Piepkorn v Scott

[2005] HCATrans 859

[2005] HCATrans 859

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Adelaide  No A29 of 2005

B e t w e e n -

HENRIETTE PIEPKORN

Applicant

and

ALAN GEOFFREY SCOTT (TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY)

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

Publication of reasons and pronouncement of orders

McHUGH J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON THURSDAY, 20 OCTOBER 2005, AT 11.00 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

McHUGH J: The applicant applied under s 153B(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (“the Act”) to have annulled a sequestration order that was made against her on the ground that the order ought not to have been made. Justice Finn of the Federal Court dismissed the application on the grounds that there were no grounds on which the Court could determine whether the debt that was the subject of the bankruptcy notice was a “genuine debt”, and that the consequence of the sequestration order on the applicant’s ability to pursue litigation against her former employer is not a ground on which to annul the order. The Court also noted that, even if it was satisfied that the order ought not to have been made, the applicant’s conduct subsequent to the making of the sequestration order would be grounds on which the Court would have refused to exercise its discretion to annul the order.

The Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed an appeal from the decision of Finn J on the grounds that the application made to Finn J was bound to fail and that no question arising under, or involving the interpretation of, the Constitution, to which the applicant alluded in her “Summary of Argument”, could lead to a conclusion that Finn J erred in dismissing the application. The Court also rejected as baseless the applicant’s claim of apprehended bias on the part of Finn J.

The applicant’s special leave application complained that the decisions of the Federal Court and Full Court prevented the applicant from exercising her “statutorial human legal right to prosecute termination of contract for sprained wrist”.  The application does not reveal a ground that would warrant the grant of special leave to appeal.  Nor is there any reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Full Court.  An appeal would have no prospects of success and does not raise any question of law of general public importance.

The application is dismissed.

Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing this application.  I publish our joint reasons.

AT 11.00 AM THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED