourthly, the qualities of vexation … are to be found, … , in the commencement by the litigant of proceedings which lack reasonable grounds and where the litigant’s institution of such proceedings may fairly be said to be both habitual and persistent.
6. Fifthly, whether a proceeding is instituted without reasonable grounds is a different question to, although not wholly disconnected from, the inquiry into a proceeding’s legal merits. The wheat, no doubt, must be separated from the chaff but in this area the question is whether what is before the court contains any wheat at all. Although, often enough, no great guidance is obtained by exchanging one formula of words with another, it will be usually of some assistance, limited perhaps, to ask whether the issues brought to the court for determination are manifestly hopeless or devoid of merit. It is, in that context, important to distinguish the difficult from the ridiculous and the unlikely from the hopeless.
7.Sixthly, although the ways in which unreasonable grounds may manifest themselves are myriad, one form often to be found in the baggage of the vexatious is a failure, often a refusal, to understand the principles of finality of litigation which rescue court and litigant alike from a Samsara of past forensic encounters.
8. Seventhly, it is the related quality of repetition which underpins, in part, a need for the institution of the proceedings to deserve the appellations habitual and persistent. The litigant’s conduct will be habitual where the commencement of proceedings occurs as a matter of course when appropriate conditions for their commencement are present as was explained by Roden J in Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 492. That formulation may not wholly explain the litigant who commences proceedings on any occasion and without the presence of any conditions, whether appropriate or otherwise. In such cases, the idea of constant repetition driven by habit and symptomatic of an inability not to engage in the behaviour may be more useful. Persistence, on the other hand, generally suggests stubborn determination but, in the context of the vexatious, carries with it the capacity to endure failure beyond the point at which a rational person would abandon the field.
9. Eighthly, each of these notions — the want of reasonable grounds, habitual institution and persistent institution — are to be gauged objectively. But this does not mean that a litigant’s own protestation as to his or her own mental state is irrelevant; frequently enough, the vexatious are betrayed out of their own mouths. Rather, the need for objective determination protects courts from the vexatious litigant who is genuinely, but misguidedly, persuaded as to the correctness of his or her own conduct.
10. Ninthly, the power to make the order arises when proceedings commenced in the way described are found to exist. But the notion of a proceeding is a broad one including a substantive proceeding directed at the attainment of final relief and collateral applications within such a proceeding; further, it extends outside the proceeding itself and embraces appeals therefrom and applications which, whilst not made in the proceeding, are properly to be seen as collateral thereto — so much flows from the definition of proceeding in s 4 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
11. Tenthly, other proceedings commenced before bodies which are not courts, such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, are not directly pertinent to the existence of the power but may nevertheless throw light on the vexatious nature of proceedings before the court; so too, the existence of a body of such administrative litigation may have relevance to the question of whether the court’s power to make the order, once enlivened, should be exercised.
12. Finally, once it is concluded that the court’s power to prevent a litigant from commencing or pursuing proceedings has been enlivened, the considerations germane to the exercise of that power are unconfined. However, the factors which will be relevant are informed by the protective purpose which the order serves. Where a litigant displays insight into their previous litigious history this will, no doubt, be relevant for it will suggest — although not determine — a diminution in the risk posed to the public. On the other hand, the manner in which a litigant conducts herself in her affairs generally is also capable of throwing light on whether the commencement of further vexatious proceedings is likely. Those general affairs include the litigant’s defence to the proceedings by which the order restraining him is sought. Because of the protective nature of the jurisdiction it is also relevant to know the extent of the damage and inconvenience the litigant’s forays into the courts have caused, pecuniary or otherwise.
Senior Counsel for the husband also referred to the discussion in Morse & Duarte at paragraph 64 as to consideration of the term “frequently” in this context, embracing “a relatively low threshold” and that “the quality of the vexatiousness of a proceeding, and the nature of the proceeding itself, inform the assessment of frequency” (citing Potier v Attorney General (NSW) (2015) 89 NSWLR 284 at [116] (“Potier”)).
Since the permanent stay order was made on 26 April 2019, the wife has filed:
(a)Her appeal against those orders (filed on 23 May 2019), which was dismissed with costs, on 23 April 2020.
(b)Her second Initiating Application on 20 May 2020. That Application was discontinued by the wife at a procedural hearing on 23 June 2020.
(c)The wife then sought special leave to appeal to the High Court (filed in July 2020), which application was dismissed in October 2020.
(d)On 6 December 2024, the wife filed her third Initiating Application in this court.
(e)On 7 February 2025, a hearing occurred in which the husband sought the summary dismissal of that Initiating Application. Orders to that effect were made by this court on 12 February 2025, after a contested hearing.
(f)On 11 March 2025, the wife filed a Notice of Appeal relating to the orders made on 12 February 2025, as well as an Application in an Appeal. Those matters were listed for a show cause hearing on 7 May 2025 and were dismissed on the same date.
I was taken through the husband’s chronology which included particulars of events occurring in the proceedings between the parties in France. I accept that those matters may be considered by me to inform the relevant context of the proceedings the wife has undertaken here in this court (and which are the subject of the s 102QB application). This is particularly relevant when the wife has no continuing basis to agitate matters in this court (after the permanent stay order was made) but has standing to pursue her entitlements in the courts in France. It is not in dispute that the wife has continued to engage in those proceedings.
Senior Counsel for the husband submitted that the repeated engagement in court processes by the wife was having an adverse impact upon the husband, including:
(a)As to the costs being incurred by him for further legal fees and engagement. I was taken to the husband’s Cost Notice dated 6 February 2025 for this tranche of the proceedings (included in Exhibit 1). I note that the husband (at the time of the hearing) had incurred costs of $4,899.20 for the court event on 29 January 2025 (being the first return of the wife’s third Initiating Application); had incurred costs of $20,076.70 for the contested hearing on 7 February 2025; and had estimated costs of $11,055 for the conclusion of the hearing before me; and
(b)The stress and burdens of further engagement in this process, in this country, while at the same time attempting to complete a litigation process in France also involving the wife.
I was also urged to have regard to the impact of these proceedings on the resources of the court and to the wider public interest in the application of limited public resources to these proceedings, which ought be directed elsewhere. That consideration is consistent with authority and with the overarching purpose relating to conduct in this court, now set out at s 95 of the Act, which includes the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources of the court.
The husband’s Senior Counsel submitted that the wife’s affidavit makes clear that she does not disavow her previous conduct (in bringing the applications after the stay order was made) and that at best, she is attempting to relitigate matters which are long resolved. It was submitted that her evidence before the court makes clear that there is a real risk she will continue to make applications to this court, if a s 102QB order is not made. As is addressed further below, there is weight to those submissions.
The wife submitted that her applications to this court should not be considered vexatious in circumstances where she was trying to correct a misunderstanding by the court about the nature of, and status of, the proceedings in France. The wife submitted that she had “no alternative” but to come back to this court in circumstances where her financial security (as the occupant of the Suburb C property) was imperilled by the husband’s failure to pay the mortgage to Westpac secured over that property and by the actions of Westpac.
In support of that submission, the wife referred me to the documents at Exhibit 4, being two letters from Westpac:
(a)On 14 March 2025, advising as to an overdue payment for the mortgage; and
(b)On 27 March 2025, referring to a different bank account being overdrawn.
Those letters did not assist me to understand the submission the wife was making in circumstances where I did not have evidence as to the total of any mortgage arrears relating to the Suburb C property or the status of her related bank account or accounts, or how these two documents might otherwise relate to the submissions she sought to make about her urgent and parlous financial situation.
Even if I had such evidence, it did not appear relevant to an assessment of the proper characterisation of the wife’s conduct in filing further applications in this court, after the orders permanently staying the proceedings had been made.
The wife made a range of submissions about her perception of what had occurred previously in these proceedings including as to the deficiencies in the process before the court on earlier occasions, and to the effect that she had been disadvantaged and her rights lost.
I have regard to the wife’s affidavit and note the assertions/submissions in that document and her case outline document, including to the effect that:
(a)She is not a vexatious litigant;
(b)Her applications have been “brought in good faith to get relief from the situation of financial abuse and coercion organised by the husband over 14 years”;
(c)She wishes to expose the “unbearable harassment and violence” to which she had been exposed by the husband;
(d)She has been “forced to fight fraudulent submissions, slanderous accusations and being forced to live in a situation of financial abuse and psychological abuse for more than 14 years”;
(e)She makes assertions about the “financial abuse” by the husband of her, and elsewhere asserts “forum shopping” by the husband;
(f)The husband has engaged in litigation “primarily to harass or annoy” her;
(g)She makes a number of submissions which are highly critical of the husband and how she regards his conduct in these proceedings and the proceedings in France; and
(h)She makes repeated assertions and, or, submissions to the effect that the husband had misled the court into accepting that there were proceedings on foot in France when Stevenson J made her orders.
I invited the wife on several occasions to make any further submissions which she considered relevant to the application before the court by the husband. Repeatedly, the wife returned to her dissatisfaction with the previous court processes and her belief that the husband had acted poorly and had, in effect, led the court into error (in finding that Australia was the clearly inappropriate forum). She submitted repeatedly that her actions in bringing proceedings here were “legitimate” and that the suggestions that she was vexatious “are unfounded and fraudulent”.
The wife persisted in argument which did not address the operation of the permanent stay and which was shaped around a distorted view of her “rights” including, “that I strongly believed that I had the legal right to seek assistance from the Family Court, as it was the appropriate venue to provide relief and prevent financial harm”.
The wife contended in her affidavit that “the application to have me declared a vexatious litigant … is itself vexatious” and asserted that such was filed without reasonable ground, to cause delay and financial detriment (to her), and was filed for a wrongful purpose.
The wife also submitted in her affidavit that the fact that she was not successful in her applications to this court did not mean that her “claims were not justified and my applications were vexatious”.
I had regard to Exhibit 5 being a document which set out the orders sought by the wife. In that document she, in effect, sought that the husband’s application be dismissed and then set out asserted grounds in six sub paragraphs (all of which go to the matters summarised above including: the husband’s false submissions; that his application is without merit; that it would be unjust for her to bear his costs; that his application was filed to obstruct and delay the determination of her legitimate claims; that it represents forum shopping and procedural manipulation by the husband; and that it is based on misleading submissions).
The wife also purported in that document to seek orders (in part 2 of Exhibit 5) to the effect that her interim application of 6 December 2024 (which was dismissed by Boyle J) be “reinstated” and a range of other orders (including for immediate financial support to be paid by the husband to the wife). All of these matters were not responsive to the application before the court and again, ignored the orders made on 26 April 2019 permanently staying proceedings in this court.
The wife made submissions to the effect that she was facing extreme financial difficulties and that the husband had not engaged with her in good faith about the financial and property matters between them. Senior Counsel for the husband referred me to certain correspondence which formed part of Exhibit 1 as evidence of steps taken on behalf of the husband with respect to matters relating to the Suburb C property.
The criticisms made by the wife about the husband’s conduct more generally are not directly relevant to the application to be determined. In any event, I noted to the wife that she and the husband retained the power to have further discussions about the matters remaining in dispute between them, pending the final hearing in the French proceedings.It was agreed between the parties that the proceedings in France were now listed for final hearing in that country in November 2025.
Disposition
Since the orders were made on 26 April 2019 permanently staying the proceedings between the parties in this court, the wife has filed several additional applications here, which are set out in paragraph 30 above.
The applications made by the wife after the permanent stay orders (summarised previously) are the subject of scrutiny in support of this application by the husband under s 102QB. In looking at each of the applications made by the wife, and having regard to the matters set out in s 102QB(1) as to vexatious proceedings, I am satisfied as to the following:
(a)There was no proper juridical basis to bring such applications (after the permanent stay order was made).
(b)I accept that having exhausted her avenues of appeal, the wife has refused to “depart the arena” and the second and third Initiating Applications were without proper foundation and without reasonable grounds, given the effect of the permanent stay.
(c)I accept that the application of 6 December 2024 was in effect an improper attempt by the wife to relitigate matters determined by the court on 26 April 2019.
(d)The repetition of the assertion by the wife that her unsuccessful applications did not necessarily mean that her “claims were not justified and my applications were vexatious”, makes clear a wilful disregard for matters which do not suit her preferred narrative. The permanent stay orders make clear that this court is not “the appropriate venue” for such matters to be pursued.
(e)After the third Initiating Application failed, the wife pursued an appeal which process was dismissed by Aldridge J on 7 May 2025.
(f)Given the existence of the permanent stay order, I am comfortably satisfied that the proceedings the subject of this application are properly described as an abuse of process and, or, as proceedings which are instituted or pursued without reasonable ground (see the “vexatious proceedings” definition at s 102Q of the Act).
The arguments the wife made to support her actions are, with respect, unhelpful and only add weight to the submission made on behalf of the husband that the wife is without insight, and is likely to file further applications like this, if not restrained.
I find that the wife has frequently instituted proceedings since the making of the orders on 26 April 2019. Since the orders of April 2019, the wife has filed two additional Initiating Applications, filed and pursued her unsuccessful appeal to the Full Court, her unsuccessful special leave application to the High Court, and has failed in her appeal from the orders made on 12 February 2025 summarily dismissing her third Initiating Application. In each instance, the application made by the wife was misguided, given the operation of the orders of 26 April 2019.
As discussed by Perram J in Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No 2) [2009] FCA 398 (“Gargan”) (quoted above), it is permissible in this exercise to consider the primary proceedings themselves, and those which are “collateral”, and those which extend outside of the proceedings, including appeals.
While I have taken into account the pursuit and failure of the wife’s appeal from the April 2019 orders as another example of a misguided application, even if I accept that the wife was entitled to pursue her rights of appeal following the permanent stay orders, her subsequent applications are sufficient to establish frequency. The “quality of the vexatiousness” and the “nature of the proceeding itself” informs the assessment of frequency (Potier above). I am persuaded that the second and third Initiating Applications, and the steps more recently taken in these proceedings by the wife, given their nature, are sufficient to establish frequency.
In reaching these conclusions, I have considered carefully the documents filed by the wife and the written and oral submissions she has made. None of those matters assist in explaining the basis of her further applications to this court after the stay order was made.
I respectfully have regard to the observations of Perram J at paragraph 6 of Gargan, that:
… it will be usually of some assistance, limited perhaps, to ask whether the issues brought to the court for determination are manifestly hopeless or devoid of merit. It is, in that context, important to distinguish the difficult from the ridiculous and the unlikely from the hopeless.
It is difficult to imagine, in light of the permanent stay of proceedings order, a circumstance where a party’s subsequent applications could be more clearly described as “manifestly hopeless or devoid of merit”.
The applications by the wife have resulted in the application of substantial resources by the court, in the management of these processes and by the husband, in his response and opposition to them.
I am entitled to have regard to the need to protect the finite resources of the court and the public interest and I accept the submissions on behalf of the husband that without some further restraint, it is likely that the wife will bring further applications. That risk is made clear by the wife’s most recent conduct after the orders were made by Boyle J in February of this year.
It is clear from reading the wife’s documents that she seeks to re-agitate matters which were the subject of evidence and submission in the hearing before Stevenson J. It is also clear that the wife has not accepted or appreciated the finality of those orders, despite having exhausted all appeal avenues. It is apparent that the wife has difficulty in accepting the outcome of orders made in this Court (and the orders of the Full Court) but her disappointment about those processes does not establish an entitlement to revive concluded applications.
This is not a case where the wife has made a mistake and where she expresses regret about such a mistake; nor has she shown any insight into her litigation history. These matters weigh in favour of the orders being made, as sought by the husband.
I am satisfied that the wife has frequently instituted proceedings that are vexatious. I am satisfied that each application made by the wife after the expiration of the appeal process in the shadow of the permanent stay, was made without any reasonable prospect of success. These proceedings, in my view, comfortably fall within that category of cases which may be described as “manifestly hopeless or devoid of merit” (Gargan at [6]). Similarly, the wife’s actions are readily suggestive of a party who refuses to accept the finality of the order made.
I accept that the husband has been unreasonably burdened by the wife’s conduct, some of which burden may be addressed by a costs order (addressed separately below). However, other aspects of the impact of these proceedings cannot readily be remedied, including the stress and distraction of these processes at a time when the husband is also engaged in litigation in France. I accept the submissions made on behalf of the husband as to the adverse effect of the wife’s actions and these proceedings upon him.
I have regard to the protective purpose of the power to make orders under s 102QB. I cannot find that the wife has shown insight into her conduct and as such, the risk of further applications by her remains credible and leads me to determine that restraint upon her is warranted.
I also have regard to the wife’s submissions to the effect that her actions were necessary to remedy certain misconduct by the husband and to protect her from adverse financial consequences. While I accept that the wife is genuine in the expression of those concerns, the wife’s assertions (disputed by the husband), taken at their highest, are not evidence and cannot displace the operation of the permanent stay of proceedings and do not enliven jurisdiction.
While I accept that limiting a person’s access to a court is a serious matter, the existence of the permanent stay order makes clear that this is not the court in which the wife should be pursuing her remedies. I take into account the fact that the proceedings in France are advancing to conclusion, and that the wife may pursue her remedies there.
I am satisfied that it is necessary to make an order as sought by the husband. In doing so, the order I make will require the wife to seek leave of the court in which she seeks to commence proceedings under the Act, before service of any process upon the husband may occur. That will have the effect of shielding the husband from the impact of any further actions taken by the wife, unless and until the court grants leave to commence proceedings.
COSTS
The husband sought costs of and relating to these proceedings. The costs relating to the hearing of his summary dismissal application had also been reserved to the hearing before me for determination.
I directed each party to file and serve submissions as to costs along with any relevant documents to be tendered in support of their submissions.
The husband, in his costs submissions filed on 17 April 2025 (which totalled 34 pages, inclusive of annexures), sought that the wife pay his costs, on an indemnity basis, (with such sums payable within 90 days of the orders), as follows:
(a)The sum of $27,175.90 with respect to the summary dismissal of the Initiating Application filed 6 December 2024; and
(b)The sum of $18,562.50 with respect to the determination of the section 102QB application.
The wife also sought certain orders relating to costs in her costs submissions filed on 28 April 2025 (which totalled 156 pages, inclusive of annexures). The wife set out her orders sought as follows (found in Annexure A to her costs submissions):
2.No order for costs against the Applicant in relation to her 2024 application, notwithstanding its summary dismissal, due to the Respondent’s misconduct.
3. In the event that an order for costs is made against the Applicant, the amount sought by the Respondent be deducted from the substantial debt owed by the Respondent to the Applicant for property-related expenses as detailed in Order 4 below.
4.That the Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of defending the vexatious litigant proceedings on an indemnity basis, including:
a. Court filing fees in the amount of $1,100;
b. That the Court order the Respondent to pay to the Applicant, within 60 days of the order being made, the following amounts representing the financial burden directly arising from the Respondent's abusive conduct:
1.Respondent’s share of expenses on the property from 2012 to 2025: $55 718
2.Share of mortgage repayments made by the Applicant since 2018, presently estimated at $116,000, which arose directly from the Respondent’s misuse of process and refusal to comply with his 2019 representations;
3.Reimbursement of legal expenses incurred by the Applicant in France, estimated at $90,000, resulting from the Respondent’s contradictory conduct in initiating foreign proceedings after representing to this Court that property division was completed.
5.That interest be awarded on all sums ordered to be paid to the Applicant which the applicant submit to be (at a rate of 4%):
a. $13 290 of loss of money on interests for the share of expenses.
b.$33 500 of loss of money on interests for the share of mortgages.
(emphasis in original)
The wife sets out in that document a series of other orders which she proposes the court should make. Those orders sought do not relate to the matters before the court and are not supported by a separate application and will not be addressed further in these reasons.
Principles regarding costs
The starting point under the Act is that each party shall bear their own costs (s 117(1)). In circumstances where the court forms the view that there are justifying circumstances, the court may make such order for costs as the court considers just (s 117(2)).
When considering whether to make an order for costs and what order to make, the court is directed to have regard to the matters set out in s 117(2A).
In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2), the court shall have regard to (as set out in s 117(2A)):
(a)the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings;
(b)whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party;
(c)the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;
(d)whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;
(e)whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;
(f)whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer; and
(g)such other matters as the court considers relevant.
It is unnecessary for the court to be satisfied in respect of each and every factor set out in s 117(2A) of the Act, nor does any factor set out in s 117(2A) of the Act have priority over another (see for example Prantage & Prantage(Costs) [2014] FamCA 850 at [12], citing Fitzgerald (as child representative for A (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania)) & Fish (2005) 33 Fam LR 123).
I first need to determine if there are circumstances which justify departure from the usual position that each party pay their own costs and whether there are circumstances which support the making of a costs order in their favour. I am to balance the considerations set out in s 117(2A) and determine if, taken overall, the circumstances justify the making of a costs order.
Discussion
Section 117(2A)(a) – the financial circumstances of the parties
The wife, in her submissions filed 28 April 2025, seeks to rely on her Financial Statement filed 6 December 2024. She contends that her financial circumstances are exposed in that Financial Statement.
The wife deposes to being unemployed but receiving the French Retirement Pension of $274 per week. Additionally, the wife derives rental income to total an average weekly income of $1,025. As for the wife’s expenses, she provides a range of estimates to suggest that her total average weekly expenditure is in the amount of $2,395. The wife estimates that she is to make mortgage payments in the amount of $615 per week in respect of the Suburb C property. The wife asserts in item 23 of her Financial Statement to paying a weekly amount of $413 towards the parties’ property in Town C, France. However, her evidence suggests that this is a reference to payments made by the wife previously and ceasing in 2023.
The wife’s Financial Statement further suggests that she has $135,358 in Australian bank accounts and $39,400 in French bank accounts.
It is uncontentious that the parties remain the joint owners of the Suburb C property, and that the property is subject to mortgages with Westpac. The husband, in his costs submissions, has directed me to evidence in the wife’s affidavit filed on 6 December 2024 pointing to an assertion as to the value of the Suburb C property of $2,000,000 (being the estimated value as at 13 February 2024). The wife, in her Financial Statement, suggests that the Suburb C property is worth $1,800,000 (filed 6 December 2024). I accept that assertion by the wife as an admission by her. I have evidence (attached to the husband’s costs submissions) as to the total mortgage debt over that property as at 28 February 2025 being $218,278.81.
The preferential allocation of the Suburb C property has been provided to the wife in the French proceedings (as was found by Boyle J in paragraph 17 of her reasons dated 12 February 2025). The French proceedings are listed for determination in November 2025. If the wife retains the Suburb C property at the conclusion of the proceedings in France, it appears on the current evidence that the Suburb C property has significant equity.
The husband has not filed a Financial Statement in these proceedings. The husband has incurred and paid certain legal fees as part of these current proceedings (having been billed $27,175.90 in respect of the summary dismissal and $18,562.50 in respect of the s 102QB application). I infer from his at least part payment of those amounts that he has access to certain financial resources. As outlined below, where there is no evidence that the husband has paid various legal costs incurred, I find that the husband has an obligation to pay his lawyers in circumstances where he has provided the requisite costs agreements which make clear his obligations, and tax invoices detailing the specific amounts incurred for legal services on his behalf.
The annexures to the husband’s costs submissions would suggest the following in relation to his costs with respect to the summary dismissal application:
(a)On 8 March 2025, the husband received an invoice from his solicitors for the amount of $4,899.20 (there is evidence that this amount has been paid by the husband).
(b)On 8 March 2025, the husband received a further invoice from his solicitors in the amount of $13,146.70 (there is evidence that this amount has been paid by the husband).
(c)On 16 February 2025, the husband received an invoice from Counsel for the amount of $9,130.00.
The amounts at (a), (b), and (c) above total $27,175.90.
The annexures to the husband’s costs submissions would suggest the following in relation to his costs with respect to the s 102QB application:
(a)On 15 April 2025 the husband received an invoice from his solicitors in the amount of $8,002.50.
(b)On 27 March 2025 the husband received an invoice from Counsel in the amount of $1,760.00.
(c)On 11 April 2025, the husband received an invoice from Senior Counsel in the amount of $8,800.00.
The amounts at (a), (b), and (c) above total $18,562.50.
The wife attached to her costs submissions a document labelled “F” which she described as “Updated Costs incurred by the Applicant”. That document appears to be a schedule setting out certain expenses which (I infer) the wife asserts she has incurred since 2017. The assertions as to historical costs incurred are not relevant to the matters to be considered by me at this time.
There is an additional part of that schedule headed “Australian Property proceedings started in December 2024 by Applicant”. That part of the document is replicated below save for formatting:
Australian Property proceedings started in December 2024 By Applicant Nov-24 Expert Report -French International Expert 2,496 € Nov-24 Expert Report -French International Expert 1,270 € Dec-24 Filing of Initiating Application 500 Dec-24 Servicing […] initiating application 175 € Servicing […] Interim application and orders 175 € Copies 200 Sep-24 International expert 2,496 € error International expert 970 € New expenses Feb-25 Copies 300 Apr-25 court fees $1,045 Error -2,496 € Total in France 5,086 € $9,021 Total Application December 2024 $11,066 Feb-25 court fees $1,045 copies $60 Application summary dismissal $1,105
In addition to opposing the costs orders sought by the husband, the wife also asserted that he should meet her costs (though leaving aside all other difficulties with this approach, it is not clear what legal costs she has incurred, save that she has paid a filing fee to file the third Initiating Application as well as hearing fees for the hearings both before me and before Boyle J).
That aspect of the wife’s application appears at best to be founded in her belief that the husband’s conduct warrants criticism (particularly relating to the Suburb C property). As indicated previously, there is no proper application before me nor evidence which would inform my ability to make such an order.
I also take into consideration the fact that the parties have other property interests and those matters remain the subject of the proceedings in France.
The wife submits in her documents that she is experiencing financial hardship and that she has been unable to pay the mortgages over the Suburb C property. The two letters from the bank referred to previously (Exhibit 4) refer to arrears of payments under the mortgage of $1,890.73.
Even if I was to take those submissions and the limited evidence before me as to the wife’s circumstances at their highest, the asserted strained financial circumstances of the wife is not in itself a bar to the making of a costs order. As was noted in Vang & Chung [2024] FedCFamC1A 25 at paragraph 23, “financial impecuniosity is not a bar to the making of a costs order where the conduct of a party may otherwise warrant the making of such an order: Cross & Beaumont (2008) 39 Fam LR 389 at [60].”
Section 117(2A)(b) – whether either party is in receipt of legal aid
Not applicable.
Section 117(2A)(c) – the conduct of the parties
These proceedings have arisen as a result of the wife’s conduct in commencing further proceedings despite the permanent stay orders of 26 April 2019. I have set out above the circumstances that have led me to conclude that the wife ought be the subject of restraint under s 102QB of the Act. I accept that the nature of these proceedings and the findings I have made support the conclusion that the conduct of the wife is a relevant consideration which weighs in favour of a costs order being made.
The wife asserts that the husband’s conduct warrants consideration and that he has failed to comply with orders as to disclosure. However, the orders to which she refers arose as a consequence of her filing her third Initiating Application – which are proceedings she should not have commenced, given the permanent stay orders. Accordingly, I do not accept that the husband’s failure to engage in processes relating to the wife’s vexatious application is a proper basis for criticism of him.
Section 117(2A)(d) – whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to comply with orders
The husband’s proceedings were commenced in response to the third Initiating Application of the wife. I accept that the husband’s proceedings were entirely consequential upon the failure of the wife to adhere to the 2019 permanent stay orders.
Section 117(2A)(e) – whether either party has been wholly unsuccessful
The third Initiating Application filed by the wife was summarily dismissed on 12 February 2025. I have acceded to the husband’s application under s 102QB. I am accordingly satisfied that the wife has been wholly unsuccessful with respect to her third Initiating Application. Given the orders I have made as to the s 102QB application brought by the husband, the wife has been wholly unsuccessful in maintaining her opposition to that application as well.
Section 117(2A)(f) – whether either party has made an offer in writing to settle the proceedings and the terms of that offer
The wife attaches to her costs submissions a letter from her then lawyers to the husband’s lawyers dated 27 November 2018. That letter appears to express an offer of settlement relating to the financial matters between the parties following the end of their marriage. Those issues are now the subject of the French proceedings. I do not have evidence available to me to understand the import of that offer and I note the proceedings between the parties in France are not yet resolved. It does not have relevance to the matters to be decided by this court at this time.
Section 117(2A)(g) – such other matters as the court considers relevant
Neither party suggested that there were other matters which I ought to take into account.
Conclusion – Justifying circumstances
Each of the parties submitted that justifying circumstances existed for the making of a costs order. Given the matters addressed above, I find that there are circumstances which justify a costs order being made in favour of the husband against the wife.
The husband sought that the wife pay his costs on an indemnity basis.
In compliance with r 12.13(4) of the Rules, the husband annexes to his costs submissions the costs agreements by which he is bound as to the terms of the engagement of his lawyers.
An order for indemnity costsis a significant departure from the normal standard and requires exceptional circumstances (Harris & Dewell (No 2) [2018] FamCAFC 180), where the Full Court said:
23.In Kohan and Kohan, the Full Court held, in applying the principles expounded by Sheppard J in Colgate-Palmolive, that an order for indemnity costs represents a “very great departure from the normal standard”. In the later decision of the Full Court in Prantage & Prantage, Thackray and Ryan JJ referred to Kohan and other authorities in the Full Courts of both this Court and the Federal Court of Australia as well as the state appeal courts. Their Honours concluded (at [86]) that the “usual rule” continued to apply in respect of awards of costs in this Court notwithstanding the Full Court accepting that the difference between party/party costs and a party’s actual costs has continued to grow significantly.
24.That proposition also derives support from what Callinan J said in Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. His Honour said that an order for indemnity costs should “be exceedingly rare, as they have a tendency to encourage extravagance and put the quantum of legal fees beyond the effective scrutiny of the courts and their taxing officers”.
25.The rarity of an order for indemnity costs can also be seen illustrated by the comments of Lindgren J in NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2), referred to by their Honours in Prantage (at [102] – [103]). Lindgren J said that there is no rule that indemnity costs will be ordered “where the losing party was guilty of ethical or moral delinquency in the antecedent facts which have given rise to the litigation.”
(Footnotes omitted)
In Colgate Palmolive Co v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, Shepherd J provided some examples of circumstances that might justify an order for indemnity costs. I respectfully refer to and adopt the guidance drawn from that decision by Holden CJ in Munday v Bowman (1997) FLC 92-784, at 84,660, where His Honour provided the following examples:
(a)Where it appears that an action has been commenced or continued in circumstances where a party properly advised should have known that he had no chance of success. In such cases the action must be presumed to have been commenced or continued for some ulterior motive or because of some wilful disregard of the known facts.
(b)Making allegations of fraud, knowing them to be false, and the making of irrelevant allegations of fraud.
(c)Evidence of particular misconduct causing loss of time to the court and to other parties.
(d)The making of allegations which ought never to have been made or the undue prolongation of a case by groundless contentions.
(e) An imprudent refusal of an offer to compromise.
(Citations omitted)
That said, the categories of circumstances which enliven the discretion to award indemnity costs are not closed (Yunghanns & Yunghanns (2000) FLC 93-029 at [31]).
I conclude that this is one of those exceptional cases where costs on an indemnity basis is appropriate. The wife’s conduct, in the face of the permanent stay orders, creates a “special or unusual feature” to the proceedings which have followed. The purpose of costs orders is compensatory, not punitive (see Fowles & Fowles (No 5) [2024] FedCFamC1A 188). Given my findings as to the wife’s conduct, and the protective nature of the s 102QB orders I have made, the husband ought to be shielded from experiencing the financial consequences of the wife’s conduct, fully. That leads me to conclude that the wife should meet, in full, the costs the husband has incurred in responding to the wife’s repeated applications, which conduct I have found to be unmeritorious and vexatious.
I therefore order that the wife pay the husband’s costs on an indemnity basis as follows:
(a)$27,175.90 with respect to the summary dismissal of the Initiating Application filed 6 December 2024; and
(b)$18,562.50 with respect to the determination of the s 102QB application, inclusive of the costs relating to the hearing before me.
I order that those costs be paid by the wife within 90 days of these orders. That is the timeframe proposed by the husband in his application. Given that the wife appears to have savings in bank accounts under her control, that timeframe is sufficient to allow the wife to arrange her finances in order to meet this obligation.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and seven (107) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Simpson. Associate:
Dated: 12 June 2025
0
13
2